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NEW SERIES.

VOL. X.

Dorner's System of Christian Doctrine.

VOL. IV.

D. c. 39

EDINBURGH:
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET
1882.

PRINTED BY MORRISON AND GIBB,

FOR

T. & T. CLARK, EDINBURGH.

LONDON, ... HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO.

DUBLIN, ... GEORGE HERBERT.

NEW YORK, . . . SCRIBNER AND WELFORD.

A SYSTEM

OF

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

BY

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TRANSLATED BY PROFESSOR BANKS.

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

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FIRST MAIN DIVISION.—(*Continued.*)

THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST.—(*Continued.*)

B.—*Development of the Ecclesiastical Doctrine.*

§ 114.

ON one hand, the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Reconciliation[1] of mankind with God through Christ has in all ages remained immoveably the same, namely, in respect of the consciousness of the Christian Church that the communion between God and mankind, disturbed by sin, has been restored through the mediatorial Person of Christ, who, as the Representative of the personal unity of God and man, accomplishes His work through His substitutionary love without violating the divine justice, nay, in harmony therewith. On the other hand, the development of this dogma contains a variable element through its dependence on the current development of Christology, Ponerology, and in the last resort of the Doctrine of God.

LITERATURE.—Cotta's Treatise in his edit. of J. Gerhard,

[1] [*Reconciliation* and *atonement* represent the same word in the original, *Versöhnung*. *Atonement* is used wherever English idiom permits. At the same time, the substantial equivalence of the two terms must constantly be borne in mind in the following discussions.]

Loci Th. t. iv. Ziegler, *Hist. dogmatis de redemtione*, ed. Velthusen, 1791. Bähr, *die Lehre vom Tode Jesu in den drei ersten Jahrh.*, 1832. Baur, *die Lehre von der Versöhnung in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung*, 1838. Cf. Tholuck's *Liter. Anzeiger*, 1839, No. 79. Nitzsch, *Dogmengeschichte*, p. 370 ff. Ritschl, *die chr. Lehre von der Rechtf. u. Versöhnung*, i. 1870. Hasse, *Anselm v. Canterb.*, 2 vols. 1849, 1852. Other discussions of the Anselmic theory by Bornemann, Franck, Sibmacher, Ziinen (*Anselmi et Calvini placita de hominum per Christum a peccato redemptione*, 1852). Aemil. Höhne, *Anselmi Cant. philosophia—ejusdem de satisfactione doctrina dijudicatur*, 1867. As to Luther's doctrine of Atonement, cf. the works of J. Köstlin, 1863, and Th. Harnack, 1862, on Luther's Theology, also Held, *De opere Jesu Christi salutari*, 1860, and Chr. H. Weisse, *Martinus Lutherus quid de consilio mortis et resurrectionis Jesu Christi senserit*, 1846. Socinus, *Prælectiones Theol.; Christ. religionis brevissima Institutio, Biblioth. Fr. Polon.* i., *Cat. Racov.* qu. 377. Hugo Grotius, *Defensio Fidei Cath. de satisfactione Christi*, 1617. As to C. Vorstius, cf. Baur's *theol. Jahrbücher*, 1856. Against the Socinians, L. Hütter's *Loci Comm.* xxii. Fr. Turretin, *De Satisfactione.* J. G. Töllner, *Ueber den thätigen Gehorsam Christi*, 1768. F. A. Philippi, *der thätige Gehorsam Christi, ein Beitrag zur Rechtfertigungslehre*, 1841. Thomasius, *De Obedientia Christi activa*, 1846. Von Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, ed. 2, 1857–59, i. 577. Against his doctrine arose: Philippi, *Herr v. Hofmann, gegenüber der luth. Versöhnungs- und Rechtfertigungslehre*, 1856. Thomasius, *das Bekenntniss der luth. Kirche von der Versöhnung und die Versöhnungslehre Chr. v. Hofmanns, mit einem Nachwort von Harnack*, 1857; cf. also Thomasius, *Lehre von Christi Person und Werk*, iii. 1, pp. 157–315, ed. 2, 1862. Ebrard, *die Lehre von der stellvertretenden Genugthuung in der H. Schr. begründet—mit besonderer Rücksicht auf v. Hofmann's Versöhnungslehre*, 1857. Weizsäcker, *Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theol.* 1858, p. 154 ff. Gess, *Jahrbücher f. d. Theol.* 1859, p. 467 ff. Von Hofmann, *Schutzschriften für eine neue Weise, alte Wahrheit zu lehren*, 4 Stücke, 1856–59. Sartorius, *Lehre von Christi Person und Werk*, ed. 7, 1860. Schöberlein, *Grundlehren des Heils*, etc., 1848. The same, Art. "*Versöhnung*" in Herzog's *theol. Real.-Encycl.*, and his work, *Die Geheimnisse des Glaubens.* Kahnis, *Luth. Dogm.* iii. 371. A. Schweizer, *Centraldogm.* ii.; *Reform. Dogm.* ii. 331, 377, 388, ii. 164 ff. Schenkel, i. 650. Edw. Park, *The Atonement;* Discourses and Treatises of Edwards, Smalley, Maxcy, Emmons, etc., 1860. (Collection of the more important advocates of the older New England theology.)

1. The variable element in the dogma does not consist in the Church ever having doubted whether we owe to Christ alone the restoration of divine communion and redemption, and whether His work is all-sufficient and complete. From the first it was with His name that Christendom connected the forgiveness of sins—that blessing which must appear and does appear to every one, who knows aught of himself and God, the first and most urgent requisite in order to the attainment of divine communion; for the good man is conscious that atonement for his sin, not a positively holy and virtuous walk, is the fundamental and most sacred problem. This religious is again the first moral problem, without the solution of which man's entire existence would be destitute of foundation and assured worth, because an existence without God. In Christ, then, was beheld the God-given, personalized, universal principle of Redemption. But it was only by degrees that reflection advanced from the experienced fact of redemption through Christ to the work of demonstrating the necessity of this special form of redemption, or from the *that* to the *why* and *how*. And to this question belonged again the dogmatic knowledge of—1. The Person adapted to be the Mediator; 2. That which makes salvation necessary; 3. The Character of God, in order that the Redemption or Reconciliation may harmonize with His nature. Certainly many, abstaining from closer dogmatic investigation, prefer to stop at the totality of Christ's Person. In it they behold the realized, personal reconciliation between God and mankind, between heaven and earth. In this mystical doctrine Christ's essential Person and His vitality or manifestation are not distinguished from each other in thought; by His very existence the Person sanctifies the race, rendering it acceptable to God. But if atonement is viewed as accomplished in Christ's mere existence or birth, then the ethical meaning and ethical form of Christ's work, as well as sin and what Christ did and suffered for sin, remain obscure and in the background. Real possibility is still not actuality. To regard all humanity as reconciled and sanctified as matter of course, because the Incarnation took place in a certain spot of humanity, leads to physical and false sacramental theories of redemption. The Church was therefore compelled, not merely in the interest of

Gnosis, but also in order to secure its faith against falsification, to advance from the general, from the totality of the principle, to the special, because to stop at the principle would be to falsify the principle itself. But to do this was to initiate movement in reference to the dogma.

2. But despite all the variability exhibited by the history of the dogma in the Church, it is not without an identical and fixed element. This was the case not merely because man's need of redemption in presence of a holy God was always acknowledged, and both the mission and work of Christ—the Sinless One—among sinners were always regarded as a gift of God's paternal love, but also because the way in which Christ carried out His mission to mankind, under every aspect in which it is viewed, bears a twofold character. It bears, on one side, the character of substitutionary love, which makes our misery its own, in order that we may make what belongs to it ours. And again, while justice is very unequally treated as regards clearness and emphasis, the presupposition remains, that Christ accomplished redemption, not in opposition to but in unison with the divine justice, in unison not merely with legislative justice, but also with the justice that denounces punishment against sin. He represents neither Love without Justice, nor Justice without Love.

3. As relates, then, to the dogmatic development of this doctrine or the variable side of the dogma, it will be helpful both to the understanding of its history and to its thetic construction, if we consider preliminarily to what extent the shaping of the doctrine of Atonement depends on these three dogmas—Christology, Ponerology, Theology.

First. The more completely both sides in the *Person of Christ* are defined,—the divine and the human,—and the more correctly their relations are apprehended, the greater must be the importance attributed to the work of Christ. For nothing but the divine side in this Person gives us that sharp contrast between His suffering and His dignity which suggests a mysterious depth in His love and a divine import in His sufferings. On the other side, nothing but His humanity secures the reality of the historical revelation in Him and the verity of His suffering and acts, while nothing

but His uniqueness secures the possibility of His being a substitute for us. Hence it is clear that the Christian doctrine of Atonement depends on the rejection of Ebionism and Docetism. But even after both sides were acknowledged completely *in thesi* (as was done at Chalcedon), the unity of the Person might be so conceived that the *divine* side preponderated in a one-sided way. The consequence of this was, that the humanity became a mere selfless organ of the Divinity. But in this case the humanity contributes nothing essential towards procuring the forgiveness of sins. Rather is the atonement then only revealed through Christ in the sense that it is *exhibited* in Him or by Him,—whether the meaning be that God is essentially and eternally propitiated for sin, or that we are told how we are to make atonement to God,—this exhibition taking place through His teaching, or symbolically through His sacrificial death. But the humanity of Christ then retains a merely accidental import. In order to the enlightenment of men on this subject, or to the office of teacher, no divine Incarnation was necessary. But the doctrine of Atonement is no less affected by a false preponderance of the *human side* in Christ's Person, such as prevailed after 1750; for then Christ is little more in what He did and suffered than a martyr for truth and pattern of morality. A principal part of the truth, it is said, for which Christ died, is that God forgives sin in virtue of His love, and is essentially and eternally propitiated for it, provided only it comes to an end in the future. Thus the two extremes are again at one in the doctrine, that reconciliation was not first procured through Christ's historical Person, but that God, instead of standing in essential opposition to evil in virtue of His holy Justice, is eternally reconciled with the world's sinful reality on account of the possibility of good still dwelling in it. The aim of the Reformation, as shown before, is to secure both to the divine and human sides in Christ's Person their full rights, thus rendering possible a satisfactory doctrine of Christ's atoning work.

No less, *secondly*, must the idea of Atonement be different according to the condition of Ponerology, *i.e.* according as that from which deliverance is necessary is found mainly in something *objective*, in *physical ill*, perhaps as a punishment (whether

the ill be *θάνατος*, or the bondage of sin, or the mastery of Satan); or according as this is discovered mainly in something *subjective*, whether in the consciousness of discord, or in ungodly volition, in evil acts or states; or, finally, according as the objective and subjective are united, as was done at the Reformation. The *one-sided objective theory of Atonement* places the process altogether outside man; it is, *e.g.*, a process merely between God or Christ and Satan. Just so, when *death* or the *guilt* merely of another—Adam's—is regarded as the enemy, the process of its conquest or abolition may take place in a purely objective way, without man being compelled to take an essential part therein. Conversely, when that which has to be vanquished is found simply in subjective moral character, the process of reconciliation is placed solely in man, as is done by the purely subjective theories, and nothing is left for Christ to do and merit. The Reformation, on the contrary, goes back from what is external, from *physical ill* and objective punishment to the *culpa*, which is no mere *debitum* inherited from another's guilt, and finds the ground of the objective punishment in guilt. The physical ill is *punishment* through its connection with sin and through the divine justice. Punishment and sin, the objective and subjective sides, while different, are also connected by the intermediate idea of *guilt*,[1] which is the main idea in relation to the doctrine of Atonement, and that not as mere *debitum ex aliena culpa contractum*.

Thirdly. Both the purely objective and the purely subjective theories of Atonement may assume different forms according to the concept formed of *God*, with whom the reconciliation is necessary (although, as already said, every Christian theory of Atonement at least includes justice in a negative aspect and love in a positive). Still, the concept formed of man and sin on one side and of Christology on the other, depends in the last resort on the definition of the doctrine of God. Now, as we know, God may be conceived either in a merely physical way, or in an æsthetic way as the Principle of Harmony, or in a logical way as supreme Truth and supreme Knowledge and Wisdom, or in a juridical way as Justice, or in a moral (*i.e.* in the sense that His sole concern

[1] *Form. Conc.* 799. 818. *Apologia*, I.

is for amendment and obedience to His law), or in a religious, as Love. These views determine at the same time the Ponerology and Christology, and therefore the doctrine of Atonement; and we are justified in hoping to be able under this division to include a survey of all the more important theories of Atonement possible. The theory of Atonement may therefore take either a physical, or æsthetic, or logical, or juridical, or moral, or one-sided religious form, according as it is determined, either really or in pretence, by a doctrine of God; and all this both on the one-sided objective and subjective mode of considering the question. At the same time, such a review will suggest important dogmatic hints towards a suitable construction of the doctrine. The idea of God, rightly conceived, is adapted to guard against the one-sided objective and subjective theories of Atonement, requiring as it does the union of the objective and subjective elements; for in God lies the reason that He willed men to be not impersonal instruments, nor deistically independent, but images of Himself. For this very reason, by the divine will they are on the one hand capable of personal culpability, and on the other destined to blessedness in divine communion, but without violence to justice or indifference to wrong. And thus the main question is: How, despite sin and guilt, which in virtue of the divine justice expose men to punishment and separate them from God,[1] a combined revelation of divine justice and love may take place in the world, as they are eternally combined in God, whereas through sin and guilt the two seem necessarily at variance in the world. Since, further, all possible aberrations in the doctrine of Atonement—the objective and the subjective—correspond to a true element in the idea of God and of man made in God's image, the true Christian theory of Atonement must combine the elements of truth scattered in those theories. It will include, therefore, the abolition of physical ill, the restoration of harmony, the return to wisdom, to true self-consciousness and moral amendment, but all in due moral order. In the same way, it can neither obscure justice by love, nor love by justice, but will reveal both in their divine harmony.

[1] §§ 87-89.

1. *History of the Doctrine up to the Period of the Reformation.*

§ 115.

The ancient Church-teachers, in proceeding to lay down the rudiments of a dogmatic theory, as well as the Middle Ages, predominantly favour objective theories of Atonement; whereas the period of the Reformation began to blend the subjective with the objective side.

1. Although the fact of deliverance through Christ's self-sacrificing love was always certain to the Christian consciousness, the common Christian faith did not include as matter of course an immediate certainty of the *mode* in which He brought about salvation, and therefore did not include an immediate certainty of a definite theory of Atonement, or of the necessity of the mode realized historically. Nevertheless, one thing may be said: the idea of *substitution* is common to all the Fathers. Thus Irenæus says: "Christ must needs become what we are, that we may become what He is; what He did and suffered held good, therefore, for us. *Longam hominum expositionem in se ipso recapitulavit.*"[1] Athanasius teaches: "Men were created for eternal life, but fell a prey to death as a punishment for their sin. Thus the Logos, the *αὐτοζωή*, became mortal, in order as a vicarious sacrifice to vanquish death through suffering death."[2] We may say that the idea of the substitution of Christ forms the common germ-point or ground-thought in all attempts at dogmatic theories, however different, whether the chief idea is sacrifice, or Christ is described as a means of exchange or a ransom-price to God or to Satan, or whether, finally, the matter is presented more after the Pauline manner, in an abstract way apart from figure. But, as concerns the *mode* in which the work of redemption is carried out, the Church in all ages is united on

[1] *Adv. Hæreses*, v. 23. 2, iii. 17, 1. 18, 7. Cf. too, *Ep. ad Diognet.* c. 9.

[2] *De Incarnatione*, c. 6–10, c. Ar. ii. 68. Similarly Eusebius of Cæsarea, Hilary, Ambrose, Augustine, Leo the Great, Cyril of Alexandria, c. *Nest.* iii. 2. John of Damascus, *de Fide orthod.* iii. 27. Cf. Nitzsch, *Dogmengesch.* p. 370 ff.

two points: that redemption must not be effected by sheer might or in the way of violence, but in the way of suffering and dying love; and, indeed, the necessity of mortal suffering is always brought in some way, directly or indirectly, into connection with the divine justice. Especially for the sake of the latter point, or in order to prove that the relation of Atonement to the divine justice, which is so often placed in the background in modern days, formed an essential part of the faith of Christendom in all ages, and was by no means foisted into theology by Anselm (as may seem to be the case, when the history of the doctrine is dated only from him and Abelard), we will review the beginnings of the different theories before Anselm, which certainly for the most part leave room in their breadth for various dogmatic interpretations of a higher and lower kind. Here come specially into view the ideas of *sacrifice*, of *ransoming* from Satan and of ransom to God, or *satisfaction* to His *justice*.

Almost all without distinction call Christ a *Sacrifice*.[1] Certainly this common word, however well-grounded its liturgical position, expresses of itself no definite theory. Were Christ compared with the peace-offering, were He simply well-pleasing to God (ὀσμὴ εὐωδίας) because of His love for God and for sinners, the relation of His Person to the removal of sin and procurement of forgiveness would become secondary. The same would be the case were He only called a Sacrifice on the ground that He presented Himself in His purity to God, giving us a pattern of surrender to God and self-consecration, or, finally, on the ground that by the sacrifice of His death He was the cause, so to speak, of the world's repentance, on account of which God then forgives sin. And, in fact, all these conceptions are found in the Fathers.[2] But they by no means stop there, but at the same time consider Christ's sufferings in relation to our sins, not merely in so far as His spontaneous surrender to death is said to be a pattern

[1] Cf. *e.g.* the passages in Hase, *ut supra*, p. 236 f.

[2] The first class, which leaves out of sight Christ's mortal sufferings, occurs most of all in that mystic theory, according to which in Christ a humanity well-pleasing in God's sight is presented to God, who accepts this gift and beholds us in Him. So Irenæus, Justin, who regards Christ as the Paschal Lamb, *Dial. c. Tryph.* c. iii. Cf. Semisch, *Justin d. M.* 1840, pp. 413–418. Origen, *cont. Cels.* iii. 28, and others.

of self-consecration to God,[1] etc., but also in such a way that Christ is viewed as a sacrifice for the general good, or as an *expiatory sacrifice* for sin. So by Origen, Athanasius, Hilary, Augustine, and John of Damascus.[2] It is true the question still remains: Is He an expiatory sacrifice merely as a symbol of forgiveness to us, given by God as a pledge of His love, which love is no mere fictitious creation,[3] or did Christ bring about some real and objective result, which without Him had not existed? But still, despite ambiguity of figurative phraseology, it remains certain that wherever Christ is regarded as an expiatory sacrifice, a relation between His suffering love and divine *justice* is supposed.

The expiatory sacrifice forms a transition to the second figure, that of *Ransoming*. For if Christ's death is an expiatory sacrifice, this at once suggests that we are *bought* at great cost, that He is the means by which we are purchased for Christ's kingdom, or the *ransom* by which we are delivered from ruin. But to the figure of purchase or ransom a series of various theories might attach themselves, always, however, implying that a grave hindrance to the salvation of mankind could only be removed at the price of Christ's death or blood. The ruin from which deliverance is necessary might then be found either in the power of Satan over mankind, or in death, or in the guilt inherited from Adam, or in sin and personal guilt, or, finally, in God's just displeasure. All these various phases, again, are closely interconnected. For it is only sin and guilt, personal or inherited, which justly incurs God's displeasure. Further, it is only through God's just displeasure that Satan possesses power over men, while this power again is displayed in death, which is inflicted by Satan, as well as in the dominion of sin. But this connection was by no means clearly perceived at once. The consciousness of penal desert gave the impulse first of all to seek and find in Christ deliverance from a *penal state*. The predominant view up to the Middle Ages of the evils from which redemption

[1] And according to Clement of Rome, *ad Cor.* i. 7.

[2] Origen, *cont. Cels.* i. 31, vii. 17, *in Num. Hom.* xxiv. 1, *ad Rom.* t. iii. 7. 8; Athanasius, ed. Col. 1686, i. 73, 426, 366-69; Augustine, *cont. Faust. Man.* xiv. 2. 3, *de Trin.* xiii. 14; John of Damascus, *de Fide Orth.* iii. 27.

[3] Thus Gregory of Naz. *Or.* 42, says: "God accepted the ransom by way of *οἰκονομία*."

is necessary was merely objective, and the view taken of the nature of redemption harmonized therewith. The hostile power which threatened man's welfare, and from which Christ rescued us at the cost of suffering and death, was predominantly conceived as a power external to man; and since mankind was viewed as subject to the dominion of Satan and death through Satan in virtue of the guilt inherited from Adam, it was natural that the power of Satan, who is the ruler of death, should be regarded as the central-point of the ruin from which deliverance is necessary, and that Christ should be primarily regarded in His suffering and death as engaged in conflict with Satan,—ideas favoured by passages in the New Testament.

2. The most elaborate theories adhered for a long time to this line. The doctrine of the vanquishing of *Satan* by Christ was advanced by Church-teachers with a variety of application, only that the conviction always recurs therein, that redemption or atonement could not be effected by means of violence, or in the way of mere caprice or power, but in that of *justice*.[1] Men were subject to Satan's dominion by God's righteous judgment,[2] and ought not to be wrested from him by violence, or in such a way as to give him cause to complain of violence done to his rights. On the ground of these assumptions, the victory over the devil was achieved, according to some, by legal means. After the manner of *justitia commutativa*, the person of Christ, on which Satan worked his pleasure, is the ransom-price, for the sake of which the devil had to release men. Christ's soul was offered in the way of exchange to the devil, and for its sake he was to set men free; for that soul was the noblest possession, by reason of its perfection surpassing the whole of mankind in value. The devil agreed to the exchange. But he was unable to retain this pure soul, it was torture to his hand, and thus Christ became the conqueror of the devil and death.[3] On Satan's

[1] According to Irenæus, man must not be redeemed from death and perfected βίᾳ or by caprice. According to Augustine, Christ must overcome Satan *lege justitiae*, not *violenter*. In the same way speaks Gregory of Nyssa, *Or. Cat.* c. 15–27.

[2] *E.g.* according to Augustine, *Diabolus jure æquissimo omnem prolem primi hominis vindicabat. Iniquum enim erat, ut ei quem ceperat non dominaretur.* Cf. *de Trin.* xiii. c. 12.

[3] So Origen, *Comm. in Matth.* xvi. § 8, *Exhort. ad Mart.* 12. Similarly Theodoret and Augustine.

part, accordingly, there was self-deception. As the deception was intended by God, this view led to the formal theory of a deception of Satan by God.[1] This application, although starting from the idea of justice, makes the divine majesty and power, not justice, finally decide the victory of Christ; and the deceptive craft, although represented as military strategy, fails to harmonize with the divine holiness. Although the ransom to Satan is never, of course, represented as a sacrifice to him, he is still, with a touch of Manichæism, viewed as a sovereign Power, co-equal with God, a Power with which God treats, or which He outwits and thus strips of its rights. Better, therefore, are the theories which place the deliverance from Satan's power and right on such a basis, that Satan is put in the wrong, and a just conflict with him ensues. Gregory of Nazianzum and John of Damascus expressly reject the notion of a ransom to Satan.[2] They say: Christ was slain by Satan, and Satan was deceived as to Christ's divinity by His birth of a virgin and humble condition, so that he did not know Him; but Satan thus sinned against the Holy One; for God had only conceded to him power over sinners. As a punishment, he lost his right in mankind by sentence of God's just law. It is true that even thus a dualistic element remained, the reason of which perhaps lies in the following considerations. The Christian consciousness, in seeking to regard Christ as a Substitute for guilty humanity, does not venture directly to subject Christ to the divine *justice* and punishment, and make Him without further ado the object of the displeasure of the just God. For this reason Satan is interposed, God's punitive justice is placed in Satan, nay, in mythological phraseology is hypostatized as it were in him, of course on the basis of God's cosmical government. On one

[1] According to Gregory of Nyssa, the divine wisdom led the devil to the exchange mentioned. In his view, the divine Incarnation is an artifice of the wisdom of divine love, since it seemed to render accessible to the devil the essentially inaccessible, *Or. Cat. l.c.* Gregory the Great describes Christ's flesh as the bait held before the Leviathan by the divine stratagem of the Incarnation, in order that he might try to swallow the hook of Christ's divinity, and thus come to shame. Similarly, according to Origen, the cross is the net, according to Peter Lombard, the *muscipula* in which Satan was caught. In like manner Augustine, *Ep.* 130, 134, 263. Cf. Philippi, iv. 2, p. 65.

[2] Gregory of Naz. *Or.* 42; John of Damascus, iii. 27. Many Fathers who include Satan, regard Christ again as an expiatory offering to God.

side it seemed necessary to assume punitive justice as an active factor in the redemptive process; on the other side, were Christ directly subjected to it, there was danger of a conflict both with God's love and with the dignity of the Son of His love. But when punitive justice was placed in Satan, outside God, it was made to appear as if justice were not an objective determination of the divine essence, as if God might be reconciled with sinners without further ado, provided Satan's right and power were out of the way, whereas this right can still only flow every moment from God.

Moreover, the theories which, without attributing importance to Satan, go back to the Adamic *debitum* as a debt contracted by Adam and to be paid by his posterity, or to *death* as the just punishment of God, from which redemption is necessary, do so in such a way as to imply that it would be well with the world and everything would be in harmony, provided these hostile powers, standing outside the personality, were out of the way. For this reason opposition to these theories was never quite suppressed, and traces were not wanting of a representation more in harmony with facts; *e.g.*, according to Gregory of Nazianzus, the devil cannot be the recipient of a ransom, but the Father received it. According to John of Damascus, Christ presents Himself as a sacrifice and ransom to the Father, whom we have offended—not to the usurper was the blood of the lawful Lord offered,[1] recourse being thus had again to the idea of an expiatory sacrifice under the figure of a ransom to God. Nay, long before Anselm there was mention in a non-figurative, abstract way of a satisfaction offered by Christ to God. So by Ambrose, Cyril of Alexandria, Hilary, Augustine, John of Damascus.[2]

The exposition given above shows, indeed, how the Patristic doctrine applied all the divine attributes in regular order to Christ's work of atonement,—Love and Mercy, Power, Vera-

[1] Cf. Nitzsch, *ut supra*, p. 374 ff.

[2] According to Origen, Christ rendered the necessary *propitiatio*. Ambrose, *de Fuga*, 7: "Christ died, *ut satisfieret judicato;*" Gregory of Nazianzus and John of Damascus, *ut supra;* Cyril of Alex. *c. Nest.* iii. 2: "Only the Logos, because ἀντάξιος τῶν ὅλων, could die for all, and thus take away the punishment of our disobedience;" according to Eusebius of Cæsarea also, Christ vicariously assumed our penal suffering—death; His death is equivalent to the infliction of the punishment on all. Cf. Nitzsch, p. 373 ff.

city and Immutability (both in reference to the threatening of sin with death and to the promise of salvation), further, the Divine Wisdom, and finally, Justice. But still it is, above all, the latter upon which, although so inadequately, the necessity of the saving process through Christ's death is made to depend; and, moreover, Justice is regarded not as the divine consistency in manifesting His Love, but as that which acts as a bar to the communication of His love until a way is found in which the divine love is able to realize its thoughts of salvation without violence to justice. The defectiveness of the theories before Anselm consists, therefore, in the following points. It is wrong to find that which renders redemption necessary in something merely external to man. It is wrong so to distribute the several parts as to make Satan represent the energy of justice, and God with Christ the pure forgiving love, which only evinces its justice in refusing to infringe on Satan's right. It is wrong, finally, to make the process of reconciliation only issue, as it were, from God. On the contrary, we must have the courage to bring God's justice and Christ into mutual relation.

3. But the idea of *justice* first receives independent and systematic notice in the *juridical* theories, of which that of Anselm is by far the most profound.[1] Anselm endeavours to demonstrate the *necessity* both of atonement by Christ, and of divine incarnation in order to atonement. He starts from the *honor Dei* as an inviolable good. God's honour is the prevalence of *justitia* in the world; by obedience to God's will the creature pays the honour due to God. God's care for His honour is not egoistic, justice being the universal law inviolable even to the divine volition. It would be inconceivable, as well as unworthy of God, that He should will anything opposed to justice. In this way God's power and plenary authority are placed beneath, not above, His justice. In His character of justice He *must* require righteousness or obedience to His righteous will from rational beings. This is the *solus et totus honor* which they can offer to God. *Hunc honorem debitum qui Deo non reddit, aufert Deo quod suum est Deumque exhonorat, et hoc est peccare.* Sin is a *contumelia Deo illata.* To it God cannot and ought not to be indifferent. He must

[1] Anselm Cantuar. *Cur Deus homo?*

demand *satisfaction* for it; and this requires *plus reddere quam ablatum erat*, in order to efface the wrong to His honour and atone for the *injuria*. Baumgarten-Crusius here strikingly calls attention to the Old German expiation or penance, and to that conception of sin as an outrage to honour which was in keeping with the chivalrous spirit of the age. Notwithstanding, the divine honour is not regarded as a mere private good, so that God might, like a private person, in virtue of His free plenary authority, renounce claim to satisfaction or not. On the contrary, it would be against God's honour to forgive sin *without* satisfaction; for otherwise evil would be freer than good. In the absence of satisfaction, *poena* must follow. Now, man cannot render satisfaction for the past; for what he has and can do he owes as a rational creature to God. Punishment, therefore, would be necessary; and how grievous this must be is evident from the consideration that the violated good—the honour of God—is of greater value than the whole world, and therefore the violation of this honour is of infinite import. But, on the other hand, the infliction of the punishment must entail destruction on the world. This would be the destruction of the fair world-order, the overthrow of the fair world-plan, which willed along with the angels the perfection and happiness of the race of human beings.[1] Thus, in order to render punishment unnecessary, God must give to humanity the means of rendering the satisfaction which it cannot render out of its own resources. Humanity must render it. It cannot do so as mere humanity, but it can as divine humanity (*Gottmenschheit*). Now, Christ is the God-man. He can render it, because He is the eternal Son as well as man, His person and His work thus possessing infinite value. As man, indeed, His active obedience is due to God; and by it, therefore, He cannot acquire merit capable of transference to us. But it is otherwise with His spontaneous suffering, which was not matter of obligation. According to Anselm, this suffering is not *penal suffering* in virtue of the *jus talionis;* but Christ creates *meritum* by His love, which yields not even to death. This is a good *plus amabile* than sin is hateful. Not merely, therefore, does God regard

[1] The race of human beings is not merely designed to supply the place of the fallen angels. It has also to Anselm a worth of its own.

this suffering as an action, a *plus reddere quam ablatum erat*, and thus an adequate satisfaction;[1] but Christ's suffering begets an overplus of *meritum*, a reward being conferred on Him. This reward He cannot receive on His own account, for He is already in possession of divine majesty. But in His love for us He counts it a reward to Himself to be permitted to impart the reward due to Himself to those who follow His word and example, and whom He calls His kinsmen. His satisfaction holds good objectively for all; His reward secures the happiness of believers. The fact of Christ's work not merely being a legal satisfaction, but being also regarded by God as transferable merit, involves a *convenientia*, although not a strict legal arrangement.

It deserves unceasing acknowledgment that Anselm employs the idea of *justice* not merely in the disguised and impure form peculiar to the theories which refer to Satan, nor simply in the manner of mere civil law, which requires the payment of the debt contracted by Adam after the fashion, as it were, of a money debt. In the place of mere *debitum* appears in Anselm the *culpa*, possessing infinite significance; and in place of the payment of a debt and the defeat of Satan, the *satisfaction*, which *God must* require in virtue of His nature, of the justice which is not subject to His will. The satisfaction is brought into direct relation to God and to His justice; Christ, who renders the satisfaction, stands directly face to face with justice. Although Anselm at the same time treats sin as injury, which according to Old German law requires along with an equivalent for the insult or damage a tribute of honour, still he does not regard it as a mere private matter, but as an absolutely culpable offence, directed against the absolutely good order in heaven and on earth, and thus against the honour of God. In law, injury forms a sort of intermediate sphere between civil and criminal law. And since, according to Anselm, God cannot in His plenary authority dispose at pleasure of the gravity belonging to the *injuria* to His honour, as a private man may decide what importance he will attribute to an attack upon his honour, his theory leans to a conception of sin allied with criminal justice. But, as

[1] He regards the divine justice as God's maintenance of Himself in His moral glory, similar to the use in the O. T. of the idea of כָּבוֹד.

relates to *satisfactio*, in excluding therefrom Christ's active obedience, Anselm has indeed properly nothing but a *satis-passio*, while attributing to the spontaneous (according to him, non-obligatory) suffering (in harmony with the mode of view met with elsewhere in mediæval theology) *the character of a good work, meritorious, because non-obligatory.* Instead of the rendering of the obedience or good works due from men, appears a spontaneous, non-obligatory, supererogatory suffering on the part of Christ; instead of the *idem*, He thereby rendered a *tantundem*, the divine estimation assigning to the sufferings the value of positive good acts. This confounding of the worth of suffering with positive acts plainly implies something of an arbitrary nature, and to a certain extent reintroduces the notion of private right. Moreover, the idea, appropriate to Roman Catholicism, that there are actions at once good and non-obligatory, and that such actions acquire merit; and further, the opinion that sufferings, because involving renunciation, are in themselves pleasing to God, and to be set on a par with good actions, are both faulty. Add to this, that Anselm, because viewing Christ's humanity as impersonal, cannot properly say that *humanity* has satisfied God in the way justice requires. Besides, scarcely any but physical sufferings come into view in this theory. For, had he regarded the spiritual sufferings, which are the consequence of Christ's high-priestly love for men, he could not have said of these that they were not obligatory on Christ, *i.e.* not included in His office. Had Anselm seen that what is spontaneous and what is done in virtue of office—the officially obligatory—are not mutually exclusive, he might have conceded importance also to Christ's active obedience in relation to the work of redemption. Nay, the way in which He bore His sufferings must have its ground in His positive moral power. Supposing, finally, that sin demands an infinite satisfaction on account of the infinite wrong to God, sin might indeed be covered by Christ's spontaneous suffering, so far as it possesses infinite value, and therefore by the suffering merit of Christ, but without overplus or reward for Christ capable of being transferred to us.[1]

[1] An altogether similar theory of reconciliation was advanced by Nicholas of Methone in the Greek Church about the same time. Cf. Ullmann, "die Dogmatik in der griech. Kirche, sc. xii.," *Stud. u. Krit.* 1833.

Scholasticism, after Anselm, only partially preserved his thoughts. The reference to Satan indeed, still maintained by Peter Lombard, is more and more generally given up, and Thomas Aquinas holds fast the satisfaction (*satisfactio*). The spontaneous, non-obligatory humiliation and sufferings assumed by Christ as Head, are said, by reason of the love for us which they reveal, to be an acceptable sacrifice to God, a meritorious ground, for the sake of which He forgives us, so that they may be called *a ransom paid to God.* But the satisfaction of Christ was on this theory as little necessary as the Incarnation. It is true the satisfaction by Christ's sufferings was fitting (*modus conveniens*); for as the suffering of the God-man corresponds with the gravity of the guilt, so it corresponds also with the divine mercy and justice. But this *modus* was not necessary in itself. Although simple, immutable Being, considered as knowing and willing, forms the basis of Thomas Aquinas' concept of God; although, further, the world, to which that knowledge and consciousness refer, is conceived as in deterministic dependence on God,—still no special place is left by Aquinas in God's eternal essence for the justice of God in particular. Justice, as a special determination of God's essence, is not in keeping with his view of the abstract identity of God with Himself. On the contrary, God's absolute plenitude of authority now gains most essential influence. But in this case God might just as well accept (*acceptare*) a mere finite worth as satisfaction as that infinite worth which dwells in Christ, and which transcends the amount required by justice.[1] But He chooses the *modus convenientior*, that of satisfaction by suffering. *Duns Scotus* differs still more widely from Anselm.[2] The necessity of atonement by Christ is to him altogether immaterial, because to him God in His innermost essence is nothing but free plenary authority. In addition, he not merely denies the infinity of the wrong done to God by sin on account of the finitude of man, but also asserts the finitude of the merit

[1] Cf. the Art. "Thomas v. Aq." by Landerer in Herzog's *Realencyc.* vol. xvi. 5; Ritschl, "Studien über Genugthuung u. Verdienst," *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* 1860, 4. In his view, Christ's work becomes efficacious by awakening love; but love is awakened by Christ's love for this very reason, that what it does and suffers is a ransom to God.

[2] Respecting Duns Scotus, cf. the Art. by A. Dorner in *Herzog*, ed. 2.

of Christ, which he derives wholly from Christ's strongly emphasized humanity. Thus the argument for the necessity of a satisfaction by the God-man, deduced from the idea of God as well as from the nature of evil, is entirely given up. In place of this necessity he puts the *meritum*, the value of which is determined by God's free plenary authority. That authority permits an *acceptatio* of the merit of Christ to avail for the circle of believers. Thus, as relates to the demonstration of the necessity of Christ's work, *Thomas Aquinas* and *Duns Scotus* fall behind Anselm, while not denying the fitness (*convenientia*) of the divinely-appointed economy of salvation, and endeavouring to give more scope than Anselm to the manifestation of God's spontaneous love. Thus is their theory, although unelaborated, a transition to the one which recurs to the *wisdom* of divine love and freedom.

Observation.—The theory of Abelard cannot be regarded as worked out with precision, nor has it exercised any influence worth mentioning on the subsequent development of the dogma. On the one side, he seems to diverge from the usual path of Church-teaching, and to look for reconciliation to righteousness of life, to the love implanted in us by God through Christ. The love of God, displayed in Christ's Incarnation, suffering, and death, awakens responsive love in us, by which we are justified and saved. On the other side, in allusion to Gal. iii. 13, he emphasizes the *expiation of the divine justice by Christ*, who on the cross became a curse for us (cf. Reuter, *Geschichte der Aufklärung im Mittelalter*, i. 320); an aspect which Ritschl, who has selected Abelard as a *testis veritatis*, ought not to have passed by in silence. But Abelard cannot claim the high scientific importance in relation to the present dogma which Ritschl attributes to him. For how he combines both conceptions — the more moral and the juridical—is not apparent, because he says nothing expressly on the point. It is conceivable that he held both without reconciling them, and without consciousness of any contradiction. But it is also possible that Abelard did not intend to advance the former theory, which is the more modern in tone, and specially commended by Ritschl, in opposition to the other one, which recurs to the expiation of the divine justice, but still presupposes the latter. In favour of this is the fact that he would have our imperfect righteousness supplemented by Christ's intercession, which accompanies the life of believers, and by Christ's

righteousness, after the manner of the mystic theory, which sees in Christ's objective righteousness our expiatory substitute. But further, when he specially finds in Christ's sufferings and death a manifestation of God's love powerful enough to kindle responsive love in us, the question is reasonable, how far a manifestation of love ought to be found in Christ's sufferings and death if no expiatory and substitutionary meaning belongs to them (a question doubly warranted in relation to Ritschl's own theory, since he neither favours the mystic view nor regards an expiation as necessary). Thus Abelard's moral theory only seems to gain intrinsic strength and consistency on the supposition that he has not framed it in opposition to the expiation offered to justice, but presupposes the latter. In this way, certainly, the form of Abelard's theory becomes essentially different from Ritschl's account of it, since it is then similar to the views held by many Church-teachers before him, who ascribe to Christ's sufferings and death, along with the expiation of justice, the awakening of responsive love.

2. *The Evangelical Doctrine of Atonement.*

§ 116.

In this dogma also the Reformation proves itself to be the conclusion of an old and the beginning of a new age. Its advances in Ponerology and Christology contributed to this result, but especially the Evangelical *principle of faith*, which strove to realize to itself in Christ's work the objective foundation of the peace of conscience it had gained. That from which deliverance is necessary is no longer considered as something merely external to man and objective, as the dominion of Satan and the power of death, or as an alien inheritance, but as personal guilt which subjects to desert of punishment.[1] On this account it is not merely freedom from punishment or moral amendment, but above all the abolition of guilt and the pacifying of divine justice, which is recognised as the first requisite to man's redemption, in order that filial relationship to God and righteousness of life may be added to the state

[1] Cf. above, § 75.

of peace with God. To this end the Evangelical doctrine bases the work of salvation on both sides of Christ's Person in their unity,[1] while Christ Himself is brought into direct relation with divine justice, which He perfectly and vicariously satisfies by means of His righteousness in active and passive obedience. Thus, in the objective reconciliation of God by Christ the basis is laid in respect of God for the application of His grace to us, while in respect of man the possibility is opened of elevation from consciousness of guilt and punishment into peace of conscience and filial relationship to God, or into consciousness of justification through faith.

LITERATURE.—The Evang. Symbols: *Conf. Aug.* iii.-iv. xv.; *Apol.* 92; *Form. Conc.* 684, 696, 894; *Heidelb. Cat.* Qu. 38 ff.; *Conf. Helv.* c. 11; *Dordr. Syn.* pp. 213–218, ed. Augusti; *Colloq. Lips.* 400; *Form. Consens. Helv.* 450; *Gallic.* xvii.; *Scot.* ix.; *Cat. Genev.* 526; *Westmonast.* (in Niemeyer's appendix to the *Reform. Symbols*, 1840) c. 8, p. 12 ff.

Observation.—The notion that the Reformation doctrine is simply a repetition of that of Anselm, is as erroneous as it is common. It is true that the former holds by the necessity of that mode of reconciliation which was realized historically, as firmly as Anselm; but in place of God's injured honour, which demands satisfaction,—a view still retaining somewhat of the spirit of civil law,—the Evangelical doctrine, and especially Calvin and Melanchthon, put punitive justice, with which Christ is placed as Atoner in direct relation, which Anselm had not done. For Anselm said: Either punishment or the substitution of satisfaction for punishment. But the Evangelical doctrine finds the satisfaction in the pacifying of the justice which demands punishment from man. According to the Evangelical Church, the satisfaction consists not primarily in the offering of good works as a tribute of honour, nor, as in the case of Anselm, in the innocent sufferings endured by Christ, not at the hands of God and His justice, but simply at the hands of men, those sufferings being merely treated by God as good works, which are of benefit to us; but according to Evangelical doctrine, Christ enters into direct relation with the just punishment due to us. Moreover, whereas Anselm leaves out of sight

[1] Cf. § 94.

Christ's active obedience, because as man Jesus was bound to render it, the Evangelical doctrine brings Christ's active obedience into direct relation with the work of atonement and with divine justice. The active obedience is necessary, like the passive, to the pacifying of divine justice. Instead of the civil or political conception of justice, we have here the absolute view and a correspondent theory of punishment to place in contrast with the violation of an infinite good—the divine will—by the doing of wrong and the omission of obligatory good.—As concerns *Luther* in particular, in him the old theories, as Weisse, v. Hofmann, and Held rightly remark, revive and enter upon a new course. It is thus with the reconciliation of heaven and earth through the Incarnation, or through the meritorious life by which Christ presents Himself in His proved righteousness as a perfect sacrifice to God; and again with the theory of the vanquishing of Satan and death. But this is not all, for he also takes God's justice into account, as Thomasius proves in detail.[1] Again, he treats Satan in a different way from that in which all the old theories treat him, bringing him into close connection with the law. Through Satan's temptation, the law provokes the sinner to rebellion and disbelief of God. Through sin, the law became Satan's handle to effect man's destruction. Now Christ's triumph over Satan is complete, because He raises above the sole authority of the law, above the legal standpoint. But since, in Luther's view, the law in its commands and ordinances, its threats and penalties, is of divine origin, and has its roots in the divine justice, his teaching rightly takes the ground, that Christ led beyond the legal stage by satisfying the law in every respect, and therewith triumphed over Satan, death, the world, and sin. But certainly it was Melanchthon who worked out the relation of atonement to the divine justice, and in this Calvin is essentially one with him.

1. The Evangelical principle—the experience of *Justification* through faith in Christ—necessarily reacted on the doctrine of Atonement; and here, indeed, the fruitfulness of the advance made by the Reformation in Ponerology specially shows itself. For Justification is the disburdening of the personality from *guilt* at the tribunal of God's punitive justice, and therefore from punishment; but this in such a way that

[1] Cf. Köstlin, *Luther's Theol.* ii. 404 ff.; Harnack, *ut supra*, i. 557 f.; cf. "The New Year's Sermon" in Luther's *Kirchenpostille; Hauspostille*, Erlang. ed. iii. 137, 305; Thomasius, *ut supra*, 260; Philippi, iv. 2, p. 114 ff.

the believer has the consciousness that *divine justice itself has been satisfied by Christ;* that no exception has been made at the cost of justice; that his is not simply the experience of divine long-suffering, including neither definitive forgiveness nor satisfaction made to justice. On the contrary, the believer knows that, despite his own unrighteousness, harmony with the law and with justice has been restored by Christ. In this knowledge is rooted his assured peace of conscience, his elevation above those doubts as to the Christian economy of salvation which conscience would always suggest, in case forgiveness came to the sinner in the way, so to speak, of a partial act of exception, through a breach with justice and violation of the eternal law. But by this means, since it is only faith *in Christ* which knows itself justified, Christ's acts and sufferings enter into direct relation with the penal law and with our guilt which has to be blotted out, Christ being thus the Atoner, to whom the consciousness of justification attaches itself. The Reformers and Evangelical Confessions state the matter thus: Christ's sufferings are penal sufferings, to which He submitted,[1] not an *opus supererogatorium*, but having relation to our liability to punishment. He bore the *maledictio*, the *jus legis contra nos.* God's law is absolutely immutable, and therefore brooks no exception. *Lex divina est immota, ergo legi satisfieri debet; obligat vel ad obedientiam, vel ad pœnam. Peccato, malo infinito, debetur pœna infinita, abjectio, mors æterna. Puniendo Deus justitiæ suæ satisfacit, non remittit peccata ex levitate, vel futilitate.* For this reason has God provided a means of reconciliation, *temperamentum, copulatio justitiæ et misericordiæ. In pœna quæ debet esse placatio, oportet punienti tribui laudem justitiæ.* As *innocens*, Christ does this.[2] Thus is the *jus legis* observed, and indeed satisfied on our behalf; for Christ has satisfied the claim of the law or satisfied justice, in order that the law may not condemn us.[3] As He has spontaneously, so He has innocently suffered for men (or at least for the elect, see below), and thereby averted punishment, because He has caused guilt not

[1] *Apologia*, 92, 93.

[2] Cf. Melanchthon, *Corp. Ref.* xxiii. 338, 549, xxi. 1042, 1077.

[3] *Conf. Aug.* iii. iv.; *Apol.* 92, 195; *Form. Conc.* 696, 57; *Heidelb. Cat.* 38 f. Without this imputation even sins of omission could not be forgiven.

to be imputed to us. Nay, in order that we may not merely escape punishment and the imputation of guilt, but that God may regard us as righteous and holy in Christ, and so His whole paternal grace may become ours, Christ's own righteousness—as well that of His active as of His passive obedience—is imputed to us.[1] Only a portion of the Evangelical Theologians (among the Reformed *Piscator*, among the Lutherans *Karg*, among moderns *Töllner*) have declined to include Christ's active obedience. Even the Reformed Theology on the whole holds by this view, which is again linked to the doctrine held in the ancient Church of the merit of Christ's life. Schweizer, Schneckenburger, Schenkel go so far as to assert that the chief stress of the Reformed Theology rests on Christ's active obedience.[2] But in doing so, they confound Christ's active obedience with the communication of new life, and forget how decisively Calvin, Wolleb, Maresius, and others emphasize the expiation of just punishment rendered by Christ.

2. The *fruit* or *benefit* of Christ's Atonement is, above all, found in this, that God *placatus est, homo expiatus.* This implies a change brought about in God's relation to sinful humanity through Christ's historic work. The change relates to the remission in the heart of God, rendered possible and actual by Christ. Above all, Christ procures the forgiveness of sins, *i.e.* the cancelling of *guilt.* This is opposed to the eudæmonistic, servile view, which puts the chief stress on freedom from physical ill, from punishment, not on the just claims of the law being satisfied and the conscience relieved from the burden of guilt. In opposition to this view the *Apology* says: *Remissio pœnæ frustra quæritur, nisi cor antea quæsiverit remissionem peccatorum.* Moreover, the Evangelical doctrine is opposed to the notion that sanctification, the obliteration of sin, is first in importance, and that forgiveness of sins takes place on its account, although of course forgiveness is, with Augustine, referred to grace (as *justitia infusa*, or *inhærens, habitualis*). Still, the benefit of Christ's

[1] *Form. Conc.* 684, 696.

[2] Schweizer, *Glaubl. d. Ref. Kir.* ii. 399 f., and *die chr. Glaubensl. nach prot. Grundsätzen*, ii. 171 f.; Schneckenburger, *Vergleichende Darstellung d. luth. u. ref. Lehre*, i. 124.

merit is not exhausted in the negative blessing—the removal of guilt, remission of punishment, and abolition of the consciousness of guilt and punishment. On the contrary, Christ's purpose is also to impart to those whom He represents the divine favour, which brings us salvation and sheds peace abroad in the heart of believers,—a result completing the revelation of the reconciliation of God effected by Christ. Thus Christ's entire obedience secures for us, that for Christ's sake God does not merely not impute our sins to us, but also regards us as righteous and holy in virtue of Christ's whole righteousness—the *obedientia activa* also—being imputed to us. Again, the *extent* to which the atonement by Christ refers is of importance in deciding its *value*. Christ's entire obedience is viewed as of infinite value, sufficient to cancel infinite guilt and punishment, and to present every believer holy and righteous before God. According to both Evangelical Confessions, therefore, this value is *all-embracing, i.e.* refers to all sins,—original and actual,—sins not merely before but also after baptism,[1] whereas the Catholic Church limits the efficacy of the atonement to original sin and sins before baptism. As relates to *persons*, the Lutheran Church ascribes universal value to Christ's atonement more definitely than the Reformed. But even the Reformed theologians teach that Christ's merit, because infinite, would be sufficient for all in itself, only the application of this universal power is rendered particular by the twofold *decretum*. Along with this idea the doctrine occurs in the *Form. Consensus Helv.* (which was not adopted as a Symbol), that it was neither the will of God nor of Christ that Christ should taste death for all, but only for the elect. But, in order to atone even for these, a *piaculum* of infinite value, sufficient in itself for all, was necessary on account of the infinity of guilt. Both Confessions teach that neither human penance nor good works can supplement the merit of Christ and the value of that merit.[2] Christ's atonement possesses this value through the character of His *person*. He is Mediator between God and men, because of His standing in the most intimate relation to both through the *Unio* in

[1] P. II. *Conf. Aug.* iii. *de Missa*, p. 25, § 21 ff.

[2] *Conf. Aug.* xv. § 3, p. 13; *Apol.* 193, 51; *A. S.* 305; *Cat. Heidelb.* ed. Niemeyer, pp. 431, 443, qu. 60 ff.

Him. The *Form. Conc.* says: The divinity and humanity must not here be separated, else the work loses its value. On this account *Stancarus* was condemned, because he wished to regard only the human side as mediatorial, and for this reason to ascribe finite value to Christ's obedience, enhancing it by means of *acceptilatio.* On the other hand, *Andr. Osiander* was condemned, because he treated redemption as secondary, and regarded justification as effected only by the divine nature of Christ dwelling in us, while severing it from the atonement, which to him was something external and subordinate, "the payment of our debts 1500 years ago." The doctrine of the Church seeks to secure the historic truth and reality of Christ's entire obedience by His humanity, and its infinite value by His divinity; and in this way the Christological advance made in the age of the Reformation in respect of a more living conception of the unity of Christ's person, has its influence on the dogma now under consideration.

3. From what has been said, it is clear how definitely the Evangelical Church advances beyond mere *convenientia*, or adaptation in Christ's work, to the necessity of this mode, and how by the consciousness of God's immutable justice it avoids everything arbitrary or capricious, even where arbitrariness shelters itself behind God's free plenary authority. On the other hand, it firmly lays down the ethical idea of God. And it is worthy of note that here the Reformed theology does not, as in the doctrine of the *decretum Electionis* and *Reprobationis*, go back to God's supreme authority, but to the divine justice, which it reckons a part of God's essence, and therefore does not subordinate to God's *supremum arbitrium.* But from this it also follows that Christ's atoning action *procured* a blessing of a moral nature most precious to God Himself, a blessing which did not previously exist even for God, and that consequently a change was made by Christ's work, in accordance with the *decretum*, not merely in the relation of men to God, but in the relation of God to men. Thus has the Evangelical Church, in asserting the necessity of Satisfaction, afforded proof that, advancing beyond the mere legal stage, and for this reason visited with the reproach of Antinomianism, it pays greater honour to the inflexible honour of God's law than those theories which assign to that law the

precarious position of a positivity which might be other than it is, and which therefore do not regard atonement by Christ as the essential mode of salvation. When the *Formula of Concord* says: *Gratia Dei, Meritum Christi, Fides* belong to *Justificatio*, this triad shows how, according to Evangelical teaching, the process of Atonement, starting from the depths of the Divine Essence, proceeds onward to the historic Mediator, until it reaches its goal in *fides*, with its joyous assurance of the divine forgiveness. The decisive factor is the *terminus medius, Christus per quem Deus placatur;* but still the process is not concluded with the objective transaction through Christ outside us. It first comes to rest in *fides*, because by faith the peace, which exists through Christ in God's heart, is received into our heart. Mere objective atonement, on the other hand, however important and fundamental, would avail us nothing.

4. The advance made in the Evangelical doctrine of Atonement, and continued by the theology of the Church, corresponds to the advance made by the Reformation in Ponerology, Christology, and Theology. But the *defects* also, which, as formerly indicated,[1] were not overcome in these doctrines, exercised their influence, giving rise to a number of points needing explanation or more satisfactory verification. *We shall consider these defects*, as they appear in part in the Symbols and old Evangelical theologians of both Confessions, following as closely as possible the defects, previously discussed and still remaining, in Ponerology, Christology, and the doctrine of God.

First. We saw previously that the old Evangelical theology made too little distinction in the doctrine of *sin* between generic and personal sin, especially that of definitive unbelief, which is inevitably followed by damnation. The consequence of this on the present dogma is, that the statement: Christ died for all the sins of the world, as to form gives the impression that His atoning work avails even for the sin of definitive rejection of Christ,[2] which neither was nor could be the meaning. On the other hand, it gives the impression

[1] § 75, 6; § 96. Cf. §§ 94. 95.

[2] Certainly Quenstedt does not seem to shrink even from this. P. ii. p. 163. cll. iii. 324.

that Christ, in order to make satisfaction for sin at all, must endure the punishments of hell for us, those punishments being due by divine justice to all sin, not merely to that of definitive unbelief. This defect in dogmatic precision acquires greater importance from the fact that the *idea of punishment* was not investigated with sufficient thoroughness. The usual supposition was, that the satisfaction of divine justice consisted in the same amount of suffering befalling Christ which would have befallen those destined to obtain forgiveness, on which view the amount of Christ's sufferings would necessarily have been greater if the number of sinners had been greater, and smaller if smaller. When this quantitative conception of sin and of Christ's sufferings is carried farther, those sufferings appear as a numerical amount, which Christ was bound to discharge for all without distinction, in order to create for them the possibility of deliverance, since those for whom He did not pay the amount would be those excluded *a priori* from election. A further consequence would be, that if the numerical sum due had been paid on behalf of those remaining in unbelief, punishment for their sins, which had been expiated, could no longer be demanded of them, because Christ had made satisfaction for them, and a double satisfaction would be unjust. But even if the sin, to which Christ's atoning work could not refer, were separated from that capable of forgiveness, and it were said that Christ had only to do with the latter, the old theology is still inclined to maintain that it was necessary for Christ to endure the pains of hell, because the infinite significance of sin demands infinite punishment.[1] But in opposition to this view the question was early asked, Whether the comparatively brief duration of Christ's sufferings could come into comparison with the punishments

[1] The Reformed theologians in part teach that on the cross Christ suffered the pangs of hell. The Lutheran Confessions, while not excluding this view (Frank, *d. Theologie der Concordienformel*, ii. 32, 1861), do not teach it, as is often done by theologians on both sides. But the impotence of rebellion and despair form a part of those pangs, and these cannot be thought of in Christ without dissolving the *Unio*. It is true, the Lutheran Confessions speak of the eternal death to which we should be exposed apart from Christ's suffering for us. But it is not said that Christ endured this eternal death. For this reason, moderns like *Kahnis* (iii. 397), *Frank* (*Syst. d. chr. Wahrheit*, ii. 181 ff.), and *Gess*, reject this Theologoumenon of the old Protestant theologians. It is otherwise with Philippi, iv. 2. 136.

of hell, and as relates, for example, to those dying before maturity, whether original sin alone could be an *adæquata causa damnationis* to the punishments of hell? The disposition to externalize the idea of punishment, in order to seek a quantum of suffering in Christ answering to the amount of sin, followed naturally from the assumption, that the satisfying of divine justice by Christ's suffering for men's sins rests on the *jus talionis* of the compensation-theory, which was confounded with the absolute theory of punishment formerly discussed;[1] and then the question was asked, What sufferings of Christ in particular make expiation for definite, particular kinds of sin? But therewith it is overlooked that suffering as suffering is no good in God's sight, and divine justice is not revenge; the only good is the revelation of justice. Such a treatment of the matter is repugnant to the Evangelical view of sin, that view being averse to such piecemeal division, and rather drawing attention away from the endless diversity of sin's manifestations to its single source. Thus the revelation of the *divine* justice demanded is not to be of a kind implying punishments as various as the manifestations of sin. Nor can it be shown that retributive punishments, various in kind and corresponding to all human sins, were borne by Christ. Generally speaking, this tendency to a *quantitative* equivalent in Christ's sufferings for human sins must lead to undue, one-sided stress being laid on Christ's *physical* sufferings, whereas the suffering of His soul alone exceeded the delight and joy felt by any sinner in sin. On the supposition of the sum of general guilt and punishment on the part of the world having to be cancelled or paid by a mathematically equal quantum of suffering on Christ's part, we should have before us in the cross a sum in arithmetic instead of a wondrous mystery of love. From the *quantitative* we must advance to the intrinsic view of the matter, to an intensive estimate of the work of Christ. Further, were Christ's work considered in the light of a calculation and counter-calculation, Christ being made the payer of a money debt, this evil consequence would follow, that Christians might demand remission of punishment and justification from God as their strict *right;* and if the satisfaction were of this nature, gracious forgiveness would be

[1] § 24, 6; 32, 4. Cf. § 88.

out of the question. But, on the contrary, Christians are conscious that not merely Christ's mission, but also the imputation of His righteousness, is not indeed an act of arbitrary favour, but of grace, so that they would of necessity look on it as impious to ask forgiveness as a legal due from God, on the ground that God, after the debt has been paid by Christ, cannot again require its payment from the debtors. Instead of this, the Christian consciousness only requires that forgiveness clash not with divine justice, Christ having satisfied that justice. Evil with its culpability, like Christ's merit, must be conceived dynamically or intensively. Christ's merit is not to be measured by weight and number, because it is a potency intensively infinite, equal to the guilt incurred by the violation and rejection of an infinite good. But Christ's sufferings owe their intensive import to the fact that they are not merely physical, but *spiritual* sufferings, sufferings of His divine-human person. By God's just ordinance sin draws upon itself His *wrath* and *displeasure*—that intensive power (*Grösse*). As the divine displeasure is the source, so it is the innermost *core* of punishment, the sting in every other punishment. Wherever a sinner, though the subject of outward ill, regards it not as a sign of the divine displeasure, he is still superficially blind to his penal state. On the contrary, although the ills, which were punishments, still continue, if that intensive element in punishment—the divine displeasure—no longer rules, but the enjoyment of the peace and favour of God, then that which was punishment is no longer punishment, but the remaining ills are, as it were, swallowed up by the sense of infinite good, of the divine favour, which transforms even ill into a proof of love. Thus under every aspect we are directed from the mere quantitative, arithmetical view of sin and guilt, of the divine grace and divine punishment, as well as of Christ's merit, to a higher mode of view, from an extensive to an intensive power (*Grösse*). But that which is intrinsically infinite in worth or demerit refuses to be measured by weight and number.

Observation.—Another common defect in the Church theologians, is in making the satisfaction contained in Christ's sufferings the chief matter to such an extent, that they regard the mere execution of punishment as identical with the

restoration of divine grace. But that the mere objective execution of punishment, even when tending to the benefit of the sinner, could not suffice, is easily apparent. Even in the State, when a criminal has expiated his punishment, he is not on this account so restored to citizenship and confidence that all is forgotten, and honour and cordial confidence are completely regained by him; for he might submit to the punishment reluctantly. *Restitutio in integrum*, the return of full confidence, is only possible when the sufferer acknowledges the justice of the punishment, thus doing honour to justice. Then only is atonement made to justice. For these reasons, in the case of Christ an objective execution of punishment is by no means sufficient; *i.e.* it is not sufficient for the ills and sufferings, even the death, ordained as a punishment to men, to be inflicted on and endured by Christ for men's good. In order to the restoration of God's spontaneous communion with sinners, and to the fresh bestowal of His favour, besides suffering, this is necessary, that Christ, in the suffering coming to Him as Mediator through the injustice of men, *honour* and *acknowledge* God's justice in His judicial displeasure at sin, and submit to the feeling of that just displeasure; and this is a new and broader act, including not merely willingness to endure outward sufferings, but to descend for the sake of a sinful world to the feeling of just subjection to punishment.

Second. As relates to Christology, a firm, intimate connection must certainly be maintained between Christ's physical sufferings and those of His soul, the conscious sense of life and suffering on its physical side having its roots in the ψυχή of Jesus. But however important, according to the N. T., those physical sufferings of Christ, by which He entered into most real fellowship with sinners, the reasons just advanced show that His spiritual sufferings should receive more consideration than is commonly the case.[1] Sin, as the infringement of an infinite good, and guilt, are only comprehensible in relation to the soul; only the soul can have the sense of God's just displeasure. But the reality of Christ's human soul must also influence the doctrine of atonement, inasmuch as the really human will is most important in relation to His

[1] Matt. xxvi. 36 ff., xxvii. 46. Cf. Isa. liii. 7, 8, 11; John xii. 27; Mark x. 39; Luke xii. 50. It is especially the Catholic theologians who are disposed to dwell unduly on the physical sufferings and the sense of them. Cf. Cotta's Dissert. on Gerhard's *Loci Th.* t. iv. 75.

obedience, in order both that His suffering may be voluntary, and that He may do honour to the divine justice, feel the divine displeasure, and confess its justice. But we pointed out as a leading defect in the old *Lutheran* Christology, that it confounded the States of Humiliation and Exaltation by the *Communicatio idiomatum*, supposed to be absolute from the beginning, and inconsistent with the admitted reality of the humanity.[1] This has critical consequences for the present dogma. For, according to this Christological theory, Christ was necessarily after the *Unio*, even as man, in possession, not to say exercise, of every divine prerogative, and in undisturbed divine blessedness. But this would be inconsistent with the reality of His suffering. And if Christ's humanity, as this theory must properly assume, even before the Exaltation entered into fellowship with the Godhead, then the Godhead is so preponderant in Him, especially if Christ's humanity is supposed to be impersonal, that only God the Son, or the Logos, as it were, stands over against God the Father, and therefore God over against God, or over against Himself. But if in this work it is God who at once pays and receives, and therefore pays to Himself, atonement is in danger of becoming a mere internal calculation of God, and the history of atonement a mere epideictic or symbolic transaction, a sign of that which God possessed eternally in Himself even apart from Christ. Then would Christ by His historical work *procure* nothing new, nothing which did not really exist for God before. Lutheran theology, it is true, did not intend this. On the contrary, even the old Kryptists endeavour here most of all to treat Christ's humiliation as real, and regard Christ not as God merely, but as true man.[2] But this proves that, where those Christological propositions ought to have evinced their truth, they had to be given up as unpractical and useless, and that, on the other hand, where a practical application of the doctrine of Christ's Person was in question, recourse was had to the propositions of another Christology, lying in the line of the one sketched by us. But

[1] See §§ 94, 95.

[2] According to Luther's postulate: Here must Christ be regarded as man pure and simple (Walch, xiii. 547, xii. 1677–85. My *Geschichte der Christol.* ii. 555), a view which certainly goes too far, because it would dissolve the *Unio*.

the *Reformed* doctrine also was not free from the danger of Docetism in the form of apprehending Christ's historical work, nor does it adequately secure the procurement of an infinite blessing by Christ's historic work. For if the divine *Prædestination* and *Election* alone, and therefore God's will, are viewed as the ultimate, all-conditioning and decisive cause both of Christ's work and of faith, while Christ's work and man's faith are not viewed, in accordance with the demand of the divine *essence*, as *conditioning* the attainment of God's counsel of salvation to historical realization, then again the history and work of Christ are in danger of being viewed in a mere docetic light, whereas the strict Reformed doctrine of God's justice and of Christ as the *causa meritoria salutis* repudiates everything docetic.

There must be added, in the *third* place, the defect, formerly indicated in the *Doctrine of God* held by the old Church theologians, namely, the false conception of God's immutability and elevation above the world. In order to exclude temporal change from God's knowledge and volition, that doctrine would make God's relation to the world eternally the same, and assign all change to the world. But the consequence of this must be, that neither could evil produce an alteration in God's relation and disposition towards the world, nor for this very reason would the atonement of Christ influence the way in which He is disposed towards men. But if Christ's atonement does not remove real divine displeasure, and again render possible a favourable disposition on God's part, His atoning work cannot be understood in its entire earnestness and depth. Then no place remains for objective discord between God and the sinful world, nor for the removal of such discord. The only question could be of a discord on the part of men with God, and of a change in their attitude to God.

5. Again, the greatest importance belongs to the question respecting the *Transferableness of our guilt to Christ, and of Christ's righteousness to us*,—a point upon which the opposition to the Evangelical doctrine of atonement, especially on the part of the Socinians, first of all and early fastened. Against the transferableness of our guilt to Christ is the consideration, that it seems to run out into caprice, and only to be possible at the cost of the immutable law, because the guilty one is

exempted from punitive justice, while the innocent one is punished. The earnest emphasizing of justice seems thus to pass into crying injustice. Justice—that guardian of distinctions, and therefore of the rights of the personality—seems necessarily regarded as mutable, whereas it is part of God's essence. Now, as regards, first of all, the transference of our guilt and penalty to Christ, the Symbols certainly remind us, as an argument in favour of its possibility, of Christ's position as the κεφαλή, a position forming the ground of a substitution. But the way in which this substitution is to be conceived was not settled more precisely. Many theologians speak as if it implied a sort of *commutatio personarum*, and as if in consequence of this Christ were directly subject to God's wrath, an object of the divine displeasure and punishment, whereas others opposed both notions. And as concerns the transferableness of Christ's righteousness to us, the *commutatio personarum* seemed to be avoided by the person of Christ being distinguished from His work or merits, and an attempt being made to show that there is objectively in Christ something over and above, which is available for transference to us. This the *Form. Conc.* seeks to establish in the following manner.[1] As Son of God, Christ was not personally subject to the law, but Lord of the law, even as to His humanity, in virtue of the *communicatio idiomatum*. Since, nevertheless, by an obedience well-pleasing to God He submitted to the law, merit was the consequence, which He needed not for Himself, and which was therefore available for others. This theory, reminding us of Anselm, cannot be approved even in its confirmatory aspect (in which aspect it is put forward), to say nothing of its intrinsic merits.[2] It has much in common with the Romish doctrine of supererogatory good works avail-

[1] 684, 15; 697, 58.

[2] When Philippi, *l.c.* (as also iv. 2, pp. 146 ff., 134), and also Harless (*Zeitschr. f. Prot.* 1839, No. 7), defend these propositions of the *Form. Conc.*, whereas Frank gives them up (*die Theol. der Concordienformel*, ii. 38, 1861), and when Harless reminds us that Christ's appearance in the world, as well as His servant-form, was not His duty but voluntary, it is overlooked that what is voluntary is not therefore arbitrary (*i.e.* must not be handed over to caprice), but may be official duty, and what is done officially and therefore as matter of duty is not unfree or necessitated; and it is overlooked that the law or the ἐντολή is the efflux of the divine *essence*, and not a matter of mere free plenary authority. It is true that men have no right to demand the Incarnation or

able for others. The law—that efflux of God's holy essence —is here directly made no part of the essence of God (and therefore of Christ's also, as the Son), but is treated as the efflux merely of supreme authority, and therefore derived from the physical category of power. But Christ is not *exlex*, but ἔννομος. He is certainly free even as man, but free in gladly and spontaneously realizing the will of the Father, the ethically good and necessary. It would be contrary both to His Deity and humanity, were He able to deal with the law by arbitrary will. What He did in obedience to the law or the ἐντολή of the Father is an official, and certainly unique, fulfilment of the law of love binding on all men. In this fulfilment, therefore, and not in anything material, not in any work or merit divorced from His person, must the grounds of the legitimacy and force of His substitution be sought. For the rest, in order to secure the benefits of this substitution and intercession of Christ to us, the Confessions rightly refer to the correlate of Christ's love—faith in man. His merit avails for *fides*, inasmuch as faith *respicit in personam Christi, quatenus ille pro nobis legi sese subjecit, peccata nostra pertulit.*[1] The transference of the merit of Christ to us is mediated on His side by His intercession with the Father, on our side by that believing surrender to Him which loses itself in Him.

sacrifice of Christ. But this does not abolish the official character of Christ's free action. Philippi supposes (*ut supra*, pp. 23–42), that were Christ under obligation to holy action, and were only His holy death vicarious, this would be equivalent to saying that by His active obedience He procured eternal life for Himself and by His passive obedience for us. Here, withal, a false idea of substitution betrays itself, as if the same love, which by action and suffering manifests the vicarious spirit, could not at the same time be the means of attesting and glorifying one's own person. The converse of such a view would be, that what has really vicarious force would exclude the personal ethical conduct of him for whom the substitution avails, and therefore would be without productive power. When he says further, that, were Christ under obligation, He would not be One Person, since the Logos cannot be under obligation, but is Lord of the law, apart from the error of supposing that there may be caprice in God in relation to the law, the counter-question is necessary, whether the humanity of Christ can be real, if He is as little under obligation as man as He is as Logos, whether Docetism or Monophysitism would not be the consequence? It is certainly unbecoming to assert obligation of God, since He is Himself the ethically necessary. But the ethical necessity, according to which God acts, even as the Incarnate Son, coheres very well with the official action, in which the ethically necessary expresses itself for men.

[1] *Form. Conc.* 684, 13; 697, 58.

The consequence is, that our *injustitia* is not imputed to us, but His *justitia*. Thus, in laying hold of Christ we lay hold of our righteousness.[1] But this teaching rather indicates the *factum* of the transference and the way thereto, than shows how the transferableness harmonizes with personal responsibility.

6. That Christ's merit did not consist, as Anselm supposed, merely in passive, but also in *active obedience*, was distinctly acknowledged by the Evangelical doctrine.[2] But the right way of combining and applying the two was not as readily found, while the wrong one gave rise to early attacks on the whole doctrine. The supposition, certainly, that personal obedience is no longer due from us, because Christ's vicarious righteousness dispenses with it, was utterly rejected on Evangelical soil, obviously as it seemed to be suggested when the idea of substitution was not rightly laid down. But the demonstration of the *obedientia activa* was vacillating from the first. Some said: We not merely need the cancelling of past guilt in order to please God, but, if the law is to be satisfied, we must also appear righteous and holy before God, so that even our past may no longer disturb the world's harmony, but appear in God's sight as normal and as positive obedience. Christ's suffering, then, cancels the guilt of disobedience; His *obedientia activa*, on the other hand, presents us holy before God. But this division of the One complete obedience is insufficient. For if the *obedientia Christi activa* by itself has the effect of presenting us holy and obedient before God even in reference to our past, liability to punishment is thereby excluded, and Christ's vicarious suffering is needless as penal suffering. Conversely, if His passive obedience has atoned for all guilt, substitution through the *obedientia activa* seems superfluous, for then even the guilt of omitted good is cancelled, so that the non-existence of righteousness no longer forms a punishable gap. Quenstedt refers the *obedientia passiva* to the *pœna*, the *activa* to the *culpa*.[3] But when the *culpa* is cancelled, the penalty is no longer penalty; and the

[1] *Form. Conc.* 584, 5; 696, 55 f.; 685, 15.

[2] *Form. Conc.* 685. 686. 696. The *obedientia activa* resulted from the fact that Christ *sine peccato peccati pœnam subiit, Apol.* 118.

[3] Cf. Thomasius, *De obed. Christi activa*, on the historical development. Quenstedt, *l.c.* sec. ii. qu. 3.

abrogation of the penalty is impossible, unless the guilt is first abrogated. Just as little is it admissible to refer the *obedientia passiva* to our sinful past, the *activa* to our imperfect present and future, which are covered by it. For Christ's *obedientia passiva* cannot be referred merely to the sinful past before faith, the subsequent operation of pre-Christian sin in the believer still needing Christ's atoning efficacy. Further, the *obedientia Christi passiva* would not really be atoning in character unless it were also an act of active obedience—both an act of love and an act done in acknowledgment of the divine justice. It thus appears that it is wrong to cut in two the one complete merit of Christ, seeing that Christ's obedience under both aspects must always co-operate. The relation of the *obedientia passiva* and *activa* to each other cannot be such as to allow the supposition that either of the two without the other effected a special part of the expiation or covered a special defect. But as they did not exist apart in time, and doing and suffering were always combined in Christ's Person, so, although relatively opposed, they must be treated dogmatically on the basis of their interdependence and mutual interpenetration. Mere physical sufferings would have no atoning import; but, as the sufferings are sufferings of the soul, they necessarily imply action, because love. Thus, His *obedientia passiva*, because a free volition to suffer in the interest of justice, is also an action, and His action included the will to satisfy God by suffering borne in virtue of office.

Observation.—When *Schleiermacher* apprehends the *obedientia activa*, so far as it is vicarious in nature, as a communication of life and the principle of sanctification, we are led at once into an altogether different sphere (see above, p. 24). For the whole old Evangelical theology places the *obedientia activa* and *passiva* in relation with the justification of the sinner before God, but not with sanctification. It would be more in keeping with the spirit of the Evangelical doctrine to regard the *obedientia Christi activa* as the ground on which man obtains not merely remission of guilt and punishment, but also a new bestowal of the divine favour, and thus, for the first time, full justification. So Philippi, who remarks, however, that even this may be derived from Christ's penal suffering, so far as it is an act of obedience.

3. *Subjectivistic Theories of Atonement.*

§ 117.

The transition to theories of atonement of a one-sided subjective kind was made by Socinianism and Arminianism. In these systems, justice and law, like punishment, have no necessary importance in themselves, but only in relation to the consciousness of man, whose welfare is to Arminianism the highest end. The eudæmonism of the popular philosophy denies punishment altogether, as it denies the absolute worth of the moral. And the subjective theories of Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, while teaching a self-redemption on the part of man in the way of volition, knowledge, feeling, do not rise above the self-forgiveness of sin and guilt—the pseudo-Protestant counterpart of Romish Indulgence.

1. *Hugo Grotius*, with whom the Arminians are here essentially in sympathy,[1] does not wish indeed quite to give up the idea of divine justice and punishment; but, according to him, both these have no inner necessity of an absolute kind (as little as the divine law), but only a relative one, namely, in reference to the wellbeing of men, which is the supreme end. The world, as now constituted, can only be made happy by obedience to God's will and to the law given by Him. That regard for the welfare of the creature, which is decisive for God, is also the reason of the penal sanction with which God's positive law was invested in relation to sin. But the same regard also forbids the simple forgiveness of sin; for such relaxation of the law would beget recklessness and corrupt the world, although in the abstract God *might* bestow free forgiveness, as, too, in the abstract no necessity having its ground in God compelled the giving of this particular law. But since the original purpose of the law, to secure the welfare

[1] *Defensio Fidei Cath. de Satisfactione Christi adv. F. Socinum de J. Chr. Serv.* 1617. In opposition to him, J. Crell, *Resp. ad libr. Grotii de Satisf.*, *Bibl. Fr. Pol.* iv. 1623.

of mankind through *fulfilment* of the law, was frustrated by sin, another economy recommended itself. In order still to maintain this ultimate purpose, which would of necessity be injured by the infliction of punishment on mankind, God's *administrative wisdom* hit upon a scheme, which does honour to the law and its penal sanction without involving the sinner's ruin.[1] The expedient used is, to set forth Christ as a penal example with a view to terrify, and as a sign of God's abhorrence of sin, notwithstanding His forgiveness of it. Christ is the Head; like a king He answers for His people, presenting to God in symbolic penal suffering the acknowledgment that grace ought not to be extended to the presumptuous. But after this act of Christ men may think of God as forgiving upon condition of amendment; what their virtue lacks, grace supplies in the case of the upright. Here, therefore, we have indeed a divine arrangement, but its sole purpose is to beget in the subjective consciousness of men the idea that Christ satisfied the divine justice — even penal justice — for us; whereas, according to Grotius, the truth is that justice threatened with punishment, not for its own sake, but solely on account of man's welfare. Thus, justice takes here but a precarious, subordinate position, the highest position being due to the divine *wisdom*, into which justice resolves itself. The latter is supposed to be directed solely to the welfare of men, even amendment or obedience being simply a means of happiness. This theory involves a strong eudæmonistic spirit, making God a means to the good of the individual subject; for both the divine justice and the law—the divine action in general—have here no absolute significance, no worth in themselves, but only outside themselves, in relation to the wellbeing of men. Absolute *plenary authority* is regarded as the innermost thing in God; and this authority settles by its *beneplacitum*—according to the teaching of Duns Scotus and some of the defenders of absolute predestinationism—what the law shall be and whether punishment shall follow, while at the same time acting according to the rule of wisdom, of harmony with the welfare of the world

[1] Leibnitz also views justice as a species of wisdom. Administrative wisdom is also the basis of the "Governmental theory" widely current in the theology of New England.

(*convenientia*). This no doubt implies a certain goodness, which aims at the eudæmonism of the creature, but not holy love blended with justice; for otherwise the morally good could not be kept in the position of a mere means in order to wellbeing.

2. Even before *Hugo Grotius*, the *Socinians* had relaxed the ideas of law and justice—in the same way as Duns Scotus—by regarding them both, not as necessarily grounded in God's essence, but merely as necessary in relation to men, whereas in the abstract God might have given another law. For this reason, the conflict waged by Grotius with the Socinians of necessity remained without result. The Socinians, however, attacked both the ecclesiastical doctrine and Arminianism with keen weapons.[1] *Forgiveness* and *satisfaction*, they said, are mutually *exclusive* ideas. Where the satisfaction is complete no debt is left to pay, and there is nothing to forgive. Conversely, where a real forgiveness obtains, no place is left for demanding a satisfaction, for this would be to demand what has been already settled by gift. No forgiveness is possible on the theory of the ecclesiastical doctrine, but merely a commutation between our punishment and the suffering or acts of Christ. This objection rests upon an external conception of the guilt to be cancelled, which very conception is again described by Socinianism as inadequate, when it teaches that money-penalties may be paid by another than the debtor; but (and thereby it passes to a more weighty objection) the *essentially personal penalty* of eternal death cannot be transferred from the guilty party to another, and least of all to an innocent one. Moreover, it is said, the idea of *Head* avails nothing, because Christ has only been Head since His resurrection. He therefore did not suffer as Head, but was Himself bound to fulfil the law. Hence there is no real merit capable of transference to others. Satisfaction on the part of Christ by means of His *obedientia activa* is *impossible*, because a virtuous life is the duty of every individual. This, it is alleged, is indirectly acknowledged by the fact of the Church doctrine requiring an *imputatio meriti Christi* to *fides;* for, were the satisfaction by Christ complete in itself, its efficacy

[1] Cf. Fock, *Der Socinianismus*, 1847, ii. 610 ff. *Cat. Racov.* qu. 61 ff., 379 ff.

could no longer depend on the individual's faith. But even Christ's suffering and death, it was said, were *insufficient* for a satisfaction; for Christ did not taste eternal death and was but an individual, whereas, according to the ecclesiastical doctrine, eternal death had to be endured by each individual. We see that these objections fasten on defects and unsolved difficulties in the working out of the ecclesiastical doctrine, the idea of substitution especially being exposed to various misinterpretations. Against the doctrine of Christ as a penal example, the Socinians object that Christ would then be unjustly made a mere means.[1] Adopted by Rationalism in the 18th century, the Socinian objections were scarcely carried much farther. The theory of the Socinians themselves is to the following effect. It would be a contradiction to the divine omnipotence or freedom for God to be unable to forgive freely, without demanding penalty or expiation. In order to forgiveness, God merely requires amendment and sanctification in man. No change in God's relation to men is necessary, but merely a moral change in man. Those in the way of self-amendment God can freely forgive. But Christ contributes to that amendment by His example and His obedience unto death, His death sealing His doctrine, the doctrine of forgiveness among others. And the objective sealing of His doctrine lies in the Resurrection and Exaltation of Christ. Socinianism transforms religion into morality, and fails to transcend the legal stage.

3. The *Eudæmonism* of the pre-Kantian popular philosophy, after lurking in the Arminian system, goes still farther in dissolving the ideas of punishment and penal justice, and in subordinating even the moral law to physical categories of power, caprice, or pleasure. According to *Steinbart*, God is merely to be conceived as absolute goodness, which overlooks the mistakes of its children. The God of the Old Testament is cruel, bloodthirsty, vengeful. God's justice is rather merely wise, symmetrical goodness. At the same time, men are certainly supposed to be permanently undeveloped, scarcely responsible beings. Löffler and Eberhard deny the remissibleness of punishments, because, according to them, the only possible punishments are benefits, salutary chastisements, not

[1] Notwithstanding, Töllner, Döderlein, and Reinhard adopt this idea. Cf. Philippi, iv. 2, p. 181.

real punishments. Thus remission of punishment is superfluous, nay, impossible. To this must be added the exaggerated representations of the natural excellence of man. In this case there can be no question of criminality as a violation of absolute good; all that is injured by evil is our own happiness, which even now is inconsistent with evil. But the issue of this presumption in the subject of making his happiness the end of the world and the world-order, and God a means in order thereto, is that man is robbed of all share in absolute worth, and degraded into a mere finite being with ends of mere finite wellbeing. The Eudæmonists may serve to teach us, that we can only give up the idea of punishment by abolishing the absolute worth of good in itself, and the absoluteness of our destiny. Christ's death under its sacrificial aspect appears to these Eudæmonists an impossible horror, or on Christ's side idealistic fanaticism. It is spoken of indeed in the New Testament, but only by accommodation to notions of the age—what notions forsooth it is hard to say, seeing that the cross of Christ was to the Jews a stumbling-block, to the Gentiles foolishness.

4. The *Subjective Theories of Atonement from Kant onward* relate to Will, or Knowledge, or Feeling.

First, Theories of the *Will*. *Kant* successfully opposed Eudæmonism, and consigned it to the contempt it deserved. Not happiness, but morality is the good of absolute worth and the ultimate end. Hence the punitive justice which guards the absolute right of the moral element is well-founded; a proportion between moral worth and wellbeing is a demand of the practical reason. From these premisses some Kantians (*e.g.* Flatt the Elder[1]) deduced the following conclusions:—Forgiveness of sin is an impossibility, nor is it necessary in order to amendment,—a view which Flatt strove to vindicate by Scripture. Punishment must necessarily follow; the opposite supposition would be moral laxity, and would involve morality in self-contradictions. Nevertheless, moral effort must be honestly carried on in reliance upon divine help, even without hope of remission of punishment. But to require such effort is to require the impossible; for

[1] C. Christ. Flatt, *Philosophisch-exegetische Untersuchungen über die Lehre von der Versöhnung des Menschen mit Gott*, 1797, 98.

how can confidence and love blend with consciousness of punishment and fear, especially when no mere external punishment is in question, but also self-condemnation and the sense of condemnation before God? Others, like *Süskind*, insist that execution of the punishment may have injurious moral effects, and in this case remission is possible; God may communicate the reality of forgiveness by revelation. But *Tieftrunk* assumes an *a priori* cognizable practical necessity for the remission of punishment, at least of the heaviest, sharpest punishment. According to him, no true amendment is possible without inner joyousness and cheerfulness in moral effort, in order to which the assurance of reception into the divine favour is necessary; for what is required is no mere legal obedience, but love for the law, while love for an absolutely implacable law is impossible.[1] The inference from this seems to be that remission of punishment, forgiveness, must take place before real amendment, in order for the latter to be possible. But the moral standpoint must not be untrue to itself in working out its theory; the command and the penalty proceed from one and the same moral law. Were God without further ado to regard with complacency the man who stands morally condemned before Him, He must of necessity be indifferent to the distinction of good and evil. It thus becomes necessary to acknowledge that the commands of the moral law which aim at realization and its penalties, do not contradict, but agree with each other, and that therefore the infliction of punishment is reconcilable with such realization. *Kant*[2] sought to escape this difficulty in the following way. He knows nothing of divine displeasure, or of discord in man with God, in the strict sense, but only of discord in man with himself. As legislation is to him only self-legislation, so chastisement is only self-chastisement, inner unhappiness. External punishments would be tolerable, and no injury to goodness; but self-condemnation and self-contempt would of course disturb inner progress in goodness,

[1] Süskind in Flatt's *Magaz.* St. i. 1796. Tieftrunk, *Censur des prot. Lehrbegr.* vols. ii. iii. Cf. Flatt, *ut supra*, i. 127 ff., 143 ff.

[2] *Religion within the Limits of mere Reason*, Pt. 2, 1793, vol. x. ed. by Rosenkranz. Respecting the personified idea of the good principle, p. 69. Respecting guilt and punishment, p. 83 ff.

and paralyze cheerfulness and moral energy. There is especially radical moral evil within us, which is a constant source of such discord. This discord to him is no mere subjective notion, but rests on an objective basis. The guilt of sin exposes to punishment (and on account of radical evil such guilt pertains to every one). Even the reformed man, who after his change of heart contracts no fresh guilt, cannot regard this change for the better as paying the old debt. Any overplus in a life well-conducted subsequently is out of the question. From this antinomy, according to which punishment is morally necessary and yet morally injurious, Kant seeks the following way of escape. Despite all this, he continues, man may carry within himself a better element,—better will, good disposition,—which may still of course be far removed from completeness of moral strength. It answers to the idea of humanity well-pleasing in God's sight, called by the Church "the Son of God." Although now every one is only in a course of endless approximation to the goal, we may still conceive to ourselves that "One who knows the heart by pure intellectual intuition judges our ceaseless progress, on account of the supersensuous pure disposition from which it springs, to be virtually a completed whole."[1] In his new disposition, man is morally a different man from what he is empirically. He has received into himself the disposition of true humanity, which may be called "the Son of God." Or, personifying this idea, we may say: As a Substitute this Son of God bears the guilt of sin for him and for all who virtually believe in Him, as Redeemer satisfies supreme justice by suffering and death, and as Advocate secures to them the hope of being able to appear just before their Judge. The suffering, of necessity progressively assumed in life by the new man in dying to the old man, is represented by the Church as a death assumed by the Representative of humanity once for all.[2] In any case, whoever has adopted the volition of the good as the supreme principle of his will, is warranted in regarding himself as born again and just before God. Thus we are reconciled through the *idea* of man, or of God-pleasing humanity, of "the Son of God," which renders us well-pleasing to God, so far as we are one

[1] *Ut supra*, pp. 87, 88. [2] P. 86 f.

with it in the good ground of our disposition. There is here, therefore, a representation of our actuality by our idea, a sort of substitution, without which it is impossible for us rightly to know ourselves reconciled and free from unhappiness. In addition, the new man, to whom as such no punishment is due, has still to suffer for the sins of the old man. He really bears these sufferings, which may be called vicarious sufferings on the part of the new moral personality for the physical, sinful personality, and which again help to free the consciousness from guilt and the sense of penal desert.

This Kantian theory is exceedingly instructive. It confesses that the unhappiness and condemnation of conscience, so injurious to moral progress, must be abolished, if it is ever to be better with us; further, that in order thereto, our actuality must be left out of sight, and replaced by a substitute better than itself; and that God must look upon us through our idea, instead of judging us according to our works. This implies that the mere legal standpoint must give place and be transcended in order that the law may be fulfilled. Moreover, Kant's principles imply that if this idea is mere law and in no sense reality, it cannot be a substitute for our empirical *reality*. But to what reality does he appeal? To our good disposition. But therewith he suddenly assumes, as much against expectation as without warrant, a realization of the idea of the perfect man *in ourselves*, without our being able to see how this is to be arrived at, if radical evil has poisoned the inmost ground and highest principles, and if the actuality, in which disposition constantly shows its impotence and vacillates between good and evil, needs atonement, and no immediate certainty of moral progress, such as is necessary in order to hopefulness in a better moral walk, exists before the end, and therefore no right to comfort oneself with the idea of substitution through the ideal man. He therefore confounds what is to be a substitute with what needs substitution, the idea of man with its realization, the ideal righteousness which man ought to have with its reality, and instead of solving the problem, assumes its solution. Thus, precisely at the point where he deviates from Christianity and wishes to evade Christ's substitution, he falls away from himself and evades his own principles. How can the resolve on a better life

guarantee or represent the reality of goodness, seeing that it is merely a desire after goodness, not goodness itself, as Kant himself acknowledges in holding only the possibility of an endless approximation to moral perfection? Such approximation is a wretched comfort, seeing that, while it affirms a constant growth, it affirms also a never-ending distance from the goal. Before, therefore, it is satisfactorily proved that our ideal really exists in some form for God, and is put to our account in God's esteem, according to Kant himself (and therein he is right) there can be no claim to a consciousness of Reconciliation.

Observation.—It deserves notice, that in his *Criticism of the Faculty of Judgment* (p. 329 f., ed. by Rosenkranz), Kant describes the moral community, not individuals *per se*, as the aim of the world, and at still greater length in *Religion within*, etc. (p. 114 ff.). But whereas Kant teaches self-redemption through the moral volition of the subject in the moral community, many with more external proclivities expect a harmonious existence, free from all trouble and discord, as the result of the best State, or of the best constituted society, or of the rule of man over nature. On this view the religious and moral needs of the personality and conscience come under consideration at best indirectly.

In the *second* place, others seek Reconciliation in the way of *Knowledge* or Intelligence. Right knowledge brings everything into order and harmony, because it has power to determine the will; instruction, culture, brings the world redemption from every ill. Or, according to the scheme of absolute Idealism: The possessor of knowledge comprehends his true Ego; the Ego is free and pure, and in comparison with it everything empirical is mere semblance, even sin. Evil is a mere nonentity, or at least the non-being of good, lethargy, or defect. But, alas! the true Ego is no actuality, but bare possibility. But in the moral sphere the very first requisite is a better actuality, for in the actuality sin and guilt do not remain bare possibilities.

Finally, some of the Romanticists seek Reconciliation in *Feeling*, in part in connection with Kantian criticism.[1] The Romanticists proper seek the reconciling harmony in the

[1] So Fries, H. Schmid, de Wette, together with F. H. Jacobi.

æsthetic, in Art and artistic enjoyment, especially Music. With more show of refinement, the literati of the *Weltschmerz* (World-Agony) find Reconciliation in a blending of pleasure and pain, chiefly in a proud sorrow for the low, poor, pitiful world, to which they feel themselves far superior. They seek their pleasure in the self-complacent suffering of an utterly empty self-consciousness, in which there is as little of divine sorrow as of divine joy. For the pleasure is here nothing but vapid superiority or irony over the joys and sorrows of men, a negative, blighting pleasure without even the power to make itself the object of irony. An offshoot of this school is the modern Pessimism of a *Schopenhauer* and a *von Hartmann*, who, at least in theory, treat the misery in the world with seriousness, and to whom nonentity is the only object of hope.[1] Far higher stands the school of *Jacobi*. According to it, Reconciliation consists in elevating the subject into the ideal, divine sphere, through the inner consciousness of God and of the ideal, noble Ego. The Ego, it is true, is not free from the dualism of idea and reality, and fails to rise above alternation between the sense of happiness and unhappiness on account of unabolished dissonances, not merely in the moral, but also in the intellectual life. From the historic Christ and His work the school of Jacobi and Fries is able to derive little more than a symbolic meaning.[2]

4. *Reaction against Subjectivistic Theories of Atonement.*

(From 1800 to the present time.)

§ 118.

After one-sided subjectivity had again inclined to acknowledge the necessity of attaining unity, not merely with self but also with God, the *theories of Atonement* current

[1] His latest writings in part approximate more to the Hegelian theory of reconciliation. Cf. A. Dorner, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1881, 1.

[2] According to de Wette, Christ's death is the symbol of divine reconciliation, and shows God's earnestness in forgiving. Stäudlin and Tieftrunk also speak of a symbolic meaning in Christ's death.

in the *ancient Church* revived, only that now the Reformation-principle of penitent faith so far asserted itself, as, along with the objective provision gained in Christ, to make the requisite room for the subjective side of the atoning process. But so long as evil of a physical or logical nature, or sin, is regarded as the only thing which has to be overcome, and not guilt in relation to the divine justice, so long is the development in the Reformation-doctrine required by Christian faith and Holy Scripture impossible (§§ 113–116).

1. Were the question at issue merely man's reconciliation with himself, or with his surroundings, instead of with God, atonement would not be a religious question at all. Subjective Idealism in various ways denies the need of objective communion with God, at most with the partial exception of Jacobi, who after all rather recognises the need for man to become conscious of God, than the need for enjoying those acts of God which are the basis of communion. The reaction from subjective Idealism to desire after real objectivity, which, on the whole, characterized the beginning of the present century, again caused God to be recognised as true Being and the supreme Good, the consequence of which for the present dogma was, that an atonement of a merely subjective nature was seen to be inadequate, the chief stress being laid upon the restoration of unity with God, on which everything else must depend. Thus *Schelling* and *Hegel* form a turning-point to a spiritual tendency more favourable to the present dogma. But certainly this change was only a preliminary condition; the cause was not yet won.

The Pantheistic systems of modern days speak (it is true, on the surface only) of a sort of reconciliation in the process of *the divine life*. That life steps forth from its eternal unity and self-identity into its antithesis, into other-being (*Anderssein*), in order to the creation of the world, which is Nature and Spirit; but the third stage is its return from the antithesis into itself through the Spirit, which apprehends itself in its other-being and again coalesces with itself. Since these systems directly postulated God as the essence or the

reality of man, they made this process permanent in the divine life even as to its subjective side, and proceeded to investigate how the consciousness of reconciliation may be reached in us.[1] It is then affirmed: *In himself* man is one with God, being divine by his essence, only he knows it not at first; his consciousness is at variance with his essence, and thus he is estranged from himself. But when he reaches the knowledge of his essential unity with God, the variance is done away, reconciliation becomes his, he knows God as his Father, and himself as God's son. The position belonging to Christ is, that He is the first self-conscious man, free and certain of His divine essence. And this consciousness of God's Fatherhood and man's sonship is the good news which He proclaims.[2] According to this view, Christ has kindled the consciousness of reconciliation in mankind by teaching that God is eternally reconciled. Thus, no procuring of reconciliation by Christ is necessary. The unity of God and man is here thought as substantial, indestructible: all that is necessary to reconciliation is to know it. But seeing that the mere appeal to the substantial unity with God ignores ethical and religious requirements as well as the consciousness of sin, such a theory can give no peace to the consciousness of sin and guilt, when once awakened, but only stifle the need for the true atonement. Simply to refer us from the evil actuality to the essence, which in the best case is mere possibility, such as can never satisfy God's holy law, implies indifference to the distinction of good and evil. Further, this theory depends for reconciliation on a mere change in the consciousness, not in the being of the entire personality in a moral and religious respect.[3]

[1] Hegel, *Relig. Philos.* ii. 191, 218. God is a process; He (1) exists in His eternity in and for Himself; (2) He passes over into His other-being in order to the creation of the world, which is Nature and Spirit. To the diremption (3) the return into itself—the reconciliation—joins on. The Spirit distinguishes itself from itself, and again coalesces with itself. This theory claims to be at once a doctrine of the Trinity, a Cosmogony, a Ponerogony, and a Soteriology. The process is part of the divine life. The philosopher knows and passes through the process.

[2] So, for example, Marheinecke, *Grundlehren d. chr. Dogma*, 1827, p. 227 ff.; Biedermann, *ut supra*, pp. 675-688; Baur, *Gnosis*, 1835, p. 700 ff.

[3] Biedermann would make this process ethical and religious, not merely intellectual (cf. § 866); but since he treats the human side not as receptive

2. The majority of modern writers lay stress on the necessity of sin being overcome, and seek to establish the importance of Christ's intervention therein. But they do this in very different ways. Some[1] think of sin as an objective power, hypostatized in the "flesh." This power Christ was obliged to assume with human nature, in order, by the sacrifice of the sinful flesh, to give a new birth to human nature, to render that nature sinless through His Person, and present it pure and holy. According to Menken, human nature is corrupted, physically and psychically, by the forbidden fruit of the poisonous tree. This poison is the principle of sin, inhering in us without fault of ours. Christ has again removed it from human nature by His death, which became a second birth of the human flesh, after Christ had resisted all Satan's temptations to acquiesce in the propensity to evil. Whoever receives Christ in faith, receives the principle of cleansing and sanctification. Thus Christ's death benefits us in virtue of His mystical community of life with us (through faith). But on this theory Christ had first of all to die in order to His own cleansing from sin and His own sanctification,[2] while the fruit of His sanctification by His death would be, that He also became to us the principle of sanctification mediated by an act of death, and thus the principle of atonement. But the idea of sin obtaining here is a physical one, as if sin would die through physical death, as if the flesh were essentially sin; and this view leads to a physical theory of redemption, as if a holy corporeity, instead of the Pneuma imparted to the conscious volitional person, were able to cleanse and sanctify us. Guilt and penalty are here ignored to such an extent that it is accepted as self-evident, that to one who is sanctified in principle God is able

of divine communication, but as immediately divine, he is again led to a theory of self-redemption. And in this process the intellectual element—the vanquishing of the stage of presentation by the concept or the true consciousness—plays again the chief part. See below.

[1] So Menken, Rud. Stier, Ed. Irving, Stroh: *God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, pp. 48–51. In reference to the Pauline doctrine, *Holsten* reaches from the exegetical side a similar result.

[2] Stroh, *ut supra*, p. 51: Christ's death on the cross is a destruction of sin to its roots and in its seat, therefore not a suffering of the penalty of sin, not a payment of the debt of sin, not the death of a sinner or of a suffering, dying Just One, who stands by imputation in the sinner's place.

and willing to give reconciliation and justification; and that real sanctification may exist before sin is forgiven. The case would not be different if, as others wish, we were to go back to those theories (§ 115) which discover the evil needing to be removed by atonement in the power of Satan.[1] The first thing requisite cannot be the overthrow of Satan as an external power, but the undoing of the bond by which men are connected with Satan; and that is *guilt*. Christ's atoning purpose must refer to this guilt directly, not merely indirectly, or in the sense that Christ subjected Himself to the just penalty of guilt incurred by the guilt of men, *i.e.* to *death*, over which Satan had acquired power in virtue of the divine ordinance (Heb. ii. 14). Even were Satan annihilated, or his right to inflict death on sinful humanity abolished, yet if sin remains unexpiated there can be no atonement; God could not for Christ's sake regard the humanity, which He patiently bore with, as reconciled. For God's relation to every man is direct; the relation of His justice to sin and guilt is direct, and not merely through Satan. The divine work of atonement is able so to undo the bond, knit by guilt between us and God's penal justice, that this very bond is transformed into a bond of communion in love.

3. *Schleiermacher* struck out a new path in respect to the present doctrine also. His fundamental conception has become the most influential in modern times, although it almost entirely ignores the divine justice in relation to the work of atonement, and in consequence of his Doctrine of God strictly excludes all influence upon God![2] Since the consciousness of God grew in Christ into God's perfect being, not merely is there in Him personal holiness, and therefore untroubled blessedness, but He has also the power and the vocation to draw men into the communion of His holiness

[1] To this view Frank (like v. Hofmann, see below, p. 54) approximates (*Syst. d. chr. Wahrheit*, ii. 153, and *Theol. der Concordienformel*, ii. 45), when, according to him, the chief stress in the work of atonement falls on Satan being stripped of his power. "The only way," Frank says in the latter passage, "in which the penalty of the sin of the world could be laid on a sinless man is by the tyranny of Satan being laid on him, that tyranny including all the woe and all the suffering of the world." Philippi justly censures this view, iv. 2, 136 f.

[2] *Der Christl. Glaube*, §§ 100-104, ii. pp. 94 ff., 102 ff., 128 148.

and blessedness, and by this means to redeem and reconcile them. Nor is this done in a *magical* way by a purely objective transaction. On the contrary, *faith* is necessary in order to our partaking of His holiness and blessedness. And just as little is it a satisfactory course to reduce Christ's redeeming work to the prophetic office, to His teaching and example. This he calls the *empirical* heresy, corresponding to the Ebionite conception of the person of Christ, because it is forced to lay the chief stress on self-redemption. How then does Schleiermacher, after excluding these errors, conceive of Christ's atoning office itself? The way, first of all, in which he presents Christ's high-priestly communion with men, is most excellent and suggestive. If Christ really desired to participate in the life of men, the sufferings, ordained to every member of a sinful race as afflictions, must necessarily light upon Him.[1] Nay, the deeper He saw into the nature of sin, and the more earnestly He contended against it, the more must the power of evil have pressed upon Him; and thus He suffered through the sin of men not merely in His last days, but during His whole life. But it was in His last days that the depth of suffering disclosed itself to Him, when the two representatives of the world's sin—the heathen and Jewish—turned, and, as it were, conspired against Him. But it was not so much His personal suffering, due to the sin of the world, which He felt so keenly. This suffering is only understood aright when it is recognised as His *act;* and here Schleiermacher gives a place to Christ's active obedience. For His suffering proper consisted in this, that His outer suffering, caused by sinners, presented to Him as in a mirror the depth and extent of sin, and stirred His *sympathy* in the most powerful way. This sympathy, springing from the energy of His love, leads Him into unhappy communion with us in order to transform it into a holy and blessed communion. This *sympathy* constitutes Christ's proper high-priestly action in distinction from His prophetic and kingly office. It has the power of drawing us into the communion of Christ's holiness and blessedness, after He, by His sympathy, had let Himself be drawn into communion with us. The *Teacher* and *Prophet* remains outside the scholar as

[1] P. 136 f.

his example; but Christ, as High Priest, draws us into His communion by His sympathy with us,—that sympathy by which He feels our sin and its wretchedness, while allowing its power to burst on Himself. This high-priestly love of His, endowed with such power of attraction, is matter of delight to God; and since God now beholds us in this union with Christ, which is established by faith on our part, Christ's person renders us objects of the divine delight, and presents us pure before God. God has determined to let all salvation flow to us through Christ's mediation, and looks upon us in Christ, who is therefore our substitute. According to Schleiermacher, the kingly office also is distinct from the high-priestly one. From it proceed our personal sanctification and the founding of the community.

But although, according to Schleiermacher, participation in Christ's blessedness is objectively conditioned by participation in Christ's holiness, still, according to him, we have not the consciousness of atonement through *knowing* ourselves to be already holy, even in a merely initial sense; for, should the consciousness of our reconciliation merely result from the consciousness of our holiness, which is always imperfect, the former must always remain imperfect and vacillating. On the contrary, the atonement and the consciousness of it have their security in the fact of Christ standing in communion with us, and our standing in communion with Him.[1] For *Christ's* sake, faith is warranted in treating present sin as non-existent and future, completed sanctification as already present. According to this view, Christ's high-priestly sympathy, which finds its most perfect expression in His suffering, is the climax of His redeeming work, by which we are freed from punishment and the sense of it; for that sympathy has the power of drawing us into His fellowship. Only in the fellowship of His sufferings can His blessedness be felt, because the consciousness of how God was in Him, and therefore of His holiness and blessedness, chiefly arises in us from absorption of the spirit in His sufferings; and by this very means the communication of holiness and blessedness to us may become fact.

Unquestionably, the view here given of Christ's high-priestly office is spiritual and forceful, compared not merely

[1] P. 133.

with the Rationalism, but with the Supernaturalism of those days. By the Biblical doctrine of Christ's sympathy and living communion with us, He seeks to impart movement to that which had become rigid in the Christian dogma. *Nitzsch* developed this still farther in representing Christ's suffering and death as the principle of repentance to the world, as judgment upon sin, which is forced to reveal its innermost essence by killing the Holy One, who, however, by the purity of His person, stands security to God for this, that those receiving forgiveness of sins through communion with Christ shall also become partakers of His holiness. The defects of Schleiermacher's theory are in the closest connection with his Doctrine of God. While Omnipotence preponderates over justice in God, no adequate place remains either for guilt or punitive justice.

The reason given by Schleiermacher for prefixing Christ's redeeming to His atoning work, is, that otherwise the first regard would be paid not to evil as such, but to evil so far as it is a source of suffering, and that deliverance from suffering would be sought first. But the desire for atonement is not eudæmonistic. It is desire for deliverance from guilt; and this is something eminently moral. Further, according to *Christl. Glaube*, ii. 107, those conceptions of the atoning work, which make the communication of Christ's blessedness independent of reception into living communion with Him, are magical in character. But magical it cannot be, if Christ as Atoner enters into communion with us by anticipation, without our returning the communion at once. On the contrary, it would be magical if we enjoyed communion with Christ before guilt was blotted out. For the sake of Christ's communion with us, God is able to look on us with complacency, just as Christ's high-priestly function has a value for God in itself, and not merely through our faith.

Hofmann's theory is partially akin to Schleiermacher's.[1] He calls the ecclesiastical theory an artificial mystery. Christ is an Atoner to him, because of His having proved Himself righteous despite the uttermost that sin and Satan could do against Him. By this self-attestation Christ vanquished Satan, and established a relation no longer dominated by the sin of

[1] *Schriftbeweis*, i. *Schutzschriften*.

Adam, but by the righteousness of the Son, *i.e.* a state of life holy and well-pleasing to God. This holy righteousness, which was also passive obedience, does not effect expiation as penal suffering, but because He fulfilled the demand of the divine law,—holiness,—thus rendering a service well-pleasing to God, and making reparation for sin. So far as by faith in Him we receive into ourselves the same principle of holiness which He exhibited in His attestation of Himself as righteous, we have the right to regard ourselves as well-pleasing to God and reconciled. Therefore we have atonement by at least initial sanctification. That Christ's personal self-attestation exhibits Him as righteous and holy is true, but this belongs to His prophetic office; but thereby nothing is affirmed in relation to the high-priestly office. Thus von Hofmann is behind Schleiermacher. He does not once take into account Christ's high-priestly sympathy. The only point he has in common with Schleiermacher is the mystical union with Christ through faith, and that he makes Christ a substitute in God's view in relation to our holiness. But to him Christ's substitution is in no sense an act of Christ, or a means impelling us to convert Christ for us into Christ in us.

The controversy which arose against him[1] was of no essential benefit to theology, because his opponents almost entirely maintained the ecclesiastical doctrine without removing the difficulties which it left. They especially omit a searching examination of the ideas: Justice, Punishment, Expiation. Philippi and Thomasius place justice and love, even in God Himself, in opposition instead of in distinction, thus losing a supreme unity. Philippi frankly connects therewith the other proposition, that the divine attributes are not objectively distinguished, but merely in relation to our finite thought.[2] He would also have Christ's sufferings regarded as penal sufferings in the strictest sense, vicarious in nature it is true, but in such a sense that we have a right to demand forgiveness for their sake. He comes very near to placing Christ's sufferings under the *jus talionis* (see below), and to

[1] On the part of Philippi, Thomasius, Harnack, and others. See Literature above.

[2] Philippi, iv. 2, p. 44. See above, vol. i. p. 191.

simply identifying Christ's person with those to be punished.[1] Others, like Schöberlein, start from love as the supreme unity, but because in that unity they fail to distinguish between self-affirmation and self-communication, they gain no secure position for justice.

4. Two *Jurists* have given closer attention to these ideas, *Göschel* and *Stahl*.[2] Göschel's leading thought is: Justice and Love in no sense form an antithesis. Punishment is an outflow of paternal love, certainly a necessary counterstroke to law-opposing volition, in order to effect its conversion. But even in the act of punishing, the judge cannot be without love to the offender; he cannot but sympathetically feel his guilt and sin. The more pure and unreserved such sympathy is, the greater its power to subdue and amend the heart of the sinner, and by this very means to render the fullest satisfaction to justice. The fact of the judge bearing the punishment in poignant sympathy constitutes a satisfaction to the righteous government of the world. Christ had this sympathy in the purest and profoundest degree; we are reconciled when, following in His steps, we feel His sorrow by penitent faith. These are the sufferings left by Christ (Col. i. 24) to believers as a remnant, which they bear. His feeling of our punishment must pass over to us. Forgiveness is not the abolishing, but the perfecting of punishment; for real penal suffering—such as satisfies God—carries forgiveness in itself, because it is the expiatory feeling of the justice of the punishment, without which no forgiveness is possible. But here it is the consciousness of guilt which is conceived to be the *punishment* of men, this consciousness being identical with dying to sin, and therefore with initial sanctification.

[1] IV. 2, pp. 38, 41. According to p. 28 ff., sin is the attempt absolutely to annihilate God the Infinite One Himself—*Deicidium*. It is consequently an infinite offence, which can only be absolutely expiated by the same infinite penal suffering of absolute death with which the Infinite One is Himself threatened. Thomasius, who accepts a vicarious, expiatory, penal suffering, is censured by Philippi (p. 234) because he merely regards a passive obedience as necessary to atonement, without including active obedience. Respecting Sartorius, Gess, Weber, cf. Philippi, p. 238 ff.

[2] Göschel, *Zerstreute Blätter aus den Hand- und Hülfsacten eines Juristen*, 1832, Th. i. pp. 468–494: *Das Strafrecht und die christl. Lehre von der Satisfaction*. Stahl, *Fundamente einer christl. Philosophie*, 1846, Abschn. ii. cap. 6: *Die Gerechtigkeit und die Strafe*. Cap. 7: *die Sühne*.

And Christ is here represented as Judge, which contradicts the N. T.,[1] although the Judge is at the same time credited with sympathy. But, according to Göschel, Christ's suffering is merely the principle of repentance.

Stahl's view is different. While rightly refusing to separate justice and love in God, he desires the two to be separately revealed in the world in opposition to sin. The function of justice, he says, is by guarding the divinely-established moral government of the world, and by retribution to maintain the validity of that government, and therewith God's glory or supremacy. Now the sinner is a rebel, virtually denying God's supremacy. In opposition to this, God must reveal Himself as the Lord, and this is done by using His Omnipotence, which reveals to the sinner such power as nullifies his physical strength, and thus reveals his nothingness. This retributive justice restores the glory of the moral government of the world, but only by physical means, by force and externally, not by transforming the law-opposing volition. But the justice of the world's moral government, he continues, may also be satisfied by internal means, the glory of God may be restored by *expiation*. The first form of satisfaction—punishment—can certainly only be undertaken by the guilty one. But expiation may be undertaken by an innocent person, in order by this means to bring the sinner to repentance and inner acknowledgment of the glory of God and His moral government. Now Christ's suffering was not penal suffering, but an expiation to the world's government, an expiation which can be offered best by an innocent person. It was an expiatory suffering of love undertaken for our good. This theory has much in common with that of Anselm, as Philippi rightly perceives. On one hand, punishment for the past is supposed to be necessary, and the blotting out of past guilt to be demanded by the law, like repentance and acknowledgment of the majesty of the law for the future. On the other hand, expiation is not placed in relation to punitive justice, but the atoning element is supposed to lie in the new acknowledgment of the moral government of the world for

[1] John iii. 17, xii. 47. The Redeemer has not come primarily for judgment. The Judge would only here come into question, if merely the divine side in Christ's person came under consideration in reference to atonement.

the future, and expiation is supposed to be substituted for punishment.

Akin to Göschel's are the ideas advanced by *Dr. W. Simon* of England.[1] Atonement is not to be conceived as self-redemption, but exclusively as God's work in us, for in 2 Cor. v. 18 it is said: "*God* reconciled the world to Himself." It is with this reconciliation as with command. When from a feeling of inward helplessness we ask God for help, He gives strength for the fulfilment of His command. Thus He Himself gives that which He requires. Through us He fulfils that which is our duty towards Him, thus taking our place. But there is a command of God not merely to do, but also to suffer, for it is normal and God's will that we suffer for sin (punishment). But we could not bear the sufferings, which are just according to divine appointment. Now, as God's Spirit works vicariously in us in order to satisfy God's command, so is it also with suffering. God can suffer in us, bear the punishment which we cannot bear. All help to a sufferer, especially to one whose sufferings are moral, is only possible through co-suffering. If we are acquainted with a co-suffering and yet strong heart, able to show us how to suffer, then the disposition and courage are awakened in us to suffer in a way well-pleasing to God. This we have in God, and thus God is security for the right method of suffering. While we can suffer for one another, we can only bear outward sufferings for others, not the inner burden. On the other hand, it is God's prerogative to relieve us of spiritual burdens also. Nevertheless it is a moral law, even for God, that He can only help sinners at the price of atonement, that He suffer with us, that He take on Him our burden, share our anxiety and sorrow; but since He is God, He is able also to turn them to our good (Rom. viii. 25). He can bear our punishment, regard and impute it as ours, nay, He effects that we bear it in Him. He is bound by Himself, by the ethical necessity in Him, to characterize spiritual pain as righteous pain. Forgiveness, which abolishes the exacting or condemning law, would be frivolous, nay, no forgiveness. Dr. Simon would make not merely the man Jesus suffer, but also the Logos. How this is possible without objectionable

[1] In the treatise, "Atonement and Prayer," *Expositor*, Nov. 1877.

anthropopathism, he does not inquire more closely, while not allowing any loss to the Godhead through the origination of Christ's Person, or any confounding of His Ego with man.[1] Co-suffering, so far as it is a demonstration of the strength of love, cannot be described as unworthy of God,—a view which Frank rightly developes.[2] On the other hand, another objection lies near at hand. This theory gives us only a suffering of God in us in order to expiation, but not the necessity of a divine-human suffering. The historic Christ brings us here merely the knowledge of God's co-suffering and yet strong heart.

Bushnell, in saying: We can only forgive and forget entirely when we have also done good to an enemy, transgresses the limits of the admissible in reference to divine suffering. It is said to be thus with God. Only after He has suffered for us is there full forgiveness in His heart, is His heart, so to speak, free.—To say that only the divine beneficence perfectly reconciles God with us (not merely shows Him to be perfectly reconciled), is an inner contradiction; for a love that does good to an enemy is more than pardon, and must therefore certainly have been already forgiving love. Without doubt, beneficence towards foes acts like coals of fire on the head, and is more adapted than anything else to change the disposition of a foe and incline him to acknowledge his fault, and therefore (to apply the matter to the present dogma) to reconcile *man* with God. But this refers to the ethical sphere, belonging to the application or use of prevenient love for our sanctification; and therewith no explanation is given, how God can both forgive and do good to sinners without prejudice to the divine penal justice. This is certain,—and therewith we return to the theory of Göschel and Simon,—that God regards sin with abhorrence, and cannot forgive it offhand; nay, that He ought not to allow His love to prevail, unless it acknowledge the justice of the punishment, and therefore affirm sorrow for

[1] This line of thought recalls the words of Sartorius (*die heilige Liebe*, i. Abschn. iii. cap. 2): "God can only forgive sin by forgiving nothing to Himself, by *Himself bearing what He forgives*, and Himself performing what He commands, as is done by Jesus in His servant-form, who by fulfilling the law makes possible the forgiveness of its unfulfilment."

[2] *Syst. d. chr. Wahr.* ii. § 35.

sin to be just, and participate therein. But here, if anywhere, Christ's humanity is to be taken into account. For if His entrance into our unhappy condition is left out of sight, the chief matter in the process of atonement was a transaction within the divine nature. But in this case the whole would wear a Docetic look; for, since God even as Logos is true God, it follows that God would then demand homage to His justice alongside or in His love from Himself alone, and would therefore receive satisfaction from Himself simply. But this would render Christ's humanity useless or needless in order to atonement. That humanity would then at most help to exhibit the inner, super-historical process of atonement in God Himself, while contributing nothing to the realization of atonement. This would be opposed to the mediatorship of the God-man.

Ritschl also occupied himself at length, though in quite a different way, with the idea of justice. To state and examine his theory on this point is of as great importance for understanding as for criticizing his doctrine of atonement. In this criticism the thetic exposition given previously (vol. i. § 24) must be brought to bear.

According to Ritschl, God is to be conceived absolutely and exclusively as *love*, the one concern of which is to realize the divine world-plan (*i.e.* the kingdom of God), which consists in the freedom of men, *i.e.* in their dominion over nature, and in the mutual improvement of the members of that kingdom. The justice of God is simply the consistency with which God's love provides for the welfare of members of the kingdom. Of retributive, especially punitive justice, there ought to be no mention in the moral and religious sphere. The sense in which theology usually employs the word justice only has its place in public or civil right,[1] and is alien and inapplicable to the moral and religious sphere; a position which Ritschl tries to prove by a series of reasons,[2] which can by no means be regarded as relevant, and in great measure refute Ritschl himself. With the Socinians, he censures the ordinary doctrine, that justice and the necessity of punishment are grounded in *God's essence*. If justice belonged to the essence of God, God's

[1] Cf. *ut supra*, iii. 211 ff. [2] iii. 211–225.

will, he says, would be subject to this justice as to a physical necessity. But, on the contrary, everything must be under the divine will, even as character itself is only shown in permanent volition and action.[1] Ritschl does not see that for the same reason, if it held good, there ought to be no mention of the divine love, in which he yet would discover God's essence; and he overlooks the fact, that a free will not determined by the ethical essence of God would be simple caprice, and therefore unethical in nature, a mere physical force. In relation to God and God's kingdom,—the moral sphere,—he continues, only the moral law comes into account, not legal right (*das Recht*). For *legal right* refers merely to the outward order, the system of actions, which subserve the ends of a particular State; it is nothing but a human, civil arrangement for finite ends. On the other hand, the *moral law* or the divine will refers to inward disposition, and is comprised in the demand for love, but not as a legal injunction. It refers to the system of dispositions, aims, and actions, which follow of necessity from the all-comprising end of the kingdom of God, and from the subjective motive of universal love of man. In view, therefore, of this opposition between the moral law and public right, it is a contradiction to conceive the moral law in the form of public right.

It would certainly be a mistake to regard love as that which the State has to create by the means at its command, of which force is a part; or so to lay it down as a principle of State-action, that the State, instead of employing its own means which operate after the fashion of physical necessity, should leave everything to the freedom of love in individuals. It must work with the instruments of retributive justice, to which reward and punishment belong. But, nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to affirm on this account that the State, Right, and Justice have nothing to do with the moral sphere. Right and Justice are themselves moral ideas, in no sense of mere finite, transient significance; as negative pre-conditions, they themselves belong to the complete notion of the moral. If the State would be corrupted in its essence by identifying legal right

[1] Cf. iii. 213 f.

with love, still more would the moral sphere be shattered to its foundation by severing right and justice from the moral sphere. A love that did not embody justice would result in the distinction of good and evil being made a matter of indifference, and become weak, blind goodness; and whilst it fancied itself moving in divine heights above everything natural and finite, it would fall back to the eudæmonistic and therefore physical stage. The principles of Ritschl would result in emptying human, civil right of moral import, and in leaving it without basis. Certainly the ideas of right and justice stand in need of supplement; they do not represent the all of morality. But still the State has no such ignoble origin, that its sole concern is about finite interests. In administering justice, it represents on its part a divine idea. The hard, narrow framework of the State, representing what is compulsory and morally necessary for the commonwealth, is the indispensable guard as well as school of moral freedom. For the rest, the State does not embrace the entire sphere of justice, but merely the public sphere of human society; so that, supposing it demonstrable that civil right has nothing to do with morality, it could not be concluded from this that morality has nothing to do with right and justice in general. And yet Ritschl permits himself to draw this false inference, in supposing that an idea of justice, involving *reward* and *punishment*, has no place in the moral sphere, the kingdom of God, but merely in the State. The special reasons he gives for this conclusion are the following. If we may speak of punishment in the moral sphere, reward may be spoken of with no less right. But the bestowal of eternal life cannot be treated as a "returning" (rewarding) of the observance of the moral law. Moreover, the consequence of admitting the notion of reward into the kingdom of God or the moral sphere would be that the law of love would be fulfilled for the sake of reward, instead of from love, which asks for no reward.[1] There would then necessarily be a possibility of speaking of a legal claim, and Pharisaic mercenary virtue would be justifiable. But if for such reasons the idea of reward in the moral sphere is objectionable, the corresponding idea of punishment

[1] iii. pp. 214-219.

must be given up. In addition, experience shows that the idea of punitive justice involves contradictions; for just men suffer, unjust flourish. Finally, no outward evil can be named which ought to be described as punishment; for all may be regarded as good, *e.g.* as chastisement, and can only become punishment (namely, to the sense of the subject concerned) through the consciousness of guilt—a subjective power, whereas in itself or objectively nothing is punishment.

It is correct to say that love neither ought to desire nor does desire reward; but it would be a mistake to deny that, in the same degree in which the desire is wanting, it is the more worthy of and actually partaker in reward. The demand for reward would not merely offend against humility and gratitude, which are conscious of owing everything to God, but would also betray an egoistic, eudæmonistic spirit, which has its reward below, a disposition to which goodness would not itself be the highest thing and its own end, but a mere means to something else in reality of a subordinate kind. But certain as it is that love, as the sphere of the positively good, is higher than the sphere of mere legal right, still retributive justice is in no sense incompatible therewith. Although the virtuous man ought not to aim at reward,—for the essential test of pure virtue, such as alone renders worthy of reward, is precisely that we give from love, not expecting to receive again,—still reward, inward or even outward, follows virtue as certainly and necessarily as the shadow the body, provided only that virtue is first present, *i.e.* provided the reward is not sought or made the end to which love is the means.[1] This follows from the harmonious, creative co-ordination of the moral and the physical, a co-ordination which stamps the ethically good as the supreme reality possessed of power to unite everything in harmony with itself. It is a sort of ethical Docetism (Spiritualism) for any one so completely to sever nature from the spiritual and moral sphere as to undertake to be indifferent to everything physical.[2] And not merely has retri-

[1] Matt. vi. 33.

[2] Ritschl not merely makes the relation of God's retributive justice to nature as loose as possible, but denies such a relation, and tries to frame his doctrine

bution in its rewarding aspect its necessary place in *God's* government of the world, thus proving the co-ordination of everything natural with the moral, and the use of that co-ordination as a means in order to the moral; but *we* also should act immorally, if in our intercourse with men we did not return (of course we do not repay) love, and in general refused to be guided by the law of justice. But certainly the more important point for us here is to maintain the right and reality of a *punitive* justice in God. The objection, that experience presents to view the opposite of such justice, has been already treated above (§ 88, 3. 4), and, moreover, is refuted by the other objection of Ritschl, "that all external evils may be regarded as chastisements," for this implies that no good man has to complain of wrong in God. But although to Christians external evils are no longer punishment (which is to be proved later on), it does not follow from this that they were not so originally, or that these evils would have had a place among mankind if sin, which makes punishment and chastisement necessary, did not prevail among them

of God in general on this basis. According to him, it is indifferent to Theology whether God is thought as Creator (consequently as Almighty), Theology having to do only with the *causa finalis*, not the *causa efficiens;* inquiry as to the cause of the world, and in the same way knowledge of the world, is indifferent to it. The sense of absolute dependence on God as the *causa efficiens* is rejected by him as the independent basis of religion. Faith in God is supposed to be first derived from the consciousness of moral freedom, and thus to be a merely secondary thing, *i.e.* to indicate a source of help, wherewith we are able to preserve the consciousness of being worth more than the whole world, as well as a courageous heart for the discharge of our calling (see above, § 98, 3). It is scarcely necessary to call attention to the contradictions in which he hereby involves himself. Nevertheless, the only security given him by the conception of God for that harmony between nature and the moral in which it is morally necessary to believe, is that God is the one sole (*einheitliche*) causality (*causa efficiens*) of the world. Whereas, further, he treats nature so churlishly; almost the only definition he is able to give of freedom, and therefore of the morality of the Christian, where he endeavours to describe it, is as dominion over the world. And the only position of religion in his esteem is that of a means in order to such freedom. That it is also, and indeed primarily, an end in itself, is a view which he does not reach. In his contention against the punitive justice, which employs even nature as a means for its own purposes, Ritschl proceeds as if we had not one world, in which even the natural is subordinate to the supreme law which holds together the natural and spiritual, but as if we had two worlds independent of each other, which would be flatly to deny that the ethical is the supreme power in the world, the principle determinative of worth and fate.

When the divine reason, clothed with omnipotence, has created morally free beings, the right of punitive justice cannot be refused to it without exposing the moral world to the danger of falling a prey to chaos. The very prerogative of God as the "World-ruler," unless omnipotence be wanting to Him, is not to treat evil and good, guilt and innocence, with love unalterably the same, and by this means to throw doubt on the distinction between good and evil themselves.[1]

On these premisses it may be surmised by anticipation that *Ritschl* is unable to lay down a special theory respecting the divine work of atonement. Rather, the gist of his great work is the doctrine, that no Expiation or Satisfaction is necessary, because there is no punitive justice in God, just as in experience there is said to be no punishment (except in the State). Nay, the question suggests itself, whether in his eyes even the ideas of *guilt* and *penal desert* do not resolve themselves into mere subjective representations (*Vorstellung*), and whether, above all, he does not deny even *moral freedom of will;* for certainly his contention against a punitive justice would only be conclusively demonstrated on the supposition that there is no capacity in man to contract moral guilt. As matter of fact, Ritschl has been so understood. Let us then test his doctrine on this point in order.

While he calls the problem of moral *freedom* a crucial question in theology (iii. 251), he does not venture to give, but avoids giving, a straight answer of his own in respect to it. Rather, he again evades it by turning aside to real or

[1] Schweizer expresses himself far more to the point (*Chr. Glaubenslehre*, ii. 187): To us the moral attribute stands without any doubt above the natural; next, the fatherly attribute above the universal moral; and therewith the sphere of love, grace, and fatherly wisdom above holy goodness, justice, and the wisdom of universal Ruler; *only the higher revelation of God cannot contradict the lower.* The kindly attributes of the Father are an enhancement of the moral attributes of the Ruler (*i.e.* the latter are *not set aside, not dissolved, but fulfilled in the Father*), and especially is this true of wise justice, which is ever united with kindly disposition, because it *becomes an element absorbed and involved in the fatherly love*, which takes the form of *grace* towards sinful children. (But to show grace is to affirm, not to deny, guilt and penal desert.) He rightly censures (p. 184) the opinion of the Socinians, that God can forgive apart from all condition and expiation. Certainly his doctrine of absolute predestination prevents his conceding to Christ's historical work a real causality in reference to the reconciliation of God, and impels him to accept forced interpretations by Calvin, Maresius, etc., see pp. 173 f., 177 f.

theological freedom so called. That he denies moral freedom and objective *guilt* seems confirmed by the fact, that he would have all sin proveable by experience regarded as sin flowing from the ignorance with which human development universally begins, and that he speaks much indeed of consciousness of guilt, but not of objective, actual guilt occurring in experience; that, on the contrary (iii. 43, 67), he only concedes validity to the idea of guilt in so far as sin is associated with consciousness of guilt. Nay, because empirical human sin is sin in ignorance, it is said not to need expiation. But, on the other hand, he would still regard the will as participating in moral evil, even if only in consequence of human ignorance (pp. 40, 44). He even says that the definite rejection of Christianity, were it to occur (which, however, cannot be established by experience), would be real guilt of a gravity not admitting of expiation (pp. 332–338). Certainly, expressions of the latter kind do not confirm beyond doubt the supposition of actual moral freedom; for even if volition is present in sins of ignorance, it is not on this account free volition. Further, the supposition of an actually occurring definite rejection of Christianity, which becomes the object of divine wrath and punitive judgment, would involve him in difficulties and self-contradictions, for a capacity would thereby be conceded to man of incurring punishment and guilt in the most real objective sense, and of offering resistance to God. But when such a capacity of incurring guilt (which, however, Ritschl cannot wish to be described as merely the gift of Christianity) is once conceded to man, the right is entirely lost to ignore this capacity in pre-Christian days, and to say: Man can indeed freely incur the highest, inexpiable guilt, but not slighter guilt, such as is pardonable though still requiring atonement. Further, were the necessity of a punitive justice in God (although at first, and until the final sin is present, of "quiescent" justice) seriously acknowledged in relation to the sin of definitive unbelief, it would be no less an illogical course to say: God's retributive justice can indeed punish the highest guilt with eternal death, but cannot visit any other guilt, at least with milder punishment. Considering, further, that his entire investigation respecting atonement is built upon the contention against a punitive justice in God

and its supposed incompatibility with His fatherly love, it is strange that no clear, connected doctrine respecting punishment, God's punitive justice, moral freedom, and guilt is to be found in Ritschl. Nor is this improved by the summary words: "The Christian view of the world 'judges' sin, which is universally diffused both in act and inclination, to be the antithesis of God's kingdom, without necessitating cause either in God's government of the world or man's gift of freedom;" for the remark is only too obvious, that these words recall the circumstance that Ritschl also goes back to a twofold judgment in respect of the Person of Christ. The scientific, historic judgment regards Him as mere man, the religious "judges" Him to be the Son of God, and ascribes divinity to Him. The same dualism between the religious and the intellectual or scientific mode of view seems also to be the last word that Ritschl has to say respecting the ideas of freedom, guilt, penal desert, and God's retributive justice. That word is no doubt again capable of a twofold interpretation. His indefinitely ordered language may either signify: The mode of consideration belonging to the Christian religion presupposes indeed a true, actual guilt, but in truth and according to the divine consideration there is no such guilt. But in this way the Christian mode of consideration would be convicted of an essential error. For this reason it is probably more correct to reckon him among the maintainers, in these days not rare, of two-faced opposite truths, both equally justified from their respective standpoints,—the religious and the scientific,—but both just as certainly to be renounced from the other standpoint, so that, finally, nothing would be left but a sceptical agnosticism, a renunciation of objective truth.

Thus the question still remains: Is not the very idea of *sin* itself drawn into the vortex of such uncertainty, of such opposite streams, and thereby all need of even mere subjective reconciliation of man cut off by anticipation? This consequence, indeed, is ascribed to Ritschl's doctrine, but the objection is without justification. Even supposing retributive justice to be denied, the giving of the law or the divine will, which wills a kingdom of the good, is not thereby directly abolished, although shaken. Further, even were not merely the idea of divine punishment, but still more that of objective guilt,

denied, sin, *i.e.* moral imperfection, might still be spoken of, if only a definite moral aim, which he has not yet reached in the beginning of his existence, remains prescribed to man. If this duty occurs to his consciousness before his discharge of it, and if he compares what he is with what he ought to be, he will see himself to be in antagonism to that good aim; and this all the more if, while still at a lower stage, he perceives how his desires seek something else than that aim, and therefore are relatively averse to it. No doubt, the idea of sin and guilt cannot escape deterioration, nay, corruption, if moral freedom is not definitely taken into account and emphasized. For the rest, what Ritschl retains of all these ideas he applies to his statements respecting the doctrine of atonement as follows.

Humanity, it is true, only stands in God's presence as still imperfect. Its perfection is the fixed goal towards which He is leading it. Nor is God on His side alienated from humanity, or far from it. As already said, there is no punitive justice or penal desert in man, and in so far no objective guilt which could expose to punishment before Christianity came. Rather, all sin is mere sin of ignorance, which rather challenges helpful, saving love than punishment. There is no removing of God to a distance, which would be a withdrawal of His fellowship on God's part, an anger of God with sinners. It would therefore be an error to suppose the necessity of an expiation or satisfaction.

But, on the other hand, he continues, we all—individuals and the entire race—stand in antagonism to God through the initial non-fulfilment of the law or of the divine will. We are destined for divine communion, and so long as we fail to find this, and, on the contrary, remain for our part at a distance from God, we miss our destination. The consciousness that man is not what he should be, is reflected in religious contemplation as *guilt*. But this notion of guilt or subjective "consciousness of guilt" fills man with *discontent* to such a degree that he feels as if in a *penal state*, and imagines God to be far off, nay, his enemy, from which springs again a mistrust of God which renders man worse.[1] By this means he falls into a misery and dread, which makes him shrink from God

[1] iii. 44, 49.

and keeps his soul at a distance from God, whereas the consciousness of fellowship with God is the indispensable means to enable him to apply himself to his moral work with courage and inner security. This condition of distance from God cannot be described as mere misfortune, for there is human (although unfree) volition (see above) in those very things to which the consciousness of guilt refers. Nor is that condition *divine* punishment; for in virtue of His immutability God ever remains in paternal, loving communion with man, and never withdraws to a distance from him. But the "consciousness of guilt" is the expression of a defect in religious communion with God, and is the primary manifestation of punishment or of the abatement of the "religious" privilege of communion with God, *i.e.* consciousness of guilt is associated with distance from God; and then from this consciousness follows the consciousness of penal desert and the notion of punishment. For, generally speaking, only those evils possess the character of divine punishment which every one imputes to himself as punishment through his consciousness of guilt.[1]

How, then, would Ritschl conceive of redemption or atonement, which certainly even on his view seems necessary to human consciousness? It must be confessed that he does not require first the fulfilment of the divine law, and does not seek to derive the consciousness of divine communion or of the divine fatherly love from the at least initial realization of the law. He sees that, as the Evangelical Church teaches, distance from God, dread of God as Judge, must be first transformed into consciousness of communion with God, because this, as already said, is the indispensable means to enable man to apply himself with success to his moral work.[2]

[1] iii. 339. So far as the consciousness of guilt is supposed to be forced on us by the constitution of our nature, it has for Ritschl a certain objective—more precisely, psychological—background. On the other hand, the opinion that distance from God is at once guilt and punishment, in this indefiniteness which confounds the two, is a part of the error criticized above (§ 88. 1), that evil, the contraction of guilt, is itself also punishment.

[2] He expresses this thus: "Justification is a synthetic, not an analytic judgment" (iii. 68 ff.); but does not mean this in the sense that justification is a fruit of Christ's atonement or a divine act, but to him it is the consciousness of one who belongs to the Church of God's eternal, and therefore anticipatory, love, which with unchangeable fidelity conducts the Church to its consummation; and atonement is the reconciled subjective consciousness given in Justification.

Of course the question at issue, according to Ritschl, is not merely that God hold fellowship with humanity, for this is true even under the dominion of sin, since God is unchangeable love even in presence of sin, however much His image is obscured by the consciousness of guilt as if He were hostile to man. The question at issue must be, that man also on his part quit his distance from God and acquire trust in God's fatherly love, which is eternally the same. How, then, is this reached? Not by seeking an expiation or satisfaction. This, according to Ritschl, would only be a new error, a confirmation of the first one, which paints God as displeased with us, and through our consciousness of guilt awakens in us the feeling of unhappiness, penal desert, and the notion of God's punitive justice. Christianity proceeds differently, and by this means becomes the redeeming religion. It reveals God as Father instead of as Lawgiver and Judge, as unchangeable Love, which knows nothing of anger and punishment, since, on the contrary, as Ruler of the world, God, with unmoved security and "necessary sequence," realizes the world-aim consisting in the founding of the kingdom of God, nay, in eternal fashion (in vision *sub specie æternitatis*) sees the imperfect beginnings covered by the consummation. This revelation is given through Christ. Christ lived in constant communion with God, proving this in all He did and suffered; this is the meaning of the conception of His divine Sonship and divinity.[1] He was always conscious of God's fatherly love (which, moreover, is said to be a truth of reason), and made it known by His teaching, besides in His walk and whole personal manifestation setting the divine patience and love before our eyes[2] (thus accelerating the process of knowledge among mankind). But Christ's love may also be regarded as a proof of the love of God. It is love on God's part, that He brought this man into existence, who reveals God to us as fatherly love, and thus scatters those gloomy errors of an angry God and a punitive justice. As concerns Christ's suffering and death, indeed, Ritschl gets so far as to affirm that Christ attested therein His undisturbed communion with God. But how the fact of Christ's being given over to such sufferings is supposed to be a proof of the Father's love, this he is unable to show. At most,

[1] iii. 396 f. See above, vol. iii. § 98. 3. [2] iii. 395, 472 f., 490.

Christ is here a martyr for the truth of His doctrine. *Abelard's* position in this respect was better, because he saw in Christ not only a teacher or pattern, but also an expiatory sacrifice (see above, p. 19). In addition to the teaching and pattern, through which Christ worked, there remains for Ritschl *the founding of a Church*, whose members carry in themselves the consciousness of God's universal love everywhere the same and unchangeable, and therefore not the consciousness that God forgives and frees from guilt and punishment for Christ's sake, but that God knows nothing of anger and punishment, that therefore the dread of punishment, nay, the idea of being worthy of punishment in God's eyes, and therefore the consciousness of an objective guilt in virtue of the supreme, decisive judgment of God, rests upon an error which Christianity dispels. For, according to Ritschl, punishment only could and ought to emerge, supposing some one definitely rejected this doctrine of God's unpunishing fatherly love, a thing not occurring in experience. The founding of the Church or kingdom of God is the proper divine act which God had in view from the beginning; and every one who is reckoned in the Church, by his connection with it has security for the love of God applying also to him, and therewith deliverance from those erroneous notions of God's retributive, and especially punitive justice, which interfere with divine communion. But whoever, Ritschl believes, has this communion with God, of which the Church is the pledge, in the background of his consciousness, may give himself with comfort and success to the regular exercise of his love in the kingdom of God, and in this calling may even attain such perfection as carries with it the subjective certainty of reconciliation (iii. 573–588). For the personal assurance of salvation through the Holy Spirit, with which his teaching ends or culminates, Ritschl would therefore substitute the fact of belonging to the Christian Church as a faithful member; and hence by this Catholicizing doctrine which relegates us to some human authority he combats not only Pietism, but also the Reformation in its central point, alleging that "the testimony of the Holy Spirit is a piece of mediæval piety," whereas the very characteristic of mediæval piety is the denial of a divine assurance of salvation in the heart of the

Christian. If the certainty of God's love towards us is supposed to be based upon nothing else than, on one side, the successful prosecution of our moral life-calling in harmony with God's will (*i.e.* on our sanctification), and, on the other side, upon our connection with the Church of God, it is hard to say which of these two foundations is the weakest. A certainty of reconciliation, resting on such foundations, is in keeping with mediæval, but not with Evangelical, piety.

Accordingly, it is certain that Ritschl does not retain a theory of atonement in the proper sense, but with all decisiveness assigns the Christian doctrine of punitive justice in God, and the necessity of an expiation, to a subordinate, erring religious standpoint. *Häring*[1] is therefore right in desiring a more comprehensive appreciation of the divine justice, and in endeavouring to assure to the idea of *expiation* its right as an independent correlate of justification. The point in question, he says, is not merely the cancelling of the subjective consciousness of guilt or amendment for the future, but also the cancelling of the divine claim, which demands the penitent acknowledgment of the inviolableness of God's law and infinite abhorrence of its violation. To him the divine forgiveness is not already self-evidently involved in God's love. On the contrary, it follows from that very love itself, that God only forgives upon condition of an infinite feeling of contrition and abhorrence of evil. But man cannot render this of himself, not even the believer, and consequently cannot reckon upon forgiveness. On the other hand, Christ has rendered both; He supplements our consciousness of guilt before God (Weizsäcker[2]). He is not merely the Revealer of God, but also our priestly Representative with God, who permits Him to bear this character, because He furnishes security that all who believe in Him will also realize the normal relation to God. What thus, according to Häring, is supposed to be the condition of pardon, is plainly an act belonging to sanctification. But in his opinion the complacency

[1] Häring, *das Bleibende in dem Glauben an Christus*, 1880, a work showing an uncommon talent for theology, but too dependent on Ritschl; *e.g.* he approves even the subjectivistic doctrine of Ritschl, that there is no punishment where there is no consciousness of guilt.

[2] *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* iii. 183 ff., according to his excellent historical review.

of God rests not directly upon the human act or faith, but upon Christ—the security of our normal relation to God. According to Häring, God can and does freely forgive, in so far as our future sanctification is secured. The expiation to be demanded is in his view, therefore, a satisfaction to the divine holiness, not to justice, and does not refer to our desert and remission of punishment. He says indeed: Christ knows and experiences perfectly, and with the keenest poignancy, the entire guilt and power of sin in which humanity lay; but near as he comes to the truth, even here the reference to God's displeasure and punitive justice, in the proper sense, is wanting, for guilt has to him the meaning of obligation to render repentance and abhorrence of evil, but not of obligation to suffer punishment, which is something different from repentance and abhorrence of sin.

Observation.—Ritschl's theory is in sympathy with Kant, first, by the position which he assigns to religion in relation to morality. For Ritschl treats it as little more than a means in order to the latter, scarcely leaving to fellowship with God the position of an end in itself. He is also akin to Kant in this, that he endeavours to obtain the certainty of God from a moral idea exclusively. Like Kant, he would allow scientific validity to the *causa finalis* only, and thinks that the *causa efficiens*, together with God's creative activity, might be excluded from theology, by which means it certainly becomes more than doubtful whether he is able to suppose God the active and efficient cause of a new creation like Christianity, or, in general, to assign God any other position in reference to salvation than that assigned to God by Aristotle, namely, that of the attractive ideal, *i.e.* the deistic position. On the other hand, Kant excels him in his high regard for the idea of *justice*, as well as for the idea of the individual personality and its certainty. It forms a point of superiority to Kant, that Ritschl has transcended the standpoint of rigid legal right by the doctrine of the divine love, as well as that he would make forgiveness and reconciliation (more precisely, the consciousness that God is reconciled) precede holiness even in its rudiments. But neither Christianity nor the Church teaches an inert lax love, incapable of anger, such as would strip the divine forgiveness of value, and make the need of expiation an error. The unsophisticated conscience is unable to recognise itself in such a

doctrine, and therefore in this way, instead of reconciliation, the inner unrest is perpetuated.

Whereas, finally, Kant, while speaking of a twofold treatment of the Christian tenets,—a rational or scientific and a symbolic, which accommodates itself to a lower standpoint,—decidedly finds truth in the former only, Ritschl, on the other hand, if we have rightly apprehended him, keeps in the suspense of a Dualism, which ventures to take neither of the two alternatives in full earnest, nor even attempts rationally to combine the truth in the two standpoints, the religious and the scientific.

Lipsius also, by the unsolved contradiction between the religious and scientific modes of consideration, remains entangled in a similar Dualism to Ritschl, a Dualism leading to the standpoint of a two-faced truth. He is unwilling to sacrifice the former to the latter; but, separated too much from thoughts in which science and religion should find their unity,[1] the religious mode is too impotent to be able to restore harmony in the nature of man.

Although in *Biedermann* also the thoroughgoing antithesis between "conception and idea" may seem to threaten us with a similar Dualism, he is still in advance of Lipsius in a formal respect, because he does not co-ordinate conception and

[1] Cf. my treatise on the *Dogmatik* of Lipsius, *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* 1877, xxii. 177 ff. On one side he adopts literally in his investigation (§§ 589–655) the thoughts of Biedermann (§ 581), that the fundamental mistake of the Church doctrine is the identification of the eternal principle of Christianity with the person of Jesus Christ; on the other side, however, he would suppose not merely a casual and transient, but intrinsic and abiding, relation between the two (§ 624). According to him, principle and person have an "inseparableness, a unity as matter of fact," in relation to the immediate religious "conception" of believers. From Ritschl he takes in addition (§ 621) the importance of Christ as a religious founder, the founder of the Christian Church. God's purpose of atonement is not efficacious apart from His revelation in Christ as the objective basis of the Christian community. For the Christian Church the historic Christ (§§ 620, 621) has typical, nay, creative religious significance, and Lipsius hopes by including the founding of the Church to advance beyond the merely "ideal Christ" (§ 624), for a merely ideal Christ would also be an ideal founder of the kingdom of God,—a view which, in presence of such an historic phenomenon as the kingdom of God, already realized in the Christian Church, gives an utterly impracticable idea (p. 545). But this is only relevant on the supposition that the Christ who has founded the Christian Church is not a mere man, a teacher and pattern of divine sonship, over whom the Christian principle hovers, *i.e.* on the supposition that this principle has become identified with the historic Christ not merely in religious "conception," but actually.

idea, but views them as different stages, of which the latter only is supposed to contain irrefragable truth. But certainly he also fails to reach the Christian doctrine of atonement, because, *firstly*, he considers sin and discord as a necessary transition on man's part in the religious process, and the natural universally as evil; nevertheless, *secondly*, he holds in every man not merely capacity of redemption, but an immanent potentiality of reconciliation, consisting in his essential unity with God; and because, *thirdly*, while regarding the actualization of this (divine-human) potentiality as a new element necessary to the perfecting of man (an element which must also be regarded as a work of God, or as *grace;* in brief, as the Christian principle of God's fatherly love, to which the divine sonship or sonship of man corresponds), he repudiates most expressly the identification of the Christian principle with the person of Jesus Christ, because in the latter the Christian principle merely found its historically primitive realization, which is now the spring of the efficacy of this principle in history.[1]

If we cast a glance back at the different theories of atonement of an objective and subjective kind, it appears that in their entirety they correspond to the various possible theories of the world, which depend in the last resort on the idea of God, as we found to be true also in Ponerology and Christology. Atonement also may be apprehended from the viewpoint of divine love in a one-sided physical, or æsthetical, or logical, or abstractly juridical, or moral, or, finally, in a one-sided religious way. As a rule, over against the one-sided objective theory of atonement of the one kind belonging to antiquity, there stands a more subjective theory of the same kind belonging to modern days; so that, upon the whole, we see the cycle of the leading possibilities of an objective and subjective kind exhausted in this review.[2]

[1] Biedermann, *ut supra*, pp. 527–553. 675 ff. 689. 691: "The statement of the historical gospel respecting Jesus Christ is the fundamental vehicle of all Christian preaching of salvation." On the premisses mentioned, Biedermann cannot even maintain the typical perfection and sinlessness of Christ. But if Christ has Himself to be redeemed, He can only, in a very improper sense, be called Redeemer; God only is Redeemer, Christ being merely the precursor in the consciousness of redemption.

[2] In the same teacher are often found rudiments of several theories, of which,

The *physical* and *æsthetic* theories of atonement of an *objective* kind find atonement in the vanquishing of an objective foe of man, who is an evil to man—the devil or death. The vanquishing of the foe takes place here through the divine *might* and intelligence superior to death and Satan. If the evil, from which deliverance is necessary, is regarded as inherited debt transmitted by physical means, it is the riches of Christ that pays for us. The physical theories of a *subjective* kind find the evil, from which redemption is necessary, in inner discord, in the disturbance of wellbeing, and seek the restoration of the feeling of harmony in Eudæmonism, or by æsthetic means.

Whereas the theory of the *divine* polity makes the Eudæmonism or wellbeing of the world the highest end, to which the ethical serves as a means (the Mediator out of love assuming the death, which is supposed to be the symbol of the reality both of divine justice and divine love), other theories of this species address themselves to plans for the improvement of the world, in order to overcome evils and disturbances in the harmony of the world. But here only a precarious position is left to the Mediator.

The *objective* theory of atonement through *knowledge* is the supposition, that, men being disquieted by the fear of divine punishment and by consciousness of guilt, God, eternally reconciled in Himself, has communicated to them through divine revelation the knowledge of His forgiveness, or rather of His being eternally propitiated for sin. The *subjective* form of this theory is self-redemption by true self-consciousness and the knowledge of God, who is in essential, indestructible unity with man, or knowledge of the natural, essential nobility of man.

The one-sided *juridical* theory of the objective form is the civil-law theory of Augustine, according to which Christ pays the *debitum* contracted by us (in Adam), as well as the theory of Satisfaction for our *injuria* in Anselm; the *subjective* form of the same is Satisfaction by the complete suffering of the merited penalties due to the old man, on the part of the new man, according to Kant and the stricter Kantians.

usually, none are worked out consistently. The elements of justice and love, especially, are seldom altogether wanting. See above, p. 6.

The *moral* theory finds its atonement in the sanctification of man. Its *objective* form makes sanctification to be effected through grace, and through sanctification, if it exists in principle at least, atonement. Its *subjective* counterpart is the doctrine, that atonement is brought about through earnestness of resolve to live a better life, by which a new man is constituted in principle, who, as well-pleasing to God, represents to the true (even the divine) point of view the still imperfect empirical man. An attempt is even made to turn to account the historic mediatorship by those who say: Atonement, it is true, is the fruit of our amendment or sanctification; but the latter is brought about for the benefit of those who amend by Christ's example, and in virtue of the doctrine, confirmed by His authority, of God's readiness to forgive sins.

The one-sided emphasizing of a *divine love apart from justice* is essentially Antinomian in nature, and in all its possible forms, however lofty they seem, sinks back to an unethical and, in so far, essentially physical ground. Of the same class on the *objective* side are not merely all magical theories (whether after the manner of a Marcion, or whether countenance is given to an absorptive idea of the substitution of Christ as the personal atonement through His mere existence), but in general all, which represent the divine love as active indeed, but because destitute of an inner law of justice, as benevolent caprice. The *subjective* form of the theory of atonement, which rests in a one-sided way on the divine love, assumes again various forms. From the viewpoint of *will* it may be said, as in the moral theory, that both moral defectiveness and guilt are cancelled and covered in the eye of God's love, provided only a better will is present. On the side of *knowledge* it may be asserted: The need of an expiation arises for the human consciousness from erroneous conceptions of a justice in God that demands, and a guilt that needs, expiation; whereas God's eternally unchanging, unchiding, fatherly love dispels these erroneous conceptions, because it invites us to make the divine mode of view ours, and to enjoy reconciliation in the consciousness of that divine love which freely, without condition and expiation, with a confidence in the realization of the world-aim that

never wavers, joyously sees temporal imperfection (at least in faithful members of the kingdom) covered by viewing it *sub specie æternitatis*. Finally, on the side of *feeling*, it may be desired to find the atonement in elevation to the ideal feeling of God. But a Dualism remains in all these three forms, because morally satisfactory means for bridging over the distance between the empirical condition and the ideal world are wanting. This Dualism is the reason why all theories whatsoever of this latter kind must perforce halt, if not at a two-faced, contradictory truth, still at an unreconciled, two-faced mode of view—an ideal and an empirical. The solution of the problem cannot, therefore, lie in all these theories, which, however, by the uncertainty and the profound discord in which they plunge the spirit which has attained the summit of the pre-Christian consciousness, convert the necessity of a solution, such as Christianity promises, into the most urgent need, in order that the spirit may be delivered from its conscious or unconscious discord.

C.—*Dogmatic Investigation.*

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FIRST ARTICLE: THE NEED OF ATONEMENT, AND GOD'S ETERNAL PURPOSE OF ATONEMENT.

§ 119.

The divine justice demands expiation, and without it humanity, unable to make it out of its own resources, is exposed to God's retributive displeasure, or to punishment, which does not better but clouds the higher consciousness, and fills with dread of destruction and death. The sin and guilt of the world, which call forth retributive justice, stand therefore as a barrier in the way of God's loving purpose, which created the world for

perfection in holiness and blessedness. But as Justice and Love exist eternally in *God* in harmonious interpenetration, so God wills the *world* to be the scene of the combined revelation of the two so long and so far as the world is still capable of redemption. This is His eternal *purpose of atonement, i.e.* His purpose to give humanity the *possibility* of atonement. This possibility is implanted in humanity by the divine incarnation in Christ.

1. A frequent, but not on this account less objectionable, theory is this, that *we* only need to be reconciled *with God*, but no need exists for *God* to be reconciled *with us*, or, what is the same, no need exists of an expiation for us. Against the conceivableness of God wishing to be reconciled, or being reconciled, it is urged that this would assume a change in God. For He would cease to be angry and begin to be propitious; as reconciled He would therefore become what He was not before, and this would conflict with His immutability, nay, imply an influence upon Him from without, so that it would not even be He who changes Himself, but He would be changed,—a view unworthy of God. In order, therefore, to preserve God's immutability, the change which the idea of atonement certainly implies must be placed entirely on the side of the world or in man, either in his consciousness or will. Man, therefore, is reconciled by being delivered from the thought of anger in God, or by His will being changed for the better. On the other hand, it is out of the question to say that God must first be reconciled with man, in order that man may enjoy reconciliation, for God is raised above the possibility of being variously affected by the distinction of good and evil. But we have previously[1] proved that God's immutability cannot be of a lifeless, deistic kind, and that the distinctions in the world and its history are not indifferent to God, and therefore valueless in themselves, that rather God is, above all, immutable in ethical vitality. But for this very reason His relation is not the same towards evil and good, nor can His disposition, whether of favour or

[1] Vol. i. p. 244 ff.

displeasure, towards the ethical mutability of men be always the same.[1] And indeed the supposition that God, in harmony with His ethical immutability, accompanies the history of men with His sympathy, which modifies itself, moment by moment, according to the actual character of men, implies no passive dependence of God on the world; but it is His own essence, abiding eternally the same, and His own volition, by which He allows Himself to be determined to modify His sympathy with the world.

2. But it must now, further, be definitely laid down, that a reconciliation of God, and not merely of men with God, is necessary, whether the matter be considered in reference to *man* or to the idea of *God*.

Sin and guilt have interrupted the loving communion which God desires to have with the creature, and it lies not in man's power to renew this communion of *God* with him. To this a prevenient act of God is necessary. The only source of misery is not, that man is at variance or enmity with God, and does not accept or respond to God's ever unchanging love. Even the desire for amendment could not truly exist in one who did not, above all, affirm his guilt and desert of punishment, and acknowledge the necessity to concede its rights to the divine justice demanding punishment or expiation. His conscience condemns the sinner, so that by his own means he cannot have peace in himself and with God. Nor is the love of God, although unchangeable in itself, necessarily unvarying in its exercise, somewhat as a physical force is always unvarying in its operation. This leads to the second point: The *idea of God* requires a reconciliation of God in order to the restoration of communion with Him.

Against this it might be objected: Even granting a change in the relation of *God* to be necessary in order to reconciliation, no special arrangement, such as Christianity teaches, is needed in order thereto. For there is nothing to prevent God restoring His relation to the world to harmony, if it has been disturbed by sin, and forgiving without satisfaction and expiation, in virtue of His absolute freedom, without further ado. And in

[1] Martensen, p. 282 (Eng. ed. p. 204): That it is not merely man, but God Himself, who is to be reconciled, contradicts only a dead, not a living idea of God's unchangeableness. Cf. too, Rothe, *Ethik*, ii. § 567, p. 305.

point of fact, various reasons are alleged in favour of a so-called free divine forgiveness. It would be a denial (*e.g.* according to Duns Scotus and Socinus) of *Omnipotence*, of God's *free* plenary authority, and therefore an inadmissible limit to God's action, if He could not forgive off-hand. On the contrary, it is said, the love which seeks not its own and seeks not its own honour, must be inclined to such a *free forgiveness of sin;* and Christ Himself seems to acknowledge this to be the mode of conduct befitting God, in so frequently requiring placability and readiness to forgive from man, in accordance with God's example and on the ground of the divine forgiveness. This is even required by the *policy of the divine government* (so Grotius and the Arminians continue), because unforgiven sin preys upon itself, while forgiveness restores moral courage, and pardon, like an amnesty at times in the political sphere, ministers to the common good and preserves the commonweal from growing disorganization. To these reasons the following answer may be given. In God there is no Omnipotence severed from His ethical essence, just as little as there is in Him caprice or the physical necessity to will what He is able to do by free power. Rather, His holy essence is in God the living law for the exercise of His power. Unconditional forgiveness of private injuries, where no judicial function is in question, may be required of the *love* by virtue of which man seeks not his own. But as the guardian of universal, public moral order, even government cannot forgive violations of the law off-hand or treat them with indifference and impunity,—this would be the dissolution and subversion of moral order. Civil amnesty is only permissible by way of exception, where it may be supposed that crimes in themselves punishable are substantially caused by corrupt states of the commonweal, which are characterized by a common guilt, and by life in parties, which have all something to forgive to each other. Moreover, acts of grace, whatever the motives from which they spring, are no denial of culpability, and therefore of the right of punitive justice, but a ratification of it. Besides, *God* cannot regard evil as mere private injury, seeing that good also cannot be a mere private matter to Him. For good is the rationally necessary in itself, the alone absolutely precious thing, which cannot be sacrificed to finite good, to regard for supposed claims

of the wellbeing of individuals or the public welfare, without subverting all right order in the world. Without ethical worth and ethical distinction, only physical beings would be willed by God. There can therefore be no *policy even of divine government* which would prefer the physical wellbeing of the creature to what is ethical, and to the condition required by the ethical. An apparently exuberant, profuse love of such a kind, since it would outsoar itself, and in ecstasy, so to speak, emancipate itself from the fundamental laws of the world, from sacred justice, would directly fall back to the mere physical level of finite eudæmonism, while losing and extinguishing the character of the infinitely precious. Despite their mutual relative independence, the natural and the moral are so co-ordinated in creation (not arbitrarily, but in virtue of God's ethical essence, which is the power above even Omnipotence and its works), that true and enduring physical wellbeing at the cost of the ethical and its claim to dominion is impossible. On the contrary, *suffering* is the physically and ethically necessary consequence, the fruit and wages of sin. For these reasons the policy of divine government cannot leave evil unnoticed, first, because universal impunity would be a charter to sin, a giving the reins to moral licence, and therefore assuredly opposed to the common weal; and also because such impunity would contradict the innate law even of the physical world, and therefore contradict wise policy.[1] To this must be added, that God's holy essence cannot look otherwise than with disfavour and holy displeasure at sinners as such, and at the evil present in them and done by them. In Himself He *cannot* be eternally reconciled to evil; in Him is neither moral indifference nor caprice. Even in the world the energy of God's holy and righteous essence remains unchangeable.[2] The satisfaction of justice is the negative pre-condition of the revelation of love as self-communication. God must therefore perforce make the maintenance of His ethical glory and unchangeableness, the satisfaction of His justice which is necessarily angry and displeased with sin, the indispensable

[1] The truth of this is shown by the fact that, even where guilt is forgiven, the *evils* originally springing from God's punitive justice may continue, although no longer as punishments, and yet cannot deny their connection with sin.

[2] §§ 24. 25. 87. 88.

condition of His loving fellowship and favour. For this very reason, the conscientious man could have no confidence in a reconciliation that warped the rights of justice, and was indifferent, although not to evil generally, yet to guilt actually contracted.[1]

Thus the unsophisticated conscience, like the true consciousness of God, knows that the divine displeasure is no mere subjective conception, but objective truth; else the subject would only need to divest himself of this conception in order to enjoy impunity. But, on the contrary, the divine displeasure rests objectively on sinners, whether they are at once conscious of this or not; and it has its consequences. It is the source of all evils to men. When displeasure emerges, the state of peace between God and man is abolished, loving communication limited or interrupted. And from this withdrawal of favour and grace follows also diminution of life. Since all life has its abiding source in God, according to the profound view of the Old Testament, this diminution of life is in principle a dying; and the extremest issue—actual death in the spiritual and physical sense—must have followed, if sin had maintained its unchecked progress and uninterrupted increase. In fact, the revelation of retributive justice was already in course of development before Christ.[2]

[1] Even Weizsäcker (*ut supra*, p. 183 f.) rightly says: A more independent and natural meaning must be assigned to the idea of expiation than is usually done at present. Biblical teaching is too decisively in favour of this view, as well as the whole of the older theology and the moral experience of the sense of guilt, which seems to him too powerful, to permit him to believe that that idea is satisfied by any manifestation of grace or of divine-human love. "I believe," he continues, "that Christ's sufferings should be considered under this point of view, that He therewith actually did something in our place, that He suffered what we ought to suffer and could not, and thereby remove this indebtedness from us. Pure moral feeling, when it awakens, is always in its guilt conscious that its penitence ought to be an infinite sorrow, and that penitence is a gnawing worm for the very reason that it never reaches this point. But in his penitence the Christian participates in the infinite sorrow of Christ."

[2] Rom. i. 18. Cf. with the above the excellent exposition of Martensen, *Christl. Ethik, spec. Theil*, Abth. i. p. 155 ff., in the section: "Imputation and Guilt; Punitive Justice," p. 156 [Eng. Trans. pp. 130–132]: The idea of guilt implies that sin is the product of man's will, and that the man who by sin has made a rent in God's holy world-order, is thereby liable to an expiatory punishment, of which not amendment, but primarily retribution must be regarded as the aim, that right may remain right. P. 157: What is imputed to a man is not merely the particular action, but the entire moral condition in which he is found. For it is by his own will that every one makes himself what he is. Even that

3. Accordingly, the question of sin and guilt is so serious a thing, that it occasions a change even in God's disposition towards man. For this reason, reconciliation apart from satisfaction of the divine justice is out of the question. Unconditional forgiveness, as shown, is inadmissible. To renew the disturbed communion of *God* with man, as said before, lies not in man's power; and yet the discord of man with God is so opposed to His true nature and destiny, that, unless it is removed, disorganization and ruin must be the consequence. The condition on which. reconciliation and restoration of communion would alone be possible even to God, is in general *expiation.*

But the *rendering* of expiation to God is utterly out of our power. There can be no overplus of merit; consequently no release from the bondage of guilt already contracted, besides what we normally owe, can be found. Man is bound to do all the good that he can do. There can therefore be no question of making good what has been neglected; the only result would be a new instance of neglect. Just as little could the resolve to amend be a sufficient expiation. The resolve is no security for amendment. It merely furnishes the possibility of future obedience to the divine will. But such possibility does not, as an adequate equivalent, correspond to that violation of the divine will which has not remained possibility, but become actuality. Moreover, indubitable universal experience shows that even those earnestly desirous of amendment are obliged ever to confess to manifold defects. Just as little, finally, is the satisfaction, which our action cannot furnish, to be found in our suffering, or in our willingness to bear as just punishment the divine displeasure with all the effects that may flow from it. For even the full knowledge of the gravity and extent of sin, the feeling of God's just displeasure, and the will to bear these, presuppose

which we call fate has an aspect under which it belongs entirely to personal imputation—so far as the man has himself appropriated and voluntarily continues transmitted evil. On p. 158 ff. he strikingly explains, that not merely conscious, voluntary transgression is sin, as held by the Jesuits, but that even sin of ignorance so called is imputable and punishable (however it may furnish a ground of palliation), Luke xxiii. 34, cf. Luke xii. 47 f. For the binding nature of the law depends not upon an accidental knowledge of the same, but it is the law of my being, by which every estimate of worth must proceed.

a measure of moral strength such as would only be possible, in realized communion with God, and is not found in a state of unreconciled estrangement from God. How could the natural man, whose better resolves even are enfeebled by discord within, be in a position fully to acknowledge his own unworthiness in presence of the divine holiness, and in thought, feeling, and will to do honour to the divine justice, not merely in acknowledging the holiness of the law and the duty of obedience for the future, but in the sense of guilt and contrition, and in the righteous disposition which bears as just even the divine displeasure with its effects? To do all this by way of expiation, remains to us an impossibility. As certainly, therefore, as the possibility of true reconciliation both of God with man and of man with God is inconceivable without expiation, so certainly this expiation cannot be rendered by sinful man. All theories of self-redemption are false, morally lax and inadequate to the need of the conscience, whether their tendency be to expel the consciousness of sin and guilt, and of a Deity angry with sin, as gloomy and essentially futile conceptions, or whether they require us to seek rest and peace in resolves on a better life, or in resignation and willingness to suffer, or even to ascribe meritorious, expiatory force to repentance and the unhappy sense of punishment. It thus remains certain that the capacity of redemption still existing in humanity has for its converse the incapacity itself to furnish the potency of reconciliation. What it still has is merely the possibility of becoming reconciled.

4. God's Purpose of Reconciliation.—Where human strength and wisdom come to an end, there is the divine beginning. God's creative wisdom, animated by the impulse of love both for the *world*, for whose sake goodness is meant to exist, and for *goodness*, for whose sake the world is meant to exist, not merely requires expiation, such as is due to its holiness and justice, but also by the eternal counsel of its mercy gives humanity the possibility of reconciliation by sending His Son; and the antinomy—insoluble without grace, —to the effect that humanity cannot live without reconciliation, and therefore without satisfaction to the divine justice, and yet cannot be the originator of its own reconciliation, is

solved by the miracle of divine love in such a way, that humanity is enabled to present the atonement by a God-given potency. In these powers of atonement belonging to humanity, and reckoned among its possessions, humanity finds a substitute for its impotence to make atonement. Thus God's eternal purpose of atonement proves itself just and yet rich in love, and restores the combined revelation of the two attributes disjoined by sin, nay, perfects the world in this way, that the world gains the possibility, not indeed immediately, but through the divinely-given Mediator, of reconciling God, and on the ground of this of becoming holy and happy.

It must, of course, be impossible to an abstract idea of the simplicity of God, such as obtains with many inconsistencies in the old Theology, but especially in Schleiermacher, to regard Justice and Love as objectively different definitions of God, the revelation of which may be divergent by reason of the character of the world. On this point enough was said previously.[1] But even those who do not assign a merely subjective import to the attributes go astray when, in order to combine the divine attributes into unity, they regard objectively conceived love not merely as the highest, but as the exclusive definition of the divine essence, and therefore in various methods consider justice as a mere form or kind of love, even though at the same time zeal or hatred to its opposite is ascribed to love, this hatred being identified with justice. The correct element in this view is, that even justice is love for goodness, zeal for its honour, maintenance of the divine honour or self-love; but still it is not love for persons, for sinners, in the form of communicative benevolence. Rather is justice in its punitive aspect the assertion of the dignity of the holy and good which God Himself is, even in opposition and antagonism to man whose desire is wellbeing. On the other hand, to conceive of punishment as mere communicative love, would in the best case lead back to the theory of amendment.[2] But, on the other side, Love and Justice are indeed not seldom distinguished, but are so conceived that they no longer blend harmoniously in the unity of the divine idea. This is the case when they are viewed as mutually limiting or tempering

[1] § 19.

[2] §§ 24. 32. vol. i. pp. 300, 456.

each other. At the basis of this theory lies the opinion, that in God's essence they form two different wills, each of which lays claim to sole authority, and is therefore involuntarily restrained by the other. It might therewith be supposed that this opposition remains mere possibility so long as sin does not actually exist, but with sin the two come into conflict with each other. Thus, were the revelation of divine Justice contrary to the will of Love, and the revelation of Love contrary to the will of Justice, both, instead of carrying their measure within themselves, would be limited by each other, since a third power—the ingenuity of wisdom—would temper both, and restore peace among the divine attributes. The Christian doctrine permits no such, even merely possible, inner conflict. For us such conflict is entirely excluded, because, while firmly maintaining the objective distinctiveness of both, we had to regard them as so constituted that an inner mutual relation and indissoluble interconnection are again cognizable in them. This is rendered specially obvious by the consideration that God is not merely the Father of His children, but also the Ruler of the world, who maintains unhurt the world's moral aim. In God is no unjust Love, no Love even merely detached, emancipated from Justice. His Love carries the law of justice within itself, it keeps in view and honours the distinction between good and evil, because it loves and wills the holy as such. Even in communication God is holy self-love, *i.e.* He loves and wills the good which He is Himself, guarding it from violation. Thus His love with its tendency to communicate cannot come into conflict with justice, but throughout wills only what is in harmony therewith. Further, Justice as the guardian of distinctions, maintains the distinction between physical good, which would be communication without moral self-affirmation, and holy or ethical love, and in so far is also a safeguard against the self-exhaustion of self-communicating love. Accordingly, they are both essential factors of "holy Love." That holy Love is secured by their distinctiveness and mutual inner relationship. In it they are united, and it is the supreme governing principle of the divine attributes in general, and of their revelation. Therewith also an answer is given to the question: How can God be conceived as demanding expiation, and therefore angry, if

still He is and must be the One who bestows on humanity the possibility of expiation? Neither is there in God a love capable of being indiscriminately communicative, and of dispensing with expiation for guilt, nor can Justice prevent Love creating the possibility of expiation; for the aim of the world, of which expiation is the means, is itself also a revelation of Justice.

SECOND ARTICLE: THE IDEA OF SUBSTITUTION AND SATISFACTION IN GENERAL.

Substitution.

§ 120.

Atonement is only possible through the fact that there are *substitutionary* forces at work for the good of humanity, and receptiveness in humanity for those forces. As the second Adam, or Representative of humanity before God, Christ is the Substitute for humanity outside Him, so far as humanity is defective in religious personality.

LITERATURE.—Cf. Gess, *ut supra.* Bersier, *la Solidarité*, 1870, pp. 68, 70 ff., 83. Monsell, *The Religion of Redemption.*

1. THERE ARE SUBSTITUTIONARY FORCES, AND A RECEPTIVENESS FOR THEM IN HUMANITY.—As concerns the first proposition, the preceding century, with its predominantly subjective tendency, the influence of which we still feel, maintained the most unfriendly attitude to the idea of substitution; and the subjective moralism, which severs the personal from the generic consciousness, and views communities simply as products of the individual will of the subjects, has given sufficient evidence of its power in the idea of the Church and of the State current in these days (to say nothing of marriage).[1] But certainly on the other side a false idea of substitution, and one hostile to personality, is possible, which we might call magical. The Church, for example, may be conceived as a *corpus mysticum* of such a kind, that the independence which every person

[1] Cf. Rousseau, *Contrât social.*

should gain in Christ, and the personal participation of man in his moral and religious edification, are abridged thereby. After what has been established above,[1] we must maintain that neither the personal nor the generic consciousness is rightly conceived if one excludes the other, because each can only obtain its true form in connection with the other. The individual and the universal do not exclude, but include each other. Whoever wishes to sever himself from the genus is in a false state.

2. Let us then survey the *circle* in which Substitution obtains. *First*, Substitution has an extensive application in the *material* and outwardly *legal* sphere. It is so in virtue of *justitia commutativa* in barter and commerce, where one class of goods passes and is exchanged for another. One also may pay debts for, *i.e.* instead of another, nay, even a money-*penalty* may possibly be settled vicariously. In legal affairs also, substitution obtains in the widest extent. No wonder that the ecclesiastical doctrine fondly attached itself to the figure of a vicarious payment of debt, which must retain its place as a figure, *e.g.* in catechetical instruction, provided that the intensive moral and religious character of the debt, which is a violation of an infinite good, is not obscured thereby, nor the relation of man to God transformed into one of co-ordinate compact. But *further*, there is substitution in the sphere of the living. Even *organic* nature supplies analogies of this. A noble branch is grafted on a wild stock, and takes the place of the branch removed, not merely with the result of the partially alien branch becoming native to the stock, but also with the result of this substitution ennobling the entire tree and changing its sap. And conversely, by engrafting in a noble stock a wild branch may be ennobled.[2] The case is similar in *animal* life. When one organ suffers, not seldom another, having capacity for such a purpose, assumes the functions belonging to the first; and this is one condition of the power of the organism for self-preservation. Thus, one sense may become a substitute for another, *e.g.* hearing or taste for sight in the blind, or the eye for the ear in the deaf, and even in the case of those with all their senses, the written for the spoken word. But especially, before the development of the

[1] §§ 82. 83. [2] Cf. Rom. xi. 17.

particular organs in an organism, the function assigned to them is not necessarily passive, but the whole assumes, so to speak, the place of the particular organ or part, not in order that its germ may be atrophied or dispensed with, but that what is lacking may be developed by means of real, *i.e.* productive, not absorbing, substitution. Thus the child, before it sees the light of the world, lives as yet no independent life, either physically or psychically; but the life vicariously lived by the mother for the child developes it to independence and maturity. As in the vegetable and animal, so in the *spiritual* sphere. Here also all culture is conditioned by substitution; and not merely in relation to culture, it is also the necessary postulate of moral independence and freedom. What the child receives from its parents is not of necessity merely such instruction as it understands as fully as they do; and in reference to morality, not merely ought that to be expected from the child of which it sees the grounds, and which it produces of its own strength, and therefore imposes on itself. On the contrary, its productive power in reference to knowledge and volition must first be educated by the objective reason of its parents, whose maxims, deposited in the mind of the child and accepted on trust by it, train it to independence. Thus the reason of the parents lives a vicarious life in the child until it is ripe for independence. This is the benefit of authority in its place.[1] And if, in order not to interfere with the child's freedom, it were left without the benefit of this spiritual authority operating vicariously, *i.e.* if each generation were left to make a purely new beginning, the gain of such a course would accrue not to personality and freedom, but directly to the spirit of wild-growing nature and caprice hostile to them. The reason, clothing itself in the form of vicarious authority (for which in its ripe state it has the power), is the true seed of freedom. The true divine contents of reason, although not produced or spontaneously appropriated by the child, stand in secret, friendly elective affinity with the yet undeveloped reason of the child. Consequently, those contents, deposited in the region of the receptive generic attitude, of the *memoria*, of good habit and obedience, in a word, in that yet impersonal intermediate region belonging

[1] Vol. i. § 6, p. 79 ff.

to the generic life, which may be called the ante-chamber of personality, possess force to summon forth the true personality, and conduct it to freedom through the life of the individual spirit in knowledge, volition, and feeling being seized by and filled with the spirit of the rational and universal. No one will say that anything unethical is involved in free personality being thus developed by the operation of the vicarious reason. On the contrary, it is an admirable, divinely-instituted arrangement, characterizing us as an inter-connected race, that in all points—physical, legal, intellectual, moral, and religious—we must have guardians, tutors, and advocates, until the time determined beforehand by the Father;[1] and that the moral form peculiar to a certain epoch of life is this, that the youthful reason, instead of being self-willed, render itself dependent and behave obediently to the objective reason co-ordinated with it, so far as that reason has still a divine and human right to live a vicarious life in it. This is nothing but the right childlike attitude, the postulate of true, free personality. But as the childlike disposition involves both the possibility of going back to the true generic nature and the capacity of allowing its powers to operate upon itself, so conversely in the vigorous, personalized reason, and especially in love, there is not merely the capacity, but the inner desire and necessity, to descend to the position of an instrument, in order to open the needy, subjective reason to itself, to enter into it, and in sympathy communicate itself to it. This is the happiness of ethical personality, and also the test of its ripeness, that it is able to transform itself into a seed-corn, so to speak, for the good of the developing reason, *i.e.* into a form in which all egoistic, absorptive substitution is excluded, and self-surrendering self-forgetfulness desires to retain but one thing—the power of being an instrument for the victory of the good, for the powers of the universal.[2]

Thus in its very highest stage personality has the power, most certainly of all, of becoming through substitution a seed of freedom.

3. But, of course, receptiveness for substitutionary forces within humanity differs at different stages of life. Whereas the first period of human existence is absorbed in the generic

[1] Gal. iv. 2. [2] Cf. John xii. 24.

connection, in the second a distinction of the subjectivity from the generic life emerges, which in the case of sinful development may lead to variance, severance, and repulsion. On the other hand, at the last stage that existence coalesces anew, and in a higher manner, with the generic consciousness. Now, the right of substitution is disputed not in reference to the first stage, but in reference to the second, where the subject desires to be self-concentrated and self-enclosed. There a jealousy for freedom on the part of the subject may even oppose itself to God, until the subject recognises his need of God, and sees that determination by divine powers, representation of our empirical life by a divine life, harmonizes well with freedom, since freedom may be determined to let itself be determined by God, and since God's aim is, that His powers, operating at first vicariously as an impulse from without, should become natural to the subject; for God is a lover of freedom.

But at the stage of subjectivity it seems to be otherwise with receptiveness for a vicarious life of the genus. The genus operates on the subject in the form of particular individuals. Were, then, these individuals to live a vicarious life in us, the only possible result seems to be the injury or destruction of our individuality. This is even the case in an abnormal course, where the stronger individuality seeks to make the others at most selfless copies of itself. But this is not necessary. For example, in the case of parents, what is one-sided and abnormal in their individuality need not be the element operating vicariously in the life of the children, instead of what is rational and universal in their individuality. Moreover, Christ is no abnormal or one-sided individuality. He is the centre and reality of our genus.[1] Consequently, His personality cannot absorb our individual peculiarity and freedom; but if we have natural receptiveness for God, we have in a special degree receptiveness for Him in whom both true humanity and the absolute revelation of God are given. Since, therefore, the receptiveness is directed to Him, both the receptiveness for the genus with its substitutionary forces and the receptiveness for God find their satisfaction in Him. Receptiveness for the genus and its substitutionary forces,

[1] § 103, 5.

directing itself to Christ, is in an eminent sense well-pleasing to God, because it is also receptiveness for God. This is the meaning of *believing* in Him, the only way in which an evil subjective life-tendency can be plunged, so to speak, into the sacred depths of vital powers possessed of creative force, into the love of One who, belonging to the human genus and concentrating its powers in Himself, is mighty to save us and to originate a new life in us. But what has hitherto been advanced is less doubted; substitution and receptiveness thereto are conceded in the sense, that in place of the old man the holy principle that was in Christ must be imparted to us, in order that His life may take the place of the old man. But all this has reference merely to the life of sanctification, not of reconciliation. And thus the main question is left: Is not the operation of substitution excluded where the matter in question is the guilt of the subject? It seems as if every one must answer himself for his free acts, and there were no room therefore for substitution.

The answer to this has been prepared for in what precedes, on the subjective side by the doctrine of sin and guilt, on the objective by the doctrine of the divine penal justice.[1] It must be frankly confessed, that a substitutionary work of Christ is not possible for every possible sin and guilt, namely, not for the sin of rejecting Him, for the *finale repudium salutis*, and therefore not for the sin, which cannot be regarded at all as the effect of generic sin, because, on the contrary, it is purely personal in kind. Guilt exclusively, and in the full sense personal, God cannot do otherwise than visit on the sinner himself. It has no interest in the words: "They know not what they do."[2] The sin of definitive unbelief is the sin incapable of forgiveness. It is the sin against the Holy Ghost, and carries with it a *character indelebilis* of evil, because it rejects the good itself or as such. The person has therefore surrendered himself without reserve to the evil principle. On the other hand, all other sin and guilt, however great and penal it may otherwise be, is not personal in the full sense; it does not impart this *character indelebilis;* the general state has an ambiguity in it which does not exclude hope.[3] To it, therefore, the divine justice stands in a different attitude, and

[1] §§ 82. 83. vol. i. §§ 24. 25. p. 297 f. [2] Luke xxiii. 34. [3] § 83, 2 C.

not merely is long-suffering compatible therewith, but also the admission of substitutionary powers. Before Christ, sin and guilt were not yet consummated, although present in different degrees; then a provisory state yet existed, because the good itself was not rejected in its clearest revelation, and hence the capacity of redemption was not yet extinguished. Thus it was possible for God before Christ's days to regard all the sin and guilt of humanity as the common sin and guilt of the race, and the punishment due to it as common punishment, for which a corresponding expiation must be required.

Despite the different degrees of guilt, which the subjects may contract at the second stage, to the divine eye humanity is like one homogeneous sinful life in common. The whole of humanity is treated by God in conformity with this view, and so are individuals. No doubt an essential distinction here presents itself between the divine procedure and human justice, although even the latter has to administer the divine objective idea of right as far as it is able. *Human judicial administration* is unable to see deeper into the heart, so as to estimate the degree of energy in the law-opposing will. It does not comprehend the entire state of man, nor to what extent outward influences were decisive in the acts of sin. It must consequently limit itself strictly to the visible outward act of the legal personality, although it also makes a distinction between *dolus* and *culpa*, thereby acknowledging that knowledge of the entire inner worth of the person is necessary to a just judgment. Human justice, accordingly, stops for the most part at the act of the individual person and at the judgment of the act, in order not to strike the innocent and let the guilty go free. For it, therefore, a final principle must be, that every one has to answer for *his own* guilt; guilt can in no wise be imputed vicariously to an innocent person. And were the divine action necessarily analogous to the procedure pertaining to human justice even in reference to the second stage, there could then be no question of a divinely-given substitution. But the fact of human judicial administration having to limit itself altogether to those particular evil acts of the subjective evil will, which appear on the surface, is not its perfection, but its imperfection and limit; and it knows well that its function is not to pronounce the definitive

judgment on a man, but merely to regulate and judge the provisory state according to the idea of justice and its best knowledge. The imperfection of human justice, which is no searcher of hearts, is based on the fact that the particular act is not the person, but only one of the manifestations of the subject, whereas the punishment falls on the *entire* person, which yet did not necessarily participate in the act, even as it is not exhausted in the particular act. Those equally punished may be very unequal in their entire moral worth or demerit. The entire worth of the person, which is essential to an absolutely just judgment, may elude the eye of the human judge, because he knows not how much of the fault is due in the particular case to education, evil example, etc., and how much to the law-resisting will. But God's administration of justice must regard the entire man, his total worth or demerit. The *first* consequence of this is a far stricter and more deeply penetrating judgment of God on the evil in the world, to wit, the view that, on account of the universality of sin and its power, a common guilt exists, and that even judges, nay, the society that demands the execution of law and justice, are implicated in the common guilt, which in God's sight is not appearance, but reality. The consequence of this from the divine standpoint is a universal *κατάκριμα* extending to the whole of humanity, a condemnatory judgment on their state.[1] In presence of this condemnation all stand in absolute need of redemption and atonement, and the distinctions of greater or less personal guilt in the subjects make no difference therein, because no one can acquit himself of joint responsibility for the common sin. Consequently, before the divine judgment-seat, antecedently to the rejection of Christ, all sinners are equal in so far as this, that the difference in the degree of their guilt is not finally decisive, but to the divine view vanishes again in essential equality as to the universal need of atonement and redemption. First, because all are infected by the sin of the race, which does not remain inoperative, and are laden with the common guilt, which neither in its origin nor growth springs from God, but from the subjective freedom and guilt, in which we are implicated as members of one family and by our own act; secondly, because all sins

[1] Rom. iii. 19, v. 18 ff.

prior to Christ may spring from the common evil root—evil bias, and may thus be regarded as specific continuations of the generic sin. But the same fact which aggravates the depth of sinfulness and the extent of guilt, both in the eyes of God, who looks not merely at the particular outward acts, but at their deeper source and the general state of man, and in the eyes of the truly penitent man, the same fact which makes sin and guilt appear in their true light, and is the cause of a *κατάκριμα* upon all,[1] causes a ray of hope to shine forth. For, on the other side, all sins prior to Christ, as formerly shown,[2] have also the character of essential equality in this, that so long as Christ has not been rejected, the capacity of redemption still continues. Receptiveness for the substitutionary forces of the genus belongs indeed to the age of childhood as by nature. But even a higher stage of life may return to the childlike nature, namely, by moral means. On this ground Christ requires us to be converted and become as children.[3] Where a man has not become a personality hardened in evil,[4] there withdrawal of the evil, subjective tendency of life is still possible. There, accordingly, substitution still has its place and fruit for those who maintain a generic attitude, or an attitude of childlike trust to the forces of atonement, supposing such to exist in humanity. We affirm, therefore: Substitution still has its place where and in so far as evil is either the result of the inherited evil bias of the race, or may be still included under the common guilt in which we are all implicated, where, therefore, the subject has not yet incurred *the* guilt, which can no longer be reckoned at all part of the generic guilt, because it is purely personal in kind, derivable neither from a corrupt nature nor from temptation by the common spirit of evil, but altogether from free decision. In all cases outside that species of guilt, the sin of the subject may spring just as well from the corrupt generic life as from his subjectivity, and may therefore be reckoned part of the common sin and guilt of the genus.

[1] Rom. v. 16, 18. [2] § 83.

[3] Matt. xviii. 1-6; John iii. 5. He describes conversion and becoming a child again as possible even to the full-grown, and therefore a spiritual return from the abnormity of the second stage to the better receptiveness of the first.

[4] Matt. xii. 31 ff.

But then the same generic side, peculiar to every one, which was the occasion of his sinfulness, and which made him part of an organism, in which he could not without falsehood exempt himself from the common guilt, is also the medium by which redemption and atonement are still possible,—provided that substitutionary saving forces are not lacking to the genus. Thus man's capacity for redemption is now defined as receptiveness for the substitutionary forces of atonement. But just so we saw above [1] that the eternal unity of Justice and Love in God in presence of man's capacity for redemption is more precisely defined as the divine purpose of atonement, and the latter as the supplying of the possibility for humanity to make satisfaction to God through substitutionary forces in it. The possibility of salvation is restored by this, that humanity in some way carries within itself a saving, personal force of universal significance side by side with its common sin and guilt, whose effect is a common punishment. This saving force is able to answer for the whole, because God Himself lives in it, as conversely every individual has receptiveness for it. And this power to make satisfaction in the name of the genus to God's punitive justice, which has reference to the genus, is conferred on the genus by the Son whom God's love vouchsafes to it. He through the act of divine Incarnation has divine power to answer for humanity, while He also became a true scion of humanity as the Son of Man, having universal relation to humanity. The fact that humanity in Him transformed this possibility of substitution into reality, thus not merely rendering the divine forgiveness possible, but actually reconciling God with the world,—this is the meaning of His office, which represents at once His ability and His right, *i.e.* His ἐξουσία. The means by which He discharges His office is, that He is able to effect and does effect the substitution, which is the law of His life as the Centre and Representative of humanity.

But, before considering this, we have to inquire what the task of His substitution was, or wherein the *Satisfaction*, which it is essential to make, consists.

[1] § 119, 4.

Satisfaction.

§ 121.

The Satisfaction which is requisite in order that God may be reconciled with the sinful world, and His communion with it restored, consists in *expiation* to be made to God. This expiation consists not primarily in righteousness of life, but in voluntary subjection to that law of the divine justice which imposes just sufferings on sin and guilt, the centre of which is the divine displeasure.

1. It is true that, so long as the capacity for redemption is not altogether extinguished, there is no necessity in God to require such satisfaction to His justice by punishment as would leave no place for the revelation of His love and mercy.[1] There is no justice in God to which the preservation of the possibility of perfecting the world, and therefore of realizing the end of the world, is a matter of indifference. Such justice would be at variance with God's thoughts in creation, and with His love. On the contrary, God is long-suffering, so long as the possibility of salvation is not yet excluded. But, of course, the divine long-suffering does not abolish the discord and dissonance engendered by sin between God and the world, and that on both sides. The time of long-suffering, as we know, merely denotes an incomplete state, which must be carried on to the point of crisis. But the remedial crisis cannot be initiated by violating the divine justice, or ignoring its rights. A manifestation of the divine favour and grace, such as maintains the divine goal of the world, cannot take place immediately in an unreconciled world, in a world standing in unappeased conflict with God's justice. Unless the divine justice is to prove untrue to itself, it must require the rendering of a sufficient expiation.[2] But the question now is, wherein must the satisfaction or expiation consist, in order to be sufficient?

2. Simple as the common answer sounds: "The amendment of the sinner is the best satisfaction," still it cannot content us.[3] Not merely on the grounds previously laid down,

[1] § 89. [2] § 119. [3] *Ibid.*

according to which the power of faultless virtue is wanting to us by nature, and there can be no question of a superfluity of good, by which we might cover our sinful past (on the contrary, our old guilt is increased by new faults of omission or commission[1]), but even if a germ of virtue at least were implanted in us by divine providence from without, or by God's Spirit from within, the goal of atonement would not be reached thereby, nor the requisite satisfaction to God effected. For even if it be said that revelation awakens confidence and hope to begin a new and better life, by giving the assurance that divine forgiveness will be imparted to a pure moral life in the future, still good conduct in the future is not on this account an expiation for the past, to say nothing of the defectiveness of the moral life, which, by the testimony of experience, never ceases in this life,—a defectiveness which itself ever needs forgiveness, instead of having power to expiate past guilt. Were it said: Still a better beginning may be made *in principle*, and although the new good principle has still to develope itself in time, yet God, who stands above time, embraces in His view the consummation with the beginning, and sees the empirical moral life covered by the former,—or to speak with Kant: The idea of humanity well-pleasing to God, with which man becomes one in the resolve upon a better life, is to the divine view a substitute for the defective actuality of man,[2]—there is no doubt in this a presentiment of the truth, that substitution, through a perfection above us, is necessary in order that God may by anticipation behold us as righteous, so far as we stand in real contact with such perfection. But a better beginning in order to moral unity is no security for future sanctification, since the better principle does not progress after the fashion of a physical necessity; so that, even then, both moral perfection and forgiveness must remain immeasurably uncertain, whereas peace of heart and renewed fellowship with God form the condition for attaining a harmonious moral life, while again having the reconciliation of God with man and His forgiveness as their postulate. Further, the idea of humanity well-pleasing to God, as a mere idea remote from actuality, would exercise no essential influence on man's moral transformation.

[1] § 119. [2] *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen*, etc. See above, p. 44.

But the chief point is and remains, that the cancelling of the guilt of the past and present is of prime necessity, if we are to attain rest of conscience and peace with God, *i.e.* to know God reconciled with us. The effect of unatoned guilt is to diminish the moral strength. It can only be better with man when God's wonder-working power transforms forgiven sin and guilt itself into an impulse to moral enthusiasm by this very means, that liability to punishment is acknowledged as true and real, while none the less a divinely-given true, real, and effectual satisfaction is obtained through the Mediator, whom the gospel announces as the purport of its glad tidings.

3. Again, the expiatory satisfaction, which we cannot make of ourselves, or the atonement, cannot be accomplished by the divinely-given Mediator as Prophet. First, not by mere *teaching*. For, since the purport of this teaching could not be a paternal goodness that is neither holy nor just, it must, in any case, propose a pure moral ideal that addresses its elevating demands to us, and would therefore result in accusation rather than atonement. But were it said: "The God-pleasing, and therefore expiating and satisfying nature of Christ's mediatorship lies in His personal, typical manifestation, so far as the contemplation of it originates a new life in us," this would presuppose that a stimulating of our moral strength suffices for our reconciliation, whereas what is needed is not merely and primarily amendment for the future, but, as shown, the purifying of our present from the guilt of our past. Nor, for the same reason, can the Kingly power of the Mediator, which imparts strength in order to sanctification, by itself alone do what is requisite. The Priestly intervention of the Mediator with the Father is necessary for us and our guilt. Can we, then, say with some distinguished teachers, that He is the medium of God's forgiving grace, by becoming *the principle of repentance to the world*, inasmuch as in His suffering innocently at the hands of the world, the sin of the world has revealed itself in its horror-striking criminality? But, in this case, the properly atoning element would be the act of our repentance. As certainly as the latter ever remains imperfect, so certainly also would atonement ever remain defective, nay, mere possibility. Nor would the case be essentially changed if Christ came into view as supplementing

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our imperfect abhorrence of evil and defective repentance (see above, p. 72). Even then the Mediator would be merely the principle of sanctification, which still, as often remarked, needs atonement as its presupposition. On these terms we could never rejoice in atonement as accomplished and availing for us.

Nor, for the same reason, can it suffice to find the atonement in this, that through all sufferings and assaults the Mediator stands approved before God in purity and fidelity, both representing pure humanity before God, and becoming also the efficient beginning of a new humanity, so that His existence forms a security to God that He may forgive without danger of thereby multiplying sin. For even this would lead back to the position, that God forgives for the sake of the possibly future sanctification, which yet remains insecure and uncertain on account of moral freedom. Forgiveness, consequently, must of necessity remain in uncertainty. The proved fidelity of the Mediator in His calling can only come into consideration here, provided His calling is not merely His own personal sanctification and fidelity, but provided that calling brings Him into the closest, and only by this means mediatorial, fellowship of doing and suffering with the race.

The Mediator must be able, by force of vicarious love, to regard and treat our sin and guilt as affecting Him. Not indeed in the sense that He knows and feels it as His personal guilt, for this would either be contrary to truth, or, instead of being Mediator, He would be one of those needing redemption. Just as little, certainly, can He wish to stand to our sin and guilt in the relation of Judge. But His satisfaction, in order to be expiatory, must have a definite reference to our sin, guilt, and penal desert. The question is, wherein this reference consists, in order that it may be able to make expiation for us?

In the first place, it must be conceded that the guilt cannot be treated on the footing of *civil law* like a *debitum* which Christ pays for the believer (either to Satan or God), not because too much importance would thereby be attributed to the work of Christ or to sin, but too little, and because too mean an idea of both, as well as of God's justice, would in this case be held.

The theory of *injuria* also, and of a *tribute of homage* to be paid to God, is insufficient, inasmuch as it proceeds on the supposition that nothing is in question but a private matter, a personal pacifying of God, to say nothing of the universal necessity of justice as an essential aspect of the ethical generally.[1]

Moreover, just as little can *compensation* in accordance with the *jus talionis*, which runs: "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth," be put in the place of the absolute theory of punishment so called, which was established in the Doctrine of God.[2] This most rudimentary, nay, most barbarous form of administering justice, was transcended even by Anselm in his supposition, certainly in an unsatisfactory way, of a divine exchange by way of satisfaction, this exchange raising Christ's voluntary sufferings, which were not due from Him, to the dignity of a good work that makes satisfaction to God. Instead of identity between the punishment and the ruin incurred, the only requisite is, that the imperial rights of the divine justice be not infringed. The divine justice has no pleasure in the suffering of the creature as such, it is no thirst for revenge; suffering is no end in itself to God, but justice; and nothing is sought primarily by divine punishment but the good of the satisfaction of justice. In the previous historico-critical investigation, we have already alluded to the untenableness of this compensation-theory. On the one hand, in reference to Christ's high-priesthood, it asserts *too much* of His suffering in seeking to point out a distinct suffering of Christ by way of penal compensation for every kind of evil human acts. He did not endure all possible, especially physical, sufferings which men have inflicted on one another, and thus endure compensatory punishment corresponding to the different sins of men. Especially was it impossible for Him to endure the actual torments of hell, for eternity is part of the punishment of hell, and the misery of despair because of its unalterableness. Further, eternal damnation is no part of the common punish-

[1] The counterpart to this is the truth in the so-called Governmental theory, which goes back to the moral government of the world. Only the moral government of the world must be conceived as the *divine* government, and be grounded in God's *essence*, which as the primary ethical is also the universal ethical principle, which must assert itself and guard its own honour.

[2] Vol. i. p. 300 f.

ment, because before the preaching of the gospel God does not visit sins with damnation, while for the sin of definitive unbelief Christ could not intend to intervene with a view to atonement. Speaking generally, no individual person would be able in a limited measure of time to experience all possible outward sufferings by way of expiatory compensation.

But, on the other hand—and this is still more important—this theory affirms *too little* of Christ's suffering. In placing the physical sufferings as the chief matter in the centre of view, whereas others have endured similar physical sufferings, it pays too little regard to Christ's spiritual sufferings, which alone were incomparably severe. Further, the application of the *jus talionis* or of compensation would give encouragement to a piecemeal way of considering sin, guilt, and punishment, as well as the sufferings of Christ. Moreover, this mode of consideration would involve the danger that forgiveness might be asserted by man as a legal claim, after the penalty had been paid for him in the way of compensation (see above, p. 29), so that the atonement would conclude with the objective fact of the payment of the debt, instead of proving the fruitful commencement of a subjective process. But in this way Christ's work of atonement would not set in motion a moral and religious process, but introduce a mechanical, lifeless, essentially negative settlement. Moreover, mere compensation would by no means give what is requisite to the cancelling of guilt and punishment. A criminal who has paid the penalty to the State, is not thereby restored to the full integrity of his personal honour. Public confidence remains still withheld. Even in respect of the Mediator, it is not merely requisite that He submit to suffering, as if some expiatory power lay in this material element. The special requisite must refer to the righteous disposition in which He bears the suffering. That suffering must be related to God's just displeasure with its effects. It must be assumed with a righteous disposition and an absolute, voluntary surrender to suffering, which prefers even to sacrifice life rather than leave the guilt of humanity on the one hand, and the divine justice on the other, without expiation. The sacrifice of life has its significance as a palpable proof of unreserved surrender both

to the humanity which has to be reconciled, and to God's inviolable, sacred justice. This surrender has as its consequence the restoration of communion on God's part. On the other hand, an external atonement for guilt by a correspondent, external, substitutionary penal suffering would not imply a new and positive relation of God to mankind in communion and life, or the converse. The measurement of the sufferings pertaining to the Mediator by the quantum of debts and merited penalties, and therefore the application of the category of quantum to establish the idea of satisfaction or expiation, is for these reasons unsatisfactory. An arithmetical calculation and counter-calculation are inadequate to the matter here treated of (see above, p. 29). Instead of the external, extensive mode of consideration, the internal intensive mode must be applied, both in reference to *guilt* and *punishment*, and to Christ's *merit*. Christ's *merit* is not measurable by weight and number, because it is of infinite worth, and a potency intensively infinite by reason of the high dignity of the divine-human Person — the Head of humanity, and by reason of the depth of His spontaneous descent into our condition, and the purity of His life and passion. Conversely, the common *sin* and *guilt* have their gravity in this, that they are directed against an infinite good, although not with the energy of a will absolutely opposed to law, and therefore not with absolute depravity; for otherwise even the capacity of redemption would be gone. Just so we have a right, nay, are under an inner necessity, to advance in reference to *punishment* also from the external quantitative to the intensive mode of consideration. We have seen that the *pith and centre of the divine punishment*, as well as the source of all further penal evils, is the *divine displeasure hanging over the sinner as such*. Were that displeasure the last word, it would beget in the man conscious of it a misery with which no external suffering, measurable by quantity, would bear comparison; for the true feeling of this displeasure is the feeling of impending perdition, of exclusion from the source of salvation and life, the feeling of abandonment by God. When really awakened, it is the real and terrible feeling of death, with which nothing else can be compared.

Of what nature, then, must the satisfaction or expiation be,

in order to effect a reconciliation down to the depths of the conscience, and restore living, unfettered, paternal communion? The Mediator will not merely know the sin of the world in its culpability, and with an incorruptible sense of truth condemn it as a dishonouring of God, but in virtue of substitutionary love will feel with intensest pain the guilt of the world as affecting Him. In loving sympathy for us He will feel and bear the *penal desert of sin*, in a word, *feel and bear its curse that lies upon us, and the justice of the divine displeasure with us.* To this displeasure He will give the honour due to it in everything which it does and will do, in order by what he does and suffers to vindicate its eternal truth and sacred majesty.

Wherever the divine displeasure is not merely known, but its earnestness and justice are also sincerely acknowledged, accompanied with a sense of misery and the feeling that this displeasure is the just source of all other possible evils; wherever, finally, unconditional and willing submission to the divine judgment is found, there God's just displeasure is propitiated, there God may forgive and again impart His favour to man; for therewith the inviolable holiness of the divine justice is again established in its rights among men, and the unreserved submission to its judgment in thought, feeling, and will is an expiatory satisfaction to it. But all this is impossible to humanity before Christ. Even supposing it to have at least an imperfect knowledge of the divine displeasure, it is still without the power to submit to this judgment with the full sense of culpability. Instead of doing this, it flees from an angry God as from a gloomy, hostile, unjust power, either by diminishing its guilt by thoughts of self-righteousness, or by despondency and despair when the accusation of conscience waxes loud, and therefore by disbelieving the divine love, which in its character of holiness requires unreserved self-surrender and submission to justice.

But what is impossible to man is achieved by the divine-human Mediator, because He sympathizingly takes our place, and by His person and work represents to God the expiatory power of humanity.

Observation.—Having considered, on the one hand, the idea of substitution and its sphere in general, and investigated

next what is requisite for an expiation in order to divine justice being pacified and satisfaction made in respect of the sin and guilt of humanity, we come now to the

THIRD ARTICLE: THE SUBSTITUTIONARY SATISFACTION OF JESUS CHRIST.

1. *Subjective Aspect.*

§ 122*a*.

Christ makes God's eternal purpose of atonement (§ 119) His own in suffering obedience, in order to give effect to that purpose in the world, and therewith to the divine interblending of Justice and Love. The means by which Christ carries out this His subjective purpose of atonement is, that His divine love or substitutionary disposition transfers itself into the place of humanity, in order with absolute surrender and acquiescence in suffering to bear in His own sense of suffering the divine displeasure against the sin and guilt of humanity, in order to manifest His saving love even in face of God's punitive justice.

1. We stand here before the sacred shrine of humanity—the Atonement. Hence it behoves us in a quite special sense to bear in mind, that here are depths which no thoughts and words of man can exhaust, depths of holy sorrow in the Redeemer, and also treasures of divine blessing and peace, which, springing from the cross, continually move and animate the heart of Christendom. Every epoch of the Church has had glimpses of or beheld rays or aspects of these depths and this wealth; and glowing discourse and hymnology, as well as contemplation and theology, have from the Church's beginning, with the understanding of the heart, lost themselves in the relations which here crowd and intertwine together. But our age has above others the gift for apprehending the natural connection of what otherwise lies dispersed or apparently in hostile relations, and for uniting in one image those elements of truth

which have so far developed themselves. Having considered God's eternal purpose of atonement, and next the idea of Substitution and of the requisite Satisfaction in general, the possibility of substitutionary forces and their need, principally in reference to the divine displeasure against the common sin and guilt of the race, the effect of which is common punishment, we proceed now to Christ's historical work of Atonement. Here, above all, the uniqueness of His personality comes into consideration, in which the possibility is given of that personality sacrificing itself for the race in the unique way which the race needs.

Everywhere, it is true, the innermost heart of love must be defined to be the substitutionary disposition and the desire to transfer itself by sympathy and communicativeness into the place of another, to identify another as an end with itself, in order to make itself a means for his sake. In accordance with this we see substitutionary forces in different spheres, in the case of parents, teachers, husbands and wives, kinsmen, fellow-countrymen. But Christ's substitutionary disposition must be determined by the uniqueness of His person, thus distinguishing itself from all others. True, the equality with us, without which that disposition would be impossible, exists completely in Him. He is true man, belonging integrally to our genus. But, in addition, by the indwelling of the Logos or God as the Son, He has absolutely universal significance.[1] In Him dwells the perfect knowledge,[2] which comprehends both the depths of the divine holiness and justice, and also the common sin and guilt of humanity, and its just penal subjection to the divine displeasure. This universal knowledge in Him is based on His perfect holiness and absolute unity with God, which stood its ground in the fiercest attacks of the powers of darkness in His conflict of soul in Gethsemane and in the dark hours on Golgotha. But His undisturbed unity with God was also the source of His love for humanity. This love, as universal as that

[1] Cf. Rothe's *Nachgelassene Pred.* vol. ii. p. 137. *Jahrb. f. deut. Theol.* 1858, p. 754, 770 f. Marheinecke, *Dogm.* p. 369 ff. Martensen, p. 285 ff.

[2] Martensen says aptly, p. 277: Although Christ's knowledge is not all-knowledge, it is nevertheless perfect knowledge. This antithesis between the unlimited and limited in His knowledge is only solved by the idea of *central* knowledge.

knowledge, with absolute purity and strength embraces entire humanity and every burden lying on it. He is to humanity like a central conscience, the heart, so to speak, in its organism, the *sensorium commune* for all its suffering, especially for its spiritual wretchedness. Although an individual, He still suffered and lived what He was, suffered and lived as an individual in the spirit of the Whole and for the Whole. Through His *calling*, which was not arbitrarily assumed, but involved in the uniqueness of His Person, He has not merely a relation to a particular circle of life, but within humanity is that member who has a primary relation to all, as all have to Him. But this relation points, above all, to the centre of all true, human life—divine communion. Thus His sympathy, which is not merely natural, but moral, was able to penetrate to the inmost depths of human need and suffering, embracing all persons and their needs. Let us see, then, how this substitutionary position of Christ is carried out in reality.

Observation.—The old controversy, whether the active or merely the passive obedience of Christ is to be included in His high-priestly office, is not settled by our saying, with J. Gerhard: *omnis Actio Christi fuit passiva et omnis Passio fuit activa.* In reference to the *atonement* of sin and guilt,—sins of commission and omission,—Christ's *suffering* comes first into consideration as a special act indispensable to expiation, although, in order to making satisfaction, it must be grounded in the strength of the positive, holy disposition that enters into God's will.[1]

2. Love seeks not its own; the stronger it is, the greater its impulse to make another's case, especially another's burden, its own. To a mother's love the child's suffering is more painful than its own would be; she would gladly bear the pain for her child. Now in Christ such love lived in unique fashion, stronger than death. In contrast with Him, all humanity stood laden with guilt. He consciously distinguishes Himself from the world of sinners, but not in

[1] Similarly Frank, *System d. chr. Wahrh.* ii. § 35. The same lies at the basis of Anselm's theory. But it is very well consistent therewith, that Christ's active obedience also, apart from Christ's suffering, is of the highest importance, chiefly as security for the sanctification of believers.

order to exalt Himself in the act of judgment and condemnation above it, but in order in love to identify Himself with it in its need of Him. His love shrinks not from the seemingly impossible; He Himself desires, at the cost of participating in the unhappiness of the race, to sacrifice Himself for it, and, infinitely more than this, Himself to feel the divine displeasure and the unhappiness answering to it. Christ bears this feeling of unhappiness, not in order to spare mankind the sense of God's just displeasure in general, but in order to deprive the penitent sorrow, which cannot and ought not to be spared, of the character of hopelessness and despair as well as of imaginary meritoriousness, and to impart to it an evangelical instead of a legal character, because, instead of shrinking from God, that sorrow has to take its stand on the ground of atonement already accomplished. Many expositors have taken offence at the question, how Paul could wish[1] to be an *ἀνάθεμα* for his brethren after the flesh; and yet this is a mere spark of the spirit of that substitutionary love which springs from the altar of the cross, from the fire of love which kindled holy flames in the martyrs.[2]

But the following objection is made to the Evangelical doctrine: It is not satisfied with Christ's substitutionary disposition, His sympathy with us, but places Him in relation to the divine penal justice (*ὀργή*). But this, it is alleged, is something abrupt, and implies a super-historical, purely mysterious transaction,—a compact between Christ and the Father, which is neither mediated historically nor confirmed exegetically. The pragmatic, historical mediation of Christ's passion and death, and its necessity, is clearly apparent, but it has no direct relation to God's punitive justice and atonement. The ecclesiastical doctrine would imply an artificial enigma or mystery in arraigning Christ before the throne of the Father in order to let Him—the Son of His love—be judged and punished by the Father, whereas the Gospels tell us indeed of Christ's suffering through sinners, but not of a God-reconciling suffering for sinners. To all this it must be answered: Certainly, as already seen, the Son could not be the personal object of the

[1] Rom. ix. 1 ff. [2] Col. i. 24. Cf. Luke xii. 49; Gal. iii. 13.

Father's wrath or displeasure. He was and remained well-pleasing to God even in His act of substitution, nay, on account of it. Moreover, in His unselfish surrender, no giving up of His moral personality is to be seen, no confounding of His person with that of men, for even His feeling could contain nothing untrue. The substitution for us can be no *commutatio personarum*. He does not Himself become the sinful personality. But as concerns the Scripture statements, it is undeniable that Christ attributed to His passion and death a divine necessity, a connection with the forgiveness of sin.[1] In the next place, it is certainly necessary to place the pragmatic or historical necessity of His passion and death in more intimate connection than is commonly done with its divine necessity in order to atonement,[2] to exhibit the transition from His outer and inner sufferings *through* men to His sufferings *for* them, and, finally, to recognise how the holy relation to humanity coincides in His heart with His living relation to the holy, just, and loving God, and how His relation to God is more closely defined by His sympathy with men. But it is also possible to show all this approximately. In any case, this task is incumbent on Theology. Let us then attempt to reconcile these claims, and that in such a way as to exclude everything magical and abrupt.

3. Christ's atoning passion is not something arbitrary and abrupt, which came upon Him by surprise, and placed Him, in opposition to the Father and His judgment, altogether outside and apart from the action of historical causes. He came into these sufferings on the one hand by historical necessity, on the other by divine necessity, combining both in His historical, divinely-given calling. His passion was an official act, to which He gave a relation to divine justice not arbitrarily, but of necessity, by recognising in that which befell Him a connection with God's punitive justice or displeasure with humanity, while presenting an expiation to God by the manner in which He bore His sufferings.

Even by the Incarnation Jesus entered in a general sense into the fellowship of physical and social evils, which inflicted

[1] John iii. 14 ff., vi. 51, xvii. 19; Mark x. 45; Matt. xx. 28, xxvi. 28; Luke xii. 50, cf. xxii. 20.

[2] Kreibig's discussions on this point are good (pp. 207-248).

sufferings on Him which He willingly endured. He became poor for our sakes, and took a servant's form, whilst He might have possessed glory.[1] He did not so regard these sufferings of humanity, in which He took part, as if they included the real evil from which humanity needed first to be delivered. His gaze is directed above all to the sin and guilt, which are the greatest of evils. He sees in the entire sum of the world's suffering its connection with the sin which by divine appointment brings in its train evils and punishment upon sinners. Whoever commits sin is the servant of sin. Thus He sees in these evils a revelation already of the divine justice, effects of the divine displeasure; and, entering without guilt into the fellowship of sinners, with willing and loving mind He allows this common punishment to trouble and smite Him. Out of the heavy sufferings and afflictions besetting Him, the outer and inner degeneracy of the people without a shepherd, out of the power of death among mankind, the consciousness grew upon Him that humanity is in a state of bondage, that harmful powers hold sway over it,[2] in a word, that *it is in a state of punishment* from which it needs to be redeemed. But although His sympathy with humanity and His suffering through fellowship with sinners ran through His whole life, still His atoning passion was not spread uniformly over His whole life. Rather, through the pragmatic, historical development of His life it came to pass, that at the close of His life He came into such relation with the sin of the world as became to Him the point of transition to a high-priestly suffering in the stricter sense, a suffering *for* the sin of the world. That participation in the common evil ordained by God to sin was for Him the condition of entrance into our fellowship. His love and patience are therein revealed. But it was a new thing, that at the close of His life the sin of the Gentile and Jewish world conspired against Him, consigning Him to a transgressor's shameful death, a new thing that by His manifestation sin was compelled to disclose its innermost nature—falsehood and hate, murderous spite against the Just One, whilst He repaid this hate with the power of propitiatory love. By His word and

[1] 2 Cor. viii. 9; Heb. xii. 2. [2] John xi. 33-38, xiv. 30.

His holy, pure manifestation He bore witness to the sin of the world, He discovered to it the falsehood in which it seeks to hide itself, in order as the Physician to heal its sickness. But the world sought to get rid of the Physician in order to assert itself. Because He was pure amid the impure, and had no part in sin, therefore the world grew more and more averse and hostile to Him, and treated His existence as a personal accusation, against which it fortified itself by arrogance leagued with falsehood. For no one could long remain indifferent in presence of such a manifestation. Whoever refused to be for Him, must of necessity be against Him. The necessary consequence of His manifestation was to initiate a crisis for those with whom He came into contact. The catastrophe which the crisis must also bring upon Him He early foresaw, and prepared His disciples for the persecution and hatred of the world,[1] neither promising them easy victory nor glory. In the same way, too, the thought of the *divine judgments* hanging over the nation, especially in the last days, filled His consciousness.[2] In the blindness with which His foes turned against the health-bringing Physician He sees a consequence of their sin, which shut itself up in self-contentment and pride against Him. He foresees that, if the nation refuses to awake and be warned, a terrible judgment awaits Jerusalem, and weeps over the city, for which He is distressed even on the way to Golgotha. Nor could He be other than conscious of the condemnation it incurred by the fact that, instead of letting itself be saved, it raised its presumptuous hand against its Redeemer. The sin that rejected Him must continue ever to bring forth new sins till the fatal point is reached.[3] But He had first of all to pass through the catastrophe, which was to befall Him, in His inner consciousness. For this end He won by hard struggles the high-priestly attitude of soul in the spiritual conflict in Gethsemane.[4] He must also learn in actual experience how humanity strove to fling Him away from it, and on its part in sinful blindness to sever every bond of fellowship with Him. For, however conflicting and divided the world of sinners otherwise is, here Herod and Pilate—

[1] Matt. v. 10-12, x. 16.
[2] Matt. xxiii.-xxv.; Luke xxiii. 31.
[3] Matt. xxiii. 35.
[4] Matt. xxvi. 36 ff.

the Gentile and Jewish worlds—united to persecute Him who stood in contrast with them—alone and forsaken in His holiness. The sin of the Gentile and Jewish worlds—and therefore the sin of *the world*—here revealed itself in its fundamental forms, confronting Him in typical shape. How does He behave in its presence? All the sufferings inflicted on Him personally—physical and spiritual—stir in Him no thought of retaliation,[1] no movement of desire for God's power and judgment to interfere and revenge Him by punishing the evil-doers. On the contrary, although what He suffers at the hands of men brings home to Him the depth and extent of the sin and guilt of the world, which He views in connection with the Prince of the world, He is far from yielding to bitterness, or wishing to assume the attitude of Judge towards sinners. He regards them as exposed to the divine condemnation, and even their rebellious hatred against Him who is conscious of being their king, is to Him, in virtue of the purity of His love, a challenge to His sympathy, a motive to redouble the ties of fellowship on His part and to constitute Himself their intercessor.[2] "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do!" In such deep compassion and sympathy He feels their sin and guilt more than His own suffering. Nay, sorrow for them, this sympathy not merely with their wretchedness, but their guilt and penal desert, is through His self-forgetting devotion His deepest suffering, the heart of that suffering. He knows their wretchedness better than they. He knows what they know not in their conduct, that they stand under God's displeasure and condemnation[3] for hating and reproaching Him. He enters into this condemnation of theirs in feeling, sorrowfully acknowledging it to be just in His deepest soul, and so far therefore subjecting Himself to the divine condemnation, which He recognises.[4] Whilst His body and soul

[1] 1 Pet. ii. 23; Heb. xii. 3. [2] Luke xxiii. 28, 34. [3] Luke xxii. 53.

[4] When we speak, with the Epistle to the Hebrews, of His sympathy (*συμπάθεια*), the meaning cannot be, that He merely felt the same sorrow which men felt. On the contrary, the world had no presentiment of His sorrow, which was a sorrow for the *sin* and *guilt* of the world and God's just *displeasure*, so that in this respect He does not properly *suffer with* men, but only suffers in order of course to awaken in them a corresponding sorrow, Luke xxiii. 38. But still in His at first solitary suffering He is the *sympathizing* High Priest.

suffer at the hands of sinners, His love to them remains stedfast, and by the very medium of the sufferings which they inflict on Him, transfers itself into their unhappy condition, over which God's displeasure hangs, and into the sense of the same, in order by suffering and intercession to avert the ruin of that condition. And thus His sufferings, which are at the same time an inner act of love, brought Him of course into relation to the divine Justice.

4. Let us by way of epitome consider this point somewhat more closely. Christ is the first and only man who comprehended the sin and guilt of humanity in its intensive, infinite significance; for as the Head of humanity He is its consciousness. He knows Himself to be sinless, but also to be entrusted with the mission to become the Redeemer of the world. All this He comprehends, not merely in thought and judgment, but also with His heart. It cannot but seem to Him impious and impossible to wish to restore God's loving relationship to men, and a happy life to them, by ignoring and overleaping the divine Justice (§ 119). For this reason the task is imposed on His substitutionary disposition of confronting even the divine Justice. And thus He is only content with desiring to do honour to the divine Justice not merely in thought, but also by the surrender of His entire Person, His will and feeling, His body and life. Knowing not merely the reality of the divine displeasure, but also its justice and necessity as well as the significance of guilt and penal desert, and experiencing the sense of that displeasure along with men, He desires to render *satisfaction* to the divine Justice, and only to effect redemption by representing humanity in this respect also before God. This has become the expiation which avails in God's sight, the λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν. For this reason He was not content with participating in the common penal condition, death included, but in His sympathy was above all moved by the guilt and punishment of humanity, not merely by that which humanity felt, but entering also into the sense of penal desert, which it had not but ought to have, into the sense of the divine displeasure or God-forsakenness itself.[1] He desires to bear what humanity neither does nor can bear. He desires, in acknowledging the divine

[1] Matt. xxvii. 46. Cf. John xvii. 19; Mark x. 45; Matt. xx. 22.

penal justice, to draw the sufferings upon Himself, to turn them away from the humanity which His love will not abandon, preferring by participation to share the sense of the divine displeasure as just, forgetting Himself and sacrificing everything but love. He is therefore a High Priest in *συμπάθεια*, making what is His ours, and what is ours His, and bearing that heaviest suffering, in which all other evil finds its centre and climax—the sense of the divine displeasure (*ὀργή*) with a guilt-laden world. He encircles the world with His energy of love, so that He is willing to answer for it, to save and cover it by His substitutionary act. In this willing surrender He even pours forth His blood, and losing Himself in a sense of our culpability and. of God's just displeasure which breaks His heart,[1] He commits His spirit into His Father's hands.

2. *Objective Aspect.*

§ 122*b*.

Christ's purpose of Atonement, which was an acceptance of the Father's purpose, and the course of action in keeping with His substitutionary disposition, which took the form of suffering obedience, have also objective significance, and therefore objective force and effect. Contemplating humanity in Christ as making satisfaction to the divine Justice, God sees in Him, who suffered for us, and in love to the divine Justice offered Himself a sacrifice to God, that perfect security for the world, for the sake of which not merely free forgiveness and immunity from punishment, but also life and blessedness, may now be proclaimed and offered to it.

1. After § 122*a* the question still remains open, whether that which Christ desired to accomplish by what He did and suffered for our good from a love that never forgets the claims of justice remained His subjective wish only, or whether God also regarded it as Christ would have it regarded, namely, as

[1] John xix. 34. Cf. Hanna, *The Last Days of our Lord.*

done for the benefit of humanity, as an expiation or *ἀντίλυτρον* for it in order to the forgiveness of sins. We saw that the purpose of substitution, which does not shrink even from entering into the misery and unhappiness of the loved object, is necessary to His free love, and is the law of its life. Now, if it were possible for God's justice to characterize such action on the part of love as worthless, as an essentially futile and impossible aspiration, then love, which yet cannot but do this, would be severed from justice at its highest point. But no justice can exist which could forbid love doing that which it must do, and without which, therefore, Christ's love in particular would not be perfect. Justice is the guard of love, not an interdict upon it. On the contrary, if justice exists for the purpose of shielding good of essential value, and therefore love, it wills love after its manner. This implies an objective value in Christ's work of love even for God. Nor can we so much as conceive that the love of the God-man, which devoted itself to death for our sakes, could have besought anything in vain. Further, to the divine judgment two things objectively exist—the receptiveness of humanity for substitutionary forces, so long as it is still capable of redemption and an object of intercession, and the concentration of objective, substitutionary forces in Christ. For Christ belongs objectively, and in the true divine view actually, to humanity, namely, as its Head and Representative, and as the only one able to save it. If, therefore, it was no caprice on Christ's part, but divine necessity,—the *ἐντολή* of love,—to desire to answer for His brethren, and, after incorporating Himself with humanity as its true Son, to make it, so to speak, a debt of love to humanity to cancel its debt, how could the Father refuse to acknowledge what He gave to Christ as an *ἐντολή*, after Christ had fulfilled it? Or, what could be lacking to the perfect satisfaction of justice, after Christ had done it honour in every respect, undertaken everything which it is bound to require, and embodied all its demands in His own willing act and suffering?

2. So far as Christ is truly man (nay, in Him appeared the inmost essence of the idea of the race), the *race* made in Him satisfaction to justice for its guilt. Now, from the time that He who did and suffered this really belonged to

humanity, it is no longer a race that does not make satisfaction to God; but as certainly as He can no longer be thought without His humanity, so certainly also humanity cannot be thought truly, if it is thought without Him, and *thus it makes satisfaction in Him.* Thus, from its own midst it presents to God and His justice the expiating, satisfying Man—its Head. And God thus receives from the race in Christ's entire obedience a good precious even to Him, which had no existence before, which could not be produced by God alone, which indeed He made possible by sending His Son, but which could only be realized by Christ in earnest, painful toil. Hence, God Himself can no longer view humanity, to which Christ with His merit and historical power over it belongs, without Him; and since God views it as it has been since Christ, He views it as one carrying in itself, along with guilt and sin, the power of the expiation which avails before God, nay, even the power of holiness.

3. But, of course, the process of atonement cannot conclude in pure objectivity, in the way in which the payment of a debt may really avail for another without his taking part in it or knowing of it. God, it is true, on His part, is in Christ reconciled with humanity even before its faith, not through faith; access to God is free, God can now offer Himself to us as a father to his children. But He offers Himself thus, *in order that* we may believe, on our part affirm Christ's fellowship with us, therefore seek fellowship with Him, and in this fellowship not merely have the consciousness of forgiveness, but also find in Him the powers of sanctification. But wherever this atoning, prevenient grace is despised or turned to wantonness, there long-suffering is at an end, and the flame of judgment bursts forth against irremediable wickedness. This very atoning, *i.e.* absolutely revealed love, must also be absolutely condemning love to those who scorn it.[1] But, first of all, the effect of what has been objectively done and procured by Christ is, that God now regards humanity as atoned for in Christ, that in His heart He has forgiven it for Christ's sake—not merely if or because it believes, but objectively in Himself in free prevenient love *because of the connection of Christ with it,* and therefore can offer forgiveness to it without injury to His

[1] Heb. vi. 10; John v. 27, iii. 36.

justice. Humanity therefore possesses in Christ the efficient power of atonement as a sacred gift, which has made forgiveness through grace not merely a possibility, but a fact for God, although the subjective process in us is not thereby dispensed with. Humanity is now no longer unreconciled either by expiation or punishment, no longer a mere object of patient long-suffering; but in Christ it may and ought to know itself judged, but in such a way that judgment is swallowed up in victory. And, withal, He who thus makes Himself a sacrifice to the divine justice for our good, has become the personal righteousness of our race, the efficient, creative principle of a new humanity, which by faith receives the objective atonement for its justification, and will stand before God in righteousness of life. By fulfilling righteousness and the law, Christ overcomes the sole supremacy of the legal stage, conducting it on to the revelation of love. But here the consideration directly suggests itself, that the holy discharge of His office was identical with Christ's personal exaltation. We saw that His theanthropic love did not assume the work of judging the world, but in its willingness to bear the full weight of God's justice on behalf of humanity drew the judgment, so to speak, down upon *itself*. But this fact has also a Christological significance for the consummation of His theanthropic Person. Before proceeding, however, to this subject, let us consider how the various theories of atonement, which have come under our notice, are related to what has been advanced.

4. RETROSPECT.—According to § 114, 3 (p. 7), it is our duty to show that what is true in the theories of atonement that have appeared hitherto, finds room or is preserved in the exposition given. The purport of the theories of a predominantly *physical* character is deliverance by Christ from the power of *death* and *Satan*. True, death is overcome by Christ only as the last enemy, and despite the atonement through Him even believers are not exempted from the necessity of dying. Nevertheless, through Christ's atonement the power of death is broken inwardly, or as a power over the spirit. The fear of death is abolished for believers, death is transformed into an object of hope; for, through the restored communion with God real triumph even over mortality is

made the object of certain hope, whereas the sufferings still remaining have lost their penal character for the consciousness of the Christian, and only continue, even as disciplinary and in so far salutary evils, so long as their good end is not yet accomplished. Just so through Christ's atonement the power of Satan—the Prince of this world—is broken, and his impotence in contrast with the Holy One, on whom he exhausted himself, demonstrated. Christians are bought for Christ and His kingdom, and saved from the power of darkness. Before Christ's advent its assaults had their strongest support in an evil, guilt-burdened conscience, which suggested the temptation to flee from God as a dark, hostile being, and to surrender oneself to the perverseness of frivolity or despair. But through Christ's atonement the accusation of conscience is so hushed, that, while its justice is acknowledged and its severity even increased, it becomes a means to lead in the way of salvation and reconciliation.

The theories, founded on the category of *adaptation* (*convenientia*), are to be acknowledged in a formal respect, not merely as relates to their fundamental thought, but still more inasmuch as design implies that knowledge of the necessity of the historically realized means of atonement, which was the problem before us. And if regard is had to the *contents* of what is given us in Christ's work of atonement, that work implies essential gain also in relation to true *knowledge* or consciousness. Not, of course, as if knowledge by itself were atonement, whether knowledge of man's true, noble nature, elevation to an ideal apprehension of humanity, of its essential unity with God, in which atonement is already given eternally,—or knowledge of a supposed, eternal reconciliation of God with sin and guilt, or of a non-existence of sin for God, or of a substitution of the ideal man who is born of better resolve and is well-pleasing to God for our sinful condition; for this ideal essence of human nature is mere possibility, and our empirical character contradicts the reality which it desires. But when, as the faith of Christendom affirms, the humanity well-pleasing to God—the Son of God—really exists, He can of course be a substitute for us according to the divine view; and our knowledge, that on account of *His* connection with us we belong to a humanity well-pleasing to

God and reconciled with Him, of course imparts to our consciousness a sense of reconciliation.

The theory also, which regards Christ as a *symbol* set up by God, on the one hand of His hatred against evil in order to awaken the consciousness of our sin and God's holiness, on the other hand as a symbol of His sparing love, rightly reminds us that God is to be conceived in the matter of atonement not merely as Father, but also as Ruler of the world, and contains all the more truth as this theory seeks a point of connection in history. To it Christ is a historic pledge and security for God's forgiving love, without His severity against evil being meant to be infringed thereby. He is the revealer of the peace of God with humanity, the personal promulgation of forgiveness by means of His teaching, which is sealed by death. But hereto must now be added: The reason why Christ is the most potent and true symbol of atonement is, that He is more than a mere symbol instructing about eternal truths or intimating them, because in Him the atonement has become present reality. Were His life and suffering not operative, but mere symbol, they could then scarcely signify what this theory supposes. Christ's suffering and death would not be an apt, but a most obscure symbol of the forgiveness of sins. How far is such suffering, supposed to be a divinely-ordained symbol, from suggesting a manifestation of divine love, unless such divinely-inflicted suffering mediates and effects forgiveness, instead of merely signifying or promulgating it! Moreover, the teaching of Christ Himself, which is sealed by His death, is by no means silent on the subject of God's punitive justice, and knows nothing of the doctrine, that evil is only punishable in the sight of the just God on account of its hurtfulness to human welfare, not on account of its absolute culpability. Seeing, then, that the mere symbolic or didactic import of Christ's suffering and death is without basis, if Christ's person and work are not, on the contrary, operative or procuring means, the view must commend itself, in comparison with the former one, according to which Christ is not a mere prophet, teacher, or example, but has and exercises the power of communicating energetic consciousness of God or sanctification and conquest over sin, for therewith He is the security for our

perfection, which is acceptable to God, the security not merely to us, but also objectively to God.

This is further supported by the following line of consideration. Christ maintained holiness and righteousness under the severest assaults; He permitted the power of sin to burst upon Him, and forced it to disclose its inmost mind—hate and falsehood. As the righteous Son of man, He exhibited the unchangeableness of pure love with love-begetting energy, and His fruitful, productive archetype lives on in the Church through the Holy Spirit. Through the startling revelation of the inmost essence of sin in Him, He has become the principle of repentance to the world. And since the power dwells in Him of drawing into the fellowship of His blessedness and holiness, God Himself is able to let Him stand as security for us. Nay, the remark is obvious, that on account of Christ's connection with us, God may even accept the beginning of the new life in us for its consummation, in order for its sake to vouchsafe forgiveness and justification to the believer. Without doubt this *moral* theory affirms much that is weighty and great; but what is true in it again becomes insecure when the procuring of forgiveness and atonement by Christ are left out of sight, independently of our personal holiness and faith in Christ. If God's reconciliation with us and our forgiveness are only procured by our faith as the principle of sanctification, only a precarious position is left to Christ's atoning action. For true faith is impossible without sincere repentance, and sincere repentance without acknowledgment of guilt and actual penal desert, and therefore of the reality and justice of the divine displeasure, nay, impossible without the wish for a satisfaction to the divine justice. But *such* repentance is impossible without the preaching of the atonement *accomplished* by Christ. Nothing but that atonement can evoke the act of trustful faith in Christ, which then no doubt becomes the principle of sanctification in us. The atonement—already accomplished, procured *anticipando* by Christ's prevenient love, not first to be procured by our initial sanctification—must be the object on which faith is trustfully to lay hold, else our assurance of salvation ever rests in the last resort on the weak foundation of our faith, which procures forgiveness by initial sanctification. Accordingly there must be a pre-existence, so to speak,

in God and Christ of our atonement, procured by Christ before our faith, in order that faith on its part may be able to enter into saving, sanctifying fellowship with Christ. Faith must be able to base itself on Christ's anticipatory communion of love with us, and therefore on Christ *extra nos*, who, however, is also for us; and then faith itself is the response to and affirmation of this communion provided by Christ. But Christ could not take His stand as security for humanity to God, unless as High Priest He entered into the sense of guilt, which we ought to have, into the sense of punishment involved in God's just displeasure. To think away this crowning-point of Christ's suffering, this sharpest sting, consisting in the painful consciousness or endurance and affirmation of God's displeasure acknowledged as just, would be to take away from Christ's suffering love that which subdues the heart and answers to the need of the conscience; and therewith the purity and overwhelming force of the principle of repentance and sanctification would suffer damage. This leads to the last and highest point.

The validity of the aspects hitherto considered must depend upon the right interweaving of the idea of *justice* into the doctrine of atonement. Certainly, after what has been advanced, the *private-right* theory is insufficient, which starts from the analogy of the payment of a money debt or a satisfaction for the injury to God's personal honour. Just as little satisfactory is the theory of retribution according to the *jus talionis*, or, to speak generally, the quantitative equivalence of Christ's physical sufferings to the penalties deserved by humanity. His physical sufferings are rather to be viewed in as close association as possible with His spiritual sufferings, and could only have their most painful significance in their connection with sin. Nor, again, must we stop at the view, that from His birth Jesus submitted to participation in human sorrow, in physical and social evils, therewith subjecting Himself to God's penal decree upon humanity, which connects suffering with sin, and therefore to the common punishment, death included, to which all members of the race are subject; for this He was obliged to assume as the pre-condition of His official action. Finally, His perfectly satisfying God's legislative justice, which requires a pure and godly life, as the righteous

personality who offered Himself to God a well-pleasing sacrifice (ὀσμὴ εὐωδίας),[1] by presenting pure humanity before God,[2] merely concerns Him personally. But this very righteousness of His cannot do other than acknowledge the penal character of sin and the rights of the divine justice, while His love with its universal power, to which the race is receptive, must in virtue of His office resolve to bring help to the race by entering into its misery and bearing its burden in high-priestly sympathy. Thus arises *the official presentation and realization of justice for the race*, of course only on the basis of His perfect ethical personality or righteousness; and by this means He not merely desires to satisfy, but does objectively satisfy the divine justice, exhibiting in the world the same zeal for justice that lives in God. Whilst His theanthropic person enters into the painful sense of the divine ὀργή, in order to deliver us from it, thereby *glorifying the divine justice*, at the same time by His holy sacrifice of body and soul, which He vicariously presents to God for us, the sacred rights of justice find their realization upon earth. Christ's spontaneous act of suffering obedience is absolutely well-pleasing to God as an act of unconditional homage to the majesty and rights of divine justice springing from His unselfish love, an act of homage by which spontaneous loving communion between God and the world is again established free from all restraint. For the result of God's good pleasure in this sacrifice is, that in His heart God can and does forgive humanity, so far as Christ represents it, no longer imputing former guilt, and therefore deprives all suffering of the character of punishment, nay, not content with our immunity from punishment, again manifests His favour and grace to humanity. Justice and love, the revelation of which in the world was sundered by sin, are again brought by Christ into realization in the unity and harmony belonging to them eternally within the divine nature, and are revealed in that realization.

[1] Eph. v. 2. [2] Heb. x. 5-10.

TRANSITION TO THE THIRD DIVISION.

§ 123.

With Christ's death not merely is His earthly work finished, but also the inner, primarily spiritual consummation of His person established. Hence, the lowest stage of His outward Humiliation is in itself the beginning of His Exaltation.[1]

LITERATURE.—Cf. Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, ii. § 567, p. 303 ff.

1. The New Testament speaks in several places of the importance of Christ's sufferings and death for the consummation of His person, and that not merely in the light of consequence and fruit or reward,[2] but also in the sense that the lifting up of Christ on the cross, outwardly the deepest humiliation, is itself contemplated as personal exaltation, glorification, or transfiguration,[3] the ground of which cannot lie in the fact that by His death He was withdrawn from all attacks of human hostility and all affliction, but in this, that even in suffering, a Redeemer's glory,[4] the power of love, and the dignity of a King who suffers for His people, are revealed.

2. The possibility of Christ's manifesting His high-priestly love by suffering and death, implied that the relations of the different sides of His personality stood as yet relatively isolated. Therefore the theanthropic Union was at first, before His death, not yet completely realized, although its consummation was divinely assured from the beginning (§ 102. 3). It is true, He was King even before His state of exaltation, and His humiliation formed a standing contrast to the dignity and greatness existing in Him. But He was not yet raised above the capacity of suffering and dying, not even above assaults and temptations, and therefore His blessedness was not yet perfect. Although, further, the Son

[1] 1 Pet. iii. 18, θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι. The latter cannot refer simply to the Resurrection.

[2] Heb. ii. 14, v. 2-7; Phil. ii. 9-11. [3] John viii. 28, xii. 32-34.

[4] Cf. Rothe, *Nachgel. Predigten*, 1869, II. xvi. p. 134 ff.

of man knew it to be His destination to bring real judgment to the world, which as yet He did not actually exercise,[1] still absolute divine majesty and might were as yet wanting to Him.[2] If in the work of atonement He were the Judge who demands and receives the expiation, He could not at the same time be the One who presents it, without converting the work into something merely epideictic. Hence Luther's saying cited above (p. 32) has its truth, the validity of what Christ did on behalf of humanity depending on this fact. But in the very sufferings by which He places Himself in relation to God's justice in order in *συμπάθεια* with us to feel His displeasure, and therewith on His part with priestly heart bear the burden of the general punishment lying on humanity, the spiritual element lacking to His person is gained. By the perfect interblending in the God-man of justice and love as they are united in God, and that in carrying forward the union of His divine nature with the human, the absolute union with God's judicial power and justice is inwardly brought about; and thus His deepest humiliation became in itself the commencement of His exaltation.[3] The movement proceeds from both sides, which seek and tend towards their perfect union. The humanity of Jesus wills and affirms the divine justice without condition or limit. Not merely does that justice live in His consciousness of God's displeasure with the world, but the Son of man, with absolute sense of justice, enters by voluntary suffering into God's judicial will, and in such self-sacrificing, righteous love embodies in human life the absolute justice that exists in God, draws the divine justice down, so to speak, upon himself, in sympathy becoming responsible for our guilt and penal desert. Therewith a scene is prepared in humanity for God as the Logos after a new manner. For, conversely, the Godhead also, who chose Him as His dwelling, wills to be revealed and gain realization in the God-man as retributive justice. Christ's perfect love for justice, which sacrifices itself in order to glorify the divine justice, and which He attested by suffering and death, was His consecration to the office of theanthropic Judge of the world. Hence His lofty language at the very moment when

[1] Cf. Matt. xxv. 31 ff., xxvi. 64, with John iii. 18, v. 22, viii. 15, xii. 47.
[2] John xiv. 12.
[3] John v. 19–22, 26.

He is being judged by the high priest.[1] Now the majesty and judicial authority of God are able and willing to make their abode without reserve in Him who, by His entrance through voluntary suffering into the judgment passed on the world, first gave the divine justice the scene of its absolute realization in humanity. His loving act in justly bearing our burden, to which His earthly and physical life succumbed,[2] became, on the other hand, the consummation of His person, in the first instance of His spirit.

Observation.—Just as, according to § 105, 1, the commencement of the Incarnation was brought about through the human soul or the spirit of Jesus, so the same relation must again obtain at the end. Christ's corporeal consummation, His resurrection and raising to the right hand of the Father, can only be the result of the spiritual consummation accomplished in the sacrifice of His death. This His spiritual consummation comes to a close in the Descent into Hades so called, and its effect is the Resurrection and Exaltation to the right hand of God.

THIRD DIVISION.

THE EXALTATION OR POST-EXISTENCE OF CHRIST.

FIRST POINT: THE DESCENT INTO HADES (cf. § 99).

§ 124.

Christ's Descent into Hades so called neither belongs to the state of Humiliation or suffering, nor has it a mere epideictic meaning. It rather marks, in respect to Christ's person, a higher state of life, pneumatic in character, in which He is able to display His spirit-power independently of space and time.

LITERATURE.—J. L. König, *Die Lehre von Christi Höllenfahrt*, 1842. Güder, *Die Lehre von der Erscheinung Jesu Christi unter den Todten*, 1853. Ackermann, *Die Glaubenssätze von Christi*

[1] Matt. xxvi. 64. Thus, perhaps, the ἀπ' ἄρτι of the passage is to be understood.

[2] John xix. 34.

Höllenfahrt und v. d. Auferstlig. d. Fleisches vor d. Richter unserer Thaten, 1855. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, § 171. Frank, *Theol. d. F. C.* iii. 397–454 (worthy of notice on account of the discussions respecting Aepin); *System der Chr. Wahrheit*, ii. 205 f. Von Zezschwitz, *Petri Ap. de Christi ad inferos Descensu Sententia ex loco nobilissimo* 1 *Petr.* iii. 19 *eruta exacta ad epistolæ argumentum*, 1857. Cf. the commentaries of Calvin, Bengel, Huther, v. Hofmann; Schmid, *Bibl. Theol. N. T.* Schweitzer, *Hinabgefahren zur Hölle als Mythus*, 1868. G. H. Waage, *De ætate Articuli, qui in Symb. Apost. traditur J. Ch. ad Inferos Descensus*, Haun 1836.

1. It may be accepted as a result of modern exegetical research,[1] that, in harmony with the faith of the ancient Church, Peter really contemplates Christ after His death, probably before His resurrection, as active in the region of the dead (in Hades, Old German *hel*), and therefore not in the place of torment, but in the intermediate region.[2] If hell is the same as the region of the dead, the notion is precluded of Christ going into Hades in order to endure the torments of hell.[3] The application, found among Reformed theologians, of the Descent into Hades to the torments of hell, which had to be endured, shows its intrinsic weakness in this, that these inner sufferings were then usually connected with the cross.[4] Since the text speaks of a preaching to the spirits reserved in Hades, the interpretation here and there endorsed by Luther, that Christ presented Himself as a victorious Lord to the devil and the damned in hell, thus making a mere epideictic triumphal progress there, is out of the question. Before Christ there was no abode peopled by the damned; the O. T. Sheol is something different. A preferable meaning would be, that Christ vanquished the devil and hell. But since this conquest takes place, not through physical power and force,

[1] Weiss, *Petrinischer Lehrbegriff*, 1855. Güder, p. 88 ff. Frank, p. 205 ff., on 1 Pet. iii. 18, iv. 6; Acts ii. 24–27 (Eph. iv. 8–10 has no place here).

[2] Only v. Hofmann, v. Zezschwitz, and Luthardt try to avoid this natural interpretation, understanding by the preaching 1 Pet. iii. 19 a preaching on earth to the spiritually dead, and that in the days of Noah (as formerly Aepin).

[3] Aepin supposed the descent into Hades to be a part of the redemptive suffering for humanity, but without including the torments of the damned; for Hades is simply the intermediate region, not Gehenna.

[4] The *Form. Conc.* 785 declares against identifying the descent into Hades with the burial.

but through His entire redeeming work, it could only be ascribed to the descent into hell at the cost of the redemption accomplished by Christ. It is hence to be regarded as the application of the benefit of His atonement, as seems to be intimated by the κηρύττειν among the departed. But this relegates us to the prophetic office. The Descent into Hades is therefore not to be regarded as primarily an act of the high-priestly or kingly office. The preaching of the grace of God in Christ, His presentation of Himself "as the efficient cause of salvation, able to atone and actually atoning," pertains primarily to the prophetic office; but this, again, reveals His person in a new form.[1]

2. The Descent into Hades cannot be derived simply from Christ's essential equality with us, as if it were a personal necessity for Him, because all men pass into Hades after the separation of the soul from the body. Acts ii. 24 does not affirm this, but rather that His person could not be held by Hades. It can only be conceded that Christ was unable to avoid Hades, if by Hades is understood the state of separation between body and soul, instead of a place in which departed spirits are gathered, because that state of separation was involved in Christ's death; but the doctrine of Christ's Descent into Hades would then be no new doctrinal point, but only a proof that His death actually took place. On the other hand, Christ's going to the spirits in prison is spoken of as a spontaneous act—not an act of physical necessity. No weakness in His person, no power of Hades over Him, led Him into Hades. In death His person is inwardly consummated (§ 123). His life in Hades is not a shadowy life; but, according to Peter, He intervenes mightily by His word, and carries on His work, His very deliverance from the limits

[1] Frank (*Theol. d. Conc. For.* p. 429) explains that the *F. C.* does not definitely assign the Descent into Hades to the state of exaltation; for while it speaks of the vanquishing of hell and the devil, this could only be on the supposition of the Descent into Hades involving suffering, as indeed was held by M. Flacius and Joach. Westphalius, as well as by Aepin. Frank himself (*Syst. d. chr. Wahr.* p. 205 ff.) rightly excludes all suffering in reference to Christ after His death (in keeping with Luke xxiii. 43), but calls it "foolish," as nevertheless the ancient Church held, to suppose that the preaching of Christ (the κηρύσσειν) in the under-world included the intention of redeeming those πνεύματα, and the eventual realization of that intention, p. 207.

of the mortal body being an indication of a higher stage of existence.[1]

3. Dogmatic sobriety enjoins moderation on this point. Christ's death was no illusive death. The separation of the soul from the body, affirmed in this article, implies a confirmation of the reality, not only of His death, but of His human soul, with which the Logos continued in union. We must therefore think of His soul as bodiless for a time—at least without the material earthly body. He was then Pneuma only. And this is the dogmatic substratum for the position, that Christ could appear and work in the region of those who, as departed spirits, lead a similar bodiless existence. We have here, then, a challenge—unless Christ is to be conceived in this bodiless state as in a condition of spiritual slumber or inaction—to imagine Him at work during this time in a way appropriate to this stadium. But no more detailed construction of the necessity and mode of this activity on behalf of the departed is to be attempted; the New Testament passages must be left in their simple form. Nevertheless, the following elements contained in the Descent into Hades are important. While the notions of the Hebrews respecting Sheol contain truth, the world of the intermediate state—not merely the notion of it—has a progressive history. Even the pious in the Old Testament tremble at the kingdom of the dead, just as in the Middle Ages, also, humanity fell back into pre-Christian dread of death. For purgatory, again, is a Hades which even Christians did not transcend, more terrible than Sheol, its gloomy issues overspreading the whole life of those days like a black cloud. Now, through Christ, the intermediate state of the departed has experienced a movement, nay, a transformation, through the manifestation of His person and work. The ceasing of this preaching, begun by Christ with *His* preaching at that time, is neither recorded nor reasonably to be supposed. The ancient Church supposed the preaching on behalf of the departed to be continued through the apostles. The apostles knew that with the completion of the atonement, deliverance is given from the terrors of Hades and the fear of death;[2] and the same

[1] 1 Pet. iii. 18, θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκί, ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι.

[2] Heb. ii. 14; 1 Cor. xv. 55; Rom. viii. 38, 39; Phil. i. 20-23.

consciousness found expression again, in the strongest way, at the Reformation. No power, not even death and Hades, can separate us from fellowship with Christ. But this further implies, that Christ's appearance among the dwellers in the region of the dead was the work of His free spirit-power—no passive subjection to a mere physical necessity. And a further consequence is, that the Descent into Hades expresses the universality of Christ's significance, even in respect to former generations and the entire kingdom of the dead. The distinction between earlier and later generations, between the time of ignorance and the time when He is known, is done away by Christ.[1] No physical power is a limit to Him. The future world, like the present, is the scene of His activity. Combining these farthest extremes in His person, He constitutes Himself the centre transcending all physical limits, "in presence of which all distinctions of time and space vanish, one distinction alone having significance—that between faith and unbelief."[2]

Observation 1.—Christ's saying, "This day shalt thou be with me in paradise" (Luke xxiii. 43), agrees with the Descent into Hades, so far as by paradise the assured state of blessedness is meant; for even in His work in Hades, Christ is in blessedness, and blessedness is in communion with Him.

Observation 2.—The period of Rationalism, however great the interest it showed for the salvation of the heathen, illogically took special offence at the present point of doctrine. On the other hand, Strauss thinks (*Dogm.* i. 264, 271, ii. 148) that the fact of vast masses of men, before and after Christ, dying without being brought into relation to Christ, proves that the Christian revelation, because not universal, is not necessary to salvation. Modern theology

[1] Cf. Martensen, *ut supra*. But this is first accomplished by a historic influence proceeding from Christ, which sets aside the common opinion that, *e.g.*, the pious in the O. T., before Christ, possessed essentially the same faith in all respects, and the same blessing by retrospective action, as Christians. Such retrospective force is rendered superfluous and more than doubtful by the preaching of the gospel in Hades. According to the *Shepherd* of Hermas (iii. 9. 16), it was necessary even for the patriarchs, and, according to Clement v. Alex. (*Stromata*, ii. 9. vi.), referred even to heathen philosophers. Cf. Güder, p. 127 ff.

[2] Cf. Martensen.

has eagerly welcomed this article, and that because it removes both the difficulties mentioned; for it testifies, that even those not laid hold of by Christ's historic manifestation in their earthly life, still must and may be brought into relation to Him, in order to be able to accept or reject Him. And thus the *universal* reference of Christianity to humanity, and the *absoluteness* of the Christian religion, are ratified.

SECOND POINT: THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST.

§ 125.

The fact of the Resurrection of Christ, unanimously attested by the New Testament as by the Church from the beginning, has its necessity in this, that the inner, spiritual perfecting (§ 123), which He attained in His death, could no longer permit to death power of any kind over His sacred person, but became of necessity the death of death. For this very reason, His reunion with the body could not be a rising again to a new death, but only to a higher existence no longer subject to death, which higher existence is a presage of the Palingenesis of humanity, nay, of the world, and that because it is also its beginning. This beginning is the transition to the *state of heavenly glory*, which qualifies Christ for the administration of His heavenly office. But it also became the historic attestation of this exaltation, as well as the proof of His living communion with His people uninterrupted by His death and departure.

LITERATURE.—Reich, *Die Auferstehung Christi als Heilsthatsache*, 1846. H. G. Hasse, *Das Leben des verklärten Erlösers im Himmel nach den eigenen Aussprüchen des Herrn*, 1854. Baur, *Neutestamentliche Theologie*, pp. 95, 195 ff., 1864. *Ibid.*, *Kirchengeschichte.* Beyschlag, *über die Auferstehung.* Neander, *Leben Jesu*, ed. 4, p. 858 ff. Gebhardt, *Die Auferstehung Christi*, 1864. Thomas, *La Résurrection de J. Chr.*, 2 vols. 1870. Westcott,

The Gospel of the Resurrection. Respecting the Resurrection also, Güder, 1862; Kahnis, 1864; Rocholl, *Die Realpräsenz*, 1875.

1. Every one allows, that the faith of the disciples in Christ's resurrection was of supreme importance for them and for their believing trust in Him, but every one does not allow its religious importance. Referring only to the physical side of Christ's person, it is supposed to have no distinctive spiritual import, nor was it requisite to the idea of Christ's person or to faith in His redeeming spiritual power; it has therefore no dogmatic importance; all that is to be accepted is the faith of the disciples in it as a historic fact, without which the founding of the Church would be inconceivable. But any one who acknowledges no more than that faith in Christ's resurrection was a means of strengthening confidence and a mighty lever for the diffusion of Christianity, will easily content himself with supposing a remarkable awakening from an illusive death, or try to settle down to a denial of the resurrection, in the latter case by assuming either subjective [1] or objective [2] visions on the part of the women and disciples, whilst Keim thinks a "telegram of the exalted Christ from heaven" is to be discovered in it. The resurrection of Christ may therefore be denied in a twofold way, either by denying the reality of His death and assuming an awakening from an illusive death to a new and again mortal life, or by assuming the reality of His death, but with a merely illusive resurrection. The two are agreed on this point, that sooner or later Christ's body falls a prey to death and corruption.

Observation.—If, like Rothe, we suppose a God-resisting principle in matter which can never be quite overcome, then, so far as Christ's personality is thought to be consummated, this consummation cannot be effected "by a swallowing up of the mortal in life." Christ cannot have again assumed and transformed His body in the resurrection, but it must be held that He utterly laid aside and left in the grave His material body in prospect of His heavenly life. If, nevertheless, a corporeity adequate to the spirit be deemed necessary to the completeness of the personality, this cor-

[1] Like Strauss, Renan, Holsten, and others.

[2] Like Ewald, Weisse, Hanne, and others. But on this view Christ's resurrection comes into analogy with spiritual apparitions.

poreity must be thought to be generated by Christ's ethical process during His earthly life, so that Christ's death, which in any case was His spiritual consummation, was also withal the consummation of the spiritual body by delivering it from the material body. In this case, death and resurrection coincide as to the chief matter. Only on this view death and the principle of death are not really overcome, the material body remaining their prey. Or, more precisely: The last enemy of the spirit left—not overcome, but merely excluded or put to flight—is not death indeed, but matter.

2. Historically considered, the resurrection of Christ is a divine witness, "a divine verdict," in favour of Christ and His cause, especially a witness to God's acceptance of His sacrifice. It forms the necessary conclusion to the drama of His life, the conclusion required by the justice of providential history. Through being Christ's justification or a Christodicy, it became a Theodicy.[1] But according to the N. T. it is not merely Christ's justification and His vindication against others, but also an epoch of development in His person. As His personal glorification or transfiguration it is compared to a new birth,[2] a mode of contemplation more familiar to the ancient Church than to the present day.[3] Through the primarily spiritual consummation of His person in death, it became possible for the *raising* up of His body to become also His own act, a *rising* up and reunion with the body.[4] Since matter originates with God and is correlated with spirit by creation, a more effectual penetration by soul or spirit through union with spirit must be possible, instead of its present imperfect penetration by spirit.[5] In reference to Christ's person and through it, the last foe—death and the form of the material body subject to it—is overcome in the resurrection, after the *κέντρον θανάτου* (*i.e.* *ἁμαρτία*) has been broken by Him, and the very possibility of temptation abolished.[6] The

[1] 1 Tim. iii. 16. This aspect of the matter is specially emphasized by Sieffert and others.

[2] Acts ii. 24; Heb. i. 5, 6; Rom. viii. 29, cf. i. 4; Col. i. 18, *πρωτότοκος*.

[3] Cf. my *History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*. The ancient Church spoke of a threefold birth of Christ, the eternal birth of the Logos from God, the birth from Mary, and His Palingenesis through the Resurrection, to which, finally, mediæval mysticism added the birth of Christ in us.

[4] John v. 26, x. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 21; Col. i. 18, cf. v. 15.

[5] Cf. vol. ii. §§ 39. 40.

[6] 1 Cor. xv. 26, 55; Heb. vii. 28.

mortal is not merely stripped off by Him,—that would not be a complete triumph,—but it was transformed and swallowed up in life. Death is a hostile power in humanity, the consequence not of its idea, but of its sinfulness. Although submitting to this death, Christ did not merely not remain subject to it, but His power of life became the death of death. It would be a contradiction to His divine-human nature, to the indissoluble union of the divine and human in Him, if death had been able permanently to rob Him of a portion of Himself. On the contrary, He unites Himself now in a loftier manner even with His body than before (when He was still subject to temptation, and His body necessarily had a relative independence in respect to His spirit [1]), and that because now His spirit as the sole centre is the perfect power over His physical side as its absolutely willing organ. And His spirit proves this by vanquishing everything mortal, everything purely passive in itself, and therefore death in principle, and proves it positively by gradual, even outward glorification, to which the forty days after the resurrection must perhaps be regarded as a transition.[2] Nor can it suffice to regard the perfecting of Christ by the resurrection as actual indeed, but in such a way that it remains invisible and concealed. As certainly as His true witnesses beheld His humiliation, so certainly also must its necessary, supplementary counterpart be revealed to them. They were to testify not conjectures respecting the consummation of Christ's person, but ascertained facts, and to be put in a position to obtain by historic means that image of Christ's dignity which was to live on in the Church. This is also necessary to the perfection of His self-revelation, in order that the full, complete view of the historic Christ might be secured to the Church in assured knowledge for all ages. His disciples were to learn as matter of fact

[1] § 106. 2; § 107. 2.

[2] The supposition of Hofmann (ii. 1. 518–525) and Kinkel (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1841, 3), that Christ after His death passed at once into the supernatural, exalted state with the Father, and that His appearances were merely a rendering Himself visible again, does not correspond with the representations of the New Testament. Moreover, on this view the Ascension would become something merely epideictic, and the distinction between the time of the forty days and the later time, when He appeared to Paul, to which Paul's own disciple Luke calls attention (Acts i. 2-4), would vanish.

that His living, complete person was not overpowered by death. On the one hand, through the forty days after the resurrection without losing Him they were weaned from His constant outward fellowship, while trained to inner fellowship and its permanence; and on the other, they were assured of the continuance of His entire personality, with its mastery over death. It is of special importance that, by the constantly interrupted and as constantly renewed intercourse of love even after His death, they should be made certain of the continuance of His love and fellowship with His own, and become accustomed to think of Him as the true exalted Head of His people, who, although invisibly, abides with them to the end of the days, and who can and will be in the midst of them, when two or three are assembled in His name. Every religion loses the centre of its strength, nay, of its permanence, when no longer able to believe in its essential object as really present in the fullest sense, but compelled to think of it as absent or merely as a past or absent power (*Grösse*). The disciples were now to learn (and this was taught them by the appearances of the Risen One), that He is not like one who has gone away, with whom intercourse on reciprocal terms is impossible, but that their faith may and ought to think of Him as continually living and working in fellowship with His Church. This certainty is the basis of the faith that He discharges His heavenly office.[1]

3. Moreover, on the basis of the importance of the resurrection for Christ's *person* in itself, arises its abiding importance for His office. This holds good, apart from what has been advanced, inasmuch as it is a transition to a higher free existence endowed with complete power. In the power of the indissoluble life, which is His, He can and will now communicate Himself by His spirit to believing humanity, and the highest blessings of Christianity are referred to the "power of His resurrection."[2] In it the powers of the world to come burst forth. Thus it is of prophetic significance, and

[1] The necessity, in the interest of Christian piety, for holding fast not merely the historic posthumous influence shared by Jesus with every great man, but the living activity and constant presence of Christ, is excellently and most convincingly shown by Rothe in the two sermons on *Faith in the Living Christ*, vol. ii. 281–312.

[2] Eph. i. 3, 19, 20, ii. 5, 6; Rom. iv. 25; Phil. iii. 10.

is not without a beginning of fulfilment.[1] Nay, in the perfecting of Christ's person is given the efficient principle, which in the process of the world's history will evoke also the consummation of humanity. In so far as it is man's nature and need, on decisively entering into a new spiritual world, to have regard already to the end, so the end prefigured in Christ's resurrection belongs already to the origin of faith. We believe in Christ as the security not merely of our reconciliation, but also of the perfecting of our personality. As the Risen One, He is worthy of absolute trust.[2]

Observation.—Westcott, *ut supra,* emphasizes the following points. The resurrection of Christ, although not the solution, is the illumination of the mystery of our life. By this fact the apparent contradiction between the infinite importance and the insignificance of the individual is harmonized. The antitheses of the ancient world are seen to be abolished in the new humanity inaugurated by His resurrection. It forms at once a goal, to which pre-Christian humanity supplies the converging lines, and a source from which history after Christ takes its rise. In it man finds the perfect consecration of His entire nature; it is a promise of our future, which so far as is possible banishes the feeling of isolation connected with our finite nature, and unites our nature again with the absolute, eternal One. In brief, in this fact we are able to view Christianity in its relation to the history and the future of humanity. It is there made known not as a vague idea or mere string of dogmas and a mere system of doctrine. This fact is a witness to the actual effects which Christianity has produced and is still producing. Hence the hope and strength of Christianity lie in its substantial reality.

[1] Cf. 1 Cor. xv. 20, 22 f.

[2] 1 Cor. xv. 22, 49. Martensen, *Dogmatics*, p. 318: "There exists a profound connection between the resurrection of the Lord and the perfecting of the Church. The blessed future of the Church, the ideal victory, is already reached in the risen Redeemer. The denial of the miracle of the resurrection is not merely the denial of a particular historic fact, but a denial of that entire prophetic view of the world which Christianity presents, and which finds its vital starting-point in the resurrection. The Church begins its existence from the historic fact, in which it has the image of that blessed future which must float before its eyes as the final goal from the beginning."

THIRD POINT: THE ASCENSION, THE SESSION AT THE RIGHT HAND OF THE FATHER, AND THE SIGNIFICANCE THEREOF FOR HIS OFFICE.

§ 126.

In the ascension of Christ, or His absolute exaltation, His resurrection finds its conclusion, inasmuch as the complete spiritualization and transfiguration of His earthly into pneumatic personality[1] is presented therein in perfected form. The exalted God-man is raised above the limits of time and space, the humanity of Jesus having become the free, adequate organ of the Logos. This state of consummation itself is figuratively expressed as the *Session at the right hand of the Father*, and denotes, on the one hand, divine repose and blessedness in the certainty of His eternal glory and majesty (for He is now personally Lord of glory and King of kings), and on the other, has relation to His office.[2]

LITERATURE.—Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, § 173 ff.

1. All temporal development implies limitation. Christ is not yet adequate to His idea, so long as He is still personally in course of development. His earthly humanity *could* not be quite adequate to the divinity of the Logos. No doubt it holds good even in that state: "What this man knows and wills, that God also as the Logos or Son wills in Him," but the converse does not hold good. The Son of man knows not everything upon earth;[3] even His will was only in constant process of identification with the Father's will.[4] But for this very reason, the self-communication or revelation of the Logos was not yet perfected in this personality. Now, the ascension marks the stage of the absolute consummation of the humanity, where, in eternal union with Him, it has be-

[1] 1 Cor. xv.; 2 Cor. iii. 17 f., iv. 4–6.

[2] Cf. Luke xxiv. 50–52; Acts i. 9 ff.; John vi. 62; Eph. iv. 8–10, i. 20 ff.; Col. i. 18 f.; Phil. ii. 9; 1 Tim. iii. 16.

[3] Mark xiii. 32; Matt. xxiv. 36, xxii. 19.

[4] Matt. xxvi. 39, xix. 16, 17; Luke xxii. 28.

come henceforth, in its glorified and pneumatic form, the adequate organ of God as the Son. Jesus is now set free from all earthly burden, all narrowing force of matter, from every, even physical, imperfection. Every limitation of nature is so overcome by the freedom of His spirit, that even the nature which He has in Himself is penetrated by the life and spirit of the Logos, and made its absolutely willing and potent organ, so that in it He attains His realization in the world, or such cosmical existence as corresponds with His universality, so that, without limitation of space and time, He is King of the Aeons and Controller of history.[1] The converse of this is, that now Christ's absolutely perfected humanity is quite assumed *into the Logos*, and, in so far, into the life of the Trinity. But Christ's ascension, like His resurrection, is also a real symbol of *our* future exaltation.[2] In Him humanity begins to be consummated by the Head conforming its members to Himself, and becoming the First-born among many brethren.[3] The means by which this is effected is, that in virtue of His personal consummation He now also consummates His *office*, raising it to eternal significance and strength.[4]

Observation.—Respecting the mode of the permanent presence of Christ the Head with His people, there have been many controversies, especially since the time of the Reformation. The Lutheran divines argued for the religious need of standing in immediate connection, not only with the deity of Christ or the Holy Spirit, but with the entire and full personality of Christ; whereas the Reformed were more influenced by anxiety lest the true and actual humanity of Christ should evaporate under the Lutheran conception into something docetic. The Lutherans, on their part, did not mean this (§ 94). But even when, as was generally the case, they renounced the absolute presence of Christ's humanity everywhere (ubiquity), they still endeavoured in different ways to show the possibility of its presence with His people in dependence on His will, by appealing now to the *omnipotence* of the Logos, which encompasses the universe, so to speak, with its hand, and thus brings it near to the humanity of Christ, now to the divine *omniscience*, to which the universe is present, and in which the humanity of Christ participates.

[1] Eph. i. 22 f., iv. 10; Rev. xvii. 14; Heb. i. 8, v. 6; Rev. xi. 15.
[2] Eph. ii. 5, 6. [3] Rom. viii. 29; Phil. iii. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 23 ff., 45–49.
[4] Eph. ii. 6.

But this seems rather to be a making the world present by the power of the Godhead, than a making Christ's humanity present to the world. When others say: Christ is omnipresent *quoad unionem personalem*, so far as the humanity is united with the omnipresent Logos, this might be conceded even by the Reformed. Among moderns, *Sartorius* supposes a radiant body of Christ, by which He is able to reach, or at least operate, everywhere. *Rocholl* (*die Real-Präsenz*, 1875) rejects the doctrine of ubiquity, or the supposition of an absolute omnipresence of the God-man, independent of the will, and therefore physically necessary. This, he thinks, would be repletive presence, by which independent existence would be denied to the universe. Christ would be made the real substance of the world, material objects would become mere accidents of this substance—a remnant of the Platonic world-soul.[1] On the other hand, *Rocholl* would not, with the Reformed, accept an omnipresence merely in respect of the divine side of Christ, nor conceive the divine omnipresence as merely assisting or putting forth power from afar. Just as little would he with Catholicism transfer Christ's humanity, as a rule, to the other world, while thinking of it as exceptionally present in the Eucharist by a perpetual miracle, and that in many places at once (*multilocatio*). He would rather see the Lutheran doctrine developed as follows:—In the Holy Supper there is a presentation of Christ, who is otherwise perpetually present in the Church. But He has a presence of various kinds or with many branches. Christ has, first, a fixed space, namely, in Himself, for His space is His substance. But this substance is of such fineness and power of comprehension, that He is able to have a real presence of various kinds outside Himself, nevertheless in course of development. He has, *in the first place*, in relation to the world, a presence in *Power*, which stands externally over against the finite Cosmos as the kingdom of nature, not essentially, but virtually and operatively. This first stage He calls His *dwelling near*, a mechanical presence, in which Christ's humanity participates, in so far as a relation obtains between it and the Cosmos, while the Cosmos culminates from the beginning in man. Through Christ's humanity the Logos works in the Cosmos as Power. But, *in the second place*, Christ has a further presence, a real presence *nevertheless in course of development*. By His continuous historical working (whilst retaining His fixed space in Himself) He extends Himself farther and farther. Thus, in the new humanity, as

[1] Even Martensen calls attention to the Pantheistic danger of absolute ubiquity, § 177.

a "*temple*," He has dynamic *indwelling*, or *dwelling with*, which is not merely operative assistance, but adessence, and finally becomes inexistence. The *third* form is impletive *pervasion* in the perfected Church, so that He in whom the ideal world exists fills all in all, by diffusing His fulness in the actual world, the Church being hence called His fulness (Eph. i. 23). The God-man has His most special presence in heavenly glory, *i.e.* in the sphere of consummated life, or in the *Holiest of All*. But the filling of the world with Himself, or with His power, which is in course of development and growth, must be placed in subjection to His will and operation.

2. Certainly the notion of a presence of Christ, not everywhere uniform, but various in form, has a future. By its means the universal significance and living activity of Christ may seek reconciliation with such a doctrine of Christ's personality on the part of the Reformed as preserves its lineaments, and does not evaporate into infinity. But, in order to affirm anything more precise and definite on this question, we should not merely need to enter more deeply into metaphysical questions of space and time, but to know more respecting the sphere of pneumatic corporeity than is the case. The Reformed teachers held more firmly than the Lutheran to the reality of space; on the other hand, the reality of time vanished more completely to them on the predestination-dogma than on the Lutheran doctrine. But dogmatic sobriety here counsels us to be modest, and, without laying down *a priori* theories of space and time, to be content with what has a religious interest. This does not require the *omnipræsentia absoluta* of Christ's humanity as a physical necessity following from the nature of the *Unio*. It is sufficient that His presence is subject to His loving will. The following propositions must be characterized as important for the Christian consciousness:—

1. Even in the state of exaltation Christ remains man, the *Unio* is absolutely indissoluble.

2. But His exaltation is also the consummation of the *Unio*, so that the God-man now perfectly participates in the divine majesty, and His freedom cannot be fettered by the limits of space and time. His loving will can find no insuperable obstacle in anything physical.[1]

[1] "Nevertheless, even in the exaltation it is true that the power of Christ is not world-creating, but world-perfecting," Martensen.

3. He is able to be with His people always to the end of the world in the undivided unity of His person, *i.e.* not merely as Logos, but as God-man, for He is the vitally efficient Head of His body.[1] But His presence in the world is not uniform and by physical necessity; it is morally conditioned by the world's receptiveness, reaching farther in proportion as the Church—His body—has been appropriated by the world.

SECOND SUBDIVISION (cf. § 110, Vol. III.).

THE TRANSFIGURATION OF CHRIST'S EARTHLY INTO HIS HEAVENLY OFFICE.

§ 127.—*Christ's Office in Heaven.*

The perfecting of Christ's person benefits His *office* also. His repose, like the divine, is an activity sure of its triumph, and sustained by supreme power; the glorification of His person is also the glorification of His threefold office, which is now raised to eternal significance, so as in the process of history to triumph over the limits of space and time. In this office, which He alone carries on and retains as the living Head of God's kingdom, is realized in the course of history His constantly renewed, spiritual and invisible Second Advent, which, however, will one day visibly burst forth upon us in order to the judgment and the consummation of His kingdom.

Observation.—The distinction made already between Christ's posthumous and continuous working, here first finds its complete significance.[2] All great men in the history of the world have a posthumous influence through their works, apart from their person. These works now exercise what influence they may be equal to without the personal volition and knowledge of the authors co-operating or coming into consideration

[1] Matt. xviii. 20; Acts ix. 4; Col. i. 24; Matt. xxv. 40; 1 Cor. xi. 3; Eph. i. 22, iv. 15; Col. i. 18, ii. 10, 19.

[2] Liebner was the first definitely to call attention to the importance of this distinction.

at present. But to Christ a living, personal continuity of influence must be ascribed. In virtue of the intimate relation between person and office in Him (§ 99), He is never and nowhere separated from His work. The only ground on which there can be any mention of His heavenly office is, that His participation, consciousness, and effectuating will accompany His ever-growing initiatory action. The opinion widely obtains, that, according to Schleiermacher, Christ has simply a posthumous influence, and therefore only exists for us as one belonging to the past. But a series of passages in his writings is inconsistent with this view, *e.g. Chr. Gl.* II. 146, 151, 160, 161, 185. He contemplates Christ in continuous, sympathizing association with the struggles of the Church. Indispensable as in his opinion is the *word* (*e.g.* of the Church), in order to communion with Christ, so far as it (or preaching) is a continuation of Christ's word, still, according to him, Christ's energy is present therein in virtue of the divine power inherent in His Word (p. 185), "whereby it is *perfectly consonant with truth* when to the consciousness of man in the process of conversion all mediate influence of man vanishes, Christ being immediately present in His activity." P. 147: In virtue of the relation to us which is based on His peculiar dignity, He remains the representative of the whole human race. P. 149 ff.: From Him perpetually issues forth what is necessary to the wellbeing of the Church.—Even now His guiding influence is not simply mediate and derived, although mediated by the written word.

1. *Biblical and Ecclesiastical Doctrine.*—So little is the departure of Christ from the region of vision the end of His work, that, on the contrary, it introduces the consummation or glorification of His living official activity, because it is the consummation of His person. Full salvation is first given in the perfected Lord and His office. Before Pentecost, the Spirit of regeneration was not yet present;[1] "the power of His resurrection" is the absolute efficiency, the ripening, so to speak, of the office continued in His person, which office He carries on till all foes shall be subdued.[2] His continuous, effectual participation in His work is variously expressed in the New Testament. On His departure, He says that after He has gone away He will pray the Father to send them the Spirit,[3] that He will render their prayer in His name effectual

[1] John vii. 39. [2] Eph. i. 19 f.; 1 Cor. xv. 22–28.
[3] John xiv. 26, xv. 26, xvi. 7.

with the Father, nay, that He will do what they request in His name;[1] that with the Father and the Spirit He will manifest Himself to those who keep His word and love Him.[2] Believers certainly enter by means of the Word and Spirit into a living fellowship not merely with His Church, but also with Him as the Head of His body, the spouse of the Church, which He sanctifies through the Word and baptism, which He nourishes, cares for, and fills with His powers.[3] His participation extends also to individuals, not merely to the whole. He is their Intercessor, Paraclete.[4] He bestows on believers the forgiveness of sins.[5] He feels Himself persecuted in the persecution of His people; manifestations of Samaritan-like love He regards as love shown to Himself.[6] The fellowship which He maintains with His people is living and intimate, so that Paul can say: Now I live not, but Christ lives in me. Nay, the entire state of a Christian is described as a being and dwelling of Christ in believers.[7] With this the *ecclesiastical doctrine* exactly agrees.[8]

2. Again, Christ's indivisible office in heaven in its perfected form is exercised in various ways. First, in His *Kingly* authority. Theology distinguishes the *regnum potentiæ*, which refers to the universe, to the non-Christian world, from the *regnum gratiæ et gloriæ*. Lutheran theology lays more weight on the *regnum potentiæ* than the Reformed, which prefers to dwell on the *regnum gratiæ*, while viewing the *regnum potentiæ* as the government of the Father in subservience to the *regnum gratiæ*. The kingdom of grace embraces the earthly world-period as the period of grace. Its objects are believers and the portion of humanity called to faith. Finally, the *regnum gloriæ* embraces saved believers in heaven, but is not perfected before the resurrection and the judgment. We shall therefore not treat of it until we reach Eschatology. Evangelical Christians are agreed in holding, that to Christ—the exalted King—the Church here and hereafter is one Church which He will

[1] John xvi. 23; cf. xvi. 7, xiv. 13. [2] John xiv. 21, 23.
[3] Eph. v. 23, 25 f., 29, i. 23.
[4] Rom. viii. 34; John xiv. 16; 1 John ii. 1; Heb. vii. 25, ix. 24.
[5] Col. iii. 13. [6] Acts ix. 4; Matt. xxv. 35–45, xviii. 5.
[7] Gal. ii. 20; John xvii. 21.
[8] *Conf. Aug.* 17; *Heidel. Cat.* qu. 42-50; *Art. Sm.* 312; *Apol.* 74 ff., 90 ff.; *Form. Conc.* 782, 83.

govern until at His second coming the kingdom of glory appears. In the earthly world-period Christ's kingly power is not fully revealed. It will break forth first at the end of the world. But all are agreed that even at present all worldly powers must be subservient to His work in virtue of the co-ordination of Providence and the gospel. By this means the world is becoming the *Church*, which Christ governs as its celestial Head, and conducts to its goal. But it is of importance not to abolish the distinction of the *regnum gratiæ* from the *regnum potentiæ*. We live by faith, not by sight, in order that full scope may be left for free moral decision. Hence it depends on this distinction how far the spiritual ethical character of Christ's kingdom is maintained or not, and what means are regarded as admissible in order to the growth of that kingdom. It is true, Christ's kingdom is not merely a kingdom of doctrine or idea. Christ is not merely the truth, but also the life, and His activity carries in its bosom the Palingenesis of the world, even of nature; but this through the medium of His spiritual working. Not by means of force or physical authority, or the sensuous beholding of His power, can the regeneration of the world be brought about. Since in God the ethical is by its idea the power above omnipotence, while in the God-man it is absolutely realized, He participates, of course, in the divine omnipotence, and as Head does this in a far different manner from believers.[1] But He uses His power for ethical ends; in those ends His power has the norm of its use. Thus, as King of kings He conducts the world outside Christianity to redemption. As the decay of the world before Christ was not merely a herald, but an effect of the approaching incarnation of the Logos, so He is continually judging the world in the course of history, but in order to conduct all nations and men to His kingdom. As concerns the Church distinctively, He guards and preserves it. Having in the exercise of His plenary authority as King instituted sacred ordinances for its good (§ 110), He preserves these ordinances, especially the Word and Sacrament, in order that by their means His manifestation may be perpetuated for humanity, may remain constantly present, and thus later generations may suffer no loss in comparison with con-

[1] 1 Cor. iii. 22; 2 Tim. ii. 12; Rom. v. 17.

temporaries. But above all, as King He sends the Holy Spirit into the heart.

3. In virtue of His kingship, Christ also eternally and perfectly carries on the *prophetic* office. Through all the confusion of the ages, through all the forgetfulness and scepticism of men, He preserves His image unchanged and true, thereby preserving Himself in the memory of Christendom. The heavenly form of His prophetic office, the aim of which is the presentation of Himself to the spirit, is superior to its earthly form, because it is no longer limited to Judæa, triumphing over space and time, over the distinctions of nations and tongues. To this must be added an excellence relating to the contents of the office. On earth His exaltation could not be the purport of His preaching as a fact. And, finally, after His exaltation, although now His word was committed to the lips of the disciples, His presentation of Himself receives its completion through the operation of the illuminating Spirit who glorifies Him. That Spirit, proceeding from Him, accompanies the impressions of Him made by the Word, and gathers them as into a focus, in order to cause His image to rise before man's spiritual vision, and glorify Christ in the heart. Again, since Christ continually uses mankind, when they become believers, through the Holy Spirit to bear witness of Him as the organ of His prophetic office, not merely Palestine, but the whole globe to its most distant races hears the gospel.[1]

4. Finally, by continuing His *high-priestly* office even in heaven, He again, in virtue of His exaltation or majesty, renders His earthly work efficacious, and especially His sacrifice, introducing it into the souls of men. He is not satisfied with having reconciled humanity, so that God for His sake has forgiven it in His heart, remitted its guilt, and restored the possibility of fellowship with Him. Following His Church with loving sympathy, Christ would also have salvation imparted and applied at the fit time to particular concrete persons as they come into existence in the course of generations. For this end He carries on His powerful mediation with the Father for their sake, on which account also His continuous intercession, nay, our justification is

[1] Matt. xxviii. 18 f., xxiv. 14; Mark xvi. 15 ff.

identified with His resurrection and exaltation, with His session at the Father's right hand.[1] Theology, therefore, ascribes the *Intercessio* with the Father to Him,[2] to which is added the *Benedictio sacerdotalis* in the case of those in whom His substitution proves efficacious. His high-priesthood in heaven is the eternal, living presence of the same priestly love, the temporal revelation of which was His earthly work. This earthly work is perpetuated in His ever-living love, and is endued with imperishable power by His heavenly kingship.[3] In the intercession of the exalted God-man, no uncertainty of result is possible. Nor need it consist of words. Nor does it imply that His divine-human will, in perfect unity with the divine, is not partaker in the divine power. In that case the perfecting of the kingly office by the continuance of the priestly would be precluded, or, conversely, no place would be left in the kingly office for priestly action. On the contrary, His continuous intercession implies, that as God-man He perpetually makes God's redeeming will His own, that His sympathy accompanies the history of God's kingdom, and that He regards what befalls His people as happening to Himself.[4] Further, the connection of the priestly mind with His kingship involves the eternal spirituality of His power, to which all force is foreign, since, while it allures, draws, and follows, it leaves unbelief possible. It involves, in a word, the unconquerable vitality of His pure sympathy with us. The sacred soul of all His action is the spirit of His life-begetting substitution, wherewith He bears us on His heart. Therewith is conjoined mercy and long-suffering for the still unbelieving world, which hurries not to manifest outwardly His glory and judicial power, but patiently woos souls, and above all aims at an inner crisis, nay, at initiating a good decision.

But the great, independent significance of Christ's heavenly high-priesthood, of His Intercession with the Father and *Benedictio*, is rendered especially evident by the consideration that the transference of the blessing or merit acquired by Christ to the unredeemed world, and its right distribution or

[1] Rom. iv. 25, viii. 34. [2] Heb. viii. 1, 2; John xiv. 13–16.
[3] Rom. viii. 34; 1 John ii. 1; Heb. vii. 25, ix. 14, 24; cf. *Apol.* 74. 90.
[4] Acts ix. 4.

application to individuals, only takes place through their reception into His personal fellowship, which neither can nor ought to take place through any other power than His own. On this point great and pregnant errors are possible.

The Biblical and Evangelical conception keeps the mean between two hurtful extremes, that of a false Objectivity and that of a just as one-sided Subjectivism. Both overlook Christ's heavenly high-priesthood and its necessity. But in stopping at best at the earthly priesthood merely, they take it in a false mechanical or lifeless way, and then seek an arbitrary substitute for that which nothing but the heavenly high-priesthood supplies. False *Objectivism* may assume a double form. Christ's work of atonement may be viewed in a purely external way, as the payment of a money-debt for mankind; and then by consequence, in order to the actual possession of the grace, the inference may be deemed satisfactory, that what has been paid for the whole race must benefit every member of the same as matter of course and by way of right,—a view which implies a lowering of the ethical character of the saving process, and an overlooking of grace, as if a purely intellectual appropriation would suffice in place of a personally religious one. This error is excluded for us by the fact that we were forced to base Christ's work upon a sympathy (*συμπάθεια*), which lovingly kept in view the drawing of man into a living process that seeks the fellowship of the Redeemer, and therefore kept in view the awakening of a feeling of unworthiness in us. It seeks to kindle this feeling, and give reality and force to it, the necessary consequence of which is the springing up of love in grateful return for the good Christ has done. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, holds that, after Christ has acquired the treasure of His merit, the Church instituted by Him has full authority to distribute this merit to individuals, which is principally done through the Mass as a constantly repeated sacrifice. Here the need of a perpetual high-priesthood is acknowledged, but that need is attempted to be satisfied by repetition of Christ's sacrifice, which is the work of the priest, — a theory which denies inner, eternal, all-sufficient significance to Christ's historic sacrifice, and regards Christ's presence as passive in comparison with the priest. To this

must be added, that to no man is power given to impart, but merely to offer, reconciliation to any one.

But a merely *subjective* exercise of human faith, a subjective realization of Christ's presence and of His past suffering, is just as little satisfactory. On the contrary, if our conception of the matter is to be vital and true, Christ's invincible love—the source of His continuous action—must be added thereto.

5. Both theories—the falsely objective and subjective—sever Christ's earthly action and passion from His still living high-priestly love. They suppose that love to have only acted in the past, and in the same way assume a merely *posthumous influence* of Christ, mediated either by the Church or by subjective realization; whereas an act, a loving look, a *continued working* of the living heavenly Redeemer, and therefore His real effective presence, must be appropriated by every new member in the σῶμα Χριστοῦ. To every one who would be personally assured of His reconciliation, and who would partake of the divine peace, it is necessary to know that the thoughts of substitutionary love and Christ's effectual intercession refer to him not merely *in abstracto*, so far as they are directed to humanity as a unity, but also in his concrete present; for, despite the universalism of the Christian salvation, a place is still left to election, to distinctions of earlier and later in that effectual calling, through which actual participation in the blessing of grace is first brought about. But effectual calling takes place on the ground of Christ's intercession, which avails for the individual. The universality of grace is the real possibility of our consciousness of reconciliation, but does not as yet include Christ's present loving communion with the individual person. Now, after grace has come nigh in the Word, Christ's heavenly priesthood calls upon us to believe that the living Head is anxious that individuals should become His members, and inspires the heart athirst for reconciliation with the certainty that Christ's intercession with the Father avails also for it, that Christ's will is that His substitution apply also to it, and that the look of His love rests also upon it. No act on our part merely becomes the firm objective basis of our assurance of salvation, even though this act be

faith,[1] but the purpose of reconciliation referring to these individuals. Christ therefore Himself applies the fruit of His work to successive races of men and the individuals composing them. He is not shut off from this world of ours, remaining at a distance, but continues without intermission in an active relation to His Church during its temporal life, intervening in every moment of time. His love and His action renew their youth in time for every individual, for we who need reconciliation have our life in time. As the Good Shepherd, He calls every one of His sheep by name.[2] The same heart beats for us in heaven as on the cross. His earthly sacrifice took place indeed but once, but once for all; for, issuing from His eternal Spirit,[3] it is the revelation of an undying love, which proves its vitality by perpetually applying its earthly work. Thus He works out of His eternity, while living historically with His Church upon earth.[4] The sensuous misinterpretation makes out of this doctrine a daily unbloody repetition of His high-priestly sacrifice through the priest, and therewith falls back into the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου, into a religion with human mediators. The Evangelical Church, on the other hand, has even here upon Biblical ground far greater wealth, namely, the priesthood of Christ Himself eternally new and eternally renewing its youth. Its doctrine affords satisfaction to the need which the sinner feels of knowing himself encompassed by Christ's present love itself, and enclosed in His heart.

6. Seeing that Christ's heavenly office possesses perfect and effectual continuance, Christ is the *sole* Mediator to His Church, neither sharing His dignity with others, nor admitting a substitution supplementary to His, as if He were reduced in idle repose to a mere potentiality. On the contrary, all activity in His Church must take place *in His name, i.e.* not merely by His authority, but in constant living reference to Him and to His continued working, in order that His Church may be simply His organ, by means of which He carries on

[1] In agreement with Holy Scripture, Schleiermacher says (*Chr. Gl.* ii. 146): "Christ intercedes for us with the Father in order to establish our fellowship with Him, and to support our prayer." See above, p. 143.

[2] John x. 3. [3] Heb. ix. 14.

[4] Acts ix. 4. Even here, therefore, transcendence and immanence are united.

His vocation as Redeemer. For this reason, the true doctrine of Christ's continuous threefold office contains, in the first place, the guiding principle for the three root-functions of the Church—the ordinance of teaching, of worship, and of polity and administration. These three must be based upon His heavenly office.[1] Again, this fact contains a corrective for a series of errors which may again and again disturb the Church.

First, as to the *high-priestly* office, as often shown, Christ brooks no mediatorial priesthood in the Church, neither alongside nor instead of His own. He must not be put in the background either by the empirical or ideal Church of the saints, or by a sacred order, which thrusts itself between the Church and Him. Such substitution would preclude the immediate access to Him, which He would have kept open, and is hostile to freedom; whereas Christ's high-priestly substitution is productive in developing our own free personality, and creates transcripts of His own mind, even of His priestly mind. For the entire life of the Christian is to be a worshipping, priestly life in the name of Jesus, on the ground of His sacrificial work and priesthood,[2] a life spent in intercession and works of love, filled with the substitutionary spirit kindled by Christ's substitution.

As to the *kingly* office, this doctrine forbids the notion that Christ has a substitute upon earth, whether an individual or a hierarchy. No less is an ecclesiastical Ochlocracy excluded hereby, which would vote and decide upon Christian truths by majorities. All this is a denial of the absolute sovereignty of Christ the King.[3] This sole kingship of Christ is, first of all, the true foundation of the unity of the Church, for that unity sufficiently exists where and so far as all submit themselves to His leading, His will, as expressed in Word and Sacrament. No less is it the true foundation of the *freedom* of the Church, *e.g.* in relation to the State, which has no authority over its principle. It is also the foundation of the freedom of individuals in relation to the community, and further of ministers of the Church in relation to the Church, and conversely.

[1] See §§ 136. 142. 146. 147.

[2] Rom. xii. 1.

[3] The idea of the sole sovereignty of Christ has been specially developed by the Scottish Church.

In the same way, Christ brooks no mediatorial *prophethood* in the Church alongside or instead of His own. This would be pseudo-prophecy, whether it appears in the form of the infallibility of a person or an order, in the form of a tradition independent of Christ's law, or in the form of a public opinion, whose highest authority is universal human reason. The Subjectivism of Rationalism and false Ecclesiasticism are essentially one in this, that they clothe products of mere human reason with divine authority, and thus put what is human in place of the divine.[1] All this is human arrogation of an authority equal to God's, and yet severed from Christ. Superstition and unbelief are one in desiring to centre in the mere creature, instead of in God and Christ. On the other hand, in the continuous exercise of Christ's prophetic office, the perfect principle of wisdom is so given that it is neither capable nor in need of completion.[2] The principle, locked up in Christ, unfolds itself by virtue of its infinite fruitfulness in His living members; and whoever abides near the utterances of His wisdom possesses the inexhaustible fountain, which waters all spheres of life with the wisdom from above.[3] In Him science has first found its absolutely worthy object of knowledge—God in His perfect personal revelation, which, as the Sun of the Universe, has the strength as well as the task to illuminate all spheres.

7. The exposition now given makes clear the importance of holding fast both the continued working of the exalted Redeemer, and the immediacy of a living mutual relation between Christ and believers. This also implies a direct religious relation to Him as the characteristic of Christian piety, or *the worship* of Christ, which has the example of the primitive Church in its favour.[4] The Christian worship of *God* includes also as its object God's absolute revelation and presence in the personal God-man, so that God is to be worshipped also in Christ as the sacred personal abode of His perfect presence.[5] To such a degree is His perfected humanity

[1] Papismus merus Enthusiasmus, *Art. Sm.* p. 332.
[2] § 111. [3] John viii. 32.
[4] Acts ii. 21, vii. 59, ix. 14; Rom. x. 13; 1 Cor. i. 2; Phil. ii. 10 ff.; John v. 23 ff.
[5] See § 103. 5.

the adequate organ of the Deity present in it, and to such a degree is God perfectly revealed only in it, that the worship of the Deity, as it has been first revealed through and in humanity, cannot be thought in separation from the humanity of Christ, with which God is indissolubly united in unique fashion.[1]

Observation. — Since Christ's exaltation, His heavenly historic manifestation has, of course, vanished for us. In this way a collision is threatened with the established ineffaceable need of the Christian soul to stand in real personally mediated communion of love with Christ. If there were no longer for us any secure, historic connection with Him having its place in the sensuous world, if therefore Christ worked through His Spirit in a purely internal manner, and our intercourse with Him did not take place through historical and sensuous means, then piety must necessarily assume a visionary ecstatic character, then to it Christ would be arbitrarily replaced by the mere spirit of Christ, which would be sublimated into the general divine essence, while Christ's earthly office would grow dim to the consciousness. Hence it is important to recognise that Christ's heavenly office, instead of nullifying His earthly office, rather ensures that it is brought to eternal reality and abiding remembrance, that its eternal import is preserved and rendered fruitful. On this account Christ left behind permanent institutions, which bring us into historic contact with Him, even by sensuous media. His Word, Holy Baptism, and the Holy Supper, proclaim to us this historic connection of the Church of all ages with Him, for they are the same that He gave. For this reason the letters of Ignatius say: The Gospels are the σὰρξ Χριστοῦ. In these media, since He became invisible, He has an equivalent for what is essential in the historic manifestation, or world-realization of His person or office. These three in their impersonal form and manifestation are the means, established and preserved by Him, for bringing us

[1] Cf. Rothe, *Pred.* ii. 167: "God has shown Himself to us unveiled first in Christ, and only in Christ. In Him He has become man. In Christ we directly behold God to be real (John xiv. 9). Not merely during His earthly walk, now also His image shines on us with the expression of unmistakeable truth." "All active energy and presence of spirit, even of the divine, can only be known (and therefore also spiritually apprehended) in the matter, which it makes the mirror of itself." Cf. 2 Cor. iv. 5, 6. For this very reason Rothe also in the above-named sermons adheres to the worship and invocation of Christ.

into fellowship with the personal, historic, now exalted Lord, and for keeping us therein until He comes again. Rightly used, they do not separate from Him as false substitutes, such as human persons must be, but draw to His person while He works through them. Their mediatory working is therefore no contradiction to the immediacy of the relation between Him and us. They rather mediate the immediacy not merely of Christ's relation to us, but also of ours to Him. He desires to be apprehended by faith as the personal core present in those impersonal media, as the personal import in them, ever and anon historically drawing near, and offering Himself through them as once through His bodily manifestation.

TRANSITION TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.

§ 128.

What is given objectively in Christ is to be appropriated by humanity. But humanity is designed, by such appropriation, to become the *Church* or *Community of faith*. As the centre of the kingdom of God, the Church is the final aim, which Christ proposes to His activity. The doctrine of the Church falls into three divisions:—

First.—*The Origin* of the Church through the appropriation of salvation, or through Regeneration by the Spirit, whom Christ sends.

Second.—Its Existence and Growth through the continued office of Christ, who uses the means of grace as the specific medium of His grace.

Third.—The Consummation of the Church.

1. It is in harmony with the type of Evangelical doctrine to attach to the doctrine of Christ's Person, not in the first instance the doctrine of the Church, but that of *faith*, and therefore the doctrine of the subjective appropriation of salvation, through which the Church comes into existence. On the other hand, stress may plausibly be laid on the axiom, that the whole is before the part, and next on the fact that faith does not arise without Word and Sacrament, which exist not

without the Church. These objections require careful examination, especially in our days. For, on one side, we hear complaints about personal belief and certitude of faith being put in the background, and the Church being put first; on the other, about subjectivity thrusting itself forward before the Church. If Christ meant the Church to be merely an organized government, to which the persons (at least their moral and religious character) are indifferent, and not an organism composed of living persons, nothing would be more natural than to suppose the Church founded by means of such an impersonal organized government, which Christ established in virtue of His kingly authority even before Pentecost, and therefore at the time when, according to John, the Holy Spirit and faith born of the Spirit as yet were not.[1] But if the community, which Christ founded, lacked the holy faith-creating Spirit, then what He founded would at least not be the Church, which has no existence apart from believing men, however many sacred things or institutions might exist. The Aristotelian dictum quoted above is borrowed from the sphere of nature and its organisms, and has there its proper sphere of application. On the other hand, in history its application is but limited. Further, correct as it is within the existing Church to say that the Church precedes the rise of faith, our business must, first of all, be to ascertain scientifically the origin of the Church. And as concerns this point, since neither the O. T. Church nor Christ alone was the Church, and since Christ first founded the Church by gathering together believers, nothing remains but to suppose the Church founded by means of true faith, *i.e.* faith participant of salvation. But it might be said: Inasmuch as Christ is the Head of the Church, and pertains to it as its universal principle, the Church already existed potentially in Him. But the Church, considered either as a community of human beings or as an institution for their government, was not constituted by Christ's person as such. Nor, finally, is it at all admissible, even leaving out of sight the origin of the Church, and regarding only its existence, to derive faith from the Church as its sufficient cause on the ground that it carries in itself Word and Sacrament, which work in conjunction with the

[1] John vii. 39.

Holy Spirit. For while the Church perpetuates these institutions, it only does this so long as faith is not extinct in it. Faith may therefore lay claim to being the abiding postulate even of the existing Church. To this must be added, that while the faith of believers is improved by Word and Sacrament, these two are not the Church, but, as shown above (§ 127), the continuation of Christ's office.

It is also of high importance to hold fast the Evangelical type in this place, because only by attaching the doctrine of faith directly to the Person of Christ (or, what is essentially the same, to the institutions which are continuations of His office), can the immediacy of our relation to God and Christ be secured; whereas, where instead of this the Church is put before faith, the necessary consequence is always a false dependence of the subject upon it, along with a false independence of the Church in relation to Christ. The Christian life is not transmitted, like a fluid or a material inheritance, by a law of nature. *Christiani non nascuntur sed fiunt renascendo.* Christianity begins in believers at present, just as originally in the apostles, through the continued activity of Christ, who sends the Holy Spirit that He may work through the institutions of Christ, through Word and Sacrament. The Church never has faith-creating, regenerating power. Never and nowhere does the Holy Spirit withdraw into passivity behind the acting, working Church. Never and nowhere do Word and Sacrament become His substitutes (§ 135).

2. But, of course, the notion is to be rejected, that the Church owes its origin merely to the subjective will of believing men. In that case Christ would only indirectly be the founder of the Church, nay, it would then be natural to derive its origin from the unfettered discretion of the subjects, from an agreement among them. It must be laid down as certain, that the aim of the world, which God has kept in view, and the realization of which is Christ's work, does not conclude with the origination of believing monads, be their number ever so great, everything further being left to the freedom of the subjects or to chance. Then the dispersion of humanity would not be reduced to unity by Christianity. On the contrary, such freedom, unchecked by the spirit of communion, would legitimate its permanent dispersion—a result

certainly incompatible with the ethical spirit of Christianity. For love is not the sport of chance, but, by inner necessity, formative of communion.

3. Thus the correct conclusion, in which the rights of believing personalities and of the community or Church find their acknowledgment, is this: Believers and the community stand in unconditional dependence on Christ. The Church, it is true, does not empirically precede faith; rather, believers are the constituent factors of the empirical Church, which would have no existence anywhere without believers. But, on the other hand, before the Church exists in empirical reality, it has a pre-existence in the divine counsel. This counsel again becomes the real historic potentiality of the Church in the consciousness and will of Christ, who sends the Holy Spirit. That potentiality, indeed, first passes into realization when believers exist as the material or the living stones, not without their mediation. But just as the Church was kept in view in Christ's will from the beginning, so the faith created by Christ's person and work is only thorough Christian faith through the fact of its reflecting Christ's will as a living mirror, and of a relation to community being inborn in it. Thus, in saying that faith and the Church are mutually related as the two inseparably united ends of Christ's work, and that neither can faith be called Christian without the spirit of Church-communion, nor the Church without believers, we also assert that faith and the Church are ends essentially excellent and, in so far, coequal in dignity. But for this very reason faith must make itself a means for the sake of the community, and the community make itself a means for the sake of faith; and both are rightly thought, not in their mutual separation, but only in their mutual connection. But as concerns the historic carrying out of this mutual inner relation of the two, it must be laid down that the founding of true faith in decisive creative fashion is not due to the empirical Church, but to Christ, who continues His work by the Holy Spirit through Word and Sacrament, and that everywhere and always faith must first be present if the Church is to arise or exist; and, on the other hand, that in faith as Christian, the spirit of communion, the aim of which is the Church, must be innate; and certainly this spirit cannot

manifest itself as the spirit of active love before the new personality is created by the consciousness of communion with God and Christ. The new self-consciousness is, with the new God-consciousness, the presupposition of love, while love —that truth of the generic consciousness—is the manifestation of the existing faith of the personality.

4. The conclusion from all this is, that, in seeking in the first instance scientific knowledge of the *origin of the Church*, we must start from faith, and so treat faith as at the same time to find in it the genesis of the Church. In doing so, it is always of importance to keep in mind the independence as well as mutual connection of the two poles,—the factor of the community and of faith,—since the two may be severed from each other in theory as well as in practice; and when one is sickly, help must come from the healing counteraction of the other still relatively sound factor. It is a further conclusion from what has been said, that the Church and not merely faith is no doubt a *dogmatic* (not merely ethical) idea,[1] for it is an eternal divine thought, it is essentially innate in Christ's work as well as in faith, and its realization is an act of the Triune God. But inasmuch as the Church is the embodiment of the concrete loving communion of believers, the idea of the Christian Church acquires of course an *ethical* aspect, alongside the dogmatic, which becomes the subject of Christian ethics. Finally, inasmuch as the ethical aspect requires fixed ordinances adapted to the age in order to the organization of the community of love, and especially in order that the community may be a pædagogic instrument of salvation and be guarded against external disturbances, it leads to the *legal* element of the idea of the Church, to the Church under a legal aspect. Upon the spiritual fermenting of humanity, the centre and organ of which is the Church, follows the moral transformation and reconstruction of the world in all spheres, by which humanity becomes the kingdom of God, as it is the function of Christian ethics to describe. In relation to the entire aim of Christ and the divine goal of the world "kingdom of God," as it is a more primitive and scriptural, so it is a more adequate designation than "the Church," but the latter is certainly the centre of the kingdom of God.

[1] Cf. the distinction between ethical and dogmatic propositions, i. § 1. 4, p. 28.

SECOND MAIN DIVISION.

THE CHURCH, OR THE KINGDOM OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

§ 129.—*The Work of the Holy Spirit in general.*

CHRIST carries on the work of redemption to completion through the Holy Spirit, whom He sends. The revealing purpose of the Father and the atoning purpose of the Son only attain their goal, when the Holy Spirit also reveals Himself in the world, and communicates Himself to it in conformity with His distinctive nature. In doing this, the Spirit, on the one hand, presupposes Christ's historic work; on the other, He prepares by His working for Christ's Second Advent (§ 127).

1. In Christ eternal redemption is found and all salvation provided;[1] but because in His person humanity is united with divinity, humanity in us also may and ought to be united with God.[2] Although in Christ the objective *revelation* of God as the eternal Logos is completed, that of the Holy Spirit is not therewith completed. Only when the latter ensues does the immanent Trinity attain its complete reflection in the world of revelation. True, the Holy Spirit must be thought as active even before Christ, wherever a relative union of the antithesis of God and the world is found.[3] By such relative unions the way is prepared for the perfect objective revelation—the revelation of God as the Son, and humanity is made inwardly receptive thereto. But considered in Himself, the Holy Spirit has before Christ merely the initial revelation of Himself; for the perfect revelation

[1] Heb. ix. 12. [2] 2 Cor. v. 19 ff.
[3] Gen. i. 2; Ps. li. 11; Isa. lxiii. 10. Cf. vol. i. § 28, p. 346.

requires that He prove Himself historically—which is only possible on the basis of atonement—the absolute principle of union in the heart of humanity, as in God's essence He effects the union of opposites,[1] whereas in the Son God is contrasted with sinful man merely in objective revelation. The Holy Spirit gains this His own perfect revelation first through the completion of the revelation of the Son.[2] Although in the Son of man the Logos only is incarnate, not God as the Holy Spirit, still the Holy Spirit co-operates in the incarnation of the Logos, and in Christ the Father also and the Holy Spirit dwell, even as the Triune God would make His abode in us. In the Son of man the Holy Spirit obtains the primitive scene of His perfect realization in the world. The Son of man is the point in which humanity has returned into God, the First-born of true humanity united with God.[3] At first He is still alone.[4] But since He has the Spirit without measure, and is the *Fons Spiritus Sancti*, He is able to baptize with fire and the Holy Spirit,[5] and a race of many brethren may be born to Him, but of course only after He has gone through His baptism of suffering. Hence, in the completion of His revelation, the Spirit of God is the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*,[6] as He is also said to be sent by Christ. As the Spirit of Christ, He refers back to Christ and carries in Himself the power to diffuse the divine-human life, in order to carry on the union of the human with the divine by growing assimilation of the former to the latter. Such power of union is the principle of the Palingenesis of the human spirit and of nature, in virtue of the absolute union of the two accomplished in Christ. The Holy Spirit does not after Christ begin to unite the divine and human again *de novo;* but in fixed historical continuity, the divine-human personal unity, which in Christ is incorporated with humanity, is employed for the purpose of propagating the life of the God-man.[7] Through Him sons of God are begotten, a race whose progenitor is Christ.[8] Thus, according to Holy Writ,

[1] Vol. i. § 31*a*, pp. 421, 425, 436 f.
[2] John vii. 39, xvi. 7.
[3] Col. i. 15; Rom. viii. 29; Heb. i. 6.
[4] John xii. 24.
[5] Acts i. 5, 8; Mark i. 8; Matt. iii. 11; Luke xii. 49; John xv. 26, xvi. 7–15.
[6] Rom. viii. 9; Gal. iv. 6.
[7] 2 Pet. i. 4; John xii. 24.
[8] Rom. viii. 14, v. 15 f.; 1 Cor. xv. 22; John i. 12.

the Holy Spirit in His perfect revelation, which has become possible after Christ, exercises His characteristic nature in the world also, namely, the reduction of distinctions to unity. The world or humanity standing in contrast with Christ, as the objective revelation, becomes through the Holy Spirit, as the Spirit of Christ, humanity led back to God, appropriated by Christ's theanthropic life; and this is the *Church*.

2. THE DISSIMILARITY OF THE REVELATION OF GOD IN CHRIST AND IN THE HOLY SPIRIT.—This point has been already treated in the Christology with respect to the fact, that the supposition of a like being of God in Christ and in believers is unsatisfactory to the Christian consciousness. Rather we had to assume a unique mode of God's being in Christ, which leads us back to intra-divine, eternal, trinitarian distinctions. The other side of the matter must now be considered, namely, that even the peculiar mode of God's being in Christ cannot be a substitute for God's mode of being and revelation as the Holy Spirit in the Church assimilated by Christ. This follows most simply from the character (discussed above) of Christ's substitution, which is not negative, not repressive of personality, but productive. He is not content with the existence in Himself of the fulness of spiritual life, into which His people are absorbed by faith. Believers are themselves to live and love as free personalities; they are to be ends to His love for their own sakes; and therefore Christ's redeeming purpose is directed to the creation by the Holy Spirit, whom He sends, of new personalities, in whom Christ gains a settled, established being. But by this very means God exists in them after a new manner, new not merely because the power of redemption and consummation inheres only in God's being in Christ, but now also because, although Christ remains the Principle of the life, this life shapes itself in freedom and distinctness from Christ. Only by means of such freedom can the bond between Christ and man, instead of remaining a one-sided one, become two-sided, and therefore all the firmer—the reciprocal relation of love. But at the same time, the fulness of the Spirit, of light and life, grace and truth, which dwells objectively in Christ, no longer remains merely objective to the world, but lives and unfolds

itself in the world as a living treasure of salvation. Through the Holy Spirit it comes to pass, that Christ's impulse is not simply continued and extended to men, but becomes an indigenous impulse in them, a new focus being independently formed for naturalized divine powers. As a new divine Principle, the Holy Spirit creates, although not substantially new faculties, a new volition, knowledge, feeling, a new self-consciousness. In brief, He produces a new person, dissolving the old union-point of the faculties, and creating a new pure union of the same. The new personality is formed in inner resemblance to the second Adam, on the same family type, so to speak. Everything, by which the new personality in its independence makes itself known, is ascribed by Holy Scripture to this third divine Principle. Through the Holy Spirit the believer has the consciousness of himself as a new man,[1] and the power and living impulse of a new, holy life that is free in God.[2] He is the spirit of joy and freedom in opposition to the γράμμα;[3] subjection to divine impulse is now in the blending of necessity and freedom withal spontaneous impulse; mere passivity and receptiveness are transformed into spontaneity, nay, productiveness and independence. Through Him we are not merely apprehended of Christ, but also apprehend Him; not merely known and loved of God, but are also conscious of being so, nay, know and love God. Through the Holy Spirit all natural powers implanted in creation are consecrated, inspired, and developed, the individual personality being thus raised to complete charismatic individuality. By all these means the Holy Spirit plants and cherishes the one relatively independent factor—the presupposition of the origin of the Church (§ 128), namely, the new, believing personality.

3. The second aspect is: The Holy Spirit is the spirit of *communion*. This may seem to be incompatible with the personal independence which He creates by bringing man's nature into harmony, his faculties into unison, whereby the creative thought is realized, which kept in view individuals

[1] Eph. i. 13, iv. 30; Rom. viii. 15, 23; 2 Cor. i. 22, v. 5; Gal. iv. 6. (σφραγίς, ἀρραβών).

[2] Rom. viii. 14; Gal. v. 17, 18, 22.

[3] Rom. viii. 2, 10, 14, 15; Gal. iv. 6; Eph. iii. 16 ff.; 1 Cor. xii. 9, 10, 28.

by name. But the individual believer, free in God, even when his generic consciousness is perfected, is again only perfected by love. The reality of personality is just this, that the true essence of humanity is realized in it, in an individual form indeed, but in the spirit of the universal. And this common spirit, in virtue of which all are conscious of being a unity and of carrying on one work, in reference to which they are mutually helpful or supplementary, forms the crown of the work of Christ. As at a lower stage a plurality of powers was gathered in the first Adam into a harmonious unity, so now also the individual persons are again unities, out of which a higher whole is harmoniously built up. Moved by the Holy Spirit, as its divine life-breath, redeemed humanity or the Church stands in contrast with the darkness and sin of the world, as the world of clear, blessed self-consciousness, of peace and love, as the flower of humanity, the place consecrated to be the tabernacle or temple of God upon earth.[1]

4. But although God thus establishes through the Holy Spirit a new world of light, of divine peace and divinely ordered life in place of the old chaotic world,[2] it is still certain that the Holy Spirit takes of that which is Christ's,[3] His office being to introduce into the heart the revelation objectively perfected in Christ. This revelation, to which He leads men, is the blessing which He seeks to make a subjective possession. He seeks to glorify Christ by disclosing His mind, imprinting His image on the heart, and thus uniting with Him. He makes the all-sufficient fulness that is in Christ the possession of the human personality. Hence the Holy Spirit does not seek to give a new, perfecting revelation as to contents;[4] but, completing the cycle, He recurs to the revelation objectively perfected in the Son and to the Father, in order to bring the world into intimate communion with the Father and the Son. Notwithstanding, there is a new creative act of God in the work of the Holy Spirit. For in and with that reference back to Christ, He creates new persons, and ratifies and seals the revelation of the Father in the Son; objectively, by disclosing the wisdom and power of

[1] 1 Cor. iii. 17, vi. 19; 2 Cor. vi. 16; Eph. ii. 21; Rev. iii. 12, xi. 19.
[2] Col. i. 12, 13; 2 Cor. iv. 6. Cf. 1 Cor. ii. 10. [3] John xvi. 15.
[4] John xvi. 13, 14, xiv. 26, xv. 26.

God that is in Christ; subjectively, by building up believers into the body of Christ, inspiring them, and being the moving, delivering power in them, so that they become His free organs, the scene of His revelation of Himself in the world. Thus the revelation or dominion of the Holy Spirit and the glorifying of Christ in the world, are inseparably one. But, again, the glorifying of the world itself is inseparably connected with both. This is first of all a spiritual glorifying, but one that cannot be accomplished without a *conflict* with the world itself. Hence the Holy Spirit has in the first place to exercise a *corrective office* on the world.[1] This excites opposition and hate in the world, and sets it in commotion. But the more humanity is fermented in this *conflict* by the Spirit of Christ, the more the Church, reflecting the history of the exalted Lord Himself, presses towards manifestation and mastery over nature. The exciting of opposition and the fermenting of the world agree in this, that everything must be brought to decision by the power of Christianity, that the absolutely heterogeneous and incompatible is separated, and the homogeneous gathered together. But thus the work of the Holy Spirit prepares the way both negatively and positively for the *final Judgment*, from which time everything will be subject to Christ, either to His retributive power and justice, or to the omnipotence of His love, which creates the new heaven and new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness, and where the revelation of the glory of Christ will be blended with the glory of His people.

FIRST DIVISION.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CHURCH THROUGH FAITH AND REGENERATION.

§ 130.—*Relation of the Holy Spirit to Human Activity in the Work of Grace.*

Divine and human activity are united in producing the work of grace, but in such a way that the stimulus proceeds from

[1] John xvi. 8.

the former both in the preparation and appropriation of salvation. Each embraces the whole work of salvation, but each in its own mode. In order to define this mode aright, it is important to conceive the relation of Nature and Grace, neither as one of false identity or mere quantitative distinctiveness, nor of false contrariety, *i.e.* to define it neither in a Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian, nor in a Manichæan way. On the contrary, along with the specific novelty and supernaturalness of Christian grace, its inner homogeneity with Nature must be understood. This homogeneity is secured both by the wisdom of divine love, which will not interrupt the work begun in creation, but conduct it to completion, and by the need and receptivity of human nature for Christian grace. The specific character and novelty of grace are rendered decisively secure by the fact, that the prevenient *grace of justification* is known as its first fundamental gift; and justification cannot be an effect of man's action in whole or in part, although it only becomes a conscious possession through faith. But through its actual reception and possession mere receptivity passes into spontaneity and the productive power of freedom, in which divine and human life find a union that images the life of Christ.

LITERATURE. — Landerer, *das Verhältniss von Gnade und Freiheit in der Aneignung des Heiles, eine dogmengesch. u. dogm. Abh.* (alas! not completed), *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* ii. 500–603. Luthardt, *v. freien Willen*, 1863 (cf. *ante*, §§ 74. 79). Schweizer, *Gesch. d. Central-Dogm.* ii., especially p. 564 ff. Jul. Müller, *Dogm. Abhh.* 1870, p. 186 ff.; respecting Luther's attitude towards the doctrine of Predestination, cf. also his Diss. *Lutheri de Prædest. et lib. arb. Doctrina*, 1832. Müller also refers to the opinions of J. Köstlin, Harnack, Frank, Philippi, and Plitt, respecting Luther's predestination-doctrine.

A.—*Biblical Doctrine.*

On one side (and these passages are the most numerous, especially in the New Testament) salvation is expressly

referred to God, who creates both the willing and performing,[1] as in the Old Testament a new heart is viewed or promised as God's gift.[2] Even a penitent heart is described as a gift of God. The same is true of faith.[3] But *on the other side*, repentance and faith are *required* as a moral and religious act of man. So in the preaching of the Baptist which Christ takes up.[4] The Sermon on the Mount requires a seeking after the kingdom of heaven, and commends a striving, a doing violence to it.[5] Both views are combined when faith as a divine work is absolutely required of man,[6] or when it is viewed as an impulse of will, but towards Christ, who would be superfluous if the impulse were able of itself to attain its goal or bring healing and redemption. How, then, are the two, which seem so opposite in meaning, to be reconciled? In this way, that according to the N. T. the gospel is neither a mere legal requirement nor a mere exertion of the power of God and Christ upon man, whether he is willing or not, but that like the *gift*, which it is, it addresses itself in the first place as an *offer* to the will and its free decision. It is in the first place an invitation, a call to salvation.[7] To offer is not to command or compel, and yet obedience to the invitation is a duty and obligation. Since salvation is first of all forgiveness, pardon, which, in order to be consciously received as such, presupposes the acknowledgment of guilt and God's just displeasure, while guilt is acknowledged only by the penitent, Christ says: "I am come to call sinners to repentance."[8] The Beatitudes describe the righteousness of the kingdom of heaven as the divine gift, which, however, must be the object of earnest effort.[9] Where hunger and thirst after righteousness, *i.e.* vital receptivity for it, exists, the seeking becomes an asking for the gift present in Christ.[10] The divine and the corresponding human act are connected by Paul when he says: "I follow after, that I may apprehend that for which I

[1] Phil. ii. 13, i. 6; Eph. ii. 5; Col. ii. 13.
[2] Ps. li. 10; Jer. xxiv. 7, xxxi. 18, 33, 34; Ezek. xi. 19, xxxvi. 26, 27.
[3] Jer. xxiv. 7; Acts v. 31, xi. 18; 2 Tim. ii. 25; Heb. vi. 6. Faith: Phil. ii. 13; Eph. i. 19, ii. 10. Cf. 1 Cor. iii. 6–12; John xv. 1 ff.; 2 Cor. iii. 5.
[4] Matt. iii. 2, iv. 17: Μετανοεῖτε. [5] Cf. Matt. vi. 33, xi. 12.
[6] John vi. 29. [7] Matt. xi. 27, 28, xxii. 2 f.; Luke xiv. 16 f.
[8] Matt. ix. 13; Mark ii. 17; Luke v. 32. [9] Matt. vi. 33, v. 3, 6.
[10] Matt. xi. 27 f.

am apprehended of Christ Jesus."[1] The prevenient act of Christ[2] is meant to evoke the act of apprehending in us, our being loved of God to evoke the desire to be loved in the beloved One, *i.e.* the desire to be included in the love with which the Father loves the Son.

This will-arousing summons to the divine gift, which is often represented as a feast, applies to all. The purpose of grace is universal.[3] Hence the gospel, repentance and forgiveness of sins, are to be preached to all nations.[4] This cannot refer merely to nations as unities, but must refer also to every individual; for otherwise the universality of the gracious purpose would not be earnestly meant; and if God refused what is indispensable to salvation to the individual, condemnation would be impossible. But, on the contrary, no one will be damned merely on account of the common sin and guilt.[5] But every one is definitely brought to personal decision only through the gospel. A predestination of one class to damnation, or even a mere passing by of one class altogether in respect of grace, and not simply for a time, is not taught in the New Testament. Rom. ix.–xi. treats only of an earlier and later calling[6] of individuals, and especially of nations, not of an eternal predestination of one class to damnation. Even divine hardening is only meant in such a sense that self-hardening also is included, and condemnation in such a sense that culpability and self-condemnation also are included.[7] Want of will is described as the cause of exclusion from salvation.[8] The call coming to all does not come apart from the objective means of grace.[9] But election also does not take effect apart from the faith, which follows the summons.[10] Hence, while all indeed are called, all called are not elected.[11]

[1] Phil. iii. 12. Cf. Jer. xxxi. 18: Turn Thou me, that I may be turned.
[2] 1 John iv. 10.
[3] John iii. 16; 1 Tim. ii. 6. Cf. John i. 29, vi. 51; 1 John i. 7; Rom. iii. 22, x. 4, xi. 32; 2 Pet. iii. 9; Matt. xi. 28.
[4] Matt. xxiv. 14, xxviii. 19; Mark xvi. 15; Luke xxiv. 47.
[5] Gal. vi. 4, 5: Every one shall bear his own burden.
[6] Rom. ix.–xi., xi. 25.
[7] Rom. ix. 32, x. 16.
[8] Matt. xxiii. 37.
[9] Rom. x. 14.
[10] Rom. x. 9, 16; Mark xvi. 16.
[11] Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14.

B.—*Ecclesiastical Development of the Doctrine of the Relation of Divine and Human Activity in the Work of Redemption.*

LITERATURE.—Cf. § 74.

1. The *Greek* Church had not in general a profound apprehension of the difference between the pre-Christian age and Christianity. Justin, Clement of Alexandria, and others rather see in the latter only true, wise teaching, in which distinguished heathen also participated through the Logos. Nay, in Justin's eyes righteous heathen were Christians. Not merely the Antiochians, such as Diodorus of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Chrysostom, but also Athanasius, Eusebius, Cyril of Jerusalem, leave too large a place to man's natural capacity for goodness,[1]—a proceeding in keeping with the fact that the Oriental Church had to contend with Fatalism and Manichæism, which threatened the ethical character of Christianity by their denial of moral freedom. Advancing beyond this specially Antiochian doctrine, *Pelagius* desired to derive all good from the free will of man. Inner operations of grace, determining the will, seem to him irreconcilable with moral freedom; he concedes only outward *adjutoria* of teaching and example. For this very reason, according to him, a natural corruption, originating with the first progenitor, is out of the question. Mortality is to him, as to Theodore, a physical necessity, having nothing to do with sin.[2] Evil example, indeed, has an influence, but without abolishing freedom. If, then, freedom remained intact, personal guilt would necessarily be all the greater, and the need of divine redemption be aggravated. But this consequence is not dwelt on, because, on the other hand, the effect of sin is not considered so far-reaching as not to leave the possibility of such a use of freedom as procures reconciliation and salvation.—*Augustine*, on the contrary, while ascribing freedom of choice to Adam before the Fall, makes him lose it entirely through the Fall; and since

[1] Cf. Förster, *Chrysostomus;* Wörter, p. 40; Landerer's treatise, *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.*, see above.

[2] The latter, certainly, according to Theodore of Mopsuestia, is otherwise; see vol. ii. p. 336 f.

the race fell in him, we are by nature altogether without freedom. Only they are saved who are overpowered by the omnipotence of grace and inspired with good volition. Experience shows that this does not take place in all, but only in a part. These are the elect; whereas the others, although no more belonging to the *massa perditionis* than the *electi*, are left as they are and perish, not on account of their conduct, but because grace is particular, not universal. Even to the elect, according to Augustine, freedom of choice is not restored; they are and remain determined by the divine will; consequently the human will, so far as it is good, is merely a form of the divine will.[1] Strict predestinationism fears some derogation of the divine majesty if a place is left for human freedom; whereas, if there is no freedom, God's kingdom would be poorer by an entire class of beings, ethical causality in man would be mere semblance, and no place would be left either for guilt or moral commendation. Augustine (like Pelagius) did not elaborate the doctrine of atonement and put it in the centre. Hence, what is specifically new in Christianity is not settled by him. The distinction between pre-Christian and Christian is explained away by both in opposite ways,—in Pelagius the distinction between heathenism and Christianity, because to him the decisive feature is simply the use of *liberum arbitrium;* in Augustine, to whom the heathen world is a mere mass of corruption, the distinction between the good of the Old and New Testament fades away, because according to him everything depends absolutely on God's free grace. Hence even in the O. T. there are elect and regenerate.

2. *Semi-Pelagianism* and *Synergism* are one in the desire to leave to human and divine activity their rights. Augustine's doctrine triumphed only in appearance, in reality *Semi-Pelagianism* was predominant. The latter rejects absolute predestination pretty much as the teaching of the Greek Fathers does, concedes a weakening through original sin, and accepts the universality of the purpose of grace, even admitting internal operations of grace. But according to Semi-Pelagianism, the beginning of the good work must be made by man through the disposing of himself for grace, a view which the theology of the Middle Ages developed into the *actus*

[1] Cf. Luthardt, *die Freiheit*, etc., p. 38.

eliciti fidei, amoris, spei so called, through which man renders himself worthy of receiving the grace of forgiveness and sanctification in respect of sins after baptism. On the other hand, God must complete the work of salvation. Despite the more Augustinian Council of Orange (529 A.D.), this became, especially through the influence of Gregory the Great, in the main the ruling doctrine. It is also in essentials the doctrine of the Tridentine Council, Sess. vi.[1] In this case we should have an alternating between divine and human activity, but no union.

3. THE EVANGELICAL DOCTRINE. — To Semi-Pelagianism the *Apology* opposes the axiom: "The beginning is half of the whole." The Reformation as a rule recurred to Augustine's doctrine. Some of the Calvinistic theologians went so far beyond Augustine as even to deny the freedom of Adam (Supralapsarianism), even as Luther in his treatise, *De servo Arbitrio*, felt himself compelled, not merely on account of original sin, but also of the divine omnipotence, to deny *liberum arbitrium* for the purpose of humbling man's pride and self-righteousness. But on this point the German Evangelical Church has not followed Luther. Even the German Reformed Confessions from the time of the Heidelberg Catechism, John a Lasco, and the Brandenburg Confessions, soften the Calvinistic doctrine. The Anglican Church still more definitely lets the *Decretum absol. Electionis et Reprobationis* drop, and even the teaching of the Synod of Dort is Infralapsarian. Melanchthon had at first, with Luther, entirely denied *liberum arbitrium*, calling it a *Commentum philosophicum;* but, when farther advanced in an independent and distinctive course, he maintained with growing earnestness the ethical aspect of Christianity in relation to the law and the guilt of man. Although in 1530 he had not yet rejected the doctrine of absolute predestination,[2] he already put it in the background.[3] But when, especially after 1532, he pondered the passages of Scripture respecting the universal purpose of grace, and reflected that the denial of freedom

[1] Cf. Luthardt, *ut supra*, pp. 42–53.

[2] Traces of the doctrine are found in *Conf. Aug.* Art. v.: *Ubi et quando*, etc., and xix.: *non adjuvante Deo.*

[3] And that intentionally, according to a letter to J. Brentz, *Corp. Ref.* ii. 547. The subject, however, was a statement of the common faith of the German Evangelicals.

must necessarily transfer the guilt of perdition back from the individual to a particularism in God's gracious purpose, —when, therefore, he perceived that, if no place remains *in spiritualibus* for *liberum arbitrium* to co-operate for salvation or destruction by receiving or rejecting grace, the cause of the perdition of the one class could only have its ground in the refusal of divine help and deliverance,—he advanced with increasing definiteness to the rejection of the absolute predestination which the "Gnesio-Lutherans" so called,—Flacius, Wigand, Amsdorf,—with the Reformed theologians, still continued to maintain, and taught that man has even now so much of *liberum arbitrium* that he is able either to close (*sese applicare*) with the grace, which must be offered preveniently to him, or to reject it.[1] Three factors must co-operate in the work of salvation—the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and *liberum arbitrium*, which latter must not maintain a merely passive attitude, but can and ought to close with grace. This his opponents called *Synergism*, because he left to man a remnant of *liberum arbitrium in spiritualibus* even in reference to the beginning.[2]

The *Formula of Concord*, in opposition to Augustine, concedes a co-operation in one who is *converted*, a restoration of freedom by the grace of Christianity. But with *Conf. Aug.* xviii. it maintains, that by nature we have absolutely no freedom *in spiritualibus*, but only *in civilibus*. Even Luther's treatise, *De Servo Arbitrio*, is unreservedly approved;[3] man is by nature *lapis et truncus*. But, on the other hand, it knows no *Decretum particulare* to damnation, or indeed to evil;[4] it holds firmly by the universality of the divine purpose of grace.[5] Whoever is lost, is lost only through his own unbelief.[6] Grace, that is, is not irresistible, it does not compel.[7]

[1] Cf. Herrlinger, *die Theologie Melanchthons*, p. 67–107, whose discussions respecting the different stages in the development of Melanchthon are a model of thoroughness, clearness, and conscientiously considered judgment. Cf. my *History of Protestant Theology*, vol. i. 218 f.

[2] Later, at least, Melanchthon declared for the view that the *adjutorium* of the Holy Spirit is required even in order to the will to accept the gospel. Cf. Herrlinger, *ut supra*.

[3] 668, 44. [4] 819. [5] 619; 802, 15; 813; 844.

[6] 819, 79. The unbeliever *se ipsum vas contumeliæ fecit*, 809, 41.

[7] 818, 78. *Ipsi suæ perditionis causa sunt et culpam sustinent.*

But, on the other side, the natural state of all men is described as if resistance were not merely possible, but necessary. How, then, is the *Form. Conc.* able to establish a diversity in the fate of individuals, and a difference of conduct on their part? As concerns those who are saved, their severance from the *massa perditionis* is based on Election, which as eternal took place before the foundation of the world, and is viewed as the *causa salutis nostræ*.[1] There is a decree of election, which is a comfort and the strongest of all securities.[2] So little is the divine foreknowledge of faith put in the place of absolute predestination, and faith viewed as the cause of election, that, on the contrary, it is emphatically denied that anything in us is the cause of election.[3] On this view, the difference between the saved and condemned seems still in the last resort to be altogether traced back in the Augustinian spirit to God's absolute election of the one class, the obverse of which is the passing by or overlooking of the rest. But therewith we again arrive at a particularism in grace and a twofold *decretum*, in opposition to the firmly held faith in universal grace, the preaching of which could not then be God's earnest purpose, and in opposition also to the doctrine that unbelievers are lost through their own unbelief,[4] which yet cannot be meant as a mere illusive causality. On the other hand, an *electio absoluta* (*i.e.* the doctrine that *in the elect there is no ground for their election*, and therefore the ground of that election is not the acceptance or non-rejection of grace) certainly agrees well with the doctrine, that by nature all men are altogether without capacity in spiritual things. Only it is hard to see how the possibility of resisting grace can be universally maintained alongside such *electio absoluta*. If this possibility is not limited to those who are lost, the difference of those who are saved from them seems traceable to something in them, namely, to abstinence from possible resistance. In order to bridge over statements so opposite in appearance, the *Form. Conc.* attempts the following device: In virtue of

[1] 799, 5. 8.

[2] 810, 45–47. The *decretum electionis* is *solatium et arx munitissima*. It is included in the divine decree, that the justified are also kept and glorified, 802, 20.

[3] 809, 43; 821, 88.

[4] 818, 78.

liberum arbitrium in civilibus, man retains the capacity to live virtuously, to maintain therefore good morals and conduct, and to hear God's Word.[1] If he hears it, its influence upon him is so powerful, that he is either led thereby to faith and salvation, or, if he believes not, his unbelief is his own fault. But this is not maintained by the later theology, probably in order not to attribute spiritual influence to *liberum arbitrium in civilibus*, and that at the decisive point. The teaching of the later theology rather is, that in those who receive baptism or hear God's Word, freedom of choice even *in spiritualibus* is restored by the power of grace through the means of grace. This freedom of choice (*liberum arbitrium liberatum*), restored *modo mere passivo*, has then to decide for or against Christianity, so that the responsibility for condemnation rests entirely on man.[2] The acknowledgment, that the capacity of free decision respecting his destiny is bestowed on *man*, also implies the giving up of the position, that in the elect there is no ground of their election. On the contrary, *Prædestinatio* is exchanged more and more definitely for mere divine foreknowledge, J. Gerhard and Quenstedt *e.g.* teaching: *Intuitus fidei*, or *prævisa fides ingreditur decretum electionis.*

The 18th century then passed over to Synergism, Semi-Pelagianism, nay, Pelagianism, more and more depreciating the religious side in comparison with the moral. After this tendency had culminated in the theologians of the *Kantian* school, *Schleiermacher* again emphasized the efficiency of grace, and that in the form of the *decretum absolutum*, accepting, however, the universality of grace from the Lutheran doctrine, and asserting the universality of the Apokatastasis. But he does not show how the moral ideas of guilt and punishment consist with such all-embracing determination by the divine power, and the religious consciousness is shocked if God is made even the negative cause of evil. The dogmatists after Schleiermacher, even on the Reformed side, have therefore pretty generally again subscribed to the freedom of the will. But even supposing that the Rationalism which denies

[1] 808, 40; 818, 78. Moreover, the baptized have *lib. arb. liberatum*, 675, 67.

[2] So, for example, the influential König, § 447, which is overlooked by R. Schmidt, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1880, p. 207.

internal operations of grace is left out of sight, different tendencies are always possible and perceptible in Evangelical theology. Those of one school approximate to Melanchthon's Synergism in so far as they suppose a remnant of *liberum arbitrium*, which is competent at once to accept grace or to reject it, and therefore has spiritual significance. Of this natural capacity of choice they assert that the decision respecting a final destiny of happiness or misery depends upon it, even apart from previous culture by Christian grace.[1] They remind us that higher and nobler strivings are found even among the heathen, and that the distinction between a reprobate life and that of a Socrates, Plato, and Scipio ought not to be held trivial. Grace, it is said, must find a point of connection, and that in freedom; else no living appropriation of salvation is possible, but everything would depend on the power of external influences, either divine or finite, operating after the manner of physical necessity instead of leaving a place for responsibility. We are therefore forced back upon absolute predestination, unless a remnant of free capacity in spiritual things is assumed in man. On the other hand,

[1] It is usual in certain circles to reckon *Jul. Müller* among the adherents of Synergism. He expresses himself on this subject in his excellent treatise respecting the relation between the working of the Holy Spirit and God's Word as a means of grace (p. 253), to the effect that he by no means affects the orthodoxy of the Formula of Concord, but still doubts whether Synergism would endorse his view, since he takes offence at the very word *συνεργεῖν* (of the human will in conversion), and does not hold those *tres causas*, which Synergism combines in a co-ordinate relation (pp. 252 f., 267, 268). His view is as follows (p. 245 f.): In man's natural state his heart is closed against God and His influence. But in the depths of the heart a reaction exists against this closed condition—the impulse of conscience and the presentiment of a living, holy, creative God. It lies, then, in the power of the natural man, whether he will suppress the reaction of conscience within himself, or respect it. The natural state may pass into hardness by an evil decision, which scorns that divine offer and stimulus, which addresses itself (not merely in the form of the offer of salvation in the gospel) to the secret reaction of conscience. If, instead of rejecting the good divine stimulus or offer, he holds it fast, he has the possibility of salvation. J. Müller not merely repudiates the notion of capacity in man to make a beginning of goodness (p. 252); he everywhere supposes divine activity to intervene—that of Providence or the operation of Christian grace—even in the preparation for conversion. But his view is not worked out with complete clearness and harmony. It is not made clear whether Christian grace is a necessary part of the preparation, and further, that Christianity can exercise a power over man before his freedom of choice comes into exercise, that it is a match for every form of pre-Christian sin, and that we cannot therefore

Frank and *Sartorius*[1] deny all spiritual capacity in the natural man, endeavouring to justify expressions of the *Form. Conc.* like *lapis et truncus*, and the reported saying of Augustine, that the virtues of the heathen are but splendid sins. *Frank's* first postulate is an exclusive working of divine grace, especially through the means of grace, and on man's side only absolute passivity in presence of inevitable, necessary operations of grace. To the sphere of such purely divine operations belongs everything which forms part of calling. But he reckons even regeneration and conversion as to their divine side as a part of calling, and does not therefore shrink from speaking of man being regenerated and converted apart from his knowledge and volition, although of course conscious volition must follow. He therefore maintains essentially the view expounded by Kliefoth (*Acht Bücher von der Kirche*, 1854). As this theory was subjected long ago to a destructive criticism in J. Müller's often-mentioned treatise (p. 247 ff.), one naturally wonders that *Frank* ventures to advance without fear on such unsubstantial paths.[2] Since, on the other hand, those acts of calling grace, in which man's attitude is in the first instance passive, according to him have for their aim, and must be regarded as having for their aim, to supply to those who are called the

attribute the significance of a crisis certainly leading to salvation or ruin even to the sinner's reverence for or abuse of conscience before Christianity has made its nearness felt by him, because Christianity reserves to itself the prerogative of introducing the crisis. It sounds indeed very plausible, when Müller says, that whoever denies the factor of a natural free will *in spiritualibus* falls a prey to predestinationism (pp. 250, 253), or, that to deny the fact of all divine working being conditioned by the disposition of man in any point, and to put an irresistible exercise of divine power in place of the human factor, leads to magical theories. But that none of these consequences need follow from a prevenient working of grace before the good employment of freedom, is shown in the note, p. 267, where he acknowledges that there is truth in the doctrine of Lutheran theologians of *motus inevitabiles* or *necessarii* as follows: "When the core of the gospel is brought home to the heart through knowledge, there is certainly an inner stirring of heart inseparably connected therewith; and as this glance into the significance of the gospel and the inner emotion of heart connected therewith alone renders possible a first decision for or against Christ, so only he to whom the gospel is inwardly brought home is to be regarded as actually called," pp. 267, 268, note.

[1] Frank, *die Theologie der Concordienformel*, i. 138 f. Sartorius in his *Beiträgen z. Apologie d. Augsb. Conf.* 1853. *Die heilige Liebe*, i. 165 ff.

[2] Frank, *Syst. d. christl. Wahrheit*, ii. 300–316, §§ 40, 41.

possibility of deciding by spontaneous volition in favour of the salvation offered, it is thereby affirmed withal that this prevenient, alleged, real, and universal "regeneration and conversion," which is said to form the contents of effectual calling (p. 314), is really nothing but a restoring of freedom of choice, but cannot in the least be regarded as implying good personal character in man. Hence it can be no loss to let this attempt at a new terminology drop. Nor can it add to the clearness of the matter to present regeneration and conversion (under the name of "calling") complete as a purely divine work, to which is next added the spontaneous side of regeneration and conversion as a whole just as complete. For in this case the very thing which is the chief concern remains in obscurity—the living interblending and development of the divine and human sides, since each seeks the other and is inclined to the other, and by this means evokes a fruitful moral and religious process.

Finally, *Thomasius*, *Hofmann*, and *Luthardt*[1] attempt a middle course, by assuming an operation of grace outside the religion of the Old and New Testament, which, however, does not forestall Christianity. Although by this means a higher longing, an ideal striving may be produced, this longing does not understand itself, and self-righteousness (*i.e.* defect in humility) remains connected with the striving after righteousness. Only to Christianity is it given to enlighten the natural man by its influence, and to set before his eyes what he needs and unconsciously seeks. These workings of Christianity, with the emotions belonging thereto, are inevitable (*inevitabiles*); but since free personal decision is reserved, they cannot be called *irresistibiles*. *Harless* agrees with Luthardt in thinking that the Church doctrine, that man's attitude in the work of grace is purely passive, ignores Christian ethics, which requires in order to conversion a freely conscious, personal movement on man's part. But Luthardt rightly adds, that such a division of the work of salvation, in which the divine action is intentionally set forth without regard to the human movement, cannot be sufficient. The ethical cannot be separated from the religious. Nor does Luthardt approve the makeshift, that God exclusively works what is

[1] Thomasius, *ut supra*, i. 369; Luthardt, 366 ff., 429–465.

good in us, without the human will participating therein, or the participation of the human will need be nothing more than negative abstinence from that resistance to grace which the will might put forth. For even this implies good volition, which, however, exists not by nature, although certainly it is not sufficient to assign to *justitia civilis* merely the sphere of external conduct and propriety. Only the operations which issue from *Christian* grace, after preparatory workings of universal grace, restore *liberum arbitrium* to the power to accept or reject Christian grace, which is offensive in some respects to the natural man.[1]

C.—*Dogmatic Investigation.*

1. That the divine and human sides must combine in a vital manner in the work of salvation, is implied generally by the ethical character of Christianity, specifically by the Christian doctrine of God and by Ponerology. Supposing the universal and absolute need of redemption on man's part to be established, the intervention of divine agency must be acknowledged to be necessary in opposition to Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism. Supposing, on the other hand, the universal capacity of redemption to be established, a remnant of good must be discerned even in the natural man, which must be set in motion by the work of salvation, in order that redemption may really become man's possession in the most proper sense. Man must thus be in some way an active, not simply a passive, participant in the process. But, further, for these very reasons a deep distinction must be maintained on the one side, and a continuity on the other, between the natural man and what he becomes through the efficacy of Christian grace, and the homogeneity of the first and the

[1] Whereas Thomasius and Luthardt concede spiritual emotions even in the natural man, of course as operations not of the natural capacity but of God (of universal grace), only such, however, as have yet no specifically Christian character, Philippi thinks the *liberum arbitrium in civilibus* to suffice also for the preparation of faith, because in opposition to the Symbols he attributes to it a more extended meaning, one not referring merely to secular things,—a view which, if clearly thought out, would lead to the standpoint to which the exposition of J. Müller inclines.

second creations must be recognized also here. Were we to make the distinction one merely of quantity or degree, the absolute need of redemption would no longer be maintained, nor would there be any reason why *liberum arbitrium* should not, as natural capacity for pure goodness, by effort and practice reach higher and higher stages through its own strength, especially if the good stimulus of teaching and example were not wanting. In this way the power of self-redemption might be asserted at least of the community or the human race (objective Pelagianism). In order to comprehend the depth of the distinction, we must not stop at the world of external works, nor even at the relation of man to man; for here of course a progress in culture, nay, in such good regulation of life as corresponds to the idea of morality, is possible even to natural humanity. We must in any case go back to purity of inner moral disposition, which in the last resort can only have its strength and security in unity with God as the Primal Good. But even after we have gone back to inner disposition, the sharp distinction between the natural and the regenerate man seems again in danger, from the fact that the regenerate also sin, their sanctification being not yet complete. Thus it is evident that the depth of that distinction cannot be demonstrated, if regard is had exclusively to the moral sphere. The qualitative character of the distinction threatens again and again to evaporate in the merely gradual and to become fluent, unless there is something which is found as a fixed characteristic in the Christian as such, and is entire and complete in him alone. But in Christianity one work is already completed, and one only. That is, in an objective aspect, atonement through Christ, which in reference to man becomes justification. So that the adequate description of the specific distinction between the natural man and the Christian is, that the Christian is partaker of full and complete justification, the former not. Thereby the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian modes of thought are definitively excluded, for both attain in the best case an approximation to atonement, not its entirety and completion. But then, as the specific distinction of Christianity from everything extra-Christian ought not to be obliterated, so also, in opposition to Manichæism, it

is essential not to sever the natural man and the believer from each other, as if there were no kind of continuity between the two. On the contrary, an identity of the new with the old man must be maintained. In a material aspect there is the same Ego in both; the old man is not annihilated and a new one put in his place.

But the question now is: How the two—the specific distinction and the continuity—are to be combined. Wherein especially does the universal capacity of redemption consist, which must be an efficient factor in the attaining of salvation, without however being itself redemptive? What is it in the natural man which forms the universal point of connection for grace? Grace itself would necessarily bear an abrupt and magical character, if it came upon man with overwhelming suddenness. Hence theology from the earliest days has made preliminary stages precede the possession of saving grace proper, two of which must be specially emphasized,—first, preparatory grace; secondly, precursory or prevenient grace (*gratia præparans* and *præveniens*). The former denotes the universal, conserving divine activity, at work in the heathen world even apart from the gospel, and inducing receptiveness for higher things; the other is the grace issuing forth from Christianity and its means of grace upon man before he believes. Now the *Formula of Concord*, Semi-Pelagianism, and Synergism find the point of connection in a remnant of *liberum arbitrium*,—the former in a *liberum arbitrium in civilibus*, not *in spiritualibus*; the other two, on the contrary, in a remnant of *liberum arbitrium in spiritualibus*. We cannot agree with the *Formula of Concord*. Since it makes the stress of the good or evil decision fall upon *justitia civilis*, it ascribes the highest spiritual efficiency to a power not spiritual in nature, although through the medium of the means of grace. But he who has no spiritual knowledge does not even know what Christianity is. Whether he chooses or rejects it, whether he hears God's Word or not, he knows not what he is doing. Consequently his destiny, or the judgment upon him, cannot be made to depend on such a use of freedom. *Semi-Pelagianism* essentially weakens the need of redemption, because man's freedom is supposed to be the author from its own resources of acts, by which he

renders himself worthy of grace, and therefore the author of spiritual acts of high moral and religious worth. *Synergism* is an improvement on this, because it limits the power of natural *lib. arb.* to the act of closing with grace, to ability to accept it or not, which implies the confession, that good volition of spiritual significance is necessary even to abstinence from resisting the temptation to reject grace. But to the supposition, that the natural man possesses capacity of decision for or against Christianity (which without doubt has spiritual significance), is opposed, *first*, the consideration that, without a higher ideal longing (which, like everything good, implies divine working), the natural man cannot have the preparation to receive Christian grace, a *gratia præparans* being therefore requisite. And even were Synergism to concede this, as it is well able to do and often does, because it has no liking for Deistic views, nor does it in the interest of freedom usually demand a purely immanent development, still, *in the second place*, the supernatural working of Christian grace must be postulated; for of himself, and apart from all culture by Christian grace, the natural man cannot know what Christianity is, and therefore is without the qualification for a decision valid in God's sight.[1] Only that decision can be valid, in making which man not merely knows of God as Almighty, Holy, and Just, but knows also of His revelation of love as realized and proclaimed in the gospel. In any case, therefore, a culture by Christian grace must precede the decision for or against Christ. There needs, as relates to the divine activity, a *gratia præparans et prævenions* in order to give the means necessary to man for the decision. The former presupposes a remnant of good natural disposition, which constitutes his capacity of redemption, and which is developed and fostered by God's conserving and governing activity—a remnant of the highest significance even in reference to the fruit of Christian salvation, the new creature. For the work of Christian grace must have a point of connection in the natural man, in his rational, religious, and moral constitution, with which Christianity—that perfect revelation of the Logos—is in harmony, and without which there could never be any certainty of the truth of Christianity, and

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 14.

of its harmony with the highest needs of our nature. This natural endowment, which is capable of development by all that which may be summed up as *gratia præparans*, includes in itself a *liberum arbitrium* able to produce a *justitia civilis*. And the latter has not merely civic and secular value, but something of moral significance, for the good fruits of this *justitia civilis* have already an objective worth, especially in reference to the community. But therewith the relation to God is not as yet brought into normal order, because reconciliation with God is wanting, and for this very reason the power of a new, divine life, and that goodness of disposition which alone gives to the motives of good works their purity and sincerity. Hence there is still needed the operation of Christian grace, and indeed not merely of the grace of regeneration, but above all, and in the first place, of the grace which renders possible and brings about the transition to that, *i.e.* of *gratia præveniens*, of the Christian grace of atonement which calls and offers itself. Christ is not merely the Truth and the Life, but also "the Way" to the salvation enclosed in Him, because through the preaching of the gospel He draws near to the soul, inspiring it with a tendency towards that which it needs. With all that which *gratia præparans* accomplishes, *i.e.* with all the stimulus or development of his powers, the natural man would not as yet be ripe for decision for or against Christianity. Even an affirmative choice would not be *spiritualis*, so long as it lacked the consciousness of what Christianity is, which must and is meant to be first given by redeeming grace, *i.e.* by atonement.

2. But it is indispensable that there be an actual crisis, a free, conscious decision for or against Christianity, for without this no definitive settlement of the worth and destiny of the individual were possible. If, then, as has been shown in opposition to Synergism, the natural man has not this capacity of free appropriation (*applicatio*) or decision, the first aim of grace must be, basing itself on the still existing capacity of redemption, to restore freedom to the power of making such a decision. This is effected by preparatory and precursory grace setting up in man's heart such a counterpoise to the temptations of sin, of unbelief, presumption, and pride as counteracts them, so that the man is given back to him-

self, to his freedom (or freedom to him). Now the first step to this is to awaken conscience by the action of universal preparatory grace, to awaken a delight in goodness, while at the same time, since man is shown his sin, displeasure with himself is evoked. But the knowledge of the law, of sin and guilt alone, whether excited by outward dealings and events, or by inward workings of God's Spirit, would in the best case induce knowledge of moral bondage, not of freedom; and even the longing and effort after purity could not suffice, but unless something further is gained, could only lead to despair of a higher value in life, or result in thoughts of self-righteousness. In order, then, to give the right direction to self-knowledge and the higher longing, the prevenient manifestation of Christian grace (*gratia præveniens*) is also requisite. This grace on the one hand vivifies the knowledge of sin and guilt, and therefore of helplessness, and on the other the longing after moral worth and a salvation coming from above. It does both in a decisive manner by holding up the image of Christ, which shows the glory and attainableness of the goal in a way at once attractive and confounding, elevating and humbling. Further, since the image of the Mediator, who atoned for the sin of the world, proclaims God's love revealed in Him, and offers divine favour even to the guilt-laden sinner, it makes it possible for that sinner to confess sin and guilt with sincere heart, and banishes fear of God. The natural longing of the soul to find rest in God can now assume a more definite form. The glad tidings of the gospel plant the first germs of joyous hope in the heart; and in the awakened, earnest longing after peace of conscience and reconciliation with God, the message of free forgiveness for Christ's sake, the message of the justification of the sinner by grace, finds a good soil and intelligent acceptance. Thus the effect of the Spirit's working is, that an inner counterpoise to the temptations of sin is set up, and man is restored to his freedom. This freedom is now able to make the decisive resolve of life, and in filial surrender to perform the act of faith which affirms the design of prevenient grace presenting itself, first of all, in the form of forgiveness. Thus is it possible without violence or magical working to restore freedom in the natural man, who lacked

it *in spiritualibus*, of course by divine action, and therefore in a supernatural way; and thereby Manichæism and absolute Predestinationism, whether in a particular or universal form, as well as Pelagianism, Semi-Pelagianism, and Synergism, are excluded.

Accordingly, the relation between divine and human activity in the work of salvation is in general terms as follows:—

The beginning starts from the divine, but in such a way that human activity is set in action by God, partly stimulated, partly evoked anew. The divine activity is also continuous, not effective in the beginning merely. In the sphere of *gratia præparans* God brings about the awakening of better movements in man himself in feeling, knowledge, and volition. In doing this all divine action is originative of action. Still more is this true in the sphere of precursory grace, where the soul is brought into relation to Christ. There grace, or Christ, is able more and more by the Holy Spirit to reveal itself, and draw near step by step to man, always in such a way that the talent already given to man has to operate in order to restore susceptibility for higher gifts.[1] Every new step is taken with a good conscience; every rejection of the new enlightening, awakening, and stimulating influence takes place against conscience. But finally, grace will and must lead to a decisive turning-point. If grace has wrought hitherto through single rays, these must at last converge to a living focus in the will. The soul must become a mirror, in which the complete image of Christ as the Mediator is received. There Christ acquires a higher significance than that of a Teacher and Pattern, namely a religious significance demanding the full surrender of the soul. He must then either become more to man than He was before, or less, because that which He claims is not conceded to Him. This turning-point is called into existence by the setting forth of Christ as the Atoner, or by the preaching of the forgiveness of sins for Christ's sake. This is the culminating-point of Christ's prevenient, intervenient action upon man prior to the faith, that God's favour and forgiveness are offered to him for Christ's sake.

3. CALLING AND ELECTION.—*Calling* (*vocatio*) is universal, for the divine purpose of redemption is just as universal as the

[1] Matt. xiii. 12.

need and capacity of redemption, so that the notion of a divine decree to pass by a portion of mankind, and to restore freedom of decision only to the rest, is out of the question. Christianity can only put everything in the way of decision, and introduce the Judgment on condition that sooner or later *this* goal at least is certainly and inevitably reached in the case of all, that they know what they are doing in rejecting Christianity, and that the wrong decision is not forced upon them by outward influences or by the power of inherited evil. The restoration of the possibility of a free decision for Christianity is required by the ethical character of the process introduced by Christianity, and by the personal responsibility, without which least of all could the ultimate worth of any one be determined. But if in this way *freedom* of decision is again established by Christianity and incorporated with the saving process itself, the question arises, whether this gain is not bought too dearly, whether with the admission of freedom a permanent insecurity as to salvation is not established. Such insecurity would leave no place for an abiding state of grace, and a settled assurance of salvation. Both would be constantly threatened by the vacillations of human freedom. Such a doctrine of permanent insecurity as to salvation would be in contradiction to the N. T. as well as to the Christian's need. According to John, they who fall away did not really belong to Christ and His people.[1] Paul knows that the crown of righteousness is reserved for him.[2] The Apocalypse speaks of a Book of Life, in which believers are entered, and of their new name.[3] Christians are said to be sealed to the day of redemption, *i.e.* of Christ's second coming.[4] None can pluck the sheep from the Good Shepherd's hand.[5] A Paul, a John, the Reformers, knew from experience what strength, what source of confidence lay in knowing themselves eternally saved, what a motive to gratitude and guarding of self. Hence they were unwilling to give up the *certainty* of election. But how does this agree with the restoration of freedom by Christianity? Does not this freedom form an express contradiction to the idea of election altogether, so that the idea must be dropped and merely a divine foreknowledge

[1] 1 John ii. 19. [2] 2 Tim. iv. 8.
[3] Rev. ii. 17, iii. 8, xvii. 8, xxi. 27. [4] Eph. iv. 30, i. 13; 2 Cor. i. 22.
[5] John x. 28. Similarly Rom. viii. 29–39.

of the final fidelity of the one class be put in its place? Frequently, as in later days in the Lutheran Church, the divine foreknowledge, in opposition to the *Form. Conc.*, has been put in the place of election, and the assurance of salvation limited more and more simply to a certainty of the *present state of grace;* still it is inadmissible according to Scripture, as well as according to the assertion of the Christian consciousness, to deny the idea of election altogether, or to suppose the insecurity of the state of grace perpetuated by freedom.

Election in the broader sense is already involved in *calling* generally. For although the call to salvation, and the power to decide in its favour, must come to all in due course, still all are not called at the same time. Rather the order of succession is determined by a divine election, which extends to nations and individuals. And the called are all called to salvation; not merely the beginning, but also the completion of salvation is designed for all by divine faithfulness. As called, they are set apart or elected to believe and be saved. But of course this election does not secure to man an actual share in the salvation offered to him in calling. There is no election excluding freedom of acceptance or rejection, and replacing it by an almighty volition. But it does not follow from this, that assurance of salvation must be imperilled by freedom, or still less that uncertainty as to the state of grace must be perpetuated. Rather, according to Scripture, there is an election in the stricter sense.[1] Holy Scripture teaches the eternal election of believers before the foundation of the world.[2] The restoration of freedom by no means implies that the trust of the Christian is placed in this freedom. The Christian puts his trust not in the strength and stability of his personal faith of itself, but in God's unchangeable fidelity, which will not leave unfinished the good work begun, but will guard and conduct it right through the human weakness, of whose continued influence His foreknowledge took account even in the act of forgiving. But in the next place, it is a false conception of the nature of the freedom restored, to suppose that it can always just as

[1] John xiii. 18; Matt. xxii. 14, xxiv. 22, 24; 1 John v. 4; 2 Pet. i. 10; Rom. xi. 28.

[2] Eph. i. 4-11.

easily fall away from Christ as remain in fellowship with Him. The regenerate man cannot abuse his freedom eternally. There is no such thing indeed even for him as a fatalistic necessity, a compulsion to goodness; sin is still possible to him. But regeneration produces a real change in his heart and its inclinations. It does not leave his freedom as a vacillating power of choice, equally open to opposite possibilities always and for ever (*liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*). Such formal freedom is perhaps a point of transition, but not the goal. The result of the moral process is real freedom. Such freedom is coeval as to principle with regeneration, which implants a divine σπέρμα; and so far as it exists, such freedom works for good. Even where a momentary subjection to the remains of sin is found, there is connected therewith an inner resistance to sin, so that sin in the regenerate man remains distinct in nature from sin in the unregenerate, even if this fact should be hidden from consciousness. This resistance makes itself felt again in regret and penitent self-renewal. That the saved in the next world can no longer fall from grace, is universally believed; and yet no one will say on this account that they have lost their freedom. But Paul and John know and extol ζωὴ αἰώνιος in this world also, although in weakness. But he who falls entirely was never truly regenerate. The new creature is a being immortal in nature. It is true, indeed, that the believer is conscious in the first instance of his *present* state of grace. But his future does not for this reason lie in an uncertain, anxious obscurity. A mere hope of future blessedness, unaccompanied by any confident certainty as to the future state of salvation, would not be Christian hope at all. The assurance is immanent in the consciousness of reconciliation, that according to God's gracious purpose the reconciliation and justification of man are final, that nothing, "neither things present nor things to come, can separate us from the love of God in Christ." Among these "things to come" must be the frailty, which continues to operate in the believer against his will. It belongs to the very nature of faith to commit itself with courage and full confidence to God's power and love. On the other hand, the torment of uncertainty would be perpetuated and be a hindrance to spiritual growth, if we were forced to rely only upon

our own freedom and its faithful use for the assurance of our salvation in the future. Man's chief concern no doubt should be, by fidelity and resistance to unbelief to remain perpetually in the present state of grace. Belief in a fate-like *decretum electionis* might easily betray him into indolence, presumption, self-exaltation. The divine election rather implies, that the state of grace, like everything living, is preserved by means of an active secondary causality—by means of perpetual self-renewal. But the divine purpose of grace need not for this reason be vacillating, nor the divine election uncertain. On all these grounds a union of the apparently clashing interests —of human freedom and stability of divine grace and gracious election—is possible. We are able to leave the necessary place to freedom, and yet speak of a certainty as to the state of grace by God's help, of an election of believers. The regenerate are the elect also in the stricter sense, although not without the medium of their free decision. The election of believers to eternal life does not resolve itself into a mere foreknowledge of the stability of their faith, and of their personal fidelity; but as they have really performed the decisive act of faith, so is it always in the last resort the grace laid hold of by them, its strength and fidelity, by which they are guarded and preserved from an entire apostasy from grace.

Observation.—The doctrine of the appropriation of salvation divides into the three points: *Repentance* or *Change of Mind*, *Regeneration* through the *faith* that appropriates *Justification*, and *Sanctification*.

FIRST POINT: REPENTANCE OR CHANGE OF MIND.

§ 131.

The Christian method of salvation requires a state of preparation for regeneration (§ 130). That preparation consists on the divine side in the *Calling* (*vocatio externa et interna*) or Invitation to salvation, which refers indeed to all spiritual blessings, but has for its primary contents the justification of the sinner before God by grace. The effect of this calling on man's side is *Illumination*

respecting law and sin (*i.e.* the need of justification), as well as respecting the righteousness offered in Christ; *the Feeling* of personal guilt and penal desert; and *the Awakening* of the will to seek righteousness before God. These elements constitute together the nature of the penitent mind, which however in its maturity is simply receptiveness for salvation in the form of longing after a divinely-given righteousness.

Observation.—In this threefold "Illumination, Sense of Guilt, Awakening," is produced subjective receptiveness for Christ in that threefold office of His, which averts the threefold evil, from which redemption is necessary,—error, guilt, sin.[1]

1. The New Testament in unison with the Old Testament requires first of all *μετάνοια*, reconsideration, inner turning of the disposition from the abnormal direction to the normal commencing- or starting-point. Hence with this conversion is connected the becoming a child again.[2] Right self-knowledge, united with sincerity, produces[3] acknowledgment of guilt and penal desert, sorrow and mourning, and this is associated with confession of sin.[4]

2. The terminology in use before the Reformation understood by *pœnitentia* both the sacrament of penance, and, in harmony with this, the whole of conversion, penitence, confession, and satisfaction by works, including *justificatio*.[5] While the Reformation repudiated the necessity of confession to the priest and satisfaction by works, it left for a time the name of *pœnitentia* to the entire work of conversion, including repentance and faith.[6] The modern terminology followed by us distinguishes *repentance* and *faith* as two elements, understanding by *repentance* regret or change of mind. Now

[1] § 61, vol. ii. p. 202.

[2] Matt. xviii. 3; Acts iii. 19, 26, xx. 21, xxvi. 18. *ἐπιστρέφειν, στρέφεσθαι.*

[3] Ps. xxxii.; 1 John i. 8, 9.

[4] 2 Cor. vii. 10: *ἡ κατὰ θεὸν λύπη μετάνοιαν εἰς σωτηρίαν ἀμεταμέλητον κατεργάζεται.* Cf. vol. i. § 11.

[5] Penance as a making satisfaction pushed faith into the background, reducing it to mere *notitia*, perhaps along with *assensus*.

[6] Cf. *Conf. Aug.* xii., *Apol.* vi. de Pœnitentia.

this is brought about on the objective side by all that which is included in calling.[1] But calling is the arrangement by which the gospel approaches man from without through the means of grace, and also brings influence to bear on him inwardly that he may believe (*vocatio externa et interna*). Faith comes by preaching.[2] A false universalism speaks of reconciliation and regeneration, of a share in that which forms the contents of Christianity, even outside Christendom apart from connection with the word of Christ. But as there can be no knowledge of the historic by purely inward, but only by historical means, this would be to depreciate the historic manifestation of Christ. Hence the Reformation rejects Enthusiasm or Fanaticism so called, which seeks salvation *extra verbum* by a sort of inner magic, and denies the necessity of the external mediation of Christian grace (*vocatio externa*).[3] But no less does the Evangelical Church reject also the notion of an *outer magic, e.g.* of magical force, of means of grace administered by the priesthood, which are supposed to act *ex opere operato*. The power of spiritual efficiency does not belong directly to the outward and sensuous.[4] Faith does not come by preaching directly through the power and influence of the outward sound. The heart of man must first be set to work and excited to activity. The Word has its effect on feeling and will only when it is received into the perceptive spirit, and the understanding is opened by the Holy Spirit. We avoid the errors both of outward and inward magic by acknowledging the necessity just as much of inward as of outward calling.

3. But as to *contents*, the gospel must first work as the *objective* preaching of repentance, and this involves the acknowledgment of the law and its rights on the part of the gospel. But, at the same time, the preaching of repentance must not lead away from Christ by legality and a severity that induces despair, or by a superficiality which cares only for immunity from punishment, and not for the removal of guilt and the claims of justice on the guilty. Even the

[1] Rom. viii. 30, κλῆσις. [2] Rom. x. 14–17.

[3] Cf. *Conf. Aug.* v., *Art. Sm.* 331, *Apol.* 153. 268; *Form. Conc.* 672.

[4] Even Word and Sacrament do not act blindly as of themselves, but *ubi et quando visum est Deo, Conf. Aug.* v., and therefore by an act of divine volition.

preaching of repentance must wear a Christian character, of which prophecy in the O. T. was already a beginning. To preach repentance is to take the right path, because Christ is a preacher of repentance. This is possible, for Christianity, as the absolute religion, includes also the law in its contents, and is able out of these contents to evolve the law. But such preaching becomes *vocatio* (invitation), from the fact that Christ—the personal law, the personal holiness and love—on the one hand intensifies the consciousness of sin by His typical perfection, and by all that He suffered through sin, and on the other hand causes Himself to be announced as the Saviour, who answers for sin, and through His atoning action and suffering has become the security for the Father's forgiving love. The perfect union of justice and love given in Christ leads in the true path of repentance, that through reconciliation and sanctification man may become a transcript of His justice and love. The crowning-point of the preaching of evangelical repentance and its overwhelming power lie in the proclamation of God's prevenient, humbling grace for Christ's sake, *i.e.* in this, that it is also the preaching of the reconciliation of the unbelieving world effected by Christ, that the world may believe.

4. This proclamation of the gospel as a salutary preaching of repentance, whilst guarding against Pelagian and Manichæan aberrations of pride, or presumption and despair, works through the Holy Spirit a change in the mind of man.

First, illumination respecting sin, guilt, God's holiness and justice—briefly, respecting the need of redemption, especially in the mirror of Christ's image.

Secondly, the *feeling* of unhappiness on account of separation from God by guilt and penal desert, and also the feeling of *abhorrence* for sin, and of longing to be set free from guilt and sin, *i.e.* the feeling of *penitence.* The purer this penitent feeling is,—the more, therefore, that it is not mere sorrow for the consequences of sin—evil, but for sin itself and its guilt in the sight of a just and holy God, the more,

In the *third* place, is the will excited against evil, and the *awakening* brought about, in which the desire to cast off evil and the resolve to live a better life are formed. The purer the enlightenment and penitence, the less does the awakening

take the direction of attempts at self-redemption or self-reconciliation. On the contrary, the evangelical preaching of repentance shows, on the one hand, the depth and inveteracy of sin, and therefore the impotence of such attempts, and on the other tells of Christ, the divinely-given means of propitiation —of a forgiveness which is not deserved or inherited by us, but must become our possession by free grace, and which at the same time appears as a law of faith, and demands that we desire the divine help, and submit to be led by the divine grace with the whole strength of our will. When, then, as the result of this preaching, man fervently desires to make experience of what the gospel makes known, the inwardly-working call draws to Christ, and the restored freedom has a counterpoise to doubt and unbelief in the inner need on the one hand, and the promises of the evangelical proclamation on the other. In this way, willingness may pass into the obedience of faith, or issue in desire after propitiation and redemption from sin becoming an actual turning to the Redeemer.

Observation.—Methodism would bring the occurrence of the elements described, and their order of succession, under a definite rule and uniform method. It seeks to do this by making the sensible experience of sin and grace the centre of the saving process, and using definite methods for evoking that experience. But no such technical method can be prescribed either to the *terrores conscientiæ* or to the *consolationes evangelii*. The one divine grace, sufficient for the totality of the spirit,—understanding, feeling, and will,—lays hold in its working of those sides of the soul which are most open to it, save that of course the same unity must lead in some way to a co-operation of the three sides. It is wrong to require a definite amount of penitent sorrow—a real penitent struggle in every case, although no one can lack it without heavy loss. The amount of sorrow depends on the vitality of the emotional life, which differs with the individual, as well as on the degree in which sin has previously been manifested in particular acts, which is essentially conditioned by outward circumstances. Deadness of feeling is certainly one form, and a dangerous form, of sinful abnormity, which has to be resisted; but one person may have come earlier into more vital communion with Christ, especially in a Church practising infant baptism, before sin had developed itself in him in a worse form, and therefore

before it had come to consciousness. For Christ has not a relation to sin merely; He calls forth a delight, a devoted affection, not merely because He takes away our guilt from us, but also through what He is in Himself, or through the image of His person. Hence a certain faith, a certain love to Christ, is possible even in a child from which real repentance first springs. Where, then, the image of Christ in His benignity and love has been early imprinted on the heart, or where the rays of His grace so shine upon life's early dawn that only mitigated forms of sin spring up, there it may happen that the vital communion with Him is never quite broken off; and this will not allow terror at God's justice and holiness to arise, without also His love manifested in Christ in some way revealing itself to the soul. But certainly, whatever a fortunate youth and education may do, it remains true that birth and regeneration *never* combine into one element. None is exempted from regeneration; and although there is no necessity for every one to pass first through a period under the exclusive dominion of sin or alienation from God, which would then be precisely marked off from the time when grace attains the dominion, still no one can be exempted from sorrowfully gazing down more and more into the might and the ramifications of his own sin, in order that he may consciously and of set purpose die to it. No conscious established personality, however, exists, unless it has laid hold of the *Atoner* in Christ, and obtained, therefore, justification before God through grace, for Christ's sake, as the real basis of its state of grace. The belief that there is a faith from which true repentance first springs, which the Lutheran Church owes to infant baptism, Calvin, who in general makes *pœnitentia* follow *fides*, owes to the fact that, in the interest of the prevenient character of grace, and in harmony with the doctrine of Predestination, he seeks to derive faith, not from repentance, but simply from the power of God.

SECOND POINT: REGENERATION, OR THE FAITH THAT APPROPRIATES JUSTIFICATION.

§ 132*a*.

When prepared, living receptiveness in man for salvation takes the form of trustful surrender to Christ, or becomes the *faith* of acceptance (*ὄργανον ληπτικόν*), which is

willing to be determined by Christ's righteousness as the vicarious Mediator, the result is not merely a gracious relation of the reconciled Father *to us*, or the mere substitution of Christ *for* us, but a twofold bond between the believer on the one hand, and God the Father and Christ on the other. On the part of man, there is appropriation of Christ and His righteousness, primarily of propitiating grace or *justification*, in virtue of which our sin is not reckoned to us by God, but forgiven, and the righteousness of Christ is imputed; and on the part of Christ, real appropriation of man, union of the divine life with the human by the power of the Holy Spirit. Since Christ's substitution is productive in nature (§§ 120, 127), the result of this union through the Holy Spirit is a new, living phenomenon, namely a personality after the image of God, which is a reflection of the union of the divine and human in Christ. The child of man has thus become the child of God. He now has the satisfaction of Christ (§§ 120–122) as his own, and is consequently in real possession of the justification, which before was merely a declaratory offer. The fact of being justified by faith is followed, in due course, normally by the *knowledge* of justification, or *the assurance of salvation.* But the communion instituted by faith between Christ and the soul, does not end in participation in reconciliation; but, on the permanent basis of justification in virtue of the same communion, the sanctification, which is the end and fruit of reconciliation, is developed through the Holy Spirit.

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A.—*Biblical Doctrine.*

The N. T. doctrine is, that we do not obtain forgiveness of sins for the sake of our amendment or sanctification, but conversely, that love grows out of the prevenient, pardoning love of God to the unworthy.[1] Even the lost son receives forgiveness before he is approved. The same thought lies in a narrative, which is often regarded as proving the contrary,[2] for the parable of the free remission of debt would have no sense, no applicability to the case of the sinful woman, if the meaning were, that her sins were forgiven because of her manifestation of love. Rather, her anointing of the Lord is her thanks for forgiveness received.[3] Further, entrance into Christianity takes place not through sanctification, but through baptism for the forgiveness of sins, which is treated in the N. T. as the certain and first fruit of Christian baptism. If

[1] 1 John iv. 10; Rom. v. 8. [2] Luke vii. 37–50.

[3] Ver. 47 must be understood thus: He that loves little shows by this that he has not yet had his sins forgiven, as, conversely, the greatness of a man's love evinces that his many sins are forgiven him. The woman must therefore have received forgiveness from Christ before the meal, for which now she returns thanks as well as she is able.

James derived justification from good works[1] performed by man before faith in forgiveness, and therefore before baptism, the whole N. T. economy would be abolished and useless. Such an epistle would therefore be without canonicity. But, on the contrary, the epistle assumes that the readers are already Christians,[2]—have, therefore, been baptized and received forgiveness, and have opened their hearts to the gospel.[3] Certainly, according to it, a faith that remains without fruits is merely a pretence.[4] But it is *Paul* who distinguishes justification and sanctification most clearly. He makes holiness first spring from the peace of reconciliation.[5] Unprejudiced exposition now universally acknowledges the Reformation understanding of Pauline doctrine to be correct, whether agreeing with it or not. This very admission implies that the teaching of the Romish and Greek Churches, to the effect that Paul derives forgiveness from faith *and* works, is a misinterpretation of Pauline doctrine. But what, then, does Holy Scripture understand by the faith on which, as with one voice, it lays the chief stress in reference to the appropriation of forgiveness? In the Biblical sense, it is no mere knowledge, still less a mere opinion in which doubt may exist.[6] Further, it has for its object no mere historic fact as such, but God and divine things, to which, although invisible, faith ascends above everything visible.[7] More definitely, the object or content of Christian faith is Christ, the Crucified and Risen One.[8] Regarded psychologically or formally, faith is related in a positive aspect to man as a unity; it is a matter of the heart.[9] On the side of intelligence, it is the positive antithesis to doubt, a receiving and recognizing of

[1] Jas. ii. 14-26. [2] Jas. i. 18. [3] Jas. i. 21.

[4] Jas. ii. 14. But since the epistle has to do with Christians who have been made partakers of forgiveness through faith, it rightly requires that this faith continue operative in the soul, and prove itself permanent, which can only be shown in fruits, in which persevering faith attains to completeness (ver. 22). At the same time, this fruitfulness of faith has a value in God's eyes, who calls it good and approves it, which is more than mere pardon. Even to James, the gospel, received in faith, remains God's power for good works (i. 18, 21); but there is a difference in diligence and sincerity of holiness among believers, and in correspondence with this the positive divine complacency in man has its stages.

[5] Rom. v. 1-11, cf. with vi. 1-11.

[6] Jas. ii. 19, i. 3 ff.

[7] Heb. xi. 1; Rom. iv. 17-21.

[8] Rom. iv. 25.

[9] Rom. x. 10.

truth as such;[1] on the side of will, it is obedience,[2] trust,[3] associated with confident security and certainty. The way, then, in which forgiveness is imparted to man, is this: negatively, God does not impute sin to man, so that he no longer stands under condemnation;[4] positively, faith is reckoned as righteousness, or righteousness comes by the medium of faith or from it.[5] But the meaning is not, that, considered as a subjective virtue, faith is regarded as something meritorious because of its excellence, but it has this importance because of its contents—Christ. We are righteous in Christ, as united with Him, which is the same as saying that Christ's righteousness, His substitution, is imputed to us.[6] Because, then, the whole Christian salvation is enclosed in Christ's person, faith also has a comprehensive significance, extending to the renewal of the whole man, although the part of this salvation which, in the first instance, blesses man and gives him contentment is Christ's atonement, which has our justification for its effect. But the dominating importance of atonement and justification in Paul might seem to be threatened, if not excluded, by all the passages of the N. T., which place faith in most intimate connection rather with regeneration and adoption, not merely with atonement and justification. For example, according to John, every one who believes is born of God, begotten of divine seed;[7] and Peter and James teach the like.[8] *But this forms no contradiction*, for regeneration is related to the consciousness also. The consciousness in possession of reconciliation and peace is precisely regeneration on the side of consciousness. Paul also places regeneration in the closest connection with faith.[9] But his more dialectical manner makes the particular elements stand forth more distinctly, and in their inner relations. The Pauline *υἱοθεσία* has, indeed, been referred to a mere legal relation, adoption into the place of a child, without a second birth taking place in man himself. But although

[1] Rom. iv. 20 ff.; John viii. 32.
[2] Rom. i. 5.
[3] *πεποίθησις, πληροφορία.* Eph. iii. 12; Rom. iv. 20 ff.; 1 Thess. i. 5.
[4] 2 Cor. v. 19; Rom. iv. 8, viii. 1, v. 19.
[5] Rom. iv. 3–6, 9, 22, v. 1, ix. 30, x. 6; Gal. v. 5, ii. 16, iii. 8 (*ἐκ*); Rom. iii. 22 (*διὰ πίστεως*); Phil. iii. 9, *ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει.*
[6] 2 Cor. v. 19–21.
[7] 1 John v. 1, iii. 9; John i. 13.
[8] 1 Pet. i. 23; Jas. i. 18.
[9] Col. iii. 10; Eph. iv. 24; Tit. iii. 5 f.

υἱοθεσία is carried out by means of imputation, Paul himself knows of a more than merely imputed adoption.[1] To the apostle, faith includes on the one hand a dying of the old man, but just as much a rising again of the new man with Christ; and υἱοθεσία also to him implies participation in the Spirit of Christ, by which we become new creatures.[2] Nevertheless, it remains certain that this transformation is only effected through faith in Christ's atoning mediation, not through faith in God in general, or in the impersonal merit of Christ, but through faith in the person and substitution of Christ, who died for our sins and rose again for our justification. This is of special importance to Paul, that he may find a transition from justification to the new life. In leading to communion with Christ, to incorporation into Him, faith appropriates to itself Him who, as dying and rising again, includes in Himself the power of reconciliation as well as of the new life, imparting both to us in virtue of the love which is our Advocate with the Father. To Paul, faith is living communion with Christ, a dying and being buried with Him, so that now the old *Ego*, the unreconciled man (*i.e.* the false unity of his powers), is dissolved and broken through the dying with Christ. Thus the power of His resurrection is the power in the man.[3] To the apostle, faith is the inner movement of the entire soul to Christ. Surrendered to Him, we become conscious of the love of God to us; it is shed abroad in our hearts, that we may know it in its prevenient, spontaneous nature,[4] and this is our peace.[5] Other scriptural writers express the matter thus: the accusing heart is now stilled, conscience is cleansed and disburdened of guilt.[6] In this communion with Christ, we also receive the certainty of forgiveness and of our adoption;[7] the Holy Spirit implants in our consciousness the witness of our adoption, making our heart joint-witness with Himself to the blessing.[8] But just as in this way we receive Christ's righteousness, as availing for us in God's sight and imputed to us for the sake of

[1] Rom. viii. 15–17; Eph. i. 5; Gal. iv. 5.
[2] 2 Cor. v. 17; Col. iii. 10.
[3] Rom. vi. 3, 4; Col. ii. 12; Gal. ii. 20.
[4] Rom. v. 5; cf. 1 John iv. 9, 10.
[5] Rom. v. 1; Eph. ii. 14.
[6] 1 John iii. 19 f.; Heb. x. 22; 1 Pet. iii. 21.
[7] Eph. i. 13, iv. 30; 2 Cor. i. 22, the σφραγίς.
[8] Rom. viii. 16; 1 John v. 10 ff.

Christ and of His substitution, so through faith the righteousness of life belonging to the Second Adam also becomes ours.[1]

B.—*The Ecclesiastical Doctrine.*

LITERATURE.—Cf. my *Hist. of Prot. Theology*, ii. 157–164.

1. Despite the Pauline teaching, the type of doctrine which gained the upper hand among the Orientals and in the Romish Church was that which co-ordinates faith and works, deriving justification or forgiveness from the two together. To say nothing of the consequences of the Judaism which would convert even the gospel into a *nova lex*, the assumption so congenial to the natural man, there comes within view, that he owes goodness and moral worth to himself, and that even the removal of guilt must partially at least be his own work or merit. But upon such a co-ordination of faith and works faith must needs lose its fundamental import in reference to salvation, or be rendered superficial and limited to the knowledge of Christian truth in general (*notitia*), and assent to it (*assensus*). For as faith in the N. T. sense, *i.e.* as trust in Christ's mediation, it would as matter of course be the decisive factor in reference to justification, and would preclude works having an equal share with it in the work of reconciliation. To require works in order to forgiveness must necessarily bring about a new legality, perpetual uncertainty respecting a state of grace and trouble of conscience, which would lead to a doctrine of sin-removing penances and purgatory, as a supplement to the purity and practical righteousness which are ever imperfect on earth, but which must be perfect if justification is to be complete. Even Augustine, who left greater scope to grace, did not definitely distinguish justification and sanctification, making the new life of faith, which certainly was to be initiated by God, a ground of justification, a course in which he was followed by the mysticism of the Middle Ages generally. According to him, *Fides* is justifying as a virtue, as the new life in germ. The Reformation first

[1] Rom. v. 15–21, vi. 5–14, viii. 3, 4; 2 Cor. v. 17; Tit. iii. 5 f.; John i. 13, xvi. 21 f.; 1 John ii. 29, iii. 9, iv. 7, v. 1; 1 Pet. i. 22 f.; 2 Pet. i. 5 f.

took up again the Pauline teaching, in which we found the culmination of the N. T. lines of doctrine, and the clearest expression of Christian doctrinal thought.

The *Symbols*, especially the Schmalkaldian Articles, describe their doctrine of justification and faith as the *articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiæ*.[1] Let this be held in purity, and all doctrine remains pure, the Church is master of all foes and heresies; let it be obscured and adulterated, and all is lost. Luther especially vanquished all doctrinal errors of the Romish Church, by making the whole doctrine of the Church depend on the *Fides* which appropriates justification and is at one with Scripture. He used justification—the material principle so called—as the critical principle for the entire system of Catholicism, rejecting nothing until he saw its incompatibility with this principle. Faith in the Protestant sense, then, is not mere *notitia, fides historica* with *assensus*,[2] but is a personal relation of trust to the objective historic Christ (*Christus extra nos*), who on His part has revealed His loving relation to us by His promise (*promissio*) and advocacy with the Father. Faith is a willing and accepting of the promise, and indeed not merely of the indefinite promise referring equally to all, which would be identical with the plan of salvation, but of the promise of the personal God referring to our person. Faith is the accepting organ (ὄργανον ληπτικόν)[3] in reference to this promise. Evangelical teachers hold not merely *Fides in genere*, but one by which *credit quisque sibi remitti peccata*, or *Fides specialis*—a personal act also in the reflexive sense, according to which the person confidently applies to himself the *gratia universalis*. This is *Fiducia*.[4] If we analyze this *fiducia* more closely, it is in a formal respect a trustful acceptance, not yet assurance of salvation. Only the contents received by faith have the power to give certainty of their truth and at the same time *certitudo salutis* by the *testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti*.[5] But this acceptance presupposes contents or an object, which exists for conscious-

[1] *Art. Sm.* 305. 318; *Conf. Aug.* iv.; *Apol.* ii.; *Cat. maj.* 454; *Form. Conc.* 612. 616. 622; *Heidelb. Cat.* qu. 21. 53. 64.
[2] *C. A.* xx.; *Apol.* 68.
[3] *Apol.* 75. 172. 175; *F. C.* 584. 684.
[4] *Apol.* 78. 172; *F. C.* 684.
[5] *Apol.* 178 ff.; *F. C.* 806, 31. 817, 43. 822, 90.

ness. These contents are not eternal, divine things in general; but the contents of faith include what is received in historic faith, nevertheless only in so far as it refers to salvation and has its centre therein, so that the Evangelical stage of *fides* preserves the contents of former stages as permanent, but as something objective, having eternal importance and intended to become subjective, in order when inwardly received to exert practical influence. Thus the proper object, which faith apprehends, is Christ as our Mediator, who accomplished the reconciliation of the world once for all. Apprehending then this Christ with confidence, faith receives forgiveness for the past, peace with God for the present, comforting assurance of eternal blessedness for the future, because we are empowered to regard ourselves as righteous and well-pleasing to God for Christ's sake, since God looks upon us in communion with Christ. Therewith the heart is cheered and filled with new life; a new consciousness begins, that of adoption; new spiritual affections (*motus*) begin, so that, renewed and regenerated, we take delight in God and His will. But all this is not effected by faith of itself, although it is a noble virtue, nay, the prime virtue by which a right attitude to God becomes our condition; but it is effected by the *objectum fidei*, implanted through faith.[1] Accordingly, since everything depends on the restoration of that *rapport* of the soul with Christ by which what Christ has and is becomes ours, even weak faith brings us the grace of justification.[2] Our righteousness in God's sight, therefore, is not our own excellence, nor *our* loving *union with Christ*, or the germ of sanctification through Christ *in nobis;* but the first, the fundamental thing is the *justitia Christi extra nos*, which faith apprehends and which certainly is designed for us, and would fain belong to us; or, *it is the union of Christ with us*, which comes to us for the sake of His advocacy, and becomes the *imputatio* of His *justitia*, so that before the divine tribunal His *justitia* is regarded as our *justitia* on the ground of Christ's merit and redeeming will, and for this very reason our guilt and sin are not imputed to us.[3] That positive and this negative blessing

[1] *Apol.* 68. 70, 103. 131. [2] Cf. *e.g. Cat. maj.* 546, 561, § 62.

[3] But *imputata justitia* is not *putativa*, because it rests upon Christ's real substitution, which renders God propitious to us (*Deum placatum præbet*).

are combined in the divine sentence (*justificatio forensis*),[1] which pronounces our acquittal, nay more, receives us into the divine family.

The Church dogma of "the righteousness of Christ outside us" is certainly capable of misinterpretation. The imputation of righteousness may be construed in an externally juristic sense, or in such a way that it becomes, not the living principle of a healthy moral revolution, but the pillow of moral and religious indolence. But the meaning is not, that the substitutionary righteousness of Christ and the knowledge thereof are to remain outside us and not to penetrate within us, but only that our salvation is not contained in any excellence of ours, but solely in that sufficient power of the substitutionary Christ, which is also the fruitful principle of a new life. Nor is there any dispute in the Evangelical Church on this point, that the righteousness of Christ cannot come into our possession and knowledge without repentance and faith, and that it is divine action or working by which the certainty of this possession is imparted to man, just as there was a divine act even in the offer of divine forgiveness.[2] Therefore, in laying down the postulate: We must not confide in any excellence in us, nor in the superiority of our faith, nor in the intimacy and strength of *our* connection with Christ, but absolutely in the reality and strength of the *union of Christ with us*, in the *justitia Christi extra nos*, which however in virtue of its substitutionary character is intended for us,—all that is meant is to assert the preveniency of grace, its objective sufficiency and certainty. This independence of our excellences in justification involves also its independence of the *degree* of our sanctification, and further precludes the idea that justification, so far as it is forgiveness, has degrees, and that therefore only some sins are at first forgiven until faith or sanctification exists in complete and perfect form.[3] Since the sin unforgiven would remit us again

[1] *Apol.* 109, § 131 (*usu forensi significat justum pronunciari, non effici*); *F. C.* 685.

[2] What at first was merely an act in the divine mind—*justificatio forensis*—is made known to the believer in due time by the Holy Spirit, *Apol.* 82; *F. C.* 684 f. The theology of the 17th century expresses this by *intimatio, insinuatio sententiæ justificantis*, see below.

[3] *F. C.* 689, 30-32. 694, 49.

to penal desert, and the consciousness of guilt would continue, the Evangelical principle in opposition to the Tridentine is: "Justification has no degrees, it either exists or not; degrees belong only to the appropriation of its possession; in itself as to its contents it is ever an undivided whole, and is present altogether or not at all, whereas the *certainty* of this whole is subject to growth." In the same way the common Evangelical doctrine is, that for believers the *state of penalty* is abolished, and does not still continue in so far as sin still exists in man. The latter would mean, since there is no penalty without guilt, that forgiveness is not the removal of guilt, and hence that guilt is at best partially cancelled for the believer, so far as there is still sin in him; and thus forgiveness would not be of one piece. Only on condition of man falling away from faith would he fall again into a penal condition, because falling out of the state of grace.[1] Finally, since justification is appropriated or made a possession through faith, according to the Symbols it includes the experience of divine love, which kindles love and is of life-giving power.[2]

But the language of the Lutheran Confessions is not altogether uniform and definite as to the relation of *Justificatio* to *Regeneratio, Vivificatio, Renovatio.* For, whereas the *Apology* views *regeneratio*, etc. as directly connected with the *justificatio*, which is apprehended by faith, *e.g.* even saying: *Justificatio* is *regeneratio* (which, however, undoubtedly does not mean that *justificatio* is reached through *regeneratio*, etc., but the reverse), the *Form. Conc.* warns against weaving *justificatio* into the process of *conversio* (plainly in order to secure it in its objective independence as a judicial sentence before the divine tribunal), gives *renovatio* essentially the signification of *sanctificatio*, and makes it follow upon

[1] This weighty Evangelical principle is contested by Hengstenberg, *Ev. Kirch. Zeitung*, 1864, p. 1065 ff., in the essay: "All suffering is punishment," which formed the transition to his essentially Tridentine doctrine of Justification. Kreibig, *ut supra*, p. 368 ff., is in essential agreement with Hengstenberg: "Temporal sufferings are always to the redeemed two things—punishment and signs of anger, and also manifestations of divine love," p. 376. See more on this point under C.

[2] *Apol.* 71, 62. *Fides parit novam vitam in cordibus, novos motus. F. C.* 675.

justificatio; and all that is conceded is, that *justificatio* is a *vivificatio* and *regeneratio* in *a certain sense.*[1] According to the *Apology*, the *faith*, which is made partaker of *justificatio*, receives also the Holy Spirit, so that the justified are also the regenerated (*Ap.* 82, 4. 82, 117. 71, 62. 74, 78). On the other hand, the old church theologians give *regeneratio* no assured position in relation to *justificatio*, and therefore to faith, some treating of faith first of all before regeneration (so Hafenreffer and Baier), others (chiefly on account of infant baptism) placing regeneration before faith and justification, instead of making the former dependent on the latter (see above, p. 173), nay, even treating of *faith* and *justification per fidem* only under conversion.

The *oldest Evangelical Theology* of Melanchthon, Chemnitz, Hütter, and J. Gerhard discusses the fundamental Reformation ideas with great care, but still simply, and in such a way as to show their aim throughout to be to represent justification when rightly defined as the crucial point, certainly also without more precisely analyzing the particular elements or stages of the saving process, which are necessary to the appropriation of grace to and by the subject (of *gratia Spiritus Sancti applicatrix*). The latter is done by the later theology of the 17th and 18th centuries. The usual order is: *Vocatio* (which *e.g.* takes place through baptism, even as infant baptism), *Illuminatio, Regeneratio, Conversio*, then only *Justificatio.* (To *Conversio* belongs *Pœnitentia* with *Contritio* and *Fides*, the effect of which is *Justificatio* as *actus Dei forensis* [König], whereas Calov only joins *Fides Justificans*, and in the case of the fallen *Pœnitentia*, to the divine act of *Justificatio.*) Upon *Justificatio* follows, in König, Calov, Quenstedt, Hollaz, the *Unio mystica*, then *Renovatio* or *Sanctificatio* and *Glorificatio.* The most characteristic and also curious feature is, that the theologians after J. Gerhard usually prefix to *Justificatio* not merely *Vocatio* with *Illuminatio*, but also *Regeneratio* and *Conversio.*[2] *Justificatio* is pushed still farther

[1] Cf. the passages *Apol.* 82, 117. 83. 4. 71, 62. 74, 78. *Form. Conc.* 686, 20. 687, 24. 585, 5. 6. 685 ff. Cf. Schneckenburger, pp. 2, 101 ff.

[2] Besides König, Calov, Quenstedt, Hollaz, so also Calixtus and Baier; see my *Hist. of Prot. Theol.*

back, when the doctrine of the Means of Grace, nay, even of the Church, is prefixed to it, as is done by Calov.[1] But by such a course justification loses its dominant, central significance. It can no longer figure as the turning-point from death to life, when regeneration has preceded it. If we inquire after the motive which led to the prefixing of regeneration becoming the ruling doctrine, two reasons may be named as causing the depreciation of faith and justification and the prefixing of regeneration, which is conceived as the effect of the means of grace. *First,* the opposition to mystic or spiritualistic tendencies, which were guarded against by prefixing the means of grace, or even their vehicle—the Church —to faith. Thus Calov treats of the Church directly after Christology (To. viii. ix.), and therefore has a Church before he has believers; only in To. x. is *Fides justificans* discussed, but in such a form that he begins with *regeneratio. Secondly,* the influence is here felt of the doctrine of *infant baptism,* whose regenerating power from fear of Anabaptism was not made dependent on *conversio, i.e.* on repentance, sorrow, and faith.[2] Hence in the 17th century the statement of doctrine adopted was: The grace of regeneration may be imparted either to children or adults, provided only it encounter no malicious resistance (*obex*); nay, the grace of regeneration must generally be given first, inasmuch as only by it is conversion (*Contritio et Fides*) possible, whose effect then is justification. But this view assumed that there may be a *regeneratio* before faith, and *justificatio* was no longer conceived as the principle of regeneration. Attempts were certainly made to mitigate or conceal the monstrousness of these thoughts. *Regeneratio* was interpreted of the mere restoration of the *capacity* for faith, and *liberum arbitrium*

[1] *Hollaz* makes the doctrine of the Means of Grace follow first upon *Justificatio* and the elements of the subjective process under the title of *media salutis causalia,* to which also *Contritio, Fides, bona Opera,* etc. are assigned. *Baier's Compendium,* 1693, 1750, discusses indeed *Fides* directly after Christology, but not in order to derive anything further (like *Justificatio,* for example) from it; but after establishing the specified idea of faith, he essays to show its origin, whereupon *Regeneratio* again takes the first place, *Justificatio* then following upon Conversio.

[2] Quenstedt and others say expressly (iii. 478) that in the case of children only *regeneratio,* not conversion, must be affirmed; *justificatio* is commonly used of *adultis.*

liberatum was regarded as its effect.[1] But such a dilution of the idea of regeneration is unscriptural, and calculated to efface the distinction between nature and grace, because there would then be regenerate persons who have neither faith nor justification.[2] Hence Pietism was right in maintaining the stricter idea of regeneration. Quenstedt further seeks to remove the appearance of teaching that regeneration precedes justification and faith, and of putting justification after regeneration and conversion, by the doctrine: "Regeneratio, Justificatio, Unio mystica et Renovatio tempore simul sunt et quovis puncto mathematico arctiores, adeo ut divelli et sequestrari nequeant, cohærent."[3] But since he does not affirm this from the point of view of the divine purpose of grace, which of course embraces all those elements at once (whereas they are really separate in time, because man's free will takes part in the saving process), but proceeds: "Secundum nostrum tamen concipiendi modum ordine prior est regeneratio et justificatio unione illa mystica," that order of succession in the elements is treated as a mere subjective representation or semblance, and the entire outline of the plan of salvation is again rendered doubtful or withdrawn. Even if we could acquiesce in that statement in so far as it gives up the false position of *justificatio*, still it is inadmissible to resolve the progressive, temporal character of the saving process into mere semblance, and therefore to treat the progress docetically; and it is important to give prominence to the Evangelical truth, that it is not the transformation of the sinner (*Regeneratio, Conversio*) which determines God to

[1] The *Form. Conc.* 675 had described *lib. arbitrium liberatum* as the effect of baptism. The theologians up to Hollaz usually describe first the various more comprehensive meanings of Regeneratio, and then as the strictest (*magis propria, quæ hujus loci est*) the *collatio virium credendi supernaturalis*, the one *partialis vitæ spiritualis largitio* (König, § 447, whom Quenstedt, iii. 478, almost literally follows). The same view is implied when Calov calls Regeneratio a new birth from the Spirit, *ut credant*. Still more noteworthy is it that Calov assigns Regeneratio to calling, which of itself is simply the rendering faith possible. The position of Baier is similar, when he is studied attentively (P. iii. c. 4, § 2, p. 488 f.), and after Baier of Höpfner. No doubt the theologians again usually waver, in order to attribute more to Regeneratio and baptism, namely the *donatio fidei* itself; but still the *vires credendi* are already a *pars vitæ spiritualis*.

[2] But this contradicts even the Evangelical doctrine of infant baptism.

[3] III. 621.

forgive, and is therefore the *causa impulsoria justificationis*, as Musæus supposed, or the condition of the divine forgiveness, as even John Gerhard taught (without distinguishing with sufficient precision the forgiveness itself from its possession), but conversely, that it is the gift of forgiveness which effects a moral transformation in man.[1]

A further evil consequence was that, according to the prevailing *schema*, regeneration, repentance, and faith, along with calling and illumination, were supposed to precede not merely the *consciousness* of divine forgiveness, but also the *act*. Forgiveness is therefore only supposed to enter after a series of elements involving subjective changes have transpired. It is true, indeed, that in His act of forgiving sin God is said utterly to disregard these good changes, although they all possess moral worth; free, prevenient grace is said to retain its rights, and not to be motived by human, even divinely-wrought, virtue, *e.g.* of penitence and faith; but on the other hand, God is not supposed to disregard these changes, since He makes the carrying out of the act of forgiveness in general depend on whether these changes exist. As this gives the impression of abstract, hair-splitting distinction, it is only natural that the following age went farther, and found the efficient cause of forgiveness in conversion, especially in faith as the good moral groundwork, nay, even pronounced it frigid or external (as Andrew Osiander did earlier) not to regard *fides justificans* as at least initial sanctification, and possessing worth for that reason. No less natural was it further to demand more and more from faith, that it might be equal to such a task, and be the cause of justification. Genuine, although not strong, faith was demanded, true knowledge of the law and sin, true sorrow and penitence (*contritio*, not merely *attritio*), in short, a state of true penitence, that God might be determined to His act of justification. This is seen among the Arminians, but especially in Methodism.[2] But such a course again leads us by a back-door to the Catholic method of salvation, perpetuating uncertainty as to salvation, and detracting more and more from the consolation of free grace.

[1] Cf. *Apol.* 71, etc. See above, pp. 200, 201.

[2] Cf. Fletcher's *Checks to Antinomianism* in opposition to Calvinism, and Jacoby, *Gesch. d. Meth.* 1870. See more under C.

The article of justification, then, by logical sequence, instead of forming the basis and decisive turning-point, necessarily retired farther and farther back, because repentance and faith are never perfect in this life, while justification in general was made dependent thereon. But such conditioning of the divine act of forgiveness in general by penitent faith especially obscured of necessity the Reformation principle of the preveniency of Christian grace, which gave place to the doctrine, that the gospel is nothing but the promise that God will show grace to those who amend and are converted,—a doctrine at home even in the philosophical schools, *e.g.* of Kant. Forgiving grace was therewith robbed of its privilege of being the principle of sanctification, and its connection with Christ's atoning work could only be very loose. Christ would then at most have made it *possible* for God to forgive the sins of those who have fulfilled the condition of true repentance and amendment. The result, therefore, was a development of doctrine which may be congenial to superficial thinking, and which rightly aimed at developing the process of salvation on the subjective side; but the bond of connection with Christ's objective work of atonement fell out of sight altogether, and only a precarious place was left to the saving good procured by Christ, instead of its being made fruitful. On the *other* side, no doubt, it seems Antinomian, and calculated to favour moral indifference, to assign to the atonement any practical import and validity whatever, apart from the condition of previous amendment, nay in its bare objectivity, and therefore before faith. Thus the problem arises of solving the apparent contradiction here presented. Bringing together the chief points instanced, we may describe the difficulty, the solution of which must be discussed in the further development of the dogma, thus: On the one hand the justification of the individual must, as a divine act, preserve its independence of any and every existing moral excellence in man, that it may be a prevenient, spontaneous display of love for Christ's sake; whereas, on the other hand, justification, like the consciousness of the same, is said to be imparted to man only through faith, which in any case again is an act of eminent moral import. How this apparent anomaly is solved we shall see later on. But we glance first at other related difficulties, which theology has not yet removed.

In thesi it is always maintained, that "justifying faith" is reckoned as righteousness not for its own sake, but for Christ's, and has power to establish a new life of love, or that justification is the root of sanctification, not through itself, but through its contents. But in order to carry this position out, it was necessary to adopt either the view of the *Apology* and J. Gerhard, which made the soul to be encouraged, and new, holy affections to be called forth in it, by the preaching of forgiveness accomplished, and by the consciousness of the same,[1] or the view of those who deduce the new life of holiness psychologically from gratitude, which again implies a consciousness of benefit received.[2] On the other hand, it was asserted that any one may be regenerated and justified before God, and therefore be in a state of reconciliation with God, without knowing it. The contradiction implied in this is not completely solved by distinguishing a universal reconciliation or *justificatio* from the specific justification of the individual person by a temporal act of God, and by conceding of the former, that it may exist without the consciousness of it, whereas the latter is associated with personal knowledge of justification, as also with personal faith, and is therefore adapted to establish a new life. As the universal reconciliation applies to every one, another solution is necessary. Further, the fact that justification in itself was conceived as a mere *actus forensis* in God, without any change in man or his consciousness, involved a contradiction to the position, that justification was to operate psychologically in *every* believer as the principle of the new life. Finally, there was a troublesome inconsistency in a mere divine act of *justificatio forensis* being placed in the midst of a series of elements of the saving process, in which a union of the divine and human is realized. Whereas all other divine acts—*Vocatio, Illuminatio, Regeneratio, Conversio*—affirm also a change in man, this was not supposed to be the case with *justificatio* as *forensis*, which yet emerges in the midst of the series. And yet it is said to be a divine act, which only comes to pass after man believes, through the divine forgiveness not previously existing, although without the man at once knowing it. But this is not merely incon-

[1] *Apol.* 71, 62. 74, 79. 81, pp. 82, 83.
[2] Cf. the division of the Heidelberg Catechism.

sistent with the baptismal covenant, to which God remains true, but such a conception of *justificatio forensis* threatens to push even Christ's atoning work into the background.

§ 132*b*.—*Continuation.*

C.—*Dogmatic Doctrine of Faith and Justification.*

1. There can be no question that the doctrine of *Justification* joins on in the closest way to the doctrine of Atonement[1] through Christ, and has, so to speak, to resume it. The doctrine of Atonement affirms that *God* is reconciled to the sinful world through Christ, but by no means that the enmity of the *world* to God is abolished (Rom. v. 10); for the latter relates to the moral transforming of the world, and therefore to sanctification. The *reconciliation* of God to the world implies that sin is not forgiven as matter of course, and does not remain unpunished, but that the peace of God with the world is restored, and His displeasure with sinners abolished *through Christ*, and that for Christ's sake God *has* really and in earnest forgiven the world's sin and guilt in His heart, so that its guilt is no longer imputed, but for the sake of the mediation of Christ, the heavenly High Priest, the divine goodwill is again turned towards man, and the proclamation may now be made to the world, that "the wrath of God is appeased, God's punitive justice satisfied, sin atoned for and its debt paid, the guilt of sin abolished, the accusation and condemnation of the law annulled and appeased."[2] Now the *justification* of the sinner likewise implies nothing else than that God has forgiven sin and guilt, and that in His heart.[3] The result of Christ's work is, that independently of the faith of the world and before it, God has forgiven it, and on His part is reconciled with it, upon which fact the inviting message is based: "Be ye reconciled to God." The meaning of the Evangelical doctrine of justification in defining justification to be an *actus Dei forensis* is, that it is not faith which makes God reconciled. Both ideas, accordingly, have contents so similar, that they

[1] See note, p. 1.

[2] Cf. Burk, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, pp. 5, 25, 42.

[3] Or, in Burk's language: in the heavenly temple.

might pass as synonyms, and it may not be inadmissible in some circumstances to use them as such. Hence Melanchthon's *Loci*, in their different revisions, frequently treat justification or forgiveness and atonement (*reconciliatio*) *promiscue* as identical ideas.[1] This employment of the two terms is recommended by the twofold reason of equal weight, that in this way the truth finds most definite expression, that the grace of God is bestowed on the sinner independently of all human acts or qualities, and that the gift of justification has for its contents precisely the blessing of divine forgiveness and pardoning love procured by Christ's merit. The independence of divine grace in respect of human qualities or actions is of such decisive importance for this reason, that the overwhelming force of divine love, its at once humbling and elevating or encouraging power, rests precisely on the fact, that it was shown preveniently to the unworthy apart from all human merit, thus revealing its divine greatness and purity. But this prevenient character of divine grace is most clearly apparent when, with respect to the justification of the sinner, we are conscious that it has the same contents as the *atonement*, which existed before faith or the Church, and was procured with such complete objectiveness that it neither needs nor admits of supplement. If, therefore, with a view to establish a distinction between the two ideas, we were to say: "Actual forgiveness of sins only comes about on God's side through the act of justification, but the atonement through Christ has simply the force of *rendering it possible* for God to forgive, whereas the reality of forgiveness is a consequence of penitent faith," it cannot indeed be denied, that many church-teachers express themselves as if God were not really reconciled with the world through Christ's atonement, and His disposition to the world were not for Christ's sake one of pardoning love, but as if penitent faith were to God the efficient impulse to forgiveness. But this were to depreciate Christ's merit and work, which only remained concealed because the thought of what was already accomplished through

[1] This course was taken in my Kiel Lecture on Justification, which was delivered with the apologetic purpose of defending and explaining the much-contested idea of justification, especially as *justificatio forensis*, by the easy plan of recurring to the undoubted fact, that God is in Himself reconciled with the world, and therefore to the doctrine of objective justification.

Christ's atonement withdrew for a moment into the background for the purpose of establishing *justification* also as a necessary divine act. All the less can we be satisfied in Christ's work merely with rendering forgiveness possible, while actual forgiveness is reserved for justification after faith, as Christ's righteousness to be imputed to us, and His connection with us, are no mere possibility, but a thoroughly sufficient reality. Rather might the distinction be sought in this, that the atonement relates to the world generally (as is again and again emphasized by Lutherans in opposition to particularism in the work of redemption), whereas justification concerns only the individuals who believe. But this too is insufficient. For not merely do church-teachers like Melanchthon call justification, because containing forgiveness, *reconciliatio* (see above), but conversely Holy Scripture in many places speaks of justification as a *universal* benefit of divine grace, as when Paul says: "Through the righteousness of one man has justification of life come upon all men," or, "God reconciled the world to Himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them."[1] Church-teachers also, like J. Gerhard or Quenstedt, expressly insist, that the reconciliation of the world through Christ "does not mean that forgiveness of sins and cancelling of guilt are not thereby procured for individuals, while something further must be added in order that God may forgive.[2] On the contrary, Christ, on His part, has brought to all the gift of satisfaction, propitiation, and eternal life."

2. But still a *distinction* between atonement and justification must of course be maintained. A peculiar independent meaning must be assigned to each of the two ideas; and only after recognizing this, can we affirm anything clearly and

[1] Rom. v. 18; 2 Cor. v. 19, passages which plainly have the same meaning as 1 John ii. 1, iv. 9, 10; Col. i. 20, where an ἱλασμός of the world is spoken of. Cf. thereon Burk, p. 41.

[2] J. Gerhard, *Loci Th.* vii. 178 f. § 144 f. Bellarmin had said, "The gospel mentions no one by name; when, therefore, the Evangelicals say, Every one may and ought to believe *sibi remissa esse peccata*, they take it from themselves, not from God's Word." To this Gerhard replies: That the gospel promise of salvation is universal, is undeniable, but *Generalis Evangelii promissio includit specialia*. Similarly Quenstedt, p. iii. cap. iii. *de Christo Redempt. Membr.* 2. Quæst. vi.–viii. Quenstedt goes so far (Quæst. viii.) as to represent it as making satisfaction for *finali impœnitentia* as well as for all sins, which certainly would be a self-contradiction. (See above, p. 27.)

certainly as to the interconnection, by which they form a continuity. Their distinction is intimated already in the circumstance, that Holy Scripture usually understands justification, in the passive sense, of the *possession* of the blessing of forgiveness or of participation in the grace of God, of being put into a state of grace, but in the active sense, of that act of God by which He makes the individual actually partaker in the blessing already procured for him by Christ. As relates first to *atonement*, everything depends on its independent significance and validity. For, were the nature of justification such, that *faith* in God's fatherly love, which is announced and guaranteed but not procured by Christ, effects justification, or such that God forgives in virtue of His fatherly love and not for Christ's sake, then would the high-priestly merit of Christ be ignored and set aside in the doctrine of the appropriation of salvation. But thereby penitent faith also would be corrupted and disabled, because it would close its eyes to guilt and the need of propitiation. Hence it would be impure and yet inclined to ascribe to itself the merit of the atonement, even if God's displeasure at sinners and His punitive justice were not altogether denied. The doctrine, therefore, of justification by faith ought not, as is often done to-day, to be so pressed and accentuated that the objective reconciliation of the world by Christ is thereby absorbed, or in Reformation phraseology, Christ again buried. This independence, nay fundamental import, of the atonement in contrast with faith, implies (and this forms its kernel) that Christ *procured* the actual reconciliation of God with the world, and did not merely *make it possible* to God. Otherwise the consequence would be, that faith is a jointly atoning causality, the cause of the *realization* of an atonement at all. Thus faith would be raised to the rank of a potency supplementary to the principle of atonement; it would be made jointly procuring and atoning, as if the atonement through Christ did not carry in itself the potency of justification, or as if penitent faith considered as transforming man had not the efficient principle of the origin of the transformation in the very fact, that God for Christ's sake in the preveniency of His love *has* freely and fully forgiven man.[1] This becomes

[1] Methodism most definitely derives the actuality of forgiveness from penitence and faith as a subjective act. It was led thereto by Antinomian phenomena

all the more suspicious when the further question is asked: What must be the character of the faith which accomplishes such great things? Teachers, who had once entered on this path, required genuine penitence, not merely sorrow for the consequences of sin or dread of divine penalties (*attritio*), but sorrow for sin and its demerit itself, in conjunction with true knowledge of the same and of moral impotence to help ourselves, the earnestness of resolve upon a better life, and a sincere faith full of trust and free from all doubt,—in a word, true conversion.[1] But if conversion must be already present in order for justification or forgiveness to be imparted to man, where is the power of justifying grace, which is yet glorified as *itself* converting man and making him a new man? Forgiveness of sins, if now of real use to man, would find the best work already done without it and before it. When, then, the exhortation was added to test the genuineness of repentance and faith, and only to regard such genuineness, if found, as the sign of the atonement availing for man, the consequence was, since all the requirements named are of a moral nature, and are never found perfectly in man, that uncertainty respecting forgiveness and salvation is perpetuated, nay, man is driven irresistibly to endeavour by performing those requirements to render himself worthy of forgiveness and justification, and thus to "dispose" himself for those blessings. Here, then, again were *bona opera*, although in Protestant garb, certainly of a more inward nature, upon which not merely the personal possession of and participation in the atonement, but even the real stability of Christ's work itself was made to depend. But here it was quite overlooked, that only free, prevenient grace, with its word, "Thy sins are forgiven thee,"

(especially the teachings of Dr. Crisp), which perverted the doctrine of Free Grace. Fletcher, the defender of Wesley and of his offence-giving declarations at the Conference of 1770 (cf. *The Works of the Rev. J. Fletcher*, London 1814, vol. ii. 222 ff., and his *Checks to Antinomianism*, p. 225 ff., vol. iii. 6), not merely emphasizes sanctification so strongly as to set up a second justification by works, and perfection as a universal duty attainable on earth, but also represents the *justificatio prima* (the reconciliation of God with the sinner) as effected (not appropriated) by contrite sorrow and faith, to which of course meritoriousness is denied, vol. ii. 264 ff.; cf. above, p. 206.

[1] Even Frank (ii. 333) sets up a whole series of conditions of justification, several of which belong to sanctification, and can only be observed by one who is already a partaker in salvation.

has the power to elicit the faith of assured trust. True, along with such teaching went the repeated assertion, that not conversion (repentance and faith) in itself justifies, but only the contents of faith—Christ,—that faith justifies, as the *Apology* says, not as a noble virtue, although the noblest of virtues, but because it apprehends the justifying contents. But when again language was used[1] which implied that divine forgiveness really comes to no one, except after he believes, or that in His heart God forgives no one in earnest, except when he has believingly accepted forgiveness, Christianity was not the offer of forgiveness already present, but only the announcement of one to come, when the condition is fulfilled; and in this case it could not be denied that divine grace obtains its justifying power in reference to the individual through faith only.[2] It is further true, that Evangelical teachers, in opposition to subjective, even inward acts, referred again and again to Christ and His objective merit, and that the independence of justification upon sanctification was supposed to be secured by the proposition, that justification is primarily no change in the subject, nor carries such with it (*non importat justificatio mutationem intrinsecam*), but is merely a transaction or act in God, in virtue of which God imputes Christ's righteousness to man, not imputing his sin and guilt, but regarding him as just. But this divine act was not regarded as contained in the atonement already made by Christ, but was so brought into connection with *conversion*, that not merely was the possession and enjoyment of forgiveness on the part of the individual made dependent on it, but the language used implied that even God only forgives in His heart when conversion or faith is already present. Such dependence of atonement and for-

[1] The distinguished President, Dr. John Edwards, sen., in his interesting *Remarks on the Trinity and the Economy of Salvation*, New York 1880, pp. 64–71, just published for the first time by Dr. Egbert Smyth in Andover, expresses himself on the present question as follows: "To make faith a *condition* of salvation is to burden the spirit with countless difficulties in respect of faith and works and their distinction. The result is to make us dependent on our own righteousness, and to lead to a new legality (Neonomianism). Faith is not the condition of receiving grace, but the receiving itself. Christ offers, believers receive."

[2] We may compare therewith a similar doctrine in another quarter, according to which the means of grace are supposed only to obtain their efficacy through official mediation.

giveness in general upon faith would change the fact of God's being reconciled with the world through Christ into something merely conditional. But nothing merely hypothetical is suited to be the basis of faith. If faith is to be rescued from the torment of uncertainty respecting salvation, it needs a fixed, objective, trustworthy point of support, which cannot be found in the fickleness and feebleness of human feelings or volitions, but in the last resort only in the objective atonement through Christ, and thus in the fact that there is a *justitia extra nos*, the *justitia* of Christ, who is our peace and the rock of our salvation, because the redemption perpetuated in His person has an objective, actual, and abiding worth for God, even before we exist and believe, although having a relation to us and a validity for us. On the other hand, a justification, not having the atonement through Christ for its objective basis, would no longer be justification in the Christian sense, but a deception. The objective atonement therefore demands its independence in relation to justification, and must already possess a reality and significance before the individual is in possession and enjoyment of forgiveness, and in this sense of his justification.[1]

But however important on all these grounds the independence of the atonement by Christ in distinction from justification by faith, in order to secure to Christ's work its full saving worth, and to faith its firm objective basis, it is important on the *other hand* to acknowledge, that a special and independent significance belongs also to man's *justification*. The moral character of the whole saving process depends thereupon. For, were everything finished with Christ's objective work of atonement, were a further process superseded or sisted, instead of

[1] Even Frank (ii. 303, 304) concedes: "In a certain respect it may be rightly said, that the saving propitiation and atonement for the human race, such as was accomplished by Christ's redemptive work, involves a justifying of humanity on the part of God, a remission of guilt even apart from faith, God for its sake imparting saving grace moment by moment;" and p. 328: "The saving propitiation, which Christ *has* accomplished, is just the restoring of our righteousness before God." But he speaks thus without giving effect to the acknowledgment, or considering the efficacy of the atonement for the individual as well as for the world in the matter of justification, and duly employing it within the saving process itself. He rather views the divine forgiveness as posited supratemporally, simply in the redemptive *idea*. In this case the divine forgiveness in reality has to follow as the effect of "justifying faith." Similarly, von Zezschwitz, *ut supra*. Cf. on this point, Ritschl, III. 102 f., and I. 542 ff.

being initiated by it, Christ's atoning work must then act after the manner of a physical force or of a mere finished legal business. Because Christ procured the atonement and represented before God the race, to which we belong by nature, the blessing procured by Him would pass over to us as matter of course by physical necessity, by a divine right of inheritance as it were, becoming our possession without any co-operation of ours. But this would contradict man's moral freedom, which is not impelled to salvation or ruin from without against its own will, and is not exhausted in a passive generic life.[1] Freedom can offer resistance even to the highest revelation of grace, and the process of diffusing salvation among mankind cannot be merely physical or magical in nature. Nor can it be merely juridical. We cannot say: Every debt has been paid by Christ, or still less, His active obedience has done everything which we had to do or ought to do hereafter; His obedience is a substitute for ours. For the process of salvation is no mere legal business, no mere payment of our debt for the past, and of our obligation for the future. Else, the consequence would be that we should have a legal claim to forgiveness without more ado, and without faith; nay, Christ would then really be the only personality, He alone would have moral responsibility. But Christ's substitution does not absorb, it generates our moral personality. If Christ's atonement, instead of requiring faith in order to become the possession of individuals, became their possession as matter of course because of the objective satisfaction made to God for us, then converted and unconverted, believers and enemies of the cross of Christ, would be on a par in relation to participation in the atonement, and Christ's work would give support to moral Indifferentism and Antinomianism. The same result would be reached, only by a bypath, as in the doctrine that no atonement at all is necessary, because God cannot be wroth and punish, but can only love. But just as in this way the gift of salvation procured by Christ is no dead

[1] The opposite supposition would lead to an analogous course of action, just as when regard is only had to generic sin or inherited guilt, the subjective process being ignored which leads in one case to personal sin, in the other to personal salvation. Only the atonement accepted by the subject can become his justification, *i.e.* his possession and enjoyment of forgiveness.

treasure, radiating forth its glory and blessings by natural magic, without causing any movement in the heart, but earnest, spiritual toil is requisite, not indeed to beget or create this treasure of divine propitiousness, but to make it our own personal possession, because in virtue of its spiritual nature it can only be spiritually appropriated, and without such toil would be rejected (which for this very reason would entail new and worse guilt),—as, in a word, it has the purpose and the power to introduce life and movement into the torpid, dead masses of sinful humanity,—so, *in the second place*, we must not suppose that the atonement procured by Christ, because in truth it is a self-contained whole, is of the nature of a ready-made blessing, or a treasure lying ready to hand and belonging to every member of humanity, that there is no further *divine* activity in the appropriation of this possession and none needed, and that at most a becoming conscious of or enlightenment respecting this possession is necessary to man. For, little as anything is wanting to the reconciliation of God with the world in the abstract, so that it would still need a supplement in itself, either through a moral act on man's part, or a sanctifying operation on God's, still a *divine*-human process must go through its course of development, if man is to come into possession and enjoyment of the divine gift which is independent of his faith.[1] We shall soon have to consider this process in detail. Here let it only be remarked, that neither on the divine nor the human side can it be one of mere theory.

3. But the *interconnection* or mutual relationship of the two ideas must be no less firmly held than their distinction. The atonement points to justification as its proximate goal. It is designed to become the divine act of justifying the believing sinner, and thus the possession and enjoyment of the grace of forgiveness. If the divine working stood still after atonement had been procured by Christ, the work of atonement would have a lifeless unethical conclusion; or, if the movement fell exclusively on the subjective side, this

[1] To deny all concurrence of human with divine activity would lead to absolute predestination, and that in a physical, deterministic form, and withal to absolute Apokatastasis, if Christ's work of atonement bears a universal character.

would bring us back into the line of the self-redemption theory, but no personal, reciprocal meeting and fellowship between us on one side, and God and Christ on the other, could follow. Hence the divine *purpose of atonement* itself requires continuous divine acts by which the atonement procured by Christ is introduced into the individualism of time, of individuals and their circumstances, into the consciousness and nature of believers. Here the heavenly high-priesthood of Christ has its important place. But in the same way, conversely, *justification* of itself points back to the already accomplished reconciliation of the world as its basis and presupposition, not to the mere possibility or rendering possible of the same. Christ's atonement, it is true, took place in time, but it has eternal and universal import through the righteousness of Christ, which is an eternal presence, and represents us before the Father. It forms, therefore, along with its effect—the fact of God's being reconciled with the world, or the forgiveness of God in His heart—the supra-temporal *real* basis for the entire process of salvation, God communicating the grace of salvation moment by moment, because in Himself before His internal tribunal He *has* objectively forgiven man. On one hand, it remains certain that atonement and justification have the same contents in so far as both imply that for Christ's sake God does not impute sin to the world and individuals, but accepts Christ's advocacy and security, and therefore contemplates the world and the individuals, whom in His heart He has forgiven, in Christ. But it is a new thing that through divine grace these contents of the atonement are not merely a blessing *availing* for man, but become his personal, nay conscious possession, and are therefore appropriated by man. And this can only be done by the *implanting of faith*, in which man's freedom takes part. For it is logically impossible for an unconverted man to know or receive Christian grace as that which it is. He who neither knows nor acknowledges his sin and guilt cannot desire or appreciate forgiving grace. Accordingly, the relation of the two—of atonement and justification—is this: God's being reconciled through Christ, which is also the divine purpose of redemption and the forgiveness of the sin of humanity, remains identical with itself even in the historical

divine act of justifying the individual believing sinner, and *is continued therein.* But in this act of justification, because of the presence of a new element—faith—there is historically fulfilled God's purpose of redemption, which, after God for Christ's sake *has* become reconciled with the sin of the world, now carries its work farther, and renders it historically fruitful, in harmony with the fact that He designed it to be the actual, nay, in due course the conscious, blessed possession of man. But never more can it be said that faith first brings about the divine forgiveness itself.

4. After what has been said, the relation of *faith to atonement and justification* will be settled without difficulty. These two differ in the circumstance, that in the justification of the individual faith comes into consideration, whereas the reconciliation of the world takes place before the faith of the world. Without faith the process of salvation would lose its moral character and pass into a mere magical, *i.e.* physical, action of objective remedial powers, man remaining passive. Although God is reconciled with the world through Christ, no one can know and rejoice in God's forgiving, fatherly disposition, who has not in penitent faith been made conscious of his sin and guilt, and has not a hearty longing to become partaker in forgiveness. As already said, grace can only be known and acknowledged as that which it is—*forgiving grace*—by penitent contrition. But such contrition, the more far-reaching and pure it is, all the more knows the absolute impossibility of rolling off the burden of sin and guilt from itself by its own strength, and therefore needs and longs for divine help such as the gospel proclaims. But this help avails nothing, unless man accepts it, and the right accepting is called *Faith.*

According to ancient Evangelical teaching, faith is made up of three elements: *Notitia, Assensus, Fiducia.*[1] Knowledge,

[1] To which Burk adds the desire for salvation, which finds its preliminary, pacifying conclusion in *Fiducia* in the *promissio Evangelii.* From *Fiducia* is developed further the *Certitudo salutis.* On the other hand, Fedor Schmidt-Warneck (*Die intellectualistische Glaubensdoctrin in ihrem Widerspruch zum Material-Princip der protest. Kirche,* Mitau 1880) would acknowledge only *Notitia* and *Fiducia,* and exclude *Assensus,* in order to avoid an intellectualistic pseudo-orthodoxy. But in *Assensus* he is thinking of the true knowledge of salvation, which of course can only spring from the believing appropriation of

feeling, and will are called into action, and the aim of the divine calling is to secure its evolution; for the gospel proclamation brings about a certain, although at first merely historic, knowledge (*notitia*); in proportion as the knowledge of sin, sorrow for it and for uncancelled guilt, are awakened, it also excites the feeling or presentiment, how the misery of man and the promise of the gospel are exactly adapted to each other, from which arises an assent (*assensus*) to the gospel in general. Finally, when desire for deliverance has gained strength, the grace of calling draws to a trustful apprehending of the salvation offered in the gospel, or to the proper *object* of the faith which brings about the state of personal justification. But on this point we must linger a little.

The object of Christian faith in the broader sense is of course the entire contents of the Christian revelation. Hence our theologians insist that the stages of *notitia* and *assensus* also are preserved in *Fiducia* or *Fides salvifica*. But the entire substance of revelation only becomes matter of inward, affirming appropriation after the stage of *Fiducia*. Nay, it is here rightly and expressly emphasized, *e.g.* by J. Gerhard, where saving faith is treated of: *the proper object of faith is Christ as Mediator and Atoner*, and everything else comes into view in relation to saving faith according to the measure of its nearer or more remote connection with redemption through Christ.[1] Or still more definitely: Forgiveness is regarded as the proper object for "justifying" faith, which it must apprehend and appropriate as the ὄργανον λῆπτικόν in confidence and trust. And here arises the question touched above: Must the confidence refer to this, that to penitent faith God *will* forgive sin and remit guilt; or must the object of faith be this, that sins *are* specifically remitted to man by God (*sibi remissa*

salvation. Further, he overlooks that *Fiducia* cannot be blind, and the act of faith capricious, and therefore unethical, but that it must be performed with a good conscience. To this is necessary a conscience with an open eye and a presentiment awakened by the gospel proclamation and preparatory grace, that in Christ is given that which the heart and conscience need (see vol. i. § 11, p. 140 f.).

[1] Hence an investigation respecting the distinction between *Articuli fundamentales* and *minus fundamentales* is appended here. Cf. J. Gerhard, vii. §§ 128–148.

esse peccata)? must the object, which faith is confidently to apprehend, be a hypothetical forgiveness depending on sincere conversion, and therefore merely conditional, or the prevenient loving manifestation of free divine pardon for Christ's sake? The answer is already given in the circumstance, that according to Evangelical doctrine *Fides* must be not merely *Fides generalis*, but *specialis*, and the contents or object of the faith of the subject must be precisely this: *sibi esse remissa peccata.* How can faith be faith that my sins *are* remitted, if they are not forgiven before I believe, but are only to be forgiven afterwards in virtue of the act of faith? We see that the difficulty discussed above appears in this place again, and in a thoroughly practical form. It cannot be said that the questions arising here are clearly solved by our old theologians. For, with a view to securing to faith its full importance, many expedients are used which favour the interpretation that forgiveness is imparted on account of faith, and that there is no divine forgiveness save the one procured by conversion and faith. It may especially have tended to obscurity in this respect, that the promise of forgiveness or justification to believers was described as the object which faith apprehends. This expression was preferred in imitation of Melanchthon and others, because in this way one and the same object—the promise of salvation—was proposed to the pious of the Old and New Testaments. But this expression is plainly more in harmony with the standpoint of the Old than of the New Testament; and it is in keeping therewith that nothing more than a difference in the degree of clearness was usually supposed between the grace of the O. and N. T., a doctrine not in harmony with the N. T. and the historical significance of Christianity for God's real reconciliation with the world. The *Promissio*, described as the object for "justifying faith," was not always conceived (which would be unobjectionable) as the "promise of the *possession* of Christian grace" or forgiveness, nor faith as a mere acceptance of the saving gift already present and availing for man. But the acceptance of grace must not degenerate into the notion that grace is the product of the acceptance. For the acceptance rather presupposes that the object to be accepted is already in existence and present. Nay, faith would not be an ὄργανον λῆπτικόν, but simply a

moral, procuring action, if the object which it is to apprehend were not an already present gift, but only a possible future one to be produced by faith itself. It was shown above (p. 213) how this must lead to the Romish doctrine of *dispositiones justificationis*, and also to the perpetuating of uncertainty respecting salvation. If, on the other hand, the divine forgiveness of the sin of the world is treated not as the effect of the subjective process, but as the work of Christ, and considered (as befits the prevenient love of God for Christ's sake) as the objective basis of that process in which the reconciliation of the world accomplished through Christ continues and energizes, then uniformity and continuity between the fact of God's being reconciled with the world through Christ and justification by faith are preserved. The first denotes the divine gift destined for us, the second the possession of that gift, brought about it is true by God and not merely by man. The objective divine gift is designed to become a personal possession. But in order thereto it requires faith in God's prevenient forgiveness, or in the truth that because God has forgiven the world for Christ's sake before it knew and believed the fact, He causes reconciliation and peace to be offered to it and the individuals in it. It must remain unconditionally certain, that only on the ground of the divine sentence or divine contemplation can man regard himself as righteous, and also that this sentence cannot be the effect of human action, of any course of conduct whatever of a moral character, however important, nay indispensable, such action may be, if man is to be put into personal possession of the blessing procured by Christ, and therewith into the state of justification. But even this putting into the state of justification is a divine act. As the calling is a divine act which communicates the gospel message that atonement not merely exists for the world *in abstracto* or as a possibility, but is realized through Christ and avails for individuals as certainly as the latter are included in the world to which God is reconciled through Christ, so also a divine activity is in operation, although not an irresistible one, in begetting the faith through which man is placed in the state of justification. No less, further, is a divine act present when this gift becomes matter of inward knowledge

and certainty, although an act conditioned by the believing reception of the gift. By this means the already existing grace, the perfect forgiveness for Christ's sake, penetrates into the knowledge or consciousness, and penetrates also with life-giving effect into the nature of man, from which therefore the *Apology* of the *Conf. Aug.* deduces a *vivificatio*, nay *regeneratio* of man, and *certitudo salutis*.[1] The reference also by the theologians of the 17th century to an *intimatio, insinuatio* of the divine sentence of absolution comes under this head.—According to what has been advanced, the relation of faith to atonement and justification is this, that faith must have the reconciliation of the world through Christ and of the individual men belonging to it for its contents, that it arises therefore on the basis of the universality of divine grace actual and present, but that when it has apprehended the divine forgiveness as a certain fact specifically including the believer,—this particular man,—it is placed in *possession* and *enjoyment* of the divine forgiveness, or in the *state of justification*, not merely by divine sentence, but also by divine act.

5. After we have come to an understanding respecting the ideas of atonement and justification and the relation of faith to both, it is due to the importance of the matter, even at the risk of repetitions, to consider once more the process of salvation in detail by way of summary and connectedly, in which course the turning-point from the old to the new life, and the co-operation of the divine and human factors in order to the final result, must be especially taken into view. It must be premised, that the nature of the case no less than systematic order will endure no hiatus between the reconciliation of the world by Christ and the justification of the individual. Certain as it is that the historical course of the appropriation of salvation ought not to be conceived deistically, and is not carried out without divine acts which belong to the "true, high, spiritual miracles" of which Luther speaks, and which are in complete harmony with the divine immutability rightly viewed, still, according to what has been advanced, *justification* ought not to be represented as an abrupt divine act, in which what has been gained through Christ must be

[1] See above, p. 201.

ignored or deprecated in order that the justifying God may begin as from the beginning. On the contrary, the eternally valid atonement accomplished by Christ must be introduced into the justification of man, and must, so to speak, gain in it present existence. On the other hand, the *atonement* must not stand in its objectivity like an immoveable power (*Grösse*), as if with the blessing of the reconciliation of God procured by Christ the world already had what it needs. Nor ought absolute Predestinationism to seek any support in the fact of God's supra-temporal reconciliation to the world through Christ. Rather, the accomplished reconciliation of God with the world must operate as the principle of the reconciliation of the world with God, *i.e.* must be efficacious in causing the world by spontaneous faith both to rejoice in the assurance of forgiveness, and by this very means to be transformed in consciousness, volition, and nature. The process accordingly is as follows.

First. In Christ and for the sake of His righteousness God is reconciled with humanity, not imputing to it its sins. Since God has forgiven it in His heart for the sake of Christ's priesthood, which is continued in His intercession, an absolving divine sentence before the inner divine tribunal does not first come into view in the act of justification; but the effect of Christ's historic work of atonement is that God regards the humanity, to which the Mediator belongs, otherwise than before in virtue of His accomplished satisfaction, namely, as covered by Christ's righteousness, no longer as merely capable of redemption but as reconciled, which fact may be described as a pardoning sentence of God upon the world in His inner tribunal, in which the matter rests, and which remains in force, until the gospel is rejected by definitive unbelief. It is solely the *fellowship of Christ with us,* which He by anticipation formed and maintains with sinners, His advocacy and surety and not the faith of men, not their trusting and loving fellowship with Christ, by which this forgiveness is brought about in God. Nor does this divine sentence or this divine contemplation of the world in Christ effect a change in man immediately,[1] but needs first of all to be defined retrospectively

[1] Hollaz, Baier, and others rightly insist, that *justificatio forensis* as a divine act must primarily be defined as occurring outside man. This holds good

and prospectively in its non-dependence on human merit, and in its independent value. This is the meaning of the doctrine of *Justificatio forensis*. There is scarcely a definition in the old Protestant dogma, at which more offence was taken than at this. But the meaning and value of the definition can be most easily made evident by considering the atonement under this point of view. First, the forgiveness of God in His heart before the world's conversion, and therefore not determined by it, makes clear the pure, prevenient nature of the divine love; and for this very reason, secondly, it is the overwhelming power which works true repentance; and yet, thirdly, this is of such a kind that force or mere physical procedure has no place, but room is left for a moral process in which freedom is taken into account, which process, however, is set in motion by the manifestation of the prevenient, forgiving love of God.

Secondly. But of course the inner reconciliation of God with the world does not remain shut up in God to the end. God causes the news of the accomplished reconciliation—the gospel—to reach the world and individuals in the course of history, the heavenly High Priest accompanying the process with His intercession. By the invitation a moral process is initiated, which leaves room for free decision (§§ 130, 131). This message holds good on God's part for the *whole* of humanity, and not merely for the members of His kingdom.[1] It must be as universal in its terms as the atonement through Christ, which embraces the sin of the world, and is therefore the

primarily of the *atonement*, which in a certain way may also be called justification (p. 209); but it holds good also of justification in so far as in the latter the atonement is continued, which has an objective existence independently of the subject. Only of course it cannot hold good of justification so far as it is insinuated. Rather the aim is that it shall become a personal possession, and in this way effect a transformation in man. An *immediate* working of the atonement, on the other hand, could only come about by magical means, leaving no place for freedom in appropriating salvation. Just so, were a moral change incorporated immediately with the idea of justification, the danger would arise of confounding justification and sanctification, and therefore the danger of obscuring free grace.

[1] God's forgiveness is not for the healthy, but for the sick and sinners. Forgiveness could only be limited to the members of the kingdom on the supposition that the church of God effects the reconciliation of those belonging to it by its own strength, or that the individual becomes partaker in the church of God, and thus in forgiveness, by simply entering the church.

principle of forgiveness also to all individual men. If, then, we ask *what must form the contents of the gospel proclamation*, the requirement is, that it proclaim, not a God to be reconciled through works or faith, but a God reconciled without help of ours, His forgiveness and His peace. It must therefore be affirmed respecting forgiveness, that man's relation to the fact of God being reconciled is not productive, nor even at once receptive. In so far Luther might speak of the *mera passivitas* of man in the work of reconciling God, as well as of man being justified. It has at present become very common to state the contents of the gospel proclamation thus: God forgives and justifies man, when he believes, or when he sincerely repents of and renounces his sins, as well as places his hope upon Christ,—in a word, when he is converted. But justification would thus lose its central and essential position. In opposition to this view, John Gerhard rightly insisted that the divine forgiveness has an absolute, not merely conditional character, *i.e.* is independent of our merit or good works, for the heavenly blessings are offered freely, by spontaneous grace.[1] This does not imply that faith is superfluous. Rather it is requisite in order to our becoming partakers in the gift offered,[2] but for that reason not in order to its existence. It is not correct to say, that the gospel proclamation should merely assert a covenant relation, so to speak, and set forth the contents, that God promises pardon and will grant forgiveness, when man on his side is converted and comes to true faith, and therefore to fellowship with Christ. Were the fact of God on His side being reconciled through Christ no reality in itself before faith, if He only became reconciled with the individual through his faith, then forgiveness on God's part would not be a present fact and an earnest offer of prevenient, pardoning love, but a promise and a hypothetical one, dependent for its very existence on the feeble strength of man, and on his fulfilment of the conditions. No firm trust (*fiducia*) in a grace of forgiveness freely imparted could then be arrived at, because

[1] Tom. vii. p. 171, ed. Cotta, in opposition to Bellarmin, who is of opinion that they are all *conditionales*. In the same way Gerhard rejects the notion that *dispositiones* for *gratia* are necessary, *i.e.* that God may be determined to forgiveness and may pardon. Faith, the ὄργανον λαπτικόν, is no such *dispositio* with *meritum ex congruo*.

[2] Ibid.

this grace would again in itself be made dependent on human conduct, which does not deserve firm trust. Moreover, Evangelical teaching rightly requires that faith shall not stop at generalities and take cognizance of Christian truth generally, and assent to it (*notitia* and *assensus*), nor merely stop at the general proposition, that God forgives sin and is reconciled with the world for Christ's sake, but it is essential for *Fides* to become *specialis* (*quisque credat sibi remissa esse peccata*); and this relation of the personality to a grace already present, not merely to come and thus hypothetical, is rightly reckoned a part of *fiducia*, even as the relation of grace to the personality ("given for you") requires such *fiducia*, and is raised above the uncertainty of doubt, which is justified so long as the divine forgiveness itself is supposed to be the effect of our conversion and faith, our confidence therefore having something subjective for its point of support instead of the bottomless compassion and love of God for Christ's sake. Accordingly the proper object of the faith here treated of is the forgiveness procured by Christ, free and gratuitous, availing for us and imputed to us by pure grace.[1] The contents of faith are not originated by faith, but are given to it to be appropriated, that faith may come into the possession of the divine favour and grace. Such a gift already present and offered is the contents or object, which faith can and ought to apprehend, even as it forms withal the strongest, nay decisive impulse both to the humbling and shaming of the sinner, and to the trustful apprehending of Christ, and in Him of the Father's love.

But perhaps many who acknowledge this to be the pure Evangelical and Christian doctrine, which alone answers to the prevenient character of the divine love, such as Christianity has revealed, may become timid, and ask, whether such gospel preaching does not open a wide door to carelessness and the abuse of holy things, whether the sole and necessary barrier to such a result is not the doctrine, that God forgives, not by anticipation, but only when man is improved or converted? So the Judaistic strain of thought has always judged. On

[1] J. Gerhard, tom. vii., ed. Cotta, p. 165, § 130: "Dicimus, fidei justificantis proprium et adæquatum objectum esse promissionem evangelicam de Christo Mediatore." That the *promissio* signifies the offer of a present gift procured for us by Christ, is shown by the context.

this point only the following remarks are premised in order to obviate misunderstandings. A preliminary consideration is, that the Evangelical doctrine now advanced does not imply that any one can be in actual and personal possession of forgiveness and justification, who with evil intent presumptuously abuses grace, making it a cloak of wickedness, but only that the divine forgiveness is not originated by repentance and conversion. On the contrary, the correct handling of gospel preaching must insist, that no one can really participate and rejoice in the forgiveness or justifying grace imputed and offered to him preveniently by God, who does not sincerely recognize his sins, and desire to have his conscience relieved of the burden of guilt. The personal apprehension of that blessing must be a spiritual act, just as the blessing itself is spiritual in nature. Such apprehension is logically out of the question for one who knows not what the gospel is about, who acknowledges not his sin and guilt, and does not long for pardoning grace and the healing of sin and guilt. To one who lacks these elements, the gospel, which is glad tidings of forgiveness, is unintelligible, nay, does not even exist as such, nor can he accept and possess it as that which it is. Although, therefore, penitent faith is not the cause of the divine forgiveness of sin or of justification itself, there are still logical and empirical reasons why penitent faith must precede the conscious possession of forgiveness. Just so, it is logically impossible for any one to have the offered grace as his own, if he rejects instead of accepting it, as it demands, and instead of responding to the fellowship with man established by Christ in prevenient *love* by establishing fellowship through *faith* in Him. Little as the divine forgiveness in itself is conditioned by faith,—rather it is a reality before faith, because faith does not produce its object, but presupposes and accepts it when given,—still the prevenient manifestation of divine grace takes place, *in order that* the sinner may believe in it with humility and confidence. The gospel is a loving greeting to *sinful* humanity on the part of God, who establishes fellowship *on His side*, in order that sinful humanity may respond to this greeting by *its* fellowship with the Mediator through faith. If, on the other hand, Christ is rejected by the decision of man, after the influence of the grace of calling has restored his

freedom (§ 130 f.), goodness or love itself is rejected in its supreme revelation, and purely personal, damnable guilt is incurred by an act of self-condemnation. In such sin, the sin that preceded the preaching of the gospel is perpetuated, and the guilt, which was forgiven for Christ's sake, again revives, so to speak; or rather the scorning and despising of such divine love incurs guilt of a new species. In the sin of definitive unbelief all sin and guilt first attains its unhappy culmination.

Thirdly. On the other hand, *the effect of faith in Christ is the possession of justification.* As a divine act, expressive of the divine disposition, justification precedes the inner change of man for the better. The new life or love has yet no place in man's heart, either as merit or as the condition of salvation, before God has forgiven and absolved man in His inner tribunal, nay, has made known His disposition towards humanity through the gospel. But with our *faith a new factor enters even for the divine contemplation.* The being apprehended in effectual calling has now become the spontaneous apprehending of Christ, and as we are thus made receptive to further gifts, so God bestows grace for grace. The first and fundamental gift is the Spirit of peace from above, stilling every accusation of conscience, healing the discord in ourselves and with God, and, although we still know ourselves sinners (for it is sinners who are justified), causing us to see in God no longer the angry, holy Judge, but the loving Father, whose children we are permitted to call ourselves. The believer now has experience of the fatherly love which God sheds abroad in his heart, and which brings with it the Spirit of adoption, who teaches to pray to God with the trustful, ingenuous spirit of a child. The forgiveness, offered in the gospel and made man's possession by faith, is *complete,* referring to all sins and guilt in the past as well as to natural and still existent sinfulness. Nay, so far as the power of sin cannot be at once vanquished even by regeneration (for the new life is itself a progressive one), the power of atoning grace extends also beyond the present to the later after-workings of sin, so far as the continuance of penitent faith also is bound up with them. Christianity has completed but one work—atonement, which through justification is made

completely, not merely partially, man's own possession. Everything else, like regeneration, sanctification, and glorification, is still left incomplete, nothing but the certainly efficacious principle of all these being implanted in humanity. But the divine forgiveness or justification is total, a whole neither needing nor capable of increase. Every accusing of conscience is now hushed, for, by the divine forgiveness on the ground of Christ's propitiation, guilt is cancelled, the indictment annulled.[1] But guilt being abolished, we are also freed from *punishment*. For all evils are only punishment through the divine anger and through guilt before God. Still-continuing evils, after losing their connection with the divine anger and our guilt, are but means of training, their only connection being with God's holy love towards us, as faith also knows right well.[2] The consciousness of the forgiveness of all sins and of the remission of all guilt and punishment, a conscience lightened of its load and free, along with divine adoption, forms then the blessed background of our temporal, progressive, although still always imperfect inner life, the constant supplement of our imperfection in righteousness before God, provided only we abide in faith.

Further, although God is reconciled with the world through Christ once for all, and remains so, unless the world rejects the divine gift, still God like Christ is not an idle spectator of the process of salvation; He does not carry it on simply by secondary causes, such as the labour of the church with its means of grace and the agency of man, but deems man worthy of an immediate, living relation. The eternal reconciliation procured by Christ, abiding in identity and stedfast continuity with itself, manifests itself in temporal acts, such as ever correspond to the need and receptiveness of man,

[1] Rom. viii. 1.

[2] The Catholic Church teaches otherwise, and the erroneous tenet of the continuance of a penal state even for believers is the bridge to the doctrine of Purgatory. Hence the Reformation laid great stress on the doctrine, that we are freed by Christ from all guilt and penalty. On the other hand, the Rationalistic Theology, *e.g.* Döderlein, §§ 208 f., 269, 309, and Hengstenberg (see above, p. 202), would have all suffering even of believers regarded as punishment for still remaining sin, whereas Kreibig (*ut supra*, p. 368) derives the penal character of the sufferings of those who are justified from the imperfection of their faith.

chiefly through communication of the Holy Spirit. Hence, when man has performed the act of faith, the time has come when God can place him in the *state* of justification, nay of adoption, and communicate to him a consciousness thereof. When the subject has reached the point at which under a sense of sin and guilt he longs after peace with God and the certainty of reconciliation with God for Christ's sake in filial confidence, the pardoning, gracious God sends the Spirit of peace as a living pledge of His fatherly forgiveness. The Spirit checks or hushes the consciousness of discord, and still further breathes into the heart the assurance of salvation and blessedness, by which a new consciousness arises in man as if he were born anew—the consciousness of adoption, which is associated with a new spirit and marked off with increasing definiteness from the period previous to the state of grace. True, the blessed *feeling* of forgiveness and adoption is not always connected with faith, and after its appearance does not remain uninterrupted; so far the so-called "faith without feeling" has a measure of truth. But the certainty must be distinguished from the blessed feeling. The former may indeed have different stages or degrees, but can never be wholly wanting, when and so far as faith exists. For in faith considered as trust and confidence there is already a beginning of certainty, produced by the inner strength and wealth of the objective real truth, so far as that truth has disclosed itself in inner calling to the spirit and determined it to the act of trustful faith. And again, the contents received in faith have their effect, as the man learns more and more by the exercise of faith how the gospel so fully corresponds to his needs, and the two are made for each other. Growth in certainty of salvation and in its stability, or stedfastness of heart, is both attainable and to be sought, especially since the still remaining uncertainty can only spring from the remnants of doubt, which are connected with sin, and therefore with sin are to be resisted. The causes of doubt lie especially in lesser or greater unfaithfulness, which must be overcome by penitent faith in daily renewal. But mere intermission of doubt is still not divine certainty of salvation. Such certainty and the consciousness of divine adoption are a special divine gift, called in Holy Scripture *sealing* by the Holy Spirit, the Spirit

of Christ.[1] Its place cannot be supplied by search after signs of the new birth. Instead of anxiously feeling the spiritual pulse, and musing whether we have true, penitent faith, we must boldly believe after the pattern of a Paul and the Reformers, leave the things which are behind, look forward to Christ instead of to ourselves, and confide in Him. This has in all ages created stalwart believers and heroes in Christ, who grew joyous in faith and stood equipped as witnesses of salvation. Whoever really believes, knows also—as the Reformers rightly maintained—that he believes, and is saved from doubting whether he really has faith *ipso facto* as well as by the written blessed effect of faith.[2] Here also the maxim holds good: first, true being must be sought, then the consciousness of that being will present itself in due time. For it is not knowledge which makes regenerate or elect; but regeneration or the new life, if it exists, publishes and asserts itself in the consciousness by more and more definite demarcation from the old life.

But although the *consciousness* of justification has degrees or stages, for the above reasons the justification itself has no stages. The opposite doctrine, that sins are forgiven according to the degree of sanctification, maintained by the Tridentine Canon,[3] abolishes all certainty of salvation until sanctification is completed, and therefore transfers it from earth to the next world, thus relegating us to the O. T. and robbing sanctification itself of the strongest, most urgent impulse of gratitude for full and free forgiveness. For a merely half forgiveness is none, but allows anxiety and dread of impending judgment to continue in the conscientious man in reference to still unforgiven guilt.

6. The following objections, however, are made against the Evangelical doctrine of Justification, with its distinction from sanctification, by Catholicism, and often even by Rationalism. *First*—a point already discussed under one aspect—This doctrine would imply indifference to the law and its unconditional obligation, for it ascribes to man righteousness before God, without his being personally righteous,—an

[1] 2 Cor. i. 22; Eph. i. 13, iv. 30.

[2] This is explained in special detail by Kirk, Lect. iv. p. 56 ff.

[3] To which also Hengstenberg let himself be led away in his last years, as earlier the Puseyites in England.

objection already discussed under one aspect. Thus it is antinomian and calculated to beget carelessness, remissness in what is good, because according to it man may be righteous in God's eyes, and saved χωρὶς ἔργων. *Secondly:* It is impossible in itself, that God should regard and treat one who is a sinner as righteous; else God's sentence upon man would not be a *judicium secundum veritatem. Thirdly:* But even granting that such an absolving sentence were possible, as a mere *actus Dei forensis* or *declaratorius* it would be empty and meaningless. No sentence of God uttered in Himself, no mere declaratory act at all can help man, but only a creative act, which is then called *justitia infusa, inhærens, habitualis.* Only as inhering in and pertaining to man can the *justitia Christi* be called man's *justitia.* The Evangelical doctrine already set forth contains a sufficient answer to these further objections.

As relates *first of all* to the reproach of Antinomianism, the Evangelical doctrine is built on Christ's atonement, which is itself an act of homage to the law. The law, it is true, binds individuals not merely to suffer punishment for disobedience, but also to do and fulfil the law. But free forgiveness does not place the future at man's disposal, but under the obligation of gratitude and the free impulse of responsive love. And as regards the obligation to the *punishment* demanded by the law, it was formerly shown that while the divine justice unconditionally requires *expiation* both for good neglected and evil committed, the expiation does not necessarily consist in enduring a definite amount or definite kinds of sorrow and suffering of a physical and spiritual nature as an equivalent. The chief requisite in expiation is the full acknowledgment of the weight and penal character of sin and guilt in presence of God's sacred majesty, briefly humbling before the unconditional right of the divine justice and holiness. But this right of the divine justice is acknowledged and satisfied by Christ's vicarious atonement, as well as by the demand that the man who desires justification shall recognize his penal liability, and on his own behalf affirm and acknowledge Christ's satisfying, propitiatory work in atonement for human imperfection. Without this, according even to Evangelical teaching, he comes not into possession of justification. But still more, the Romish doctrine itself

does not secure sanctification, whilst the Evangelical alone creates the possibility of sanctification in pure form. For the former implies that forgiveness is the reward of love. But how can love to God arise, when we flee from and dread Him, and therefore are not first of all released from the ban of guilt and sin? And if we are to merit salvation by our good works, and this reward is to be the impulse to love, then love is self-interested, and even in loving we are seeking our own. On the other hand, when we are assured of forgiveness and rejoice in God's love, we no longer love merely in order to salvation, but from a sense of salvation. On this footing only can our love be pure like God's.

As relates to the *second objection:* "The sentence of God on the sinner, pronouncing him righteous, would not be a *judicium secundum veritatem,*" the answer is: Absolution and reception into grace take place for Christ's sake, as even the Romish Church must acknowledge, at least in its doctrine of Holy Baptism. But Christ's righteousness is a reality, and His substitution effectual. Justification as a declaratory divine act does not say that man is not guilty or punishable; the absolving sentence is no denial, but in itself an affirming of penal liability. Nor does this sentence imply primarily, that man is holy and righteous habitually or in himself, but simply affirms the divine favour and propitiousness to the sinner, and indeed not to the sinner in himself—for certainly the truth of the case, the divine justice, would demand an opposite sentence—but affirms that the divine justice contemplates and treats man as reconciled for the sake of Christ's advocacy and perfect righteousness, of His intercession and work, so long as man retains receptiveness to salvation, and does not reject the proffered salvation in unbelief. The first negative element—the non-imputation of guilt because of Christ's high-priestly intercession—is perfectly consistent with truth, for guilt is not here called innocence, and God's justice does not demand that those who are capable of redemption should be given over to condemnation. But, on the other hand, God would not regard the sinner *secundum veritatem,* if He viewed the beginning of *habitualis justitia* as the completion, or if He ignored the connection of Christ with the sinner, which really exists so long as definitive

unbelief has not severed man from Christ. Finally, there are also good grounds in truth for the proposition, that God for Christ's sake positively bestows His favour on man. On the other hand, we must of course assert, that God cannot positively regard man's personality as righteous and holy before he has entered into fellowship with Christ's righteousness by *faith*. For, certain as it is that the fellowship of Christ with man and His high-priestly character form the basis, still these do not decide the question of the free acceptance or rejection of salvation. But the Evangelical Church does not affirm, that without faith man is regarded in his personality as a child of God, righteous and holy, for Christ's sake.

The *third objection* still remains: The *actus Dei forensis* or *declaratorius* is empty, outward. It is of course essential not to conceive of this act as lifeless, as a sentence which God utters merely within Himself. According to what has been said above, we are warranted in taking the meaning of this act to be, that in His heart God is reconciled for Christ's sake not merely with the world in general, but also with the individual, and because of the fellowship of Christ with him acquits and absolves him from guilt and punishment as by a judicial act. But this act or this sentence, which within the divine nature is independent of all human action of a moral kind, is not uttered by God merely within Himself. But in calling proclamation is made to man, that God on His side is reconciled with the sinful world, and therefore with the individual sinner; and further, there is implanted in man, and sealed by the Holy Spirit to the individual, who receives the message, faith in the saving truth that God has forgiven him his sins, and regards him in Christ as justified,—a doctrine which, as we have seen, can by no means be described as idle or empty.

7. Transition to Sanctification or Renewal. — The independence of divine forgiveness in respect of human acts or works, which forms a vital interest for the Evangelical Church, and which we have attempted to make clear in what has preceded, did not prevent the Reformers and the Evangelical theologians insisting on the inseparableness of faith and love.[1] And this can be maintained all the more purely,

[1] Cf. *e.g. Apol., de Dilectione*, p. 83 ff.; Luther's Preface to the *Epistle to the Romans;* Gerhard, tom. vii. 174 ff., 184 ff.

when faith is not the cause of God's forgiveness or justification, but simply receives the gift prepared for it, the real potency of justification thus lying outside man. For now everything pertaining to the spontaneous, subjective side of the saving process appears as the effect, no longer in the least as the cause, of God's justifying grace. If, then, the above precaution for the freedom and independence of grace has succeeded in its aim, no reason any longer exists for anxiously questioning the ethical character of faith in all its functions, and thus impeding the transition from justification to renewal. Even the receiving of divine grace is a moral act, an obedience of faith.[1] There is a *νόμος πίστεως*. It is a moral duty to seek the sole means of salvation—the redemption by Christ, and to surrender oneself unconditionally to it, seeing that redemption is a free, unreserved manifestation of love. For only in this way is moral restoration possible. Thus is faith, considered as a disposition, in itself a virtue, nay, the fundamental virtue. Its connection with the new life is the more evident as it apprehends Christ—the personal righteousness and love, who communicates His Spirit. It is true, saving faith turns to Him in the first instance as the Atoner. But precisely as such He is the glorification and revelation of divine love, the contemplation and enjoyment of which not merely pacifies the conscience, but also fascinates by its typical perfection and purity, and is potent to kindle love in return. It is impossible to stop at the mere personal reception of forgiveness. This is avoided on the *objective* side, because the ultimate aim which God wills is the moral perfecting of man as a member in His kingdom. Even in calling, as in justification, holiness is willed as the end, which both serve.[2] And if we regard the matter on the *subjective*, psychological side, faith in God's universal love to man is involved in faith in justifying grace. This follows from the connection proved to exist between the justification of individuals and the reconciliation of *the world*. For he who supposes that the reconciliation applies only to him, is entangled in egoistic fancies. Faith is faith in God's fatherly disposition towards humanity, and this already implies the acknowledgment of the duty of love to every one who by

[1] Rom. i. 5, xvi. 26; 2 Cor. vii. 15. [2] Eph. ii. 8–10.

faith receives God's purpose of reconciliation. But we saw again that repentance and conversion must precede the possession of justification. And both have already a moral character. Penitence acknowledges sin and guilt as well as the law, faith seeks a satisfaction to the rights of divine justice. In addition, experience of deliverance from guilt and penalty revives the despairing conscience, inspires the man rejoicing in salvation with new life and new impulses, snatches him from the common sinful life of the world, and transplants him into the kingdom of the new humanity, in a word, makes him in germ a new creature born of God. To such a creature it is natural to love. It is not merely gratitude to God, who first loved us, by which responsive love is begotten;[1] it is also a law of life in the new creature, blood-affinity as it were, that he who is born of God also love his brethren, either those who already are or are destined to be such. Although the new life shows itself at first in single light-glimpses, the Spirit's workings gradually converge nearer and nearer until they form a connected series, and a new, unbroken being and consciousness is able to rise, in which, while the consciousness of sin and guilt is not absent, the abolition of the discord is implanted by justification. The consciousness or conscious possession of justification forms then the decisive standpoint dividing the old existence from the new life, although the old existence was pierced or illuminated by scattered rays of grace. It is from this consciousness of being personally justified, which must needs arise in a normal course just as definitely as the consciousness of sin and guilt, that the conscious love must flow in the form of gratitude, which transforms the heart and creates the inclination to present the whole life an offering to God. For all these reasons, the transition from justification and faith to sanctification is not a sudden leap or departure from surrender to God, nor casual or arbitrary, but is founded on inner necessity, whether the matter be considered on the side of God's action and its aim, or on the side of man and the inner concatenation of the stages of the subjective process of salvation. The state of justification—the primary result of the process—is again itself an infinite, life-pregnant beginning of a process stretch-

[1] 1 John iv. 10; Col. i. 13.

ing into eternity, in which that which is already gained undergoes development, and man is shaped into a new personality belonging to and resembling Christ.

Observation.—The aim of the exposition given has been, on the one hand, to distinguish the reconciliation or forgiveness of God from that which Evangelical theology calls justification, but on the other again to connect the two in the closest way, namely, in the way in which the living, abiding basis (potentiality) coheres with its historical exercise, by which the believer is placed in possession and enjoyment of God's pardoning favour. *The solution of the problem depends, again, on the right apprehension of the relation of God to time and history,* on which the First Part dwelt at large.[1] The essential point is to combine on the one hand God's purpose of reconciliation and abiding reconciliation through Christ, and on the other the reality and necessity of a *history,* and, indeed, of a not merely human, but divine-human process.[2] And this must not be done in such a way as to imply that the prime fundamental on God's side is merely the redemptive *idea,* and the realization of atonement a purely divine act, nor conversely, that atonement or forgiveness indeed was perfect and actual before the faith of man, and for this very reason the divine activity had no more to do, but the rest of the process was merely human. On the contrary, actual participation in the supra-temporal atonement procured by Christ's historic work (*i.e.* justification) must be imparted to the believer by God in the way of temporal history.—The fruitfulness of the dogmatic positions gained in this section will manifest itself in various ways hereafter, chiefly in the doctrine of the Means of Grace, especially of Baptism and Infant-Baptism.

THIRD POINT: SANCTIFICATION.

§ 133.

The new man is created for a life reflective of Christ in His unsullied holiness, wisdom, and blessedness, and also for living membership in His body or the Church.

[1] Vol. i. p. 244 f.

[2] Here again the question turns on the right distinction and connection of the divine Transcendence and Immanence.

Observation.—The state of sanctification relates not merely to growth in holiness of will, but embraces the whole man and the development of his entire personality, and therefore the preservation and growth of sonship to God in the regenerate.

1. The first necessary function of the new man is the preserving of the salvation in possession.[1] As Conservation joins on to Creation, as everything living co-operates in its own preservation and seeks food as the means of its preservation, so the first evidence of existing life is that it avoids or repels what is hostile, and seeks after what is helpful to it. Thus faith (*πίστις*) in its self-affirming aspect becomes fidelity (*ὑπομονή*), or the virtue of stedfastness, which so holds man in check that he remains self-collected in communion with Christ, instead of giving way to distraction and doubt. If up to the point of justification man's activity consisted merely in spontaneity of living receptiveness, and the divine activity so predominated that the man *is* justified, now that the new personality is present, co-operation begins.

2. Hand in hand with self-preservation by persistent putting away of the old man, and by daily effort in the renewal of repentance and faith, goes positive *growth*. The Spirit of God cannot be satisfied with the death of the old man. His will is a new and holy life, putting forth effort on all sides. And on man's side, if man desired after receiving reconciliation to remain inactive, repentance and faith would not be ethical, not real delight in good, but delight merely in freedom from evil, in the blessing of freedom from punishment. They would not then exist at all in genuine form. Nor would there be a new focus of life. The Holy Spirit, when He takes up His dwelling in a man, seeks to be a fountain of living water also to others, that their life too may issue in eternal life. If the blossoms fall without bearing fruit, they were dead blossoms from the first, no products of a union of the divine and human life really carried out by faith. Sanctification is the living test of regeneration (*principium cognoscendi*) to itself and others. Where the process of sanctification stands still, the cause must be a sickliness of faith; and if that is wanting which cannot be wanting where

[1] 1 John v. 18, *τηρεῖν ἑαυτόν*.

actual regeneration is present, its existence may rightly be questioned. It is true, even the regenerate man still sins; but however great the similarity in appearance between his sin and that of the unregenerate, internally the distinction always remains, that a resistance is always bound up with the sin of the former (see above, p. 186), which makes itself known by retractation of the sin in sorrow or penitence, and that he no longer puts his whole strength of will into evil. *As* a new personality the man "cannot sin,"[1] he delights in God's will, and knows what is good. As such he no longer needs an outward law, but is a law to himself by the Holy Spirit.[2] But the believer is not merely a new personality, but the old man with his habits belongs still to the unity of his person. That person has consequently an imperfect disordered appearance, although in principle the old man is broken. Thus rises the duty of restoring perfect unity, which can only be done by increasing the strength of the new man by growing appropriation of the gospel; and this is effected by conquering all the powers for the new man,[3] by unlearning evil habits and propensities, or by cleansing and animating (*Beseelung*). But this is nothing else than the growing, the unfolding of the new man in all functions, as to which Christ as *lex viva* is the *example*. Thus Christ's prophetic office, to which His exemplary character pertains, acquires a position in reference to sanctification, just as prior to personal faith it had to operate as the principle of repentance. This is the meaning of the *tertius usus legis* so called, the *didacticus* or *normativus*. The first *usus* of the law, the *usus civilis* or *politicus*, serves *justitia civilis;* the second is the *usus elencticus* or *pædagogicus*, leading to repentance.[4] Holiness is the final aim of redemption;[5] the crown of the Pauline Epistles is Ethics based on faith.[6] This sanctification, starting from the καρδία of man, transforms all his powers into powers of virtue, his knowledge as well as his volition, as is more fully set forth in Christian Ethics.

3. The Holy Spirit does not extinguish *individuality*, but educes charisms therefrom. The persons remain distinct; the

[1] 1 John iii. 6-9. [2] 1 Tim. i. 9. [3] Rom. vi. 11 ff.
[4] *F. C.* 584. 717. 722, 18; John xvi. 8. [5] Eph. i. 4; Col. i. 22.
[6] Rom. xii. ff.; Gal. v. ff.; Eph. iv. ff., i. 4, ii. 10; Col. iii. ff.

nearer they approach perfection, the more purely is their distinctive, independent core elaborated, the more is their character disciplined by the Holy Spirit, who thus ratifies distinctions. It might thus seem as if He only created an atom-world of spirits, who all stand indeed in connection with their invisible centre, but not with each other. But in the first place, if the Holy Spirit is one and the same in all, and thus all are already one in themselves, and this only needs to be recognized, then even with the consciousness of unity an intimate communion is established in the form of a common spirit. Further, this potentially existing unity becomes an object of will and an actual unity; for, just by every individuality being perfected in itself is it conducted to its inner essence, its divinely conceived idea. But personal consciousness is perfected in true generic consciousness, in love, just as the world-aim—the divine idea of humanity—is directed to a living, indivisible spirit-kingdom, a real communion of love with God in Christ, and with the brethren. Since, then, in the new personality even the generic consciousness is ennobled and attains its reality, the antithesis of the individual and identical is brought to unity in the living communion, the organism of which is the supreme end. The all-embracing and imperishable organism is the Kingdom of God. This perfecting of the personal consciousness by the generic consciousness, and the converse, is secured to Christendom through Christ as its *Head*. To glorify Him is its duty, which at the same time includes the perfecting of the individual and the whole, one through the other, each one standing to the other in the relation both of end and means.

4. The aim of regenerating grace, which is necessarily directed first of all to individuals, as well as the result of the saving process following of course in the individual, is the communion of love *primarily* as religious, *i.e.* as a *Church*.

As religion is the heart in the spiritual life of humanity, so the church is the heart of all other moral communities. In it must be the focus of the flame of love that glorifies the world and a reflex of the divine life, for God is love. Separatism refuses to advance to communion in love, although it desires faith and hope, and perhaps only finds salvation in communion with Christ in love. If it refuses all communion

of love on earth, shutting itself up in inner or even outward loneliness, in order professedly to care only for its own soul and enjoy undisturbed saving communion with God, it is egoistic, loveless faith, to which even knowledge of sin and faith are wanting. Christ's will is not to be a private possession, but the common possession of humanity. It more frequently happens, however, that Separatism does not reject communion of love altogether, but desires to hold communion merely with the pure or like-minded, with the good of the same temper or colour, while refusing to join the existing religious communities as they are on account of their defects. But in acting thus, it follows a course contrary to that of Christ and the apostles. It acts as if the communion of love only existed for declarative action, or for enjoyment in declaring what is common. But Christian action is also purifying and diffusive or expansive; religious communion is the instrument and school of the life of love, in giving and taking. And every one needs such a school; but its special instructiveness and influence rest on the fact that not merely those of kindred spirit or friends are to be loved. Personal faith, therefore, as soon as it has come into existence, naturally tends towards religious communion or a church, which it has certainly no longer to found or form, for now faith arises through its agency. Seeing that, considered in the historical process, the church is the end of the process of salvation, it may be said that the church—that end of Christ—has its genesis in faith and holds its ground by means of faith, whether as in the beginning, when the church was enclosed in Christ only, and no actual church as yet co-operated with Him, or as now, when the realized church co-operates in its self-preservation or self-reproduction; for even in relation to it the law must apply, that what is living co-operates in its own permanence. But this self-reproduction of the church is always effected by the reproduction of faith and the rise of believers, who are not merely impersonal passive means in order to the church as the end, but who in the normal course carry the church in themselves. For the tendency to communion and the impulse to exercise the spirit of communion are not first given when sanctification is complete, but in its beginning, in regeneration. — As the church arises through

Christ's fruitful love, the individual standing to it in the relation of means, so, conversely, the community (and only thus is it a church) makes itself in love and service a means to individuals, to their genesis and growth; and only in such a cycle, where the individual serves the whole and the whole the individual, has the life of love in humanity its movement in giving and taking, but in such a way that its limits are ever growing wider and wider.

SECOND DIVISION.

THE EXISTENCE OF THE CHURCH.

The Division falls into three Subdivisions, of which the *first* sketches "*The Essential and Unchangeable Characteristics of the Church;*" the *second*, "*The Church organizing itself in and out of the World;*" while the *third* treats of "*The Militant Church.*"

FIRST SUBDIVISION.

THE ESSENTIAL AND UNCHANGEABLE BASES, OR THE DOGMATIC AND ETHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHURCH.

§ 134.—*Synopsis.*

The Church, building itself up out of individual persons (Div. i.), always has its existence indeed as engaged in a process of reproduction or rejuvenescence (§ 133), but still retains its self-identity by means of the unchangeable basis on which it is renewed and rises higher and higher. This living basis is Christ and the Holy Spirit, who takes of the things of Christ. Now Christ continues actively at work in His state of exaltation (§§ 127, 128), or in the church He has a permanent *continuation* of His office, but for this end, that the world may become partaker in His life. Hence two things are to be distinguished in the church:

I. The *Continuation* of His official activity.

II. The *Reflecting* of the same.

The *Continuation* takes place in the church by Christ appropriating the church as His organ, in order to exercise His influence through its ministry. This continuation of His office through the church, which, however, is not a deputing of His activity to it, He Himself ordained as certainly as the church was founded by Him in order to be preserved. In accordance with His threefold office, the doctrine of its continuation takes a threefold form:

The doctrine of the Continuation of the *Prophetic* Office of Christ in the Church is the doctrine of the *Word of God.*

The doctrine of the Continuation of the *High-priestly* Office is the doctrine of *Holy Baptism.*

The doctrine of the Continuation of the *Kingly* Office is the doctrine of the *Holy Supper.*

But since Christ not merely continues to work in the church as His organ, but also desires to have in it a living *ethical Reflection* of Himself, Christ's entire life must be mirrored in the life of the church.

The *Reflecting* of the *prophetic* office takes place in the ecclesiastical *ministry of the Word;* the *reflecting* of the *high-priestly* is seen in the priestly spirit and action of the church in worship, in vicarious, educating and instructing love, in care for souls and for the poor; finally, the *reflecting* of the *kingly* office is represented in the *power of the keys,* or in the power of establishing and administering church ordinances resting on the joint-lordship of believers with Christ, which has its centre in prayer in the name of Jesus.

In these two combined—the *continuation* and *reflecting* of the office of Christ in the church—the unchangeable dogmatic and ethical characteristics of the church are described.

Accordingly, six points emerge in reference to the

characteristics of the church, each two of which—one dogmatic and one ethical—combine in a pair, and are related to each other as the continuation and reflecting of Christ's office.

1. The body of disciples surrounding Christ before His exaltation was merely a becoming (*werdende*), not yet a self-declarative (*sich darstellende*) church, a *seminarium credentium*, a pædagogy unto faith. The perfected church is no longer a *seminarium*, but merely declarative. Since Pentecost the church exists in earthly historical reality, and is declarative and a *seminarium* at the same time. In the course of the world's history, in the fluctuation of generations and the still limited extent of the church, both forms—that of being or existence, and that of extensive and intensive becoming—must always be conjoined,—a circle of becoming Christians around a circle of existent Christians not outwardly distinguishable, who have just to show that they are Christians by their ministry to those designed to become such. It is thus clear that the two forms are essentially related to each other, and that it would be unnatural to try to sever them.

2. The teaching of the above paragraph and its division are in affinity with Schleiermacher's celebrated exposition of the essential characteristics of the church, which he also refers in part to Christ's office.[1] His three pairs are:

(1.) Holy Scripture and the Ministry of the Word (where the principle of division is the distinction between continuation and reflecting as above).

(2.) Baptism and the Supper, which are related to each other as the establishing or founding and the preserving of communion of love with Christ.

(3.) The Power of the Keys and Prayer in the name of Jesus, where the principle of division is the distinction of the relation of the whole to the individual, and of the individual to the whole. Our division is based on one thoroughgoing principle of division, and for this end aims at showing (1) the *continuation* of Christ's threefold office in the church, which is the dogmatic side of its characteristics; (2) the *reflecting* of the same by the church, which is the ethical side,

[1] *Chr. Gl.* ii. 127.

a division not thoroughly carried out in Schleiermacher, who also omits the reference to Christ's threefold office, which, however, is given us by § 127. Therewith is connected a further difference. Whilst Schleiermacher indeed groups the first pair as our text does, but combines Baptism and the Supper in the second, we place the confirming beside the baptizing church. And since the kingly office is related to the community as the kingdom of Christ, while the Holy Supper is the meal of communion, and chiefly of the exalted Lord and Head with His church, in the meal of His founding we have the continuation of His kingly activity in order to preserve and increase His kingdom; whereas the reflecting of the same takes place in the power of the keys belonging to the church, which through prayer in the name of Jesus is a participation in His government.

3. On its reflective side the church is in course of growth, still burdened with imperfection in inward and outward respects, and hence fallible, although the duty of reflection is proved to be divine. In those of its characteristics, in which Christ's activity is continued, it possesses an unchangeable governing base-type and an ever-sufficient corrective. Even the first, dogmatic side—Word and Sacrament—has a changeable element in its form. Word and Sacrament had at first a different form from the later one, but the change does not affect the essence and contents. Christ's oral word preceded the written one, which we now have. The disciples were not baptized by Christ Himself,[1] the electing and educating influence exercised by Christ immediately on the disciples being a perfect substitute for baptism in their case until Pentecost crowned His work.[2] In the same way, finally, the Holy Supper was not the same in every respect at its institution as since His glorification. But the only conclusion to be drawn is, that we must recognize an accidental element in all three, and search for the essential, which remains the same in the changing forms.

[1] 1 John iv. 2.

[2] Granted, it may be said, that they all received John's baptism. In the first place, this is not historically established; secondly, they were baptized with fire and the Holy Spirit first at Pentecost, therefore in the baptism of John they still had not Christian baptism.

FIRST POINT: THE CONTINUATION AND REFLECTING OF THE PROPHETIC OFFICE OF CHRIST.

A.—*The Continuation of the same, or the Doctrine of the Word of God.*

§ 135.

As certainly as Christ, in whom the Eternal Word became man, was given to the world in order to be permanently preserved to it, so certainly is it part of the founding of Christianity itself as a vital historic power (*Grösse*), that the objective presentation of Christ was permanently preserved to humanity in primitive purity, and an indestructible, immoveable manner. An authentic representation of His person and words was created in His disciples by Christ and the Holy Spirit, so that in their mutually supplementary entirety a pure and trustworthy image of Him remained in the world after His ascension, which was not merely transmitted in their oral preaching but fixed in writing, and recorded by the aid of the spiritual comprehension of their faith with authentic fidelity. Thus the apostles and the apostolic men appointed and acknowledged by them are true witnesses of Christ, and that not merely for their age, but for all generations and nations, and through their testimony Christ continued His testimony to Himself. In reference to primitive Christianity as historic, they are the decisive source in a thoroughly sufficient manner (*sufficientia Scripturæ sacræ*), and a norm and corrective for the doctrine of all ages, both because the several sacred writings have a unique authority (*autoritas normativa*) resting on the direct relation of this first body of disciples to Christ and on their apostolic illumination, and also because their collection into the *Canon* was carried out by the criticism of faith under the leading of the Holy Ghost dwelling in the church. But since the authentic testimony of Christ in the historical books

which is preserved to us in their writings, as well as the testimony of their personal Christian piety in the epistolary portion of the New Testament, is the specific means for generating faith (*efficacia Scripturæ sacræ*), their word, so far as it has God's Word or the revelation completed in Christ for its contents, is not merely the authentic and thus normative source of knowledge of Christianity to the church, but also a specific means of grace to individuals. But Holy Scripture does all this because it has the power of passing over into the understanding (*Perspicuitas, semet ipsam interpretandi facultas*). The Old Testament derives its highest attestation from Christ, for whom it prepares and whom it predicts.

Cf. vol. i. 3, § 7, p. 47 ff.; § 11, pp. 146–150; vol. ii. § 59, pp. 189–199; § 63, pp. 221–231; § 70, p. 284 ff.

LITERATURE.—Cf. vol. ii. p. 183. Philippi, *Kirchl. Glaubenslehre*, i. Voigt, *Fundamentaldogmatik*, 1874. J. Müller, *das Verhältniss zwischen der Wirksamkeit des heiligen Geistes und den Gnadenmittel des göttlichen Wortes. In dem dogmat. Abhandlungen*, 1870, pp. 127–277. Frank, *System der christl. Wahrheit*, ii. 235–250 (The Word of God in distinction from Holy Scripture), and pp. 393–417 (the Written Word). Hase, *Dogmatik*, §§ 198–204. Cf. John xiv. 25, 26, xv. 27, xvi. 7, 12, 13, xx. 21–23; Luke xxiv. 46–49; 1 Cor. vii. 10, 40. Respecting the O. T., Matt. v. 17 ff.; John v. 39; 2 Tim. iii. 16; 1 Pet. i. 10–12; 2 Pet. i. 20, 21. For the Church doctrine cf. *Art. Smalk.* 308; *Form Conc.* 572, 7, 8. 638, 10, 13; *Conf. Aug.* v.; *Conf. Helv.* 1536, §§ 1–5; *Helv.* 1566, c. 1, 2; *Scot.* xix. The four: *Conf. Belg.* ii.–vii.; *Anglic.* vi. vii.; *Gallic.* of 1561, ii.–v.; and *Conf. Fid. Westmonast.* cap. i. enumerate the canonical writings separately.

Observation.—The *Word of God* occurred before under different points of view, first in the Introduction in the doctrine of the Genesis of Christian Faith (vol. i. §§ 7, 8, 11, p. 144 ff.), again in the doctrine of the Conservation of the Historic Revelation (§ 63). In both cases the Word of God is considered with reference to the decisive importance of securing harmony of faith with historic primitive Christianity.

In Specific Dogmatics, again, the Word of God came under consideration in the doctrine of calling especially as a *means of grace*, and as such it has a much freer and wider sphere than when it is considered in its fixing in Holy Scripture as the source or record of revelation. But both points of view are united here, where the proper *sedes* of the dogmatic doctrine of the Word of God is found, and where we have to assign it its place in the system, in relation to Christ, to the Holy Spirit, and to the Church. The relation of the Word of God to Christ comes especially under consideration, so far as the point in hand is the continuation or preservation of the revelation given in Him in its purity for the consciousness of humanity, and therefore the securing of the identity of the faith of the church with itself. Further, the origin of the Word of God, which satisfies this need, points back already to the Holy Spirit. But the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Word of God comes especially into view in considering the efficacy (*Efficacia*) of the latter.

1. THE WORD OF GOD IN THE WIDER AND STRICTER SENSE.—We are rightly reminded[1] that the activity of the Holy Spirit in reference to the self-communication of the Redeemer is carried on primarily through the Word as a means of grace (not through the Sacraments). We have formerly shown the necessity there is[2] that revelation (*i.e.* the Word of God) should not merely remain and work internally, but that it should also enter into the sensuous finite world, and stand in contrast with the human spirit as God's external Word, partly that consciousness may more clearly distinguish what springs from God's revelation from its own ideas, partly that, by such contrasting of the divine, freedom of appropriation may be preserved, but finally, and above all, that the divine may embody itself in finite form, and thus be the more readily apprehended by us.[3] Fundamental importance is also attributed in Holy Scripture to the Word of God in the wider sense, in relation to the founding of God's kingdom. The Word is the principal means by which revelation is introduced and

[1] Frank, ii. 235 f. Cf. Luther's *Werke*, by Walch, xviii. 1796.

[2] Vol. ii. § 52, p. 142 ff. Cf. § 38.

[3] This certainly involves the presupposition, founded for us in the doctrine of Creation, and confirmed by Christology, that the outward and sensuous is able to receive the inward and spiritual, and either to express it symbolically or to subserve its objective realization. But this presupposition follows already from the unity of the world; the opposite supposition of Spiritualism is dualistic.

communicated. The kingdom of heaven grows from an insignificant germ or seed: that seed is the Word of God.[1] And as it forms the beginning, so the Word of God is preserved and transmitted through the Kerugma, the glad tidings.[2] It initiates krisis for individuals and the world. When the gospel shall be preached to the whole world, then follows the end.[3] To this word of Christ the power is ascribed to purify, to enlighten, and to make free through knowledge of the truth.[4] For the contents of the Word of God are Christ Himself, who thus continues His presence with His people through the same Word. Hence abiding in His sayings, the keeping of His word in the heart, is regarded as identical with abiding with and in Him.[5] And not merely is the word of Christ Himself, or the word of the apostles of Christ, described as the means of transmitting the gospel blessing of salvation, and the vehicle, so to speak, for communicating the treasure of the Christian salvation. On the other hand, such influence is not affirmed exclusively of the written Word. A believing church existed long before the writings of the New Testament. And even after the formation of the Canon, the Word of God assumes various forms within the church, in pious converse, in preaching and sacred song, in science and Christian art. The word of the believing church has its divine force, not merely in so far as the words of Holy Writ are repeated in it; every believer is to partake in original fashion in the truth and the certainty thereof, nay, to be a relatively independent spring of living water.[6] The living word proceeding from Christ begets living personalities, who do not depend on foreign, even apostolic, authority, but themselves know and possess the truth *as* truth.

2. But of course the Church is only able to be assured of its Christian character through its being in a position every moment to become cognizant of the identity of its faith with the primitive church, of its agreement with the faithfully transmitted Word of Christ. Nay, even the individual believer, despite his subjective certainty of what he believes,

[1] Matt. xiii. 3, 19, 24, 37, and 1 Pet. i. 23.
[2] Rom. x. 17; Matt. xxviii. 19, x. 7; Luke x. 5; Acts i. 8, x. 41.
[3] Matt. xxiv. 14.
[4] John xv. 3, viii. 32.
[5] John xiv. 23, xv. 7, 10.
[6] John iv. 14, vii. 38. See vol. ii. p. 221.

can only be certain of his Christian character through his knowing himself one with objective historic Christianity, either with the fixed written form of the same in the New Testament, or at least with the church; the latter, however, can only satisfy him so long as he retains his undoubting conviction of the agreement of the church with primitive Christianity. The need of the church and of individuals finds its satisfaction in Holy Scripture as the *historic record* of Christianity, which alone is the sufficient norm of the church's faith and life for all ages.

According to what has been said, the *necessity* of a fixed written form of the Word of God, *i.e.* the need of an authentic statement of the revelation completed in Christ, is grounded partly in the character of Christianity, in which the historic is so essential an element—(even the faith of later generations must have in it power to come into firm, conscious relation with that historic element, while certain knowledge of the historic is only possible through testimonies of a documentary kind),—partly in the uncertainty of oral tradition.[1] In view of the power of sin and error in the world, in which the church must have its place, in order to maintain beneficial intercourse with it, and of the after-workings of sin even in believers, it was inevitable that the still unrenewed world should cast its shadows into the very heart of the church. By the preservation of the authentic form of Christianity, and only by it, are recurrence to the original, and comparison of the church with the primitive norm, possible to every age. Without Holy Scripture the Reformation would have been impossible. As freedom is secured by it to the individual in relation to the erring church, as well as independence of human authority in matters of salvation, so through the record of revelation the church and the faith of individuals are preserved from subjective caprice and fanaticism.[2] That the perfected revelation should receive its documentary fixing, was therefore an essential moment in the divine purpose to preserve it. As concerns the *manner* of its realization, it did not take place abruptly, as if revelation had to begin afresh with Holy Scripture; but it took place according to the law lying at the basis of all preservation—the essential co-opera-

[1] Cf. vol. ii. pp. 222–225. [2] Vol. ii. pp. 224, 225.

tion of secondary causalities. The record of revelation is not indeed to be confounded with the revelation itself. But revelation must needs itself provide for its secure transmission. This is involved in the founding of Christianity itself as a historic power destined to live. As such, the power of *self*-preservation must be innate in Christianity. Else it would not have been adequately equipped for really passing over to humanity as a spiritual possession, as believed and known truth; for, provided humanity had Christianity as an actual possession, and as an element (*Bestimmtheit*) of its being, it could testify to and diffuse it, from which it clearly appears that the actual transition of Christianity to humanity is identical with its capacity of propagation.[1] But certain as it is that this possession (*i.e.* faith) is an essential factor in the preservation of Christianity to humanity, still through it alone the church would not be secured against intermixing anomalies and falsities; and the divine purpose to preserve original Christianity in its purity and entirety to humanity for all ages found its secure realization only through the plan that the written recording took place on the part and with the guiding co-operation of those who had enjoyed the company of Christ, were His eye- and ear-witnesses, and were trained by Him for the office of bearing witness to Him, and finally were partakers in a special degree of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from Christ, and were charismatically endowed for their vocation—all which it is only necessary to mention here after what has been said before.[2] The spirit of the natural man is not the spirit of Christ. Hence the organs of the true authentic transmission of Christianity had not to work with purely human means, but needed to be seized and inspired by the Spirit of Christ in order to be able to do what was essential. Through this inspiration the authors of these books are not simply passive machines, but independent Spirit-filled personalities. Their productions, therefore, are of the same character; and it cannot be said: Their believing personalities indeed were inspired, but not their writings. Rather, the

[1] Vol. ii. pp. 191, 221. Still it is not enough to call Holy Scripture merely a product of the Christian church. In this case the intervenient prescient working of the Divine Spirit is left out of consideration.

[2] Vol. ii. pp. 193–195, 226–229.

latter breathe the Divine Spirit, the gift of the Holy Spirit, who became the possession of the sacred authors through their faith.[1]

3. FORMATION OF THE CANON.—The gospel being recorded in an authentic and written form, these writings necessarily found acknowledgment with those who had enjoyed the oral instruction of apostolic men, who recognized their faith therein, and placed a high value on the fixing of oral tradition in the same; and upon this naturally followed zeal to preserve and collect these writings. But this zeal was employed by the presciently working, self-preserving power of Christianity for the purpose of transmitting and securing at the right time to the church of the succeeding centuries the memory of the Christian fore-time. The Holy Spirit must needs have impelled to this work, that these authentic writings might remain to the church for its guidance. And just so He must have directed this work,[2] which was rendered easy to the ancient church by historic accounts respecting the authors,

[1] But certain as it is that it is a scientific advance to go back from the inspiration of sacred books to inspired personalities, we ought not to make the degree of their life of faith the measure of the trustworthiness of that which they give us as primitive Christian tradition. Their testimony to Christ is not the mere product of their piety. Through the living recollection of Christ's image they had more than what their piety had appropriated; and so little is what they say of Christ a simple reflex of their religious spirit, that, on the contrary, through the objective beholding of Christ, their knowledge was in advance of their volition and being; cf. vol. ii. p. 194. True, only their historical position, not their participation in the Holy Spirit, is specifically different from that of other believers; and as they are not on a level with the infallibility of Christ, so also Christ must be believed in on the ground of His redeeming power, not on the ground of their authority: cf. vol. ii. 226 ff.; Gal. i. 8. Nevertheless, through the Spirit of truth they were equal to their mission. Despite their personal fallibility, they were neither under necessity nor wishful to give forth errors and false principles as truth. Their wish was to impart truth. Untruth has not the power to give inner certainty of itself, like truth. They were well able to distinguish what they were authorized to invest with the authority of Christ, and what not (1 Cor. vii. 10; Rom. xi. 25, xv. 18). Hence it is very well consistent with the imperfections of their exposition in secondary points, to affirm that their writings form the God-given, trustworthy, undeceptive record of the revelation of God in Christ, sufficient until faith passes into sight.

[2] Schleiermacher, *Chr. Gl.* ii. § 130, pp. 331, 338: "The faithful preservation of the apostolic writings is the work of the Divine Spirit acknowledging His own products. He distinguishes that which is to remain unchanged from that which assumes various forms in the further development of Christian doctrine, and on the other hand partly repels the Apocryphal directly it arises, and partly causes this kind of productivity, and the taste for such products, gradually to disappear from the church."

the place, time, and circumstances of the composition. But however important this historic element, a second factor must needs have co-operated at least as a negative active principle, in order to guard against possible errors in historic tradition. Since Christian faith is a work of the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit cannot contradict Himself, no writing can lay claim to canonicity which offends against Christian faith, or "does not treat of Christ." By this canon-forming activity, the church in no sense makes itself a judge of apostles. On the contrary, it submits to the universal laws of scientific historic criticism. It has to deduce its judgment from the facts of the case, and is subject thereto. It confers canonical authority on no writing, but only asserts the facts of the case as seen from the historic and dogmatic point of view, but independently of the wishes of the subject. Since faith just as little permits what is not God's Word to pass for it, because some human authority counts it such, as it permits what is God's Word to pass without recognition, the work of criticism or canon-forming cannot be regarded as concluded once for all. Every generation which aims at clearness and certainty of Christian consciousness, must reproduce to itself the conviction of the canonicity of the Holy Scriptures, and has a right itself to form a judgment thereupon. In this process the rule holds good, that no writing can be canonical which is in contradiction to faith. Christian faith must therefore be brought into use in the work of criticising the Canon. Since faith is not founded by mere external human authority, even apostolic,[1] but is a relatively independent power[2] (*Grösse*), co-operation in the work of criticism cannot be refused to it, at least in so far as that it ought not to regard a writing as canonical, which contradicts that which forms the primal certainty of Christian faith. If, on the other hand, a writing does not contradict this postulate, and is at the same time attested by credible historic witnesses as belonging to the circle of apostolic men, normative authority is due to it. It has such *authority precisely for faith*, not for others. But the church has to make this authority effective

[1] This constitutes the relative independence of the so-called material principle in contrast with the formal, see vol. i. § 7.

[2] Cf. Schleiermacher, ii. § 128, p. 323.

with its adherents. This, as already said, is not done on the footing that any one should believe merely because of human authority, but on the footing that by the normative authority of the Holy Scriptures that matter is secured for preaching which carries with it the power of self-attestation. Therewith a distinction between Proto-canonical and Deutero-canonical always has its place in the sense that the authority of the latter is conditioned by that of the former. But faith itself sees more and more the depth and inexhaustible wealth of Holy Scripture, and especially of Christ's words; and thus Scripture is not to it a mere external norm and law of faith, but an ever-gushing spring of light and life. From what has been said, follows the right of the science of criticism on the soil of the Evangelical Church. To desire to exclude the science of criticism in opposition to the Reformation, which unanimously excluded the Apocrypha from the canon, and to Luther, who also questioned the canonicity of particular writings of the Old and New Testaments, would not tend to the advantage of the authority of Holy Scripture as a unity, which, on the contrary, is so confident of itself that it desires the grounds of its claims to be known. In that case we remain absolutely bound to the authority of tradition, and therefore to the judgment of the church of a particular age, in reference to what is to be regarded as the Christian norm, and this radically coincides with the Roman Catholic principle. Hence Evangelical theology cannot cease to regard the *formal criticism of the Canon* (*formale Kanonik*), *i.e.* criticism of the Holy Scriptures, as one of its essential parts, of course not separated from the science of *material criticism of the Canon*, *i.e.* of Biblical Theology. Extravagances, which are disturbing to faith, are certainly possible in such a course, but *abusus non tollit usum;* faith is an unceasing stimulus to the correction of aberrations. The independence of the existence of saving faith in respect of the results of critical research and its sense of truth assure to it the equanimity belonging to the pursuit of scientific investigation; and such investigation may with all the greater confidence believe that criticism can never destroy that which belongs to the vital conditions of faith and the church, since all historical criticism is subject to the law, that it has to work with historical sources, not

with subjective, *a priori* hypotheses, which implies that of the sources belonging to the original age a portion must always be acknowledged credible and genuine,[1] and therefore that it can only operate against certain portions of the Canon from an acknowledged historic datum, and seek to show that they are not consistent therewith. But as regards this end the task of theology is simply this. To unwarranted attempts to separate the portions of the canon it has, so far as is consistent with truth, to oppose the scientific proof of their harmony or homogeneity, and to show how the contents of one writing confirm those of the rest. And thus it may be said: Scientific historic criticism is a work carried on by the Canon itself through the medium of the impartial critic, who has not to invent but to find his judgments in subordination to the facts of the case. And thus the science of criticism of the Canon —formal and material—serves to bring up afresh before the consciousness of Christendom the historic connection with the founding of Christianity, as well as the inner organic connection of the parts of Holy Scripture belonging to the Canon—a work which is itself a Ministry of the Word.

4. To the whole of Scripture, then, as the Canon, the distinctive predicates specified in the text belong. After the previous exposition, nothing more need be said as to its *normative authority.* Only this may be added, that it can only have authority in the full sense for one who believes. This involves the postulate, that what of the contents of the Christian Scriptures is not definitely and vitally appropriated by faith, is not satisfied with standing over against man as an external law unknown in its contents or at least in its truth, but that it desires such a union with the spirit as attests it to man as truth. This holds good especially of all that which has been transmitted on credible historic grounds as the acts and words of the Lord. Moreover, speaking generally, the canonical character of the rest of the N. T. has on good grounds the presumption in its favour, that it sets forth a higher, more mature stage of the Christian life.[2] The normal way for appropriating the rest will be,

[1] As *e.g.* even the Baurian school proves; cf. my *Hist. of Prot. Theology*, ii. 410.

[2] Schleiermacher rightly suggests (§ 130. 4), "that we may conceive to ourselves the Holy Spirit ruling freely in the thought-world of the entire Christian

that the already existing faith, which is a germinal unity, will grow into that which has to be still appropriated, recognizing and acting upon the inner necessity of its development on this side. Christianity itself, which faith has accepted, is a firmly compacted whole; the divine acts form an organic system, and are only perfectly intelligible through it. But from this it also follows, that this organism or system of truth must be laid down, although not in systematic form, in Holy Scripture, if Scripture is to do what it exists for. Holy Scripture is in its contents a presentation of the organism of Christian truth; and through this system each one of its parts with its special contents receives new significance. The truth organized in Holy Scripture is sufficient for all ages (*Sufficientia Scr. sacræ*).

Hereto belongs also its *Perspicuity* (*Perspicuitas*). To those thirsting for salvation it is intelligible in itself, at least in things necessary to salvation, which implies the right and the duty of believers to read Holy Scripture. Especially has Evangelical piety to strive after a sharply-defined consciousness of primitive historic Christianity, with which the believer must know himself in accord, in order to be sure of his Christian character. This perspicuity implies that Holy Scripture does not first need the help of the interpreting church in order to be understood to the extent mentioned. Else a human authority would take the place of Holy Scripture as the *norma et judex, e.g.* human learning and science, or the interpreting church. On the other hand, this predicate of Holy Scripture does not mean to deny the necessity of the illuminating agency of the Holy Spirit, of which Holy Scripture is the channel. For the Word of God has not so naturalized or incorporated itself in Holy Writ as to be equally accessible and intelligible to every one, to the crude and stupid as to the receptive.[1] The proposition of the Perspicuity of Holy Scripture is not merely directed against all false ecclesiasticism and disparaging of simple, childlike

sphere, in the same way as every individual in his own world of thought. For every one can distinguish his best thoughts, and so treasure them up as to secure their re-presentation, while he rejects the rest," etc.

[1] This implies, therefore, that *Perspicuitas* belongs to Holy Scripture by its being also a means of grace (see below).

faith,[1] but is also of importance for distinguishing the fundamental from the non-fundamental. On the other hand, it demands an interpretation in accordance with the universal laws of human language, to which, however, along with grammatical and historic research, the homogeneity of the interpreter with Scripture, his living in its atmosphere, or at least in a state of earnest spiritual desire for salvation, is necessary. Since human participation in the Holy Spirit co-operates and opens Scripture, it may be said that Holy Scripture has the power of self-interpretation through the interpreter as an organ (*semet ipsam interpretandi facultas*).

Finally, the Holy Scriptures possess Efficacy (*Efficacia*) corresponding to the origin ascribed to them. This leads to the second main aspect of the matter.

5. THE WORD OF GOD, especially in Holy Scripture, AS A MEANS OF GRACE, AND ITS RELATION TO THE HOLY SPIRIT.—Whoever calls Holy Scripture a mere dead letter, is either the victim of an optical delusion in transferring out of himself the dead sense which is within himself, whereas the seeker of salvation, like the believer, has a very different experience, or he is unable to coalesce with Scripture, because his piety wears a spiritualistic character averse from history, and he fancies himself, in his efforts after false freedom, to have outgrown the teaching of the objective Word of God. That the *Holy Spirit* is the author of our conversion and renewal, is certainly often asserted in Holy Writ.[2] But no less is this effect ascribed also to the *Word of God;* and when Holy Scripture speaks of the power of God's Word or of the gospel to beget life and be the means of salvation (Rom. i. 16; 1 Cor. i. 18, iv. 15; 2 Cor. iii. 8), this does not mean the oral word of preaching merely, but must also hold good of the Word of God in Holy Scripture. As certainly as Christianity is a historic power, and history an essential factor in it, so certainly is not merely internal spiritual working necessary in order to Christian faith, but also the working of the objective word of God, which, as we saw, must always in the last resort test and legitimate itself as such by the

[1] Matt. xi. 25.

[2] Tit. iii. 5; 1 Cor. xii. 3; Rom. viii. 9–17; John xiv.–xvi., vii. 39. See above, pp. 160, 182.

record of revelation, *i.e.* by the Word of God in Holy Scripture. But again, unless God Himself as the Holy Spirit wrought directly and immediately with and in the Word, immediate communion with God would be denied us, and we should be still standing in the pre-Christian age. But what conception must be formed of the *relation between the agency of the Word and that of the Holy Spirit?*[1]

One possibility, to which Lutheran Dogmatists of the 17th century suspiciously approximated,[2] is the following. In order thoroughly to exclude all fanaticism and objective caprice, which may at first have a pious or mystic tone, but sooner or later readily passes into Rationalism or Idealism, a kind of incarnation of the Holy Spirit in Scripture may be supposed; and it may be said: The Holy Spirit has fastened Himself, so to speak, to Scripture, so that He has no longer any special activity outside it, but His activity coincides with that of Holy Scripture; and since the Scripture came into existence, the divine power which dwelt originally in the Holy Spirit dwells in it alone; through His embodiment in Holy Scripture, His divine power is delegated, so to speak, to Scripture, which is even *extra usum* an embodied divine power, as to substance the Holy Spirit. But Scripture is something material, which the Holy Spirit cannot be; and if we could come into connection only with this divine substance—Holy Scripture—immediacy of communion with God would be denied us, Holy Scripture would become a separating mediator. And this would be still more the case, if the activity of the Holy Spirit were limited to His having inspired Holy Scripture, and deposited in it supernatural doctrines, which now operate *purely* of themselves in a natural way by logical and moral means analogously with other writings.[3] The *second* possibility would be to conceive the

[1] Cf. the excellent treatise of J. Müller: *Das Verhältniss zwischen der Wirksamkeit des heiligen Geistes und dem Gnadenmittel des göttlichen Wortes. Dogm. Abh.* pp. 127–277.

[2] Especially in consequence of the controversy with *Rathmann*, cf. my *Hist. of Prot. Theology*, vol. ii. p. 129.

[3] With Episcopius, Claude Pajon, and others, especially Supernaturalists of the last century, cf. J. Müller, pp. 215–224. The notion of an incarnation of the Holy Spirit in Scripture is a Pantheistic paroxysm, which, when it yields

bond between Word and Spirit more loosely, the working of the Spirit in the Word as accidental and external—"parastatic," dependent on a divine purpose (*e.g.* twofold Predestination), on which view therefore the Holy Spirit would only work intermittently in the elect, or only by accident co-operate with Scripture. But the universality of God's purpose of grace excludes such a separation of the activity of the two. Thus, the *third* possibility remains, namely, to ascribe to the two—inspired Holy Scripture and the Holy Spirit—a relative independence of existence and operation, while thinking of them as co-operative. On this view, the activity of the Holy Spirit is not exhausted in that of Holy Scripture, while at the same time secondary causality is not denied, or a mere logical and moral causality left, to Holy Scripture, as if it were nothing taken alone. The Word of God in Scripture is still a real manifestation of spiritual power, of divine truth in a finite form. But the co-operation of the two must not be viewed as if Holy Scripture did one part of the saving work, and the Holy Spirit the other. Instead of such a distribution, we must affirm that the two embrace the whole work of salvation, but in a different manner. Holy Scripture gives faith its object, it puts Christianity in its purity and attractive force objectively before our eyes, as a challenge and inducement to enter into union with it by faith. The agency of the Holy Spirit opens the heart and understanding to the objective Word of God, implants that Word in the heart of man, and endows it with power to transform and renew man. The Word of *God* in Holy *Scripture* can and ought more and more to become "an inner Bible."[1] It has a mediating influence, placing us in connection with the Christ of history, for without the Word we should know nothing of Him, without the primitive Word in Holy Writ nothing historically trustworthy. But "this mediating position of the Word is not meant to dispense with or exclude the immediate working of the Holy Spirit in man's spirit. The working of the Holy Spirit penetrates, embraces, and rules the working of its own

to sobriety, transfers the Holy Spirit, after His founding of Scripture, into a state of Deistic seclusion in order to contemplate Him in permanent independence.

[1] Cf Harms' *Sermons on the Bible.*

instrument."[1] The Holy Spirit perpetually glorifies Christ as He is set forth in Scripture, makes Him emerge, so to speak, from the letter and stand in living form before us. He thus brings us, through the medium of Holy Scripture, into communion with the living Christ, from which it is specially clear, how the exalted Lord of the church continues through the Word of God His prophetic office among humanity and in the church. The before-mentioned predicates also first gain their full meaning through the activity of Holy Scripture constituting it a specific means of grace. For in this way, instead of being a mere outward rule or critical principle, it becomes a productive power (*Grösse*), even as a norm and authority; in this way also its true understanding and sufficiency are first really secured to it, so that through its use the Holy Spirit can just as well lead us into all truth as the apostles themselves, and all those who enjoyed Christ's immediate instruction.[2] Although, further, the Holy Spirit does not cease even now and perpetually to beget thoughts in a direct and original way, it may still be said, since the gospel is contained in authentic totality in Holy Writ, and is in itself a living whole concentrated in Christ's person, that all the riches of the Christian world of thought are merely the unfolding and applying of the contents given in Holy Writ—contents, however, to which increasing motive power belongs by virtue of its essential relation to the continued working of the Holy Spirit. Thus it may be said in a certain sense, that all knowledge of the Church is interpretation of Scripture.

6. THE OLD TESTAMENT.—It is indeed a Jewish error to require in the church direct faith in the O. T., *i.e.* faith not mediated by the authority of Christ; it cannot be necessary to become first a Jew, then a Christian. The economy of the O. T. does not so much attest Christ, as it receives its attestation from Him; and the value of the O. T. as a whole and in detail, as well as the degree of its enduring normative force, depends in the last resort on Christianity. However, an indirect authority, guaranteed by Christ, certainly belongs to the Old Testament.[3] Christ sees in the O. T. the

[1] Müller, pp. 236, 244. [2] Schleiermacher, ii. 344.

[3] John v. 34 ff., 45–47, vii. 23; Matt. v. 17; Luke xxiv. 46. Cf. 2 Tim. iii. 15 f.

revelation or Word of God. True, much in the O. T. is temporary, especially the theocratic and Jewish national element. Still it is merely the form of the eternal divine thoughts, which in the O. T. gives an imperfect expression to them. Further, the doctrines of universal religion are contained in purest fulness in the O. T., such as the idea of the Personal, Almighty, Wise, Holy, and Just as well as Merciful God, the doctrine of Creation, Conservation, Providence, and others,—doctrines which, when uttered, commend themselves naturally to the religious consciousness as true, and upon which the N. T. builds as its presuppositions, without repeating them systematically and in full. Again, as law the O. T. points to Christ, and prepares the way for His appearance. And this preparation still has its place in the heart even in Christian days, as the Church intimates by fixing Advent-season before Christmas. Finally, prophecy contains ideally, as the history of the O. T. and the ceremonial law contain typically, what is to be realized in Christianity. In this, certainly more limited sense, the saying has its truth: *N. T. in vetere latet, V. T. in novo patet.* The knowledge of a coherent system of revelation in its organism and stages is only possible through the O. T. together with the New Testament. For this very reason the O. T. sheds light in many ways on the N. T. Especially can no conception of the latter be true, which is inconsistent with the connection of the two, or according to which Christianity is made to bring something absolutely new, not even ideally prepared for—an important canon at least negatively. Even in these days the O. T. renders a pædagogic service to Christianity, in placing us in the line which conducts to true knowledge of Christ. But inasmuch as law and prophecy all obtain their full clearness and certainty in the fulfilment, it is only Christendom, which possesses the key to the O. T. in its self-consciousness (*i.e.* in the Christianity not dependent on the O. T.), not unbelieving Judaism. Here too the saying holds good: Christendom is the true Israel.

B.—*The Ministry of the Word.*

§ 136.

Since the written Word cannot preserve itself and reach individuals without human intervention, there is an activity perpetuated in the church under the guidance of Christian knowledge—*the ministry of the Word*—which not merely transmits the Scriptures with fidelity, by critical aids restores their integrity, multiplies them, and seeks to conduct to completion the forming of the Canon, but also by interpretation disengages their meaning from its veil and applies it to each age, in order thus to reproduce amid the humanity of all ages the preaching of the apostles with the greatest possible fidelity and force,—all in harmony with the properties of Holy Scripture specified in § 135.

This Ministry of the Word is in part *informal*, in part *strictly organized*, and rejoices in being able to trace itself back to Christ's will. The duty and right (*i.e.* the *office*) of teaching is committed to the Church indeed in the first instance as its main function. But it is necessary on ethical, although not on dogmatic grounds, to secure this function by transferring it to definite persons. In this way a standing or regular and strictly organized office of teaching arises through the Church, which rightly affirms the harmony of such a result with Christ's will. But this office is bound to the gospel, and, apart from the preaching of the same, which is the source of its independence, has as a special office only the authority transferred to it by the Church.

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1. *The Biblical Doctrine of the Ministry of the Word.*— To the church, which existed first of all in the apostles, is committed as a duty and right the function of preaching the gospel to all the world.[1] Through the apostles, as the original faithful witnesses, the preaching of Christ is continued;[2] they are to judge the tribes of the new Israel, *i.e.* to govern by their word.[3] But on the basis of the apostolic Word, and under its constant governance, preaching gives birth to faith,[4] which cannot but speak out of the fulness of the heart. Christ has not provided for a continuous supplementing of the apostolate, nor yet for the founding of a distinct teaching, or still less priestly, order. The apostles indeed, as already shown, had a unique position through their immediate relation to Christ.

[1] Matt. xxviii. 19 ff.; Mark xvi. 15 ff.; John xxi. 17, xx. 23, xv. 27; cf. Rom. x. 17.

[2] Luke x. 16: Whoever hears you hears me.

[3] Luke xxii. 30; Matt. xix. 28.

[4] Rom. x. 17.

But this position of theirs is unrepeatable, and the apostolate in this sense continues only in the writings of the N. T. (§ 135). For example, in the church of Corinth, and similarly still in the days of Origen, believers in general could speak with a view to edification in worship, without all the speakers having the office of teaching for their life-vocation. Each church had leaders, but the worship was not of necessity conducted exclusively by them. On the other hand, a *teaching office* was never wanting, *i.e.* the right or authority and the duty of preaching. That faith, where it is planted, should propagate itself by further preaching or testimony, *i.e.* that there should be a continuous *teaching function* in the Church, is the will and command of Christ. This rests on dogmatic necessity. Through faith He has implanted in His Church, wherever it exists, the preaching of the gospel as its inmost impulse. Not individuals, not an order, but the Church (*Art. Smalk.* 353), is the original bearer of the office, bound as well as warranted to preach the gospel. *It is responsible* for seeing that the function of teaching is never wanting; and thus the teaching office, considered as a permanent, established teaching function, has divine authorization. The form, on the other hand, in which it has to make provision for this, is not divinely prescribed. Hence it is not necessarily the same in all ages, save that the Church must ever make as good provision as possible for the continuance of this function, which may be done in a freer or stricter form. For the rest, the primitive Christian Church submitted itself to the universal ethical laws, according to which the objective *call* or "mission" must be added to the inner subjective impulse and call by way of confirmation and acknowledgment.[1] It must be the right of the Christian Church, on which the duty of preaching is laid, to transfer the right of speaking in its name, and therefore of acknowledging or not the teaching of one who discourses from free impulse, and of passing a corrective judgment.[2] With this limitation, the προφητεύειν is conceded by Paul to all believers who have the impulse.[3] But although a free Ministry of the Word had its place in the primitive days of the Church alongside the teaching office in the apostles and

[1] Rom. x. 15. [2] 1 Cor. xiv. 29.
[3] 1 Cor. xiv.; 1 Thess. v. 19–21; cf. Jas. iii. 1.

attached by them to fixed persons,[1] Paul would still have provision made for due order (εὐταξία) in this free movement or exercise of the teaching function on the part of believers at the impulse of the Spirit. The Pastoral Epistles exhibit already an advanced polity.[2] A setting apart to teaching on the ground of evident charisms obtained, not merely for missionary purposes,[3] but also for the edifying of churches. But in the age to which we owe the writings of the N. T., the administration of Baptism and the Holy Supper, Church discipline and government, which includes the election of persons according to their gifts, were not committed to a special order, nor necessarily to persons, to whom the teaching function had been transferred by the Church; but in the earliest church all these public functions were distributed in the most various ways, but so that what was to be done in the name of the Church should only be done on the basis of the transference of its office to the individuals, or at least stood in need of recognition by the church.

2. THE ECCLESIASTICAL DOCTRINE.[4] — In harmony with the N. T., the *Augsburg Confession* requires first of all the Ministry of the Word in general (*Ministerium Verbi divini*), whatever the form of its constitution, save that a regular call (the *rite vocari*) is necessary to public teaching (*publice docere et administrare sacramenta*), by which the right of speaking and acting in the name of the Church is transferred. *Vocatio* or *ordinatio* (see below) is to be regarded as an act of the Church, not as a sacrament, nor is a *sacerdotium* supposed to be established by the transference of authority.[5] The selection may fall on the unworthy, and is so far fallible, not a directly divine act; but the duty is imposed on the church of setting apart persons for the Ministry of the Word to the best of its knowledge, not as if the Word preached by the regular official teacher were alone sure of effect.[6] Such a Catholicising error would again interpose a priestly order, "an official means of grace," between the believer and Christ. On

[1] Tit. i. 5, 9. [2] 1 Tim. iv. 14; Tit. i. 5 ff. [3] Acts xiii. 1–4.

[4] *Conf. Aug.* v. xiv.; *Art. Sm.* 352. 353; *Apol.* 201. 204. Of the Reformed Confessions, ed. Augusti, *Conf. Helv.* p. 55; *Gall.* 121 f.; *Angl.* 134. 140; *Belg.* 190 ff. 192; *Bohem.* 295 ff.; *Cat. Gen.* 518. J. Gerhard, to. xii.

[5] *Apol.* 201. 204. [6] As Kliefoth supposes, in opposition to the *Art. Sm.*

the contrary, the Confessions preserve to all believers their priestly right, expressly reserving to them the right of comforting or teaching by pious private converse. Thus, the Reformation doctrine of the Office or Ministry of the Word holds its ground against a twofold opposition, that of the hierarchical and that of the anarchical extreme, which latter would leave the function of Evangelical preaching to chance or supposed inner divine impulse, as the Anabaptists and later the Quakers. To Evangelical believers ordination is no sacrament, but according to John Gerhard and others merely *solennis et publica testificatio vocationis.* The *vocatio* is therefore the chief thing, and great weight is rightly laid upon the regular call, or "ordination to the Ministry of the Word." It is not necessary *de fide*, but a praiseworthy custom, for the *vocatio* by the Church to take place in solemn manner with prayer on the part of the Church and imposition of hands. Nor need this *accidens* be done by bishops.[1] Nay, the right of ordination, in which the *vocatio* is the chief thing, according to the old Evangelical teaching does not even rest exclusively with the clerus, but, like all Church power originally, with the Church (see above), in which laymen also may co-operate.[2]

3. DOGMATIC INVESTIGATION.—The church is to be a reflex of the prophetic office of Christ. It becomes this by appropriating Christ's word, giving it the widest circulation and increasing extension. But although the saying, "I believe, therefore do I speak," holds good of every Christian, the duty of the church is not discharged with this informal testifying or ministry of the Word. Everything informal is imperfect, subject to caprice or chance, without stability, exposed to aberrations without any certain antidote. Hence, although the Ministry of the Word is committed to the Church as a unity, and not to a special order, although the right of testing, selecting, and appointing the ministers of the Word is conferred on the Church (in which mistakes on its side are just as possible as unfaithfulness in those called to office), still it is not left to it *whether* it will or will not have a regular, *i.e.* a really fixed, Ministry of the Word as an essential part of its organization,

[1] J. Gerhardi *Loci*, to. xii. loc. 24, § 159.

[2] This follows also from the idea of ordination as *testificatio vocationis.* Hence even Evangelical magistrates ordained at first.

nay, as a fundamental institution of its existence, but this is a divine necessity of a moral order, having the example of Christ and the apostles on its side.[1] And in harmony with this duty is the fact that the Holy Spirit never allows the church to want those who present themselves to it, equipped with special charisms in keeping with this end, charisms of didaskalia and gnosis, exhortation and consolation, gifts of inspired holy discourse in speech or writing, or hermeneutic and historic as well as ruling talent.[2] In continually calling forth such talents, which seek a place for their constant exercise, the Holy Spirit virtually or creatively reveals the will of the Lord of the Church, that it should give scope and place for the ordered ministry of the Word in its manifold branches, even as, conversely, just as manifold and explicit a need of such talents is always arising. Fitted into their place, the charisms thus obtain a field of constant and abiding exercise, so that the giving and receiving members are able to rejoice together. But, to say nothing of the difference of gifts and the corresponding need of the Church, the necessity of this ordinance lies also in the successive series of generations, by which a younger generation is always associated with an older.

To the teaching office proper naturally joins on the care of souls in applying the Word to individual persons and their needs, for the right administration of the Word requires also the right distribution of the Word of truth.[3] But however necessary this strict organization of the ministry of the Word, that ministry should never forget, that it has indeed to reflect but not to continue Christ or to take His place. No divine authority or infallibility pertains to the ministers of the Word or to the teaching order, considered even as a whole, but it has perpetually to grow intensively by living itself more and more comprehensively into the Word of Christ. Nor has the fixed ministry of the Word the privilege of being the sole depository of Christian truth; but as even in the O. T. the prophets had their place alongside the established offices, because the Spirit blows where He wills, so must the Church also set itself

[1] Matt. x.; Luke x.; Tit. i. [2] 1 Cor. xii. 1-11, 28-30; Eph. iv. 11 ff.

[3] So far, certainly, as the care of souls demands also a loving transference of self into the position of others, it has its place in the reflecting of the high-priestly spirit of Christ (see below).

to allow air and free movement to the *free ministry of the Word*, especially to look upon the free investigation of science, which has to do with the truth, and not merely sacred traditions, with joyous confidence in the victorious strength of Christian truth. This victory is only achieved by the mutual supplementing of the free and the fixed, by living wrestle and strain of the faculties, not by mere lordship of the fixed. The good conscience of the Church in its traditional teaching is not shown in imposing silence within its borders on opposition to that teaching, so far as opposition does not break loose from Christ's Word, and suppressing it, but in being always ready to give reply, and far from relying on mechanical means, in letting itself be roused by opposition to bring to light new aspects of Christian truth, as each age needs, by deeper digging into the mines of the Divine Word, to solve the problems still left to every age, and therefore to acknowledge the truth lying hidden in the opposition to its tradition.

4. Independent as are the ministers of the Word, in the stricter sense, of the will of the several empirical churches in reference to the matter to be preached, they have this independence only as ministers of the *Word*. Since with the Church they are dependent on the latter, in such common subordination to a higher power they both have due freedom and independence in relation to each other. For independence of judgment belongs to the churches also, Holy Scripture being equally accessible to them, and the right of scriptural knowledge being equally their duty. They are not, therefore, bound or even warranted to acknowledge dependence on the minister of the Word, where he is not dependent on God's Word, but have in this case to prove their independence and stedfastness in the faith.[1] We must not, in opposition to God's Word, practise idolatry from regard to ecclesiastical order.

5. The conferring of other powers (*e.g.* the administration of Baptism and the Holy Supper, Church discipline, government, etc.), which rest originally in the bosom of the Church, on the same persons to whom the ministry of the Word is committed by regular call, rests on no dogmatic necessity, save that it is obligatory on the Church to call into existence

[1] 1 Tim. vi. 5.

an organized activity for these duties, and in general for everything done in the name of the Church. The more precise character of such arrangements depends on time and circumstances, and is therefore a question partly of Ethics and Practical Theology, partly of Church law.

TRANSITION TO THE SECOND POINT: RELATION OF WORD AND SACRAMENT.

§ 137.

The Sacraments are sacred actions, instituted by Christ and connected with the Word of God, in which, under outward signs, invisible grace is not merely preached, but dispensed to the individual receptive thereto by Christ Himself, to whom the Church is merely an organ (§ 134). The benefit of this offered grace is personally appropriated by faith.

LITERATURE.—Ad. Wuttke, *De ratione quæ interest inter Verbum et Sacramenta*, 1842. Hoffmann, *Das Gnadenmittel des göttlichen Wortes;* Jubelschrift für D. Strauss, 1859. J. Müller, *Das Verhältniss zwischen der Wirksamkeit des heiligen Geistes und dem Gnadenmittel des Wortes.* Sudhoff, *De Convenientia, quæ inter utrumque Gratiæ Instrumentum, Verbum Dei et Sacramentum, intercedat, Comment. dogm. theologica*, 1852. Harless and Harnack, *Die kirchlich-religiöse Bedeutung der reinen Lehre von den Gnadenmitteln*, 1869. Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, iii. 2, 112–135. Philippi, v. 2. Of the Confessions, cf. *Conf. Aug.*, v. xiii. x.; *Apol.* 98, 86. 203, 18. 252, 11–13. 265, 59; *Heidelb. Cat.* qu. 65. 69. 75; *Scot.* 18.

1. The word *sacramentum* has received by convention, not by etymology, the stricter meaning indicated in the text. The idea of the sacraments held in common by Evangelical teachers is, that they are sacred actions instituted by Christ Himself, which, under visible signs, offer the invisible grace promised in the word of institution. This idea decides as to the number of the sacraments. Accordingly, of the Catholic number, seven, which were accepted also by the later Greek

Church under the influence of the Latin, there are left only two, Baptism and the Supper, because each of the others lacks either the divine institution and promise (like the sacraments of Confirmation, Ordination, and Extreme Unction), or the outer sign, like Penance and Matrimony. Other sacred actions in the ethical sphere, like prayer, installation of authorities, or anointing of kings, might as sacred actions be called sacraments in the wider sense with as good right as the last-named. Here we have to do with dogmatic, not ethical, sacraments, because the point in hand is agencies, by which Christ according to promise continues His work upon individuals (§§ 127, 134), and in which the Church is simply the organ of His action, so that its act is to be regarded as His act, because done in His name and by His command. But since we see in them the act of Christ Himself offering salvation, their being or validity is independent of the faith or worthiness of the administrator; and in the same way faith does not make them sacraments, but receives their benefit. Moreover, the Evangelical view, in its opposition to the number seven, apprehends Christianity as a unity, not split up into fragments, although human receptiveness for the entire undivided salvation given in Christ may be of different degrees. This weighty principle is also the deepest reason of the fact, that Evangelical teachers of the Reformation age refuse to concede a different grace in the sacraments from that in the Word, in which, as in the sacrament, the living Christ works and invites to Himself, that He may impart Himself to us. Hence, with Augustine, the Symbols call the sacraments a *pictura Verbi*.[1] The second characteristic trait of Evangelical teaching is, that the sacraments work not *ex opere operato*, but that faith is requisite to their efficacy.[2] Still the meaning is not, that the sacraments only have significance for those who bring faith thereto, but simply that their benefit first really comes to man by means of faith, for the *Conf. Aug.* says that

[1] *Apol.* 200, 5.

[2] *Conf. Aug.* 25, 22. 28. 29. *Apol.* 98, 86. 252, 11 ff. 203, 18. 265, 59. *Conf. Aug.* xiii., damnant illos qui docent, quod Sacramenta ex opere operato justificent, nec docent fidem requiri in usu sacramentorum quæ credat, remitti peccata. *Apol.* 213, 18, rejects the notion, quod Sacramenta non ponenti obicem conferant gratiam ex opere operato sine bono motu cordis, hoc est sine fide. This is impia, perniciosa doctrina, simpliciter Judaica.

the Holy Spirit works, excites, and confirms faith by Word and Sacrament.[1]

2. RELATION OF WORD AND SACRAMENT.—The saying of Augustine, according to which the sacraments are to the eye what the Word is to the ear, is true in so far as faith has to see in both a divine self-manifestation, which may be called God's Word in the wider sense; and in so far as they ought not to be distinguished in such a way as to exalt one at the cost of the other. But still they are not identical. The difference expresses itself historically thus: The Reformed in general lay stress rather on the Word, which is nearer to the spirit; the Catholics, on the sacrament with its sensuous symbolism. The dogmatic problem will be to show, that in their difference they are mutually related. In doing this, the starting-point will be the unity of Christian grace, which does not permit the difference between Sacrament and Word generally to be sought in their contents, but in the diversity of *form*, in which the one grace is offered according to the variety of need in the subject. Now the affinity of the Word and the Sacrament is evident from this, that the Word—the continuation of Christ's prophetic work—must prepare the way for all further manifestation of grace, since without the Word the latter could only influence man by magic, outward or inward. The Word addresses itself to the intelligence, that intelligence may arouse the will, thus giving rise to Christian faith, which could not exist without knowledge of Christ, because it would lack its object, which cannot be given by purely inward spiritual influence, but only by the preaching of the Word.[2] Again, without the *Word* of divine institution and founding, the sacrament were no sacrament. It is itself nothing but the carrying out of the word of institution and promise, brought within the actual present. Were we to imagine the sacred action cut off from the Word, it would lack the definite meaning which interprets and gives effect to it. The Word, then —and this leads to the other aspect—has indeed Christ for its

[1] *Conf. Aug.* xiii. *Apol.* 265, 59, as the right *usus sacramenti* it is indicated, *ut fides accedat* (not *antecedat*), or *ut fides concipiatur*. This must especially apply to Baptism, for in a normal way faith must be already assumed at the Holy Supper.

[2] § 127, 3.

contents, nay, since it is preached in His name, it involves also an action of Christ; and since the Word of the gospel embraces in its way the whole field, there is no difference between Word and Sacrament in reference to contents.[1] On this is based the old Evangelical doctrine, that as to contents the *spiritualis manducatio* supplies the same as the *oralis*. But although the Word is a clothing of spiritual truth in sensuous garb, in order that faith may preserve the consciousness of an objectivity in its contents independent of its own act, and know itself one with the historic Christ in externally historic fashion through the Word, which is a continuation of Christ's act, still the Word does not satisfy the need. Although in it in its own way the one and entire gospel finds expression, the Word is largely dependent on the skill and gifts of the ministers of the Word for delivery and effect, as well as for the living representation of Christ. Further, by its nature it is first of all a communicating of doctrine or truth to the intelligence, which it addresses; and this is necessarily done in a multiplicity of sentences of human discourse, into which the unity and entirety of Christian truth is divided in its manifestation. The presentation of the gospel in its unity and entirety, such as was given in the living Person of Christ and the contemplation of that Person, is very unequally accomplished by the Word preached according to the gifts of the speaker, and never perfectly. Moreover, in this its divided manifestation the Word extends equally to all the hearers of preaching, whereas one and the same aspect of the Word is not that which suits all at one time; for preaching gives special distinctness to particular aspects of the—in itself thoroughly united—Word, the rebuking and condemning, as well as the comforting and encouraging aspects. It is thus impossible for the individual to know what part of the Word, which mentions none by name, applies to him as he is at the present moment, whether for example he must apply to himself words of grace (which application has its time and hour) or words of rebuke. And yet the establishing of a secure state of grace depends on his not appropriating grace arbitrarily, but on good objective grounds. For these defects of the Word taken

[1] As Harless rightly insists, after the example of Augustine and the Reformation.

alone, the Sacrament brings the supply. As an unquestionable institution of Christ, the Sacrament is an invitation on His part. This invitation in historical process He causes to come to individuals in such a way, that along with the outward action He is willing to communicate His grace, nay Himself, according to promise. It is meant to bring the individual into union with His person, in whom the unity and entirety of the gospel is enclosed; and thus, as an action in which Christ continues His work of receiving men, to restore to the spiritual vision of faith that which was given by Christ's outward manifestation during His earthly ministry. Thus the Sacrament combines apparently opposite but equally necessary elements.

First. Whereas the one Word divides in its manifestation into words and sentences, grace thus falling asunder through Holy Scripture and preaching into a multiplicity of rays, which yet only have their true effect when they again combine for consciousness into a unity, it is the Sacrament which presents grace in its all-embracing completeness and makes it visible to the eye of faith. It gives therefore not a mere ray of grace, but the whole Christ; and how rich its blessing shall be, depends simply on the degree of receptiveness.

On the *other* side, the Sacrament specializes grace, not in itself, but in reference to individuals. It applies the one and complete grace to individuals in historical progress. It does not, as the Word unavoidably does, exhibit one single aspect of Christianity, and that in such a way that the same aspect presents itself equally to all, however different they may be, and without the individual knowing what he ought to apply to himself. On the contrary, the Sacrament addresses itself, by Christ's commission and as His action, to particular individuals by name, who thereby, provided they believe in the divine institution and promise of the Sacrament, come into relation with Christ in His unity and entirety, enter into gracious covenant with Him, and thus rejoice in Christ's redeeming purpose as referring to their own personality, and that at the present moment, without putting subjective wishes in the place of objective truth. Thus, through the sacraments instituted by Christ, and dispensed in His name as though He Himself

administered them, Christ's work of calling and receiving men into communion with Him is just as directly applied to men as once to His disciples, so that they may be as confident of His loving will as those disciples. Hence too it is clear, that when some suppose the significance of justification by faith must be limited, if the sacraments are to receive their due honour and their objectivity is to be acknowledged, this is a gross misunderstanding of the meaning both of the Sacrament and of faith. So little is one a hindrance to the other, that faith itself longs for the Sacrament, because faith longs after personal assurance of communion with Christ, and that not a self-made, subjective, but subjective-objective assurance; and conversely, the Sacrament on its side looks for believing partakers of it, because only to such can it impart its benefit. Here, therefore, Evangelical doctrine also steers between two errors—the Romish, which injures faith by its *opus operatum*, from fear lest the sacraments and their objective significance should suffer loss through the Evangelical doctrine of faith; and the Anabaptist and Quakerish, which thinks faith should be set against the Sacrament, as if faith did not need the Sacrament, but would be placed by it in false dependence on the external. The Protestant *Fides*, in which *Fiducia* and assurance of salvation—*Fides specialis*—are the chief matter, agrees best with the *exhibitio gratiæ specialis* by the Sacrament, which most perfectly meets the need of faith. For the sacraments are personal acts of Christ to persons, as is recognized in the *Form. Concordiæ*.[1]

Observation.—Thomasius prefers another distinction between Word and Sacrament.[2] In the sacraments, he says, grace operates through physical means directly on the *nature* of man, on his entire psychico-physical, essential being (therefore without intervention of knowing and volition); they transplant us into Christ's holy human nature, and into the organism of the Church; they are the church-forming powers which the Church administers. The Word, on the other

[1] *F. C.* 807, 37: et quidem eam ipsam ob causam (re de revelata erga nos Dei voluntati dubitemus) promissionem Evangelii Christus non tantum *generaliter* proponi curat, sed etiam Sacramenta promissioni annectere voluit, quibus tanquam sigillis ad promissionem appensis *unicuique* credenti promissionis Evangelicæ certitudinem confirmat.

[2] *Ut supra*, iii. 2, p. 113 f.

hand, operates on the self-conscious personality, on the intelligence and the successive unfolding of the personality, whereas the Sacrament establishes a new relation by one drastic stroke, in one act and moment.—It is true, that in the Sacrament the undivided, concentrated grace is offered, and this grace also requires a concentration of the entire man, *i.e.* a collected living receptiveness; but it would neither be Scriptural nor commendable to ascribe to the sacraments in distinction from the Word an influence on the nature in a physical way, *i.e.* not through the medium of the spirit, so that only the nature of man, as determined by the sacrament or Christ's holy human nature, could influence his spirit. This would lead back to a physical process of salvation, to the *opus operatum*. It is also strangely wrong to exclude the Word of God from the church-forming powers. This is in keeping with the overlooking of the fact, that the Church has its constantly self-renewing genesis in germinant faith, not in impersonal nature. Finally, this mode of conception contradicts the fundamental principle of the New Testament, according to which the gospel first of all aims at the spirit, and only through it at transforming also the physical side of man in conformity with Christ's holy human nature. On the other hand it has been already premised, that it is certainly of value for faith to come into relation with the historic Christ through the medium of institutions of His which also touch the senses, only it is overlooked by Thomasius that even the Word of God comes to man in sensuous form.

SECOND POINT.

A.—*The Continuation of the High-priestly Activity of Christ.*

§ 138.—*Holy Baptism.*

Holy Baptism is the sacred action instituted by Christ, by means of which the individual is received by Christ's substitutionary, high-priestly love into His communion, that the old life may die and a new reconciled one begin—a life of sonship to God.

LITERATURE.—Matthies, *Baptismi Expositio biblico-historico-dogmatica*, 1831. W. Hoffmann, *Taufe und Wiedertaufe*, 1840.

Oster, P. J., *Briefe über die Lehre der H. Schr. von der Taufe*, 1840. Brauns, J. F., *zur Verständigung über den Anabaptismus*, 1844. Nägelsbach, *Luth. Zeitschr.* 1849, 4. Schöberlein, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1847, 4. p. 1024.[1] Höfling, *Das Sacrament der Taufe*, 2 vols. 1846, 1848; cf. especially II. 132, 105, 106, § 22. Martensen, *die christl. Taufe und die baptistische Frage*, 1847, ed. 2, 1860. Culmann, *Welche Bewandtniss hat es mit der Taufe in der christlichen Kirche?* 1847. Steinmeyer, *Vortrag auf dem Kirchen-Tag zu Frankfurt*, 1854 (cf. the records of this Kirchentag and Ev. Kz. 1854, 55). R. Stier, *Taufe und Kindertaufe* (from the "Words of the Lord Jesus," vii.), 1855. Hase, *Polemik*, ed. 2. Leiner, *Das Sacrament der heiligen Taufe; Ausleg. des IV. Hauptstücks des kleinen lutherischen Katechismus*, 1857. Willms, *Beleuchtung und Widerlegung der Schrift von Leiner*, 1862. Ribbeck, F., *Aus der Landeskirche in die Baptistengemeinde*, 1854. (In opposition to him write: Esch, C. W., *Die evangelische Landeskirche*, etc., and J. L. Müller, 1854. Subsequently Ribbeck again renounced the Baptist doctrine.) Münchmeyer, *Das Dogma von der sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Kirche. Ein historischer und kritischer Versuch*, 1854. (For the definition of the Church as *Societas fidei* in *Conf. Aug.* VIII., he would substitute the definition of it as a community of baptized persons.) In *English* Literature: Pusey, *Scriptural Views of Holy Baptism*, 1836. Rob. Wilberforce, *The Doctrine of Holy Baptism*, ed. 3, 1850 (in opposition to Goode's *Effects of Infant Baptism*). Wardlaw, *Dis. on Infant Baptism*, ed. 3, 1846 (in opposition to Dr. Halley's work: *The Sacraments*). Haldane and Birt, *Strictures on Infant Baptism*,[2] write on the Baptist side, in opposition to Wardlaw.

I.—*Biblical Doctrine.*

Baptism was instituted by the Risen Lord, after previous intimations,[3] in accordance with John's baptism, which, although not a mere baptism of repentance, but also a promise of the approach of the kingdom of heaven, only finds its fulfilment in the Christian baptism with the

[1] J. Müller (*das göttliche Recht der Union*, p. 203) declares against the notion of Nägelsbach and Schöberlein, that Holy Baptism relates also to the nature of man, and imparts the *prima stamina* of a heavenly corporeity for the forming of the new personality. Cf. Thomasius, iii. 2. 1–47. 140.

[2] Birt says of Infant baptism: It is a cause without effect, means without end, cloud without rain, tree without fruit.

[3] Matt. xxviii. 19 f.; Mark xvi. 15. Cf. John iii. 5; 1 John v. 6–8.

Holy Spirit.[1] The Johannine baptism in its turn joins on to passages in the law and prophets of the Old Testament respecting sacred washings.[2] But Christian Baptism is first a rite of symbolic cleansing, and then of consecration and reception into the community of Christian confessors. It takes the place of the Old Testament circumcision,[3] and from the beginning is the New Testament covenant-sign.[4] The nature of circumcision was chiefly to impose obligation,[5] namely, to obey the will of God as it *is* and will be revealed. Still even the Old Testament covenant is also a covenant of promise. In the New Testament, in harmony with the character of the prevenient grace of Christianity, baptism is not primarily obligation or service, but a promise and communication of divine grace. But *forgiveness of sins* appears everywhere as the fundamental factor in Christian grace; in many passages it is regarded as the first and surest fruit of baptism. In Peter, baptism is called the inquiry after a good conscience.[6] But the benefit of baptism is not exhausted in this negative factor —forgiveness. The gift of the Holy Ghost, implanting a new life, the germ or seed of a new man, is essential to Christian baptism. Hence baptism is called a laver of regeneration.[7] Paul combines the Johannine and Christian baptism, but so as to give repentance a Christian character, and uses the outward action as a symbol, seeing in the submersion the dying of the old man with Christ, the being planted into His death which procured the forgiveness of sins, and in the rising again from the grave of the water the resurrection of the new man into Christ's fellowship.[8] The intimate connection with Christ, into which baptism brings, is already expressed in the words of institution, according to which it is a being baptized into the name, *i.e.* into the revealed nature, of God as Father, Son,

[1] Acts i. 5.

[2] Ex. xix. 10, xxix. 4, xxx. 18 f.; Num. xix. 7 ff., and Zech. xiii. 1, xiv. 8; Ezek. xxxvi. 25.

[3] Col. ii. 12, 13.

[4] Cf. on this point *Ecce Homo* (by Seeley), ed. 4, 1866, p. 83 ff.

[5] Gal. v. 3.

[6] 1 Pet. iii. 21 : συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα. The answer to the inquiry is sought and found in baptism. Cf. Acts ii. 38.

[7] Tit. iii. 5. Cf. John iii. 5; Gal. iii. 27.

[8] Rom. vi. 3 ff. The relation of baptism to His death was already declared by Christ, Mark x. 38; Luke xii. 50.

and Holy Spirit. If baptism unto Christ only, or unto His death, is often spoken of,[1] the conclusion must not be drawn that ancient Christendom baptized unto Christ only. The opposite is clear from the fact that even the Ebionites used the Trinitarian formula. Rather, baptism is often called baptism unto Christ, because the revelation in Him is the centre, which points in a mediatory character on one side to God as Father, on the other to the Holy Spirit. The New Testament indicates nothing more definite respecting the relation of the outward element in the act to the inner spiritual meaning, apart from the symbolic use of that outward element, save that the gift of the Holy Spirit is viewed as connected with baptism in a normal way. In the beginning the baptism of adults was customary, a new and blessed consciousness of filial relationship being usually expected as its fruit. In harmony with this view, regeneration is especially described as its result, but in order thereto it is necessary to become as children; and so much is the receiving, and not any human observance, any human action whatever, the chief point in baptism, that Paul brings it into the most intimate association with Christ's substitution and high-priestly love. Baptism is symbolically the death and grave of the old man, but only as union with Christ's death, which His substitutionary love endured for us, thus acquiring the power so to draw us into the spiritual fellowship of His death that His death is effectual for our benefit.[2] For, dying with Christ, we also rise again with Him as men, whose old life, permeated with the generic sin of Adam, is as it were swallowed up by His substitution applied to us. Hence Paul even says, that by baptism we have put on Christ, the righteousness of Christ, as a white garment, so that we stand in God's sight as parts of His manifestation.[3] For these reasons the baptized are called sons of God, God looks upon them in Christ. Accordingly it is proved by scriptural evidence, that Christ's heavenly, high-priestly love continues its activity through baptism in His name, which takes place indeed but once,[4] but in which Christ's high-priestly love unites with man and pledges itself

[1] Acts ii. 38, viii. 16, x. 48; Rom. vi. 3; Gal. iii. 27.
[2] Col. ii. 12, 13. [3] Gal. iii. 27. Cf. Rev. iv. 4, iii. 4, vii. 9, 13 f.
[4] Acts viii. xvi. xvii.

to continued operation. But through Christ's mediation the baptized one enters also into relation to the Triune God in general.

Observation.—Holy Scripture says nothing of an effect of Holy Baptism on the nature, of another heavenly gift (*materia cœlestis*) than the Holy Spirit; but this does not preclude the divine power, which the new personality receives, conversely exercising also an influence on the physical side belonging to the personality.

§ 139.—*Continuation.*

II.—*Forming of the Ecclesiastical Doctrine.*

LITERATURE.—*Conf. Aug.* IX.; *Apol.* 156, p. 329; *Cat.* 379. 401. 534; *Heidelb. Cat.* qu. 69 ff.

1. The common Evangelical doctrine is, that Holy Baptism is necessary for all, because it is the form ordained by Christ Himself for bringing the individual person into communion with Christ's person and salvation, and because without participation in His redemption man remains in the natural corruption which, apart from counteraction, must result in eternal death. Hence both Evangelical Confessions, however earnestly the Reformation maintains the cause of the conscious religious personality, are at one in rejecting not merely Anabaptism, but late baptism in general, and in retaining infant-baptism. As in respect of the sacrament generally, so here also they have fixed two limits, which must not be transgressed. On one side, according to them, the Sacrament without faith is a *signum inefficax*,[1] for the benefit of baptism —the Holy Spirit—cannot be imparted *ex opere operato*. On the other side it is not faith which makes the sacrament a sacrament, but Christ's institution and fidelity to His promise.[2] Thereby the objectivity of the Sacrament is rendered secure, even as by the first condition all magical influence of the outward act is excluded. A consequence of the objectivity of the sacrament is, that baptism remains valid, and is not to be repeated, although in the baptismal act itself faith was not

[1] *Cat. Maj.* 549, 73. [2] *Ibid.* 545. 546.

exercised, and therefore the benefit of baptism was not effectual. A distinction must be made between *validitas* and *efficacia*. Repetition would involve the erroneous conception, maintained by Romish teaching, that the significance of baptism is but momentary, namely, valid so long as the baptized one does not again fall into sin. But, on the contrary, according to Evangelical teaching the revelation of something eternal, of God's faithful purpose of grace, is contained in the temporal moment. Baptism is on God's part a covenant with man, which only definitive unbelief can dissolve. Hence, even after the fall of the baptized one, a return to baptismal grace is possible through repentance without a new sacrament (Confirmation, or the sacrament of Penance, or Extreme Unction). "He who did not actually believe at his baptism, let him now believe" in the gracious promise revealed concerning him in his baptism, which is still in force.[1] The complete grace is wrapped up and made sure to man in this promise on God's part; he has only to appropriate it by faith. Thus, the wealth of the baptismal benefit is so great, that he can only completely make it a personal possession when his entire life is a "continuous baptism" by union in dying and rising again with Christ.[2]

Hereby also the chief point is given in respect to *infant baptism*. The *Conf. Aug.* speaks of a twofold oblation.[3] Through baptism *offertur Gratia Dei* to the baptized one, and the children are *offeruntur Deo et recipiuntur in gratiam Dei*. No mention is here made of regeneration in the fact of infant baptism; but the meaning of the *Conf. Aug.* implies,[4] that regeneration, on its emergence with faith, is the carrying out or realization of the promise connected with baptism.

2. But the *relation of baptism to faith and regeneration* was variously defined, and in the case of infant-baptism problems of peculiar difficulty arose as to that relation. The Catholic Church could assume a substitutionary faith in the Church, or a magical effect of baptism, and consequently a faith before baptism (conferred as it were), as well as an effect of baptism on the person in the moment of the outward act apart from his own faith. This the Reformation was forced to reject;

[1] *Cat. Maj.* 546, 56.
[2] *Ibid.* 548, 65. 543, 41.
[3] *Conf. Aug.* ix.
[4] Cf. Art. II.

and Luther, in order to leave no place for the *opus operatum*, assumed, although not with full certainty, the personal faith of the child in order to baptism (*Cat. Maj.* 544, 47 ff., 546). The ancient formularies, indeed, had the confession of faith recited in the name of the child before baptism, upon which the baptism followed.[1] Luther assumed that God gives the child faith for baptism in answer to the intercession of the Church before baptism. But there is no exegetical authority for ascribing a consciousness of God and Christ, or Christian faith, to infants who as yet have not even self-consciousness. And if a general, mere receptiveness for Christianity were called faith, then all men would be believers by nature. But faith comes by preaching, not by nature. Granted that we are right in ascribing the effect of the production of faith to the believing intercession of the Church, such intercession may be wanting in the baptismal act; and since it is uncertain, the authority of such baptism would be doubtful, so far as it is supposed to depend on the existence of faith in the child *before* baptism. To assign to the intercession such potency as would command with certainty individuals and the origination of faith in them, would only transfer the magical element of the Romish doctrine to the spiritual sphere and the act of the Church, instead of to the outward act of the priest. The outward *opus operatum* would then, it is true, be averted from infant-baptism, in so far as the baptismal blessing itself would not pass to the child by magical means, but only through its faith; but it would be otherwise with the origination of the faith itself. Moreover, the supposition of a faith before baptism includes yet another danger. Since, according to the common Evangelical doctrine, regeneration is originated by faith, it would follow that regeneration as well as faith comes before baptism, and therefore could not be thought as its effect. If faith and regeneration are already brought to baptism, the only meaning left to the latter is that of sealing what has been done, *i.e.*

[1] Cf. Höfling, II. 1-20: "The ancient and also the later Catholic Church gave no marked expression in a liturgical respect to the difference between adult Christian children and proselytes; they transferred the entire liturgical treatment of the Catechumenate and of proselyte baptism more or less to the baptism of children, thus paving the way for the importance which they attribute to the sponsorial institute."

the prefixing of faith to baptism leads to the Baptist theory. No wonder that Luther again betrays uncertainty whether faith in the proper sense is to be ascribed to children, although he cherishes the hope that they believe.[1] In the Large Catechism he says, whether children have faith, let the learned decide;[2] and on the occasion of the Wittenberg Concord, 1536, he conceded, that because children have as yet no intelligence, they can only have an analogon of faith, namely, a natural bias of the soul to God, just as Calvin also spoke of *fides seminalis* in children. In the Large Catechism, Luther finally contented himself with saying: "The matter does not depend on whether children have faith; baptism is valid, even when faith is wanting in the act of baptism, and brings its blessing through the faith that emerges later."[3]

The *Lutheran theology* of the 17th century abandoned the standpoint, that faith must be required *before* baptism, considering it rather, in opposition to Baptist teaching, as the effect of baptism, like regeneration. But this effect of baptism was considered as directly involved in the outward act; and thus the result was a faith produced by the baptismal act, and a regeneration apart from personal self-consciousness, apart from all knowledge of sin or of Christ, and therefore apart from all spiritual intervention on man's side, and the reproach of the *opus operatum* lay again only too close at hand. Certainly the same was not understood by faith and regeneration, which we with Holy Scripture understand thereby; rather a mere resting of the soul in God, connected with a miraculous restoration of free will, by which in due time the child is able personally to appropriate grace and justification. But this is too much for the moment of baptism in the case of children, and too little for the entire significance of baptism. It is too bare a view of the contents of the blessing conveyed to man in baptism, to suppose it merely to give the possibility of personal faith and conscious regeneration (which was then usually called conversion). See above, p. 204 f.

[1] *Cat. Maj.* 546, § 57. [2] *Ibid.* 544, 47 ff.

[3] *Ibid.* 545, 52: hoc quoque dicimus, nobis non summam vim in hoc sitam esse, num ille, qui baptizatur credat, necne: per hoc enim baptismo nihil detrahitur. § 55: quamquam pueri non crederent . . . tamen baptismus verus esset. 546, § 56: Propterea dico, si non recte credidisti prius, tamen adhuc crede.

For these reasons, *Pietism*, with its stricter idea of faith and regeneration, opposed this view. It insisted on the necessity of personal faith in order to salvation and to regeneration, and left no place for a faith which is mere passivity or unconscious receptiveness. Only, the teaching of Pietism was such as to make regeneration begin too subjectively from the conscious person. It wished, indeed, to retain infant-baptism, but was unable to weave the fact of baptism as an efficient factor into the process of regeneration, and to apply the fact of its consummation to the conscious life. The logical result of such inability must necessarily be the giving up of infant-baptism.

In *very recent* days a reaction has again set in against these views. The Puseyites maintain "baptismal regeneration." They indeed understand thereby justification especially, but obscure and minimize the idea of faith and regeneration, describing regeneration as already effected by baptism. In Germany of late the *opus operatum* has been again openly adopted by many in the interest of infant-baptism, and even the Catholic consequences of the theory with respect to the idea of the Church are not shunned, but drawn.[1] The church-idea was transformed by them to this effect: the sacrament, and not faith, decides as to belonging to the true Church; even hypocrites, blasphemers, if baptized, are members of the body of Christ;[2] the Church is not to be defined as a *societas Fidei et Spiritus Sancti*, but as a community of the *baptized*. More moderate writers say, regeneration in baptism, and the faith which baptism straightway produces, are certainly still imperfect. As birth must follow generation, so must conversion follow baptism and the regeneration (*i.e.* the generation of the new man) in it. But in this case it is a mystery how a regeneration worthy of the name is possible *before* conversion, or how after regeneration man can still be unconverted.[3] Nor can the restoration of *liberum arbitrium* be called regeneration.

This review shows very plainly, that a clear and definite

[1] *E.g.* by the *Volkblatt für Stadt und Land;* the latter by Münchmeyer.

[2] On the other hand, the *Apology* describes them as *membra Satanæ*.—*Apol.*, de Ecclesia, p. 147, 16. More fully below, § 148.

[3] See above, § 131. For the rest, in the notion of a relation to Christ, even

form of doctrine is still to be framed, at least in respect to infant-baptism. The essential points are—*first*, that baptism must not find the best work already done, as the Baptist theory supposes, but that faith and regeneration are the fruit of baptismal grace; *secondly*, that no place be left here for *opus operatum*, or the magic of grace, to serve as a centre of doctrinal corruption on other points; *thirdly*, that the idea of faith and regeneration be not here suddenly diluted in an unevangelical sense, whereas elsewhere it is to be maintained in full energy against Catholicism. In the case of the baptism of adults, when it reaches its consummation in a normal way, the union of these three postulates will be secured without great difficulty, and that union and its right dogmatic settlement will shed light on the difficulties of the doctrine of Infant-Baptism.

§ 140.—*Continuation.*

III.—*Dogmatic Statement of the Doctrine of Baptism in general.*

1. The eternal redemption accomplished objectively still needs accomplishment in the subjects. The salvation given in Christ must still be applied to each individual. No one can produce it or seize it as a prey, and on the other hand it cannot be forced on any one by violence. The gift of God is free; its acceptance must also be free. Midway between a grace lying absolutely at the disposal of man and a passively-conceived human personality, lies a livingly-conceived relation between God and man, according to which free grace is offered preveniently, whilst there is a free receiving on man's side. That offer rests on a choice or election, for one nation being invited before another to salvation, and one individual before another, implies a preference.[1] And the offer leaves room for the rejection of Christian grace, for its nature is to require free appropriation. From these main lines

apart from conversion, perhaps the truth finds unconscious expression, that we are united with Christ by a bond reaching farther back than sin. Only, this natural relation should neither be called faith nor regeneration.

[1] See above, pp. 167. 185.

sketched above (§ 130) we must not now deviate. But there was further shown already (§ 137) the necessity of a sacred act having reference to the person, by which the person may be consciously placed, as by a divinely-given objective pledge, in historic connection with Christ, and be assured of being received into His communion in accordance with His will. This sacred act is baptism, instituted by Christ for all ages. By this means, *firstly*, the individual is saved from the great uncertainty, whether he is warranted to regard himself as called and received by Christ into His communion, notwithstanding that redemption advances only by degrees. Whoever is in earnest about his salvation cannot rest satisfied with the universal proclamation of the gospel, or with reception into the communion of the Church of any place or country. Nor can he base the certainty of salvation on what is purely inward alone. For what he seeks is reception into the communion of Christ, the historic, objective, but still actively working Mediator. But Christ's act of reception in reference to the person finds no certain expression in the purely inward sphere, apart from connection with Christ's historically revealed and continuously working purpose of grace. Even reliance on the signs of regeneration could of itself never be exempt from the suspicion of self-deception. Now this defect is supplied and this need satisfied by Holy Baptism in Christ's name, which, since it is done by His command, and is without doubt merely a continuation of His institution, *is to be regarded as His act*, in reference to which the Church simply presents itself as Christ's organ. But in the same way, *secondly*, the *Church* also is saved by this institution from uncertainty as to whom it must regard and treat as belonging to it. The church can despise no one whom the government of the world, which is subservient to the gospel, brings to it in such circumstances, that duty compels it to offer to him the salvation designed for mankind; and as it can refuse itself to no one whom Christ wishes to be received among His disciples, so also it can recognize no one whom Christ does not acknowledge. Since, then, knowledge of man's heart is denied to the Church, it would be in constant danger of doing too much or too little, of excluding those whom Christ wishes to see received, and of receiving those whom He does

not approve, unless Christ had instituted Holy Baptism, by which He Himself declares to the Church—provided it is willing to administer the sacred act simply as His faithful organ, *i.e.* according to His commission—that He on His part wishes the child to be regarded as belonging to His communion, and to impart to it the benefits of His substitution. If the Church is so attentive to His gracious will as to perform baptism, wherever the offer of it cannot be refused without coming into collision with Christ's loving will, it is also certain that every baptized one, who does not openly reject its blessing subsequently, is to be regarded as received by Christ, and therefore is also to be acknowledged by the church. Living membership in it is not grounded in the will of the church, and just as little in the will of the individual himself; but reception by Christ is the fundamental, the first condition. But His purpose of reception is revealed out of the depths of eternity in time through the baptism of His institution, in reference to which His church is merely the organ. This act is irrevocable on the part of God and Christ until man's unbelief definitively rejects baptismal grace. God remains true to the baptismal covenant. If the baptized one falls into sin, which is not sin against the Holy Ghost, the way of return to baptismal grace stands open to him in repentance. He needs no second baptism—which would be a declaration of the invalidity of the first—or a second supplementary sacrament. Reception into Christ's communion, and reception into the Church, therefore, ought not to be separated.

2. But then all depends on knowing the way in which the Church ought to administer Christ's commission, in order that no human caprice may insinuate itself, but the Church may be simply an organ of His will in this act. Since Christian grace is universal by intrinsic tendency, all men are certainly designed for baptism, and mistake on this point might thus seem impossible. This view is true in the sense that Christ will let no baptized one suffer for the mistake of the Church, nor is a second baptism required, or the baptism performed to be declared invalid. But the Church must seek to be as far as possible the executant of His will; and the universal tendency of grace decides nothing as to the

time when the individual shall be baptized, for here *election* has its place (§ 130). Here it must first of all be laid down, that the Church ought not to baptize every one on whom it can lay hands—the unwilling, or children of unwilling parents; for by divine ordinance the access of the Church to the children lies through the parents as God's representatives. Here also, according to the Evangelical view, the ordinances of the first creation are not abolished by the second. It is unseemly to unite Holy Baptism with an act of resistance on man's part. Enforced baptism would be an object of contempt instead of a blessing. Only a magical theory could recommend such arbitrariness and violence. Precisely because baptism contains a blessing which claims for itself the whole life, its distribution ought not to be conjoined with a violence injurious or possibly fatal to the first germs of the blessing.[1] In the case of adults, not merely must willingness to submit to the outward action be required, but also a preparation by which they may learn the meaning of the action, and be led to conscious desire for it. On the *other hand*, it is just as erroneous to require antecedent regeneration and the signs of it in the candidate for baptism. If regeneration already exists, the only meaning left to baptism itself is to confirm what has been done. If it is only right to administer it, provided regeneration is certainly present, it would not be valid if it took place before regeneration. But since the presence of regeneration is not discernible with absolute certainty, neither could the Church ever baptize with absolute certainty, nor the baptized one build upon it as a divine seal of his reception into Christ's communion. And supposing the regenerate one afterwards to fall into temptation, it would be only too natural for him to regard himself as baptized illegally; and baptism, instead of being a firm anchor of faith, as it was to Luther, would rather be a memorial of heavier sin. Add to this, what is already implied, that all faith, which is unable to base itself on the objective attestation of God's prevenient grace, remains exposed to temptations, from which it is most certainly saved by remembering the

[1] On the ground of the inseparableness of baptism from διδάσκειν and the Word as a means of grace, Höfling rightly condemns its administration where there is no prospect of the necessary consequence—the διδάσκειν—following.

certain fact (*Factícität*) of baptism having taken place. *Finally*, it is objectionable with *Schleiermacher* to make the coincidence of regeneration and baptism the ideal of baptism. Since the church ought to come as near to the ideal as possible, the inference from this theory would be, that it should delay baptism until the probability of this coincidence is present. It would also mean, that regeneration is not the effect of baptism, else baptism would precede it, but only takes place parallel with baptism, although not under its influence. Further, such maturity would in this case be required for baptism, that every one baptized must forthwith be a full-grown member of the church; but to such full-grown maturity long preparation is necessary, in which the blessing of antecedent baptism itself may take the chief share. Therefore, to make the coincidence spoken of the ideal of the church, were to deny that Christian grace, in virtue of its prevenient character (§§ 129, 130), originates even the preparations for regeneration; whereas it was formerly shown, that Christianity is also the perfect law and principle of repentance (§ 130, c. 2, § 131), and need not calculate on a pre-Christian truth proceeding and working alongside itself, since it is itself the all-comprehending truth. The specifically Christian truth must co-operate to saving repentance. The Christian grace embraces also a sphere of Christian pædagogy. Christ would not have the mature alone reckoned among His disciples, and therefore not in the kingdom in which He rules,[1] although all are to become mature, which will be realized best if Christ provides for their training and growth from the beginning. From this it also follows, that Holy Baptism finds more complete expression as the cause of regeneration precisely where regeneration and baptism do not coincide; but where the former follows the latter, in such a way, however, that baptism constantly enters as a living factor into the process of regeneration as well as introduces it. Certainly if a human performance were the point at issue in baptism, *i.e.* were confession of sin and faith this performance, which must precede baptism by its very idea, then would the reception of the man only be justified after confession and faith, and baptism would be a sort of vow. But in this case baptism would fall primarily into the sphere

[1] Matt. xviii. 6 ff.; cf. xi. 25, 28 ff.; Acts ii. 38.

of requirement or performance; it would not be primarily a gift, but a law like the baptism of John. But on this view the prevenient character of the gospel would be obscured at the very moment of entrance into Christianity. It would seem as if God's grace were unable to offer itself to man as he is, *i.e.* as a still unconverted, unregenerate sinner, and declare to him, that God *is* reconciled with him in Christ. Rather we should thereby affirm, that a transformation or performance of man is necessary before the offer of salvation, whereas this transformation will be effected by the offer, which not merely demands but has the power to produce faith. Faith cannot arise without the object which it has to lay hold of; but the object is the offered salvation, the earnest and sufficient offer of which in God's sight is made precisely in baptism. If, therefore, as already stated, the church ought only to baptize in the case of adults, *e.g.* on mission-ground, when it perceives the conscious desire for baptism, the reason of this must not be sought in the fact that the Christian grace, before it can offer itself, presupposes subjective dispositions or performances (such as Romish teaching requires for the sacrament of Penance, which is supposed to form a substitute for the sacrament of Baptism alleged to have been rendered inoperative), but only that the baptizing church may be assured that it is not baptizing men against their will, the inwardly unreceptive or hypocritical. Therefore, in saying that in Holy Baptism according to its strict idea we have to do not primarily with an antecedent performance of the candidate, or with an already existing mutual relation between Christ and man, but with the establishing of a relation of *Christ* to man, we simply remain in harmony with the conclusions reached in the doctrine of Justification (§ 132). In baptism Christ gives expression on His part to His prevenient purpose of love; He establishes communion, and that in the substitutionary spirit which desires to represent the sinner before God for the purpose of making him a personal partaker in God's favour. Since no human performance is the essential element in baptism, it follows that the church may and ought to baptize wherever baptism is legally sought at its hands, and where, instead of resistance, receptiveness for the Christian salvation is to be presupposed; and

in taking such a course, it is assured of being in conformity with Christ's declared will. But receptiveness for salvation is already part of human nature universally (because it is designed for Christ as well as needs Him), provided no sinful resistance has developed itself subsequently, with which of course baptism cannot coalesce. Hence the apostolic practice was not to delay baptism until regeneration or its approach was discernible, but regeneration was expected as the effect of baptism. No one, it is true, can become a living, personal member of the kingdom of heaven without regeneration; but for this reason Christ can on His part by way of anticipation, and therefore at first on one side only, begin the fellowship by His regenerating grace, by His blessed greeting of love, as He did once,[1] and give expression to its beginning in order that it may become mutual.

3. EFFECTS OF BAPTISM.—Holy Baptism is a dogma only because it is a manifestation of something eternal, although in the individuality of space and time, a manifestation of eternal grace in individual application, of the love of the Triune God to the person of the candidate, who is made partaker not merely of reconciliation, but also of sonship to God. Baptism cannot be understood by a dead deistic line of thought, which severs God from the world and Christ from humanity. Its meaning only discloses itself to one who sees Christ still livingly present and ruling in due order in His house. The divine purpose of love, which finds expression in baptism, embraces not merely communion with God in Christ, but the infinitude of blessings destined for man; and everything which grace lavishes on man must be regarded as an outcome of the grace imparted or promised to man in baptism or of *baptismal grace*. Consequently, the effect of baptismal grace is not to be limited to that for which receptiveness exists at the moment of the act, but it includes also the faithfulness of God to His promises for the future; and the unfolding of grace in the subsequent life is part of the baptismal blessing, the performance on God's part of the baptismal covenant. Baptism lays the foundation, which must continue active and vital for the whole life. Through the impartation and promise of the complete grace being given and prefixed

[1] Mark x. 13 ff.

in the baptism of the child, in order that its blessing may be appropriated moment by moment, it is possible for the entire development of men to proceed from the first on a uniform plan, for the entire conscious life to be passed in the light of Christianity. That baptism cannot reveal all its powers at the temporal moment of the outward act, is not its weakness, but its wealth, by which the whole life must be adorned, which Luther meant when he said: "The whole life of the Christian is meant to be a continuous baptism."[1] From this it follows, that the genesis of conscious faith and regeneration is brought about in the most normal and happy manner under the influence of the baptismal blessing, and therefore under the consciousness of having been received preveniently by Christ's love. But further, we stand in need of the substitution of Christ in respect of the after-workings of the old man, for by baptism deliverance is given indeed from guilt and punishment, but not from sin. But, in accordance with the baptismal covenant, Christ's substitution and intercession, and the will of God to regard us as justified, still continue in respect of these after-workings of sin; and there is no need of the sacraments of Confirmation, of Penance with priestly absolution, and Extreme Unction, interpolated by the Catholic Church without scriptural ground as a substitute for the nominal baptismal grace which was at once forfeited. All these give no security, and what they promise is contained more fully and richly in the sacrament of Baptism than in that which the Catholic Church obtains by those supplementary means. After every new fall, the Christian may and ought to recur to the grace of baptism or to the baptismal covenant, assured of the abiding significance of baptism on the part of a faithful God.

4. Absolutely *necessary* to salvation certainly outward baptism is not. The disciples of the Lord scarcely received it from Christ, and the baptism of John was not Christian baptism. Hence also the church, distinguishing essence and form, teaches that the *baptismus flaminis* or *sanguinis* (the outpouring of the Holy Spirit or a martyr's death) may be a substitute for the *baptismus fluminis*. Further, the Evangelical Church rightly teaches, that not the want but the

[1] *Cat. Maj.* 548.

despising of baptism is damnable, from which it follows that the non-baptized children of non-Christians are not (as the Synod of Carthage in the year 418 supposed in a critically suspected canon) to be regarded as condemned. But still it must be held that every one must receive that which constitutes the *essence* of baptism, either in this world or the next. This essential element may be given in very different ways, but it consists in the outward reception into Christ's communion realized through an historic act. In the case of the disciples this act took place through their invitation by Christ Himself to follow Him and their reception into His communion with the promise of the Holy Spirit. Thus they are to be regarded as really baptized. A similar judgment perhaps must be held respecting the children (Mark x. 13 ff.) whom Jesus took into His arms and blessed. How God will impart that essential element to man depends on His *free* choice, not on our caprice. And for this reason the so-called baptism *in extremis* may be justified,[1] although not so as to imply that those dying unbaptized must on this account be lost. *Necessitas baptismi non est absoluta, sed ordinata.* But we must adhere to the ordinance instituted by Christ, the necessity and blessing of which we now see.

Observation.—The later theology of the 17th century distinguished in baptism, after the analogy of the Holy Supper, the *materia terrestris*, the water, and the *materia cœlestis*, which was thought to be now the Trinity, now the Spirit, and the *sanguis Christi* as well, which were united by Gerhard (ix. c. v. p. 133 f.) and Quenstedt (iv. 110). The latter cannot be proved on biblical grounds, and is therefore objected to by others. But, in general, the theory of a *materia cœlestis* in the water of baptism comes near the theory of Thomas and the Dominicans contested by Luther: "Deum spiritualem virtutem aquæ contulisse et indidisse, quæ peccatum per aquam abluat," *Art. Sm.* v. p. 329.

§ 141.—*Infant-Baptism.*

Infant-baptism is not merely permitted in the case of those born within the Christian church, but corresponds more

[1] J. Gerhard, *Loci Th.* tom. ix. p. 198 ff.; cf. Höfling, ii. 296 ff.

completely than late baptism to the idea of baptism (§ 140), and is therefore the right mode of administering baptism for a church that has gained such insight, apart from the field of missions.

1. The church ought not to be satisfied with regarding infant-baptism as something merely permitted. The merely permitted is an intermediate region, which vanishes before full knowledge, either falling back into the region of the forbidden or advancing to the divinely willed. It sprang first of all from the need of regarding the children of Christian parents as belonging to Christ, not merely on the ground of the will of the church but of Christ Himself, and of regarding the age of childhood as consecrated and hallowed by Christ, who lived through and hallowed all the periods of our life.[1] The natural bonds between parents and children are not reduced to insignificance in Christianity, but acknowledged in their importance, as was done even in the O. T. by circumcision.[2] These bonds are not simply left by Christian parents to their quiet unconscious influence, but contain a definite hint to them, that they should present their children to Christ, nay, that through them God wishes their children brought into the number of Christ's disciples, a sign of His grace directed towards children.[3] This natural connection involves the duty, and therefore the right, of parents to present their children to Christ. To say in objection, that consecration in reference to children is already implied in the natural connection, and that baptism is therefore needless for them,[4] would be to attach more importance to the bond of nature connecting children with Christian parents, and thus indirectly with Christ, than to a direct bond of union with Christ. But the former view would only be sufficient on the supposition of parents ascribing the power of consecration to *themselves*. On the other hand, the more that parents and the church are conscious of their needy condition and dependence on

[1] According to the speculative thought of Irenæus. See Martensen, § 255.

[2] Acts ii. 39; 1 Cor. vii. 14.

[3] This may be gathered from 1 Cor. vii. 14, and O. T. circumcision.

[4] The appeal to 1 Cor. vii. 14 is not relevant, because there the mixed marriage might hinder the baptism.

Christ, the more must they go back in behalf of their children, not to their own substitutionary consecration, but to Christ's alone sufficient substitution, seek His blessing, and cling to its expression in the baptism of the Lord's own institution, which of itself points to Christ's substitutionary death and life. All the more have Christian parents the right to seek Christ's blessing and consecration, as the presenting of their children accords with His mind; for He did not reject the parents who presented their children to Him, that He might touch them, lay His hands on them and pray for them, as if He could do nothing with them, or they had nothing to do with Him, but He said: "Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of God," and He had compassion on them, laid His hands upon them and blessed them.[1] This blessing and reception into His love might take the place of baptism to them. Thus, then, the church in conformity with His institution offers itself to Him as an organ for the continuance of His purpose, that through its hands He may baptize the little ones and take them into His arms as His possession. The church cannot be poorer than the synagogue; the new covenant cannot express less love than the covenant of circumcision, whose benefits applied also to children. The first sermon of Peter alluded to this.[2] At the same time, the natural fellowship of the parents renders this service, that their recollection of the child's baptism is a substitute for the child's own knowledge, and in due time this knowledge is communicated to the child after self-consciousness is awakened. But the knowledge of Christ's prevenient love is effective and fruitful in bringing about desire for communion with the Redeemer, and therefore regeneration, through faith.

Observation.—Since the infant-baptizing church offers itself to Christ in accordance with His will as an organ in bringing children into His kingdom, and desires to see its own faith reproduced through intercession in them, it may even be said in a certain sense, that Christ desires to regard their faith as substitutionary, *i.e.* as security for their children until the time of maturity. For this is the nature of childhood, that

[1] Mark x. 13–16. Cf. Matt. xix. 13–15.
[2] Acts ii. 38, 39. Cf. Luke xix. 9; Acts xvi. 15, 31, 33.

the religion of the parents is in the first instance transmitted to the children with a sort of physical certainty, of course in an impersonal manner as to religious meaning. But this inheritance has already a value and co-operates in the origination of *fides specialis*, belonging to the region of impersonal and unconscious, although salutary workings of grace.[1]

2. That the church has a good conscience in baptizing infants, and rightly regards itself as in unity with the divine will, is readily evident, whether the matter be considered on the side of Christ or the church or the child. *First*, of Christ. If late baptism is required, it is required because preparations are deemed necessary before Christian grace itself can have a place. But to deny to Christianity that it is meant to cover the entire life, is to deny its absoluteness, and implies that we must first belong to a religion preparatory to Christianity. That Christianity is the absolute religion, embracing within itself all religious truth and power, finds its most perfect expression in infant-baptism. In the same way, in it the nature of prevenient grace is set in the clearest light. In infant-baptism the church opposes the notion that Christian grace does not hold good for childhood. Children are indeed but imperfect Christians, but still they are Christians, because Christ has received them.

As to the *Church*, in refusing baptism to children, it would not do sufficient honour to its own mission and to Christ's right in children. If it supposed that it deprived them of nothing because of its desire to give them a Christian education, it would place reliance on its own influences without basing itself on Christ's grace, and incur the danger of putting itself in Christ's place. The child taken into His arms, and consecrated by Christ Himself, forms also quite another obligation to the work of Christian education than mere human bonds can do.

Finally, in virtue of Christ's all-embracing purpose of grace, the *individual* within Christendom has a right to claim that no

[1] This security of the church, in the entire absence of which baptism would be out of the question, is embodied in the form of an institution in the sponsorial relation, cf. Höfling, ii. 230. §§ 132, 133. An obligation for the child is contained in the *sponsio* of the sponsors only in so far as faith in Christ is to be regarded as a universal human duty.

portion of his life shall be outside Christianity. This is secured to him by infant-baptism. Loving education, along with the refusal of baptism, would be no compensation. Withal, the consciousness of having been the object of Christ's prevenient love is the effectual means for begetting faith, and for responding to the fellowship established by Christ.

3. The history of infant-baptism (§ 139) has certainly shown us the difficulty of preserving a Christian doctrine of infant-baptism free from opposite errors; and this difficulty is specially emphasized on the Baptist side. Nevertheless, the *reasons* urged by Baptists against infant-baptism are not conclusive, but to some extent prove the opposite. They are partly *Biblical*, partly *dogmatic* and *ethical*.

First of all, the exegetical reasons in favour of late baptism are not conclusive. If, as must be conceded, the baptism of adults was the custom in the apostolic age, the reason was the same as holds good at present in the mission field. Since the way to the children lies through the parents, Christianity first of all necessarily addressed itself to adults. But even adults had again to become children in order to receive the blessing of baptism, and the willingness or the desire to be baptized was sufficient. Or was it possible for the apostles at Pentecost to preface the baptism of the 3000 candidates by an examination of their faith?[1] In instituting baptism,[2] Christ does not set up as a universal rule: "Teach first and then baptize," but: "Make disciples" (μαθητεύσατε); and how this is to be done, is said in the following words which connect for this end the two means of grace, Word and Sacrament: "Baptizing and teaching" (all nations)—two requirements, respecting the necessary order of which the passage is meant to decide nothing, for that adults are first taught is grounded in the nature of the case. On the other hand, the necessity of teaching always coming first can all the less be inferred from the passage, as it puts baptism first. A disciple is one received into training by Christian grace; children also belong to nations. The passage thus intimates that Christianity not

[1] Cf. Acts ii. 41. The words (viii. 37), "If thou believest with thy whole heart, thou mayest be baptized," etc., received in the Elzevir editions, are most probably to be regarded as spurious.

[2] Matt. xxviii. 19. Cf. Mark xvi. 15.

merely seeks existence in adult, individual persons, but seeks also to have a national form. Moreover, the passage in Mark describes all humanity (the κόσμος, the κτίσις) as the object of training by Christianity, and connects baptism with the preaching of the gospel in such a way that the case is contemplated of baptism taking place without the presence of faith, for the meaning of the words (which for the rest are not words of institution) is: "He who believes and is baptized shall be saved, but he who believes not, although baptized, shall be damned." Here the case is conceived as possible, that one is baptized without faith, therefore prior to faith. Not this is blamed, but the being found at the judgment in unbelief. Such an one is lost, because he had a call to baptism and the possibility of believing. Further, not merely in a general sense does the love of Jesus extend to children, but He says expressly: "Of such is the kingdom of heaven," *i.e.* the nature peculiar to childhood is specially suited to the kingdom of God, because there no abnormal tendency is actual or established; on the contrary, trustful surrender is natural.[1] Little as any one is a citizen of the heavenly kingdom by his natural birth and descent, still Christianity is meant for families and nations, and has therefore established an institution for inviting all humanity into God's kingdom. "To you and your children is this promise."[2] The objective natural connection consecrates the children of Christian parents with a view to their being conducted with the parents to the communion of Christ, and reception into His communion takes place ordinarily through *baptism*.

When the *dogmatic* idea of the Church as the *Societas fidei et Spiritus Sancti* is alleged in favour of late baptism, and it is inferred therefrom that the Church ought to consist only of the regenerate, to whom infants do not belong, on the other hand it must be remembered that the Church is without infallible means of knowing who is really believing and regenerate. Therefore it cannot be its duty to set up such a standard of membership in the Church as would exclude every one who is not regenerate. Rather to it is the command given: "Let both grow together until the harvest."[3] More-

[1] Cf. Matt. xviii. 10, 14; Luke xviii. 15 f. [2] Acts ii. 38, 39.
[3] Matt. xiii. 30. More fully on this point, § 148.

over, a pædagogic side belongs essentially to the Church. It only answers to its idea when it seeks and cherishes fellowship with those who are still without the gospel. But thus there grows up around it a receptive circle of germinant disciples of the Lord, who can all the less be excluded from the Church, as the degree to which individuals partake in the Holy Ghost is not discernible to the human eye. But children may very well belong to the number of the receptive. Just as little does infant-baptism necessarily imply magical ideas. It is wrong to assert that all gracious workings of the Spirit before faith, or before the consciousness which can alone appropriate them, are magical.[1] There is also a sphere of unconscious workings in the natural ground of the soul. Certainly salvation cannot become a personal possession without faith, and therefore without consciousness. But even the Baptist theory, unless it passes into Pelagianism, must require workings of the Spirit in order to regeneration, and these workings precede the consciousness of Christian grace, else the consciousness itself could not be the work of grace. Without the calling into existence of living receptiveness, no receiving or consciousness of grace could take place. Further, in infant-baptism the personal appropriation of the salvation promised to the subject in the offer is perfectly reserved. But believing acceptance will take place most securely on the basis of God's prevenient grace, such as finds its expression in baptism.

This leads to the objections on *ethical* grounds. When it is said: "Infant-baptism forestalls free decision, since plainly the child cannot decide freely for itself," the question must be asked: "How is it to come to a good and free decision?" Is the freedom of the decision alone of importance, and not its goodness? If we have the firm assurance that Christianity is the true and saving religion, and if it is acknowledged that true freedom need not be injured by an influence whose

[1] Kliefoth in his *Theorie des Cultus der evang. Kirche*, with whom Höfling here agrees (ii. 229), rightly reminds us, that it is an illusion due to that period of our life when everything comes to us through reflection, to suppose that the Spirit of God can only come to us through thought and consciousness. Only he goes too far in making a faith worthy of the name come into existence through the Holy Spirit without consciousness and will. Cf. Steitz, *Theol. Realencycl.*, Art. *Taufe*.

aim is a good decision, it cannot be a duty, nay, not even morally justifiable, to submit all other possible religions to choice, thus smoothing the way for a false decision. A free appropriation of Christianity is possible, through man being in circumstances to decide freely for or against it. But this freedom is not limited by infant-baptism. On the other hand, it is necessary to a free decision for man to know what Christianity is about. Now this is made known by infant-baptism. The characteristic essence of Christianity is the prevenient manifestation of the love of God and Christ. But thus its essence is revealed by the prevenient offer of a present grace of God, not of one merely to be hoped for. Nay, it is this manifestation of love that first places man again on the ground of freedom, and makes a free decision possible to him (§§ 129, 130). For the prevenient grace, contained in baptism, releases man from the power of the sinful generic connection and of his own sinful nature. For these reasons, the Evangelical Church has a good conscience in so acting as to aim at a good decision with the greatest possible certainty, without being willing or able to exclude the possibility of a bad decision. Of course it dispenses baptism only in connection with Christian intercession and education, which even conscientious Baptists do not omit, and that without fearing any damage to freedom therefrom. But in its activity the church desires to base itself on Christ's injunction, on His activity in receiving men, and not to ascribe to itself the power to communicate the Holy Spirit.

Finally, it is said: The infant child can as yet receive nothing spiritual, therefore the sacred action performed on it is empty and objectionable. But infant-baptism is no empty ceremony. It would not be such even if it merely possessed significance for the moment of baptism. But it is rather an institution of Christ of such a kind as to be an expression of the eternal, faithful purpose of grace preveniently applied to the child. Or will any one assert that the child is not already an object of the loving purpose of Christ, the children's friend? Even the child is still a human being, distinguished from a merely animal creature by the essential relationship of its soul to God. There wants not, therefore, an object, to which by baptism Christ can apply and assure His love, which is in-

finitely more than if the Church merely had the consciousness of Christ's universal love and represented it to the child. The fact of Christ having received the child through His institution into gracious covenant with God can and ought to be made known to the child by the Church, and especially by the Christian parents, with the first awakening of its human consciousness. Or can it be necessary for sin first to come to actual development in man, and in the same way error on the side of consciousness, before baptism can be performed on him? The fact of the reception of the child in Christ's name and authority into the covenant of grace, which is immoveable on God's side, is a fact full of meaning, destined historically to penetrate into the life of the child and stamp a distinctive character on its self-consciousness—a treasure great enough to fertilize and enrich the whole life. Although the child may still lack the consciousness of how rich it is through the love of Christ revealed respecting it and personally holding good to it, Christ's prevenient love depends as little on its consciousness as on its will. But precisely in its preveniency lies the kindling force, the power which it has to awaken in due time faith and love in personal form; and the normal origin of faith and regeneration has to take place on the basis of the offer and assurance of salvation necessarily preceding them, but actually made in baptism. Consequently all depends, as Luther teaches, on seeing in it the revelation of something eternal in the individual moment of space and time in order to its becoming a historical power, and therefore on contemplating the benefit and effect of baptism *sub specie æternitatis*. Whoever apprehends baptism in this way cannot measure its benefit by what may be subjectively and consciously appropriated by man at the moment of baptism. Withal, the appropriation following the baptismal act must itself be regarded as the effect of baptismal grace. Accordingly baptism is the sacrament which carries in itself the powers of regeneration from the preparatory workings of salvation up to the goal. All this is merely the manifesting and revealing of the love of Christ, whose fundamental exercise is in baptism. Through the promise holding good to him, the baptized one receives in baptism a claim, conferred by God Himself, to Christ's faithful purpose of grace; but this purpose

he has on his part to affirm and appropriate by conscious volition. Consequently, within the circle of Christendom baptism must occupy the position, where all the workings of grace may most certainly appear as the outflow of Christ's purpose to receive the child into His communion. And in response to a request on sufficient grounds the Church must baptize so early, that all its influences on the child in intercession, education, and instruction may be based not on the choice and power of the Church, or on the disposition and ripeness of the child, but in the last resort on the grace of Christ made known in the sacrament, and solemnly pledged by Christ, or on the fact, that through baptism in His name Christ *has* already declared that He regards the child as an object of His goodwill.

B.—*The Church as a Reflection of the Substitutionary Love of Christ, or the Confirming Church.*

§ 142.

The high-priestly love of Christ, continued in Holy Baptism, is also the principle of all the priestly spirit which reflects Christ in the Church. On this above all is based intercession, and also all *condescending* love in the Church which is reflective of Christ. Such love has its sphere of activity on behalf of the needy in a material and spiritual respect, partly in a free, partly in an organized form. But it embraces principally the entire sphere of training immature into mature members of the Church, the divisions of which are Pædagogy and Catechesis (Education and Instruction). It is here proved, that the most perfect administration of baptism is that by which it becomes possible to place the entire development of life under the dominion of Christian grace; and thus it is made no less clear that the Baptizing Church is only a reflection of the love of Christ by becoming a Confirming Church.

1. All love has in it a substitutionary spirit.[1] On the other hand, all spiritual development in man is brought about by the mature spiritual life at first living and working vicariously in the still weak and merely germinant life, in order by the nourishment supplied to awaken independent life in the latter. The reflecting of Christ's high-priestly office by the church has therefore endless scope for exercise. But it cannot show its substitutionary character so well in the relation of equal to equal, as in its relation to the unequal. By putting itself on a level with the needy or inferior by sympathy and communication, and therefore as active love in the relation of inequality, it seeks to effect an equality for the purpose of intensive fellowship in love.

2. The wide spheres here brought into view are, firstly, of a *free* kind. Here come in all informal, casual, unconnected activities of substitutionary love in a material and spiritual respect (Beneficence, Christian Associations of every kind, Home Missions). But the Church has also to provide for a fixed system of charity, and to organize itself for this purpose. Here comes into view in a material respect the regular provision for widows, orphans, sick, and all sufferers. The earliest church organized the diaconate before it organized its government and administration.[2] It called the poor the altar of the church, in order to express the priestly character of care for the poor. This is in a peculiar sense the duty of the Church,[3] not of the State; for its principle is to endeavour through the spirit of love to effect an equalization (although not an identification) of the distinctions in the community, whereas the primary duty of the State is to guard the distinctions. The parable of the merciful Samaritan shows that diversity of faith is no limit to Christian love. On the contrary, such diversity is a challenge to it to communicate not merely material good, but also the highest good—the Gospel—by missions among non-Christians. Nor is Christian love communicative merely according to the degree of good desert. It imitates God, who makes His sun to shine on the just and

[1] § 120 f. [2] Acts vi. 1 ff.

[3] Cf. Schleiermacher's *Predigten über den christlichen Hausstand.* The function of the State is not to be beneficent but just, and therefore to guard the right of the personality to self-preservation.

unjust. But of course one of its inner laws is, not to salve spiritual wounds by material gifts, but by material to pave the way for mental and spiritual gifts. A further inner law is, that according to the apostolic saying we are to do good to every man, but chiefly to kinsmen in faith as well as in blood.[1] Christian love acknowledges therefore degrees in love and in the duty of showing love. In a spiritual respect, the high-priestly spirit of Christ is reflected in everything belonging to care for the souls of others, to care for souls in the widest sense, chiefly in education and instruction. The spirit of vicarious love is the soul of all labour of the Christian educator and teacher. This substitutionary love of the church takes an organized form, on the basis of baptism and especially of infant-baptism, in regulated Christian labour in maturing the immature members of the Church by Christian *education* and *instruction* in school and Church. Baptism shows the end and the method. The *end* is sonship to God as a conscious possession and exercise, and therefore free Christian personality, which has to reveal itself along all the radii of the spirit. Education has to take into view the totality of man, and that under the viewpoint of the will, which requires *discipline* along with positive excitation. The organization of Church-instruction is *Catechesis*. The *method* for both is determined by the end. As the latter is free personality, all drill and mechanism, all forced schooling, is excluded as mere compulsion to legality. On the other hand, it is authority of a substitutionary kind, which presents the right contents to the immature spirit. Hence good, fixed habits and training to obedience are essential to the forming of Christian character. To declare of full age on any other basis than that laid in Holy Baptism does not strengthen and collect, but scatters the powers of freedom. But if infant baptism implies that not merely the world of adults but also the child-world, nay entire nations, are to be laid hold of by Christianity, the demand for a system of *national* Christian education is a logical inference.

3. The *substitution* of the Church for the individual has its place in reference to immaturity, but its end is maturity. The Church is substitutory for the individual, in so far as

[1] Gal. vi. 10; 1 Tim. v. 8.

that, where infant-baptism obtains, it vicariously preserves the knowledge of his baptism, of his reception into Christ's fellowship. But it not merely communicates this knowledge to the individual when consciousness is awakened, but employs and renders it fruitful through its intercession and its love exercised in education and instruction. But this activity culminates in *Confirmation*. The latter is neither a repetition nor substitute, nor supplementing of the sacrament of Baptism.[1] The sacrament lacks nothing in itself or objectively, since it possesses abiding significance. Rather the purpose of Confirmation is to supply something lacking on the subjective side, and necessarily lacking in infant-baptism. This something, however, so little confers its validity on the sacrament, that the blessing of Confirmation must rather be regarded as the outflow of baptism. The work of the confirming Church is not to communicate the Holy Spirit. Express divine institution and promise are wanting to Confirmation. The Church has simply to labour for this, that the baptized one by faith, confession, and practical vows may on his part make the covenant concluded with him on God's part a reality, in order that the communion preveniently formed by Christ in baptism may become *mutual*. *By this means the believer is qualified to be a guest at the Holy Supper.* Confirmation as an act of the Church is under this aspect a testimony to admission to the Holy Supper, *i.e.* a testimony to personal fitness for receiving all the spiritual blessings of the church. But it is not on this account a testimony to fitness for acting in and upon the Church, for which a more mature physical age is necessary.

THIRD POINT.

A.—*The Continuation of the Kingly Office of Christ, or the Holy Supper.*

§ 143.

The Holy Supper is not merely a memorial-sign of Christ's meritorious suffering and death, but in allusion to the Passover, of which it is the completion, the N. T. com-

[1] Cf. §§ 140, 141.

munion- or covenant-meal between Christ the *Head* and His people on the one hand, and between believers among themselves on the other,—a meal prepared by the Lord Himself, who—at once Giver and gift—imparts His body and blood to His guests in order to the closest union with Him and with each other.

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I.—*Biblical Doctrine.*

1. The Holy Supper is a sacred action designed for repetition, instituted by Christ before His final passion by way of bequest,[1] in any case in allusion to the Passover, whatever the relation of the Passover to the day of Christ's death. He marks its high significance by this among other things, by making it the expression and setting forth of the new covenant[2] in distinction from the old, and consequently affirms that the prediction of a new covenant is fulfilled. The blood of the Paschal sacrifice blessed the Israelites only by external means, partly through sprinkling of the posts of

[1] Matt. xxvi. 26 f.; Mark xiv. 22–25; Luke xxii. 18–20; 1 Cor. x. 15 f., xi. 23–30. Cf. John vi.

[2] The cup is called the cup of the new covenant.

the houses, partly through sprinkling of the altar, in the case of the covenant-sacrifice (of which the Passover reminds) also through sprinkling the people. In the Supper, on the other hand, believers are to be made directly partakers of the body and blood of Christ as the true Paschal Lamb, and therewith of His personality, His merit and life. Certainly it is founded also in memory of Him, and this element ought not to be undervalued, precisely because it recalls most definitely the intention of Jesus, that it should be repeated. It is ordained in remembrance of Him, and therefore for the future. This is denied by *Rückert* (and by the Quakers in another form). The most trustworthy account, he thinks, is given by Mark and Matthew, from whom Paul and John diverge by intermixing the notion of a glorified body of Christ. The original state of the case, according to him, is as follows: "Moved by the thought of His sacrificial death and by love to His followers, and therefore by the thought of His departure, Christ desired to perform a symbolic action accompanied with prayer, and to include His disciples in it. As the prophet by the symbolic breaking of a stone pitcher symbolized the overthrow of the city,[1] so Christ by breaking the bread wished to symbolize His approaching death, and to invite His disciples before His death to undergo His death with Him. Christ as little thought of an institution for the future through the Supper as of a gift." But the conception of this meal as a sacred act meant to be repeated, undoubtedly goes back to the apostles, who have probability in their favour when they are summoned to give the true meaning of the Lord in preference to exegetes of the 19th century. The entire primitive Church without exception celebrated this meal as Christ's institution. Again, the text of the words and the symbols are incompatible with this interpretation, as with that of the Quakers, which assumes merely a teaching or promise of a spiritual gift clothed in sensuous language. Were the symbolizing of His death the chief matter, the cup also must be meant in some way to express the destroying of His life, like the bread which is broken. But since there is no mention of a pouring out of the wine, the parallelism of the action is inconsistent with this interpretation. The cup is drunk as the bread is

[1] Jer. xix. 10 f.

eaten. Rückert is unable to assign a meaning to either, because he supposes that no gift is in question. But why does Christ say: Take, eat, drink? Nor can the breaking of the bread mean principally the breaking of His body, for His body was not broken.[1] It is more natural to refer the breaking of the bread to the distribution for eating in common.[2] Paul desires the Lord's death to be announced through this meal until He come, and with him Luke records the addition: "Do this in remembrance of me."[3] The chief argument adduced by Rückert against the correctness of the conception held by the Church in all ages is: According to it, the first Supper could not be the same as the later one, which however must be required if the action on the eve of His passion were meant to be the institution of a permanent rite. Now, he says, Christ is no longer visible, the body belonging to His state of humiliation is now glorified. Conversely, He could not at that time communicate His glorified body, because He was not yet glorified. Consequently identity is in any case wanting between the Supper on that evening and the present one in the church, which latter is therefore without institution. Moreover, the natural body of Christ could not have been given on that evening, therefore the aim of the action is merely symbolical. The Church interpretation is only the result of a forced combination with the glorified body of Christ on the part of John and Paul. To this argument we cannot reply, that Christ's body was already glorified before His death.[4] Had Christ possessed His resurrection-body already in the Transfiguration on the Mount, the subsequent Resurrection, nay, even His death as a separation of the soul from the body, would be an illusion. The Transfiguration must be regarded not as a transforming of the substance, but simply as an irradiating of His bodily manifestation by the bursting forth of His inner glory. But a certain difference in the first Supper from the later one, an unrepeatableness of the former in certain respects, which must of course be conceded, does not do away with the essential identity. The first Supper may well be an instituting of the Supper which has to be repeated to some extent in another form. As Holy

[1] John xix. 33, 36. [2] Acts ii. 46. [3] 1 Cor. xi. 25, 26; Luke xxii. 19.
[4] Matt. xvii. would be appealed to in vain in favour of the notion.

Baptism has a progressive history from the O. T. and circumcision along with sacred washings onwards, and again from John's baptism and that of the disciples until Pentecost, when first the completion of baptism by the Holy Spirit took place, and as nevertheless an inner concatenation exists, by which the one form points by way of promise to the other, the Old Testament and Johannine form typically to the New Testament one as its fulfilment, so is it with the Holy Supper. The conception of the Supper is seeking its realization from the time of the Passover. In the latter, neither the expiation nor the communion with God was perfect and intrinsic; but still the highest solemnity even in the O. T. cultus was the eating at God's table, which is likewise the matter in question in the Holy Supper. But even after its institution the conception of the Supper has several stages of realization. The common element is, that Christ desires to make Himself a gift to those invited to God's table. The communion with God expressed typically in the O. T. is now communion with Christ, who desires to keep the Supper with His disciples, that He may give Himself to them without reserve. But He desires to give Himself as He is at the time, and this of course differs in different states.[1] In the state of Humiliation He cannot give what He gives in the state of Exaltation[2] as the glorified, kingly Host, although His body is the same, and although His people always receive what they have receptiveness for. The one form is ever typical, promissory of the following one, a circumstance already alluded to in the words at the institution, which speak of a new eating in His kingdom. Even at the first Supper He makes Himself over to them; there they possess and partake of His real bodily presence, His self-sacrificing love and faithfulness with the promise, that as He is now going to death for them, whom He calls friends, so He will remain the Mediator of the New Covenant for them. Thus His self-forgetting purpose of love, which desires to surrender itself for and to them, finds expression even in the first Supper. He gives Himself there to be partaken of in the way which the circumstances and their degree of receptiveness made possible. For He will only be completely in them, they will only be able to receive Him with complete intimacy, when He

[1] John xiv. 21 ff., xvi. 25. [2] John vii. 39, xvi. 7, xiv. 23, cf. xvii. 21–24.

is perfected and glorified, and when the Holy Spirit, whom He will send as Head and King of His people, has opened their inmost nature to Him. Hence, the further *second* stage is the breaking of bread in the Apostolic Church, or our present Holy Supper, which offers us more, because the glorified Lord as the Head of His people can now carry out His personal presence and loving surrender to us in an inward and spiritually real way. But in the *third* place, at the institution of the Supper He promises to come again, points again to a perfected Supper, which He will drink with them anew in His Father's kingdom.[1] In the Gospel of John also,[2] where the idea of the Holy Supper finds expression, He points to the last period when its full realization shall be seen for the first time. For these reasons the institution of the Holy Supper for the future, although not in a form always the same, is certain. But what, then, is the more precise meaning of the words of institution?

2. They are not handed down to us in uniform terms, from which it may justly be inferred, since the early church received these different forms without opposition, that they all contain what is essential. At least the essential part must not be discovered in that in which they vary. Now, that ἐστί may mean *signifies* is beyond question, and ought never to have been denied. In proof, it is enough to refer to the interpretation of the Parables. The meaning then certainly is: The bread is a figure of my body. But in the days of the Reformation the Schwabians rightly said, the question does not depend on this point. The typical part in the act can in no case be denied. The elements remain, and even the Romish Church cannot quite get rid of the "sign," only that it makes what remains after transubstantiation a mere sign even of the substance of the bread and wine. The chief point must lie in this, of what the bread and wine are meant to be a figure to us. If of that which as an object of remembrance is merely past and absent, as of the breaking of His body and shedding of His blood, this would lead to Zwingle's theory, according to which the Holy Supper is a

[1] Luke xxii. 30, cf. ver. 18; Matt. xxii. 2, xxv. 10, which in Rev. xix. 7 is called the marriage-supper of the Lamb.

[2] John vi. 44, 54–58, cf. xv. 4 ff., xiv. 23, xvii. 21 ff.

commemorative sign, associated with thanksgiving and confession. But in this case, as in Rückert's interpretation, the words, "Take, eat," would contain no meaning, or at least not a natural one, because believing, thankful commemoration is not a taking, but presupposes a having taken, while in itself it would be better regarded as an act in response. Were it said that the words have reference to the fruit of His death, the atonement, and were the commemoration of His death—supposed also to be a receiving or "taking" of this fruit—the forgiveness of sins, to this is opposed the consideration that before His atoning death Christ could not well say, "Take, eat" the fruit of my death. Moreover, the symbolism which thus results would be confused and indistinct. For the bread as broken would be a type of His death, His death again being a description of the forgiveness which is its fruit, and of which we are to partake. The elements also do not point with sufficient clearness to His dying, for, as already said, the wine is not poured out; and it is altogether an unusual phrase to say, that Christ's atonement is to be eaten and drunk. Since, then, the elements in the sacred act exist to be partaken of, and are partaken of, denoting consequently a gift to be received, and since the words, "Eat, drink," cannot mean a past or future gift, all that is left to be said is: *The symbolism denotes a present gift offered to be partaken of;* the elements are aliments. But that which is offered under the symbolic veil of the elements is described by Christ in the words "my body" and "my blood," by which, in opposition to anything merely ideal or merely material, is meant the entire reality of His personality, Christ Himself with body and blood; and in order to understand the full meaning of the act instituted for all future time, we must go back to the import of Christ's person in general, and its relation to believers as their Head, to His parable of the vine and branches, to His words of promise, such as: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them;" "Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world;"[1] further, to His exaltation to be the Head of the Church and the glorification of His entire person; finally, in general to His loving purpose, which desires to give

[1] Matt. xviii. 20, xxviii. 20.

Himself with princely generosity unreservedly to His people.[1] When we consider, further, that in the discourse at Capernaum[2] "flesh and blood," because synonymous with "body and blood," denotes His entire living real personality,[3] it is clear that under the symbolic veil of the elements He desires to give Himself to them in the full and entire reality of His person, and to invite them to partake of the same. Thus His loving purpose, expressed in the words of institution, is seen to be this: In true self-surrender to them He desires to be received by them and dwell in them as their potent principle of life.[4] The elements are symbols of the eating unto eternal life. The Holy Supper is therefore the meal of Christ's personal communion with believers, whom in the farewell discourses He therefore calls His "friends,"[5] as similarly the figure of the bridegroom and bride or husband and wife denotes a *mutual* life of two in each other.[6] The discourse in Capernaum is a proof that Christ had this institution in mind long before. It is true, according to that discourse, *faith* is able to partake of Christ's flesh and blood, without the presence of the outward elements;[7] but this must not be employed to depreciate the import of the Holy Supper, but rather to enhance the import of faith and of the Word of God, which faith grasps. Faith is already "spiritual eating," living communion with Christ, real participation in Him, the Word also as a means of grace conducting us to Christ. What value, again, belongs to the connection of sacramental signs with the Word and the spiritual gift, was discussed before.[8] The elements employed in the Supper are used also in other discourses to describe this complete living communion with Christ. The discourse at Capernaum joins on to the multiplication of loaves and the manna, and promises in His person, which offers itself to the participation of faith, a better bread from heaven.[9] And after the Supper, Jesus says the

[1] These passages prove also that, according to the meaning of Christ, the words of institution cannot signify giving a share in His body and blood apart from His soul or person.

[2] John vi.

[3] Like the σωματικῶς, Col. ii. 9.

[4] John xv. 4 ff., xiv. 20–23, xvii. 21.

[5] John xv. 15.

[6] Cf. Matt. ix. 15, xxv. 1; Mark ii. 19; Luke v. 34; Eph. v. 28–32.

[7] John vi. 29, cf. ver. 63.

[8] § 137.

[9] John vi. 47–51, cf. vi. 32.

same as regards the wine,[1] when He promises the sap, the vital forces of the vine, to the branches abiding in Him, in which the symbols of the Holy Supper find their clear interpretation.

§ 144.—*Continuation.*

II.—*Development of Ecclesiastical Doctrine.*[2]

1. Even in the Christendom of the first centuries there were very different conceptions of the Holy Supper, without any Church division being caused thereby, or uniformity of view being required,—especially a *symbolic* conception (*e.g.* in Origen, Tertullian, and Augustine), according to which the elements are signs of the Church or of the nourishing and sanctifying influence of the Logos, with whom believers are united, and on the other hand a *mystical* one (*e.g.* in Ignatius, Justin Martyr, Irenæus), which saw in the Supper a union not merely with the Logos, but with Christ and His glorified body. To Ignatius this meal was a φάρμακον ἀθανασίας. No more precise definition was given as to the relation of the elements to the Logos or to Christ. The above blessing for those celebrating in faith was viewed as connected with the sacred *action*, whether the elements were regarded merely as symbols of the Logos, or as media of the union with the actually present God-man.

It was in keeping with the indefiniteness and looseness of the relation of the elements to the thing, that the elements played an independent part alongside the sacrament as a communion, and were specially employed in divine worship. Since sacrificial gifts were also joined with the Supper as thankofferings for the benefits of Christ, the Holy Supper became a "Eucharist," and a sacrifice, certainly not of Christ, but of the earthly sacrificial gifts. The Supper was only changed into the *sacrificium* of the Mass after the earthly elements had vanished into a mere semblance through the

[1] John xv. 1 ff., cf. vi. 53.

[2] *Conf. Aug.* x.; *Apol.* 157; *Art. Sm.* 330; *Cat.* 380, 402, 551; *Epit.* 597 ff.; *Sol. Decl.* 724; *Heidelb. Cat.* Qu. 75 ff. Other passages of the Reformed Symbols in Augusti, pp. 73 ff., 99 ff., 105, 123, 137, 164, 193 ff., 244 ff., 256 ff., 304 ff., 377, 401 ff., 430.

transubstantiation-doctrine of Paschasius Radbert and Lanfranc. Christ's body and blood were put in their place, and treated in just the same way as the elements had been before, namely, as a sacrifice.

But long before this time it had become customary to recognize a miraculous mystery in the Holy Supper in the Greek Church also, which was moreover fond of deriving the highest blessings from the Logos. Even Cyril of Jerusalem and the scholar of the moderate Antiochians, Chrysostom, adhered to the view, that in the Holy Supper a mysterious connection of the God-man with the elements, not merely with the action, takes place; the relation of the elements to Christ's body and blood being described as μεταβολή. In itself this might be regarded as a rhetorical expression to exalt the elements after consecration in the eyes of faith; but in any case, such liturgical formulæ promoted the magical conception of a real transformation of the elements. Nevertheless the Greek doctrine remains distinct from the Romish transubstantiation. The latter makes the elements to be annihilated as to substance, and merely the semblance—the *species, figura*, of the same—to be left. The Greeks endeavour so to interpret the miracle[1] as to suppose the elements to continue, while holding a transference of them to the substance of the body and blood (not by human power, *e.g.* of the priest, but by the Holy Spirit), whereby they become accidents of this other substance. The transformation is therefore to be regarded as an implanting in another substance, which reminds us most of Justin Martyr, who makes the elements to be assumed by the God-man. The Greeks, however, notwithstanding the analogy of the Incarnation suggested here, reject the hypostatic union of Christ with the elements. The obverse, then, of this implanting in Christ's body and blood is, that Christ's body and blood sustain the elements and are present under their veil.[2]

[1] *Conf. Orthod.* ed. Kimmel, 169 ff.; *Confess. Dosith. Decr.* 17, p. 457 ff.; *Confess. Metrophanis Critopul.* p. 100.

[2] The Greek Church rejects a transformation in the sense of the identification of the elements with Christ's body and blood; it does not make the same happen to Christ's body and blood as happens to the elements in the act of partaking. This brings it near to the Lutheran doctrine. Only the latter declines to make the substance of the elements an accident in another substance,

2. In the sixteenth century the different conceptions of the Holy Supper, opposed to the Romish one, became the cause of church divisions. The farthest apart are the Romish and the Socinian view, with which that of Zwingle[1] is in affinity. They form extremes, but touch again in this respect, that both see chiefly in the Holy Supper a human performance, a work or a gift to God. According to Romish teaching,[2] through transubstantiation of the elements the consecrating priest obtains the object, which is then on one side presented to God in the sacrifice of the mass, and on the other partaken of. The sacrifice of the mass, taking place most frequently in the form of the silent mass, plays here a greater part than communion, which is further curtailed by withdrawal of the cup in opposition to the word, "Drink ye all of this." In the sacrifice of Christ eternally valid and potent without repetition the Evangelical Church has, without the mass-sacrifice of which the act of institution knows nothing, greater wealth than the Romish, and instead of the *mysterium tremendum* makes Christ's communion of love to be imparted to the believer. The magical character of the Romish doctrine thus ends in a similarity with Socinianism, namely in an Ergism [a doing], not indeed on the part of the individual, but of the Church, which out of the plenitude of its authority subordinates the receiving from God and Christ to a gift to God. The Socinians[3] of course see in the Holy Supper nothing sacramental, not even a strengthening of faith, but simply a sacred rite, in which, in thankful remembrance of Christ's death, faith is to be confessed and fellowship exhibited. To them it is a *signum professionis, tessera communionis,* able to minister admonition and encouragement to the individual. Zwingle, to whom the Holy Supper was a commemorative meal in connection with a sign of obligation, also regards it as a performance, keeping it therefore in the subjective sphere, and making of it an ethical sacrament, so

but accepts a *consubstantiatio* instead of *insubstantiatio*. On the difference indicated between the Greek μετουσίωσις and the Latin *Transubstantiatio*, the treatises of Steitz mentioned above, and a work of Professor Rhossis of Athens on the Holy Supper, should be compared.

[1] In the form in which he maintained it in the controversy with Luther.

[2] *Trident. sess.* 22.

[3] *Cat. Racov.* Q. 334 ff.; Socin. *De Cœna Domini.*

to speak, *i.e.* a sacrificial action. Nevertheless in his last years Zwingle returned to his former standpoint, according to which the Holy Supper is not merely a sign of a past thing and commemoration thereof, but a means of grace and present gift. The latter became the ruling type in the Reformed Symbols, especially through Calvin, who is herein at one with Luther. Calvin teaches that faith is raised by the Holy Spirit to Christ, in order to be fed and nourished from His divine-human substance, the result being the quickening of the spiritual man, and a blessing in relation to the resurrection. This reference in ancient Christendom to immortal life joins on naturally to the quickening of the believer's personality due to the Supper, and has been accepted by Lutheran dogmatists, especially since Hollaz, and in recent days eagerly defended as specifically Lutheran, whereas Luther did not emphasize this thought, perhaps because according to him unbelievers also partake of Christ's body and blood, whilst in reference to them Christ's body cannot have the resurrection-body for its effect.[1] With Luther, the body of Christ in the

[1] He could also dispense with it, because he ascribed an indirect influence even on the body to believing fellowship with Christ, *Cat. Maj.* 565. Luther indeed accepts already in 1523 the real presence of Christ's body and blood through mediation of the Word (Erlang. ed. vol. 28, p. 388 ff.), without, however, giving them an independent significance; they are to him merely a sealing or certifying of the real blessing of salvation. He regards them as a potent pledge of the atonement, because forgiveness was procured by them in their sacrificial character, and therefore depends on them, so to speak, as their effect and fruit (Walch, *Werke*, xx. p. 364 f.). In the *Treatise against the Heavenly Prophets* he says: We must get comfort for an evil conscience, not in the bread and wine, not in the body and blood of Christ, but in the Word which presents Christ's body and blood as given for us. Certainly Christ's body and blood are called again a treasure given for the forgiveness of sins, which is the other chief treasure (R. Schmidt, p. 403). But even then Christ's body and blood are not regarded as a special, priceless blessing, but only as the secure media for conveying forgiveness to us. But that Luther does not annex forgiveness exclusively to the sacrament is known well enough, following necessarily from his doctrine of the Word. The distinctive feature of the sacrament is the appropriation to the person, and to this the communicated body and blood of Christ are subservient. Several times Luther has described Christ's body and blood also as food, not merely as a sign (xx. 1046, 1055), by means of which immortality is imparted to the body (the chief passages in Schmidt, pp. 419–424; cf. Köstlin, *Luther's Theologie*, ii. 159–163, 516, and J. Müller, *Dogm. Abh.* 416 f.), but nothing is found of such an immediate influence on the resurrection-body in the Lutheran Confessions; and after the controversy with the Swiss, he is silent on this point.

Supper is not so much a blessing of independent significance[1] as rather a pledge of another—that of forgiveness (cf. *F. C.* 601, 744, 807). On the other hand, in the Reformed Symbols the importance of the Supper in reference to immortality or the resurrection is early mentioned.[2] The *Zwinglian* doctrine is maintained in none of the more widespread Reformed Symbols, although a moderateness averse to everything mystical gained ground to some extent in portions of the Reformed Church, which was also the case in various forms in the Lutheran Church after 1750. The common Evangelical doctrine may therefore be stated as follows: The taking of this meal is to believers a participation in Christ's living entire personality, which in any case is meant by the body and blood of Christ, since no party speaks of a partaking of the body and blood by themselves apart from the theanthropic person.[3] The *difference* between the two Evangelical Confessions relates to the way in which the elements and the invisible grace are supposed to be connected, on which also of course depends the relation of the sacrament to believers and unbelievers. The *Augsburg Confession* teaches: Quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint et distribuantur vescentibus in Cœna Domini. On the other hand, the *Variata* has: Quod cum pane et vino vere exhibeantur corpus et sanguis Christi vescentibus in Cœna Domini. The latter form wishes to leave room also for those who allow no partaking of Christ's body and blood on the part of unbelievers. The *exhibeantur* instead of *distribuantur* goes back to the doctrinal type of the Swabian Syngramma approved by Luther for a time, which teaches an equal offering (*offerre*) to all, even to unbelievers, but without asserting a partaking by the latter. In the same way the *Variata* wishes to leave room for difference of view

[1] Cf. R. Schmidt, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1879, 2. p. 191, 3. p. 392 f.

[2] *Gallic.* 36; *Helv.* 1566, c. 21; *Scot.* 21; *Heidelb. Cat.* Qu. 76. Cf. my notice of J. Müller, "Union," *Stud. u. Krit.* 1855.

[3] This is clear, *e.g.*, from *Form. Conc.* 600, 11. 747, 75. 752, 94. 754, 101. 102. 760, 126. 783, 78. Although Luther, in the heat of the contest for the real presence of the body and blood of Christ, puts the unity of His person and fellowship therewith in the background, emphasizing especially the body and blood, his meaning was not that Christ's person is absent, or the body and blood separated from it. In any case, the Lutheran Church holds fast in its Confession to their inseparableness from His person.

in reference to the mode of Christ's presence also assumed in the offering, and omits the *improbant secus docentes*, but does not expressly exclude the partaking by unbelievers, which is at least favoured in the *Invariata* by the expression, that Christ's body and blood are *given* (*distribuantur vescentibus*) on Christ's part to those who eat the elements. That unbelievers *take* and enjoy Christ's body and blood is consequently not affirmed even by the *Invariata*. According to Luther, Christ's body and blood are present *in, sub et cum pane et vino*, by which it is affirmed that whoever receives the elements not merely might have, but, as the *Form. Conc.* also teaches, receives Christ's body and blood. But the *Form. Conc.* itself shows that the receiving is not a partaking. From that formula of his it followed for Luther that the eating (*manducatio*) is also *oralis*, so far as Christ's body and blood are received with the elements. This inference is just, if the union of the body and blood of Christ with the elements is absolute; for then what happens to the former is identical with what happens to the latter, and Luther inclined to this view, when he charged Melanchthon, on the journey to the Cassel Conference, to maintain that Christ's body *dilaniatur et dentibus laceratur* in the Holy Supper. Christ would then certainly be treated in the Supper as passive matter.[1] Nevertheless, Luther's true doctrine cannot be learned from this winged word of his. In any case, the view taken by the Lutheran Church of the connection of Christ with the elements is not so rigid, that it approves the above expressions (which are rather expressly rejected), or that it makes a material imprisonment of Christ (*impanatio*) take place.[2] Further, the *unio sacramentalis* with the elements is not made so indissoluble as to take place also *extra usum*. The presence of Christ is not to be conceived after the manner of the presence of the elements (not locally), but a *modus supernaturalis* of the presence obtains; and the view is earnestly repudiated, that the *manducatio oralis* is a *Capernaitica* one, for only the elements, not Christ's body and blood, experience a *lacerari dentibus*.[3] Finally, the same conclusion follows

[1] So, in fact, the Lutheran doctrine is understood by J. Müller.
[2] *F. C.* 600, 14.
[3] 600. 15. 604, 42: quasi doceamus, corpus Chr. dentibus laniari et—digeri.

from this consideration, that, according to the *Form Conc.*, the *unio sacramentalis* with the elements is not the same for believers and unbelievers after the reception of the elements. It is not to be conceived after the manner of the Incarnation; for where the *Formula of Concord* gives a more precise description, it does not make a real reception of the sacramental gift take place in the case of the unworthy in the same sense as a reception of the elements. For not merely does the universal Lutheran doctrine affirm that the unworthy do not receive the spiritual blessing annexed to faith, although the sacramental contents are objectively present to man along with the elements, and are presented, *i.e.* offered, to every one, but a difference is made between the spiritual and material eating. The *Form. Conc.* in this respect says of the unworthy: *repellunt Christum ut Salvatorem*, which implies a dissolving of the saving *unio sacramentalis* by unbelief, without for this reason faith being the power by which the *unio sacramentalis* is established. When, indeed, the *Form. Conc.* adds: *admittere coguntur Christum ut judicem*,[1] the *unio sacramentalis* might seem to be viewed as continuing even for those who receive in unbelief, at least under this aspect, which would involve a partaking of Christ as Judge. But the notion of partaking of Christ, or at least of His body and blood, as a punitive Judge, is incongruous, because partaking affirms a union or assimilation, whereas the Judge stands outside and above him who is punished. The *unio sacramentalis* of the body and blood of Christ could only be applied to the purpose of judgment on the supposition of its being right to say that Christ's body and blood, like poison, work destruction or death in the case of unbelievers. But the Stuttgart Synod of 1559 rightly declared, with J. Brentz, that Christ's body and blood are to be regarded as a health-giving substance, not as poison. That Christ exercises His judicial office through a power in His body and blood which destroys the unworthy, has never been the doctrine of the Evangelical Church, nor is it contained in Holy Scripture. The *Form. Conc.* also maintains that in the Supper *non dimidiatus tantum Christus præsens est*.[2] The *motive* for Luther's doctrine of the partaking by unbelievers was not an independent interest in

[1] *F. C.* 601, 17. 783, 78. [2] *F. C.* 783, 78. See p. 318, n. 3.

unbelievers receiving Christ's body and blood just as certainly as believers, but interest in securing that the sacrament should be certain and sure to the latter, especially that the real presence of Christ should indubitably exist to faith.[1]

Calvin, indeed, for his part only accepts the formula *cum pane et vino* in the sense that Christ's body and blood may be partaken of along with the elements; but still he holds fast to the objective presence and real partaking of Christ on the part of believers, so that the only question to be examined is, whether the certainty and stability of the divine promise, *i.e.* of the real presence of Christ, would be abolished by not regarding the connection of the elements with Him as so close as that unbelievers also receive Him. The Reformed doctrine also maintains, with Calvin, that they who perform the sacred act unworthily, and therefore desecrate it, are exposed by their unbelief to the divine judgment.

The following points are to be specially mentioned as unsolved problems in the Calvinistic doctrine: the relation of the elements to Christ's body and blood is conceived in too fortuitous and external a manner; and again, Calvin thinks of Christ as confined to a special place in heaven, and is unable to apply to the Holy Supper the exaltation of the God-man to freedom from space in relation to His working. And this defect, which concerns Christology, not the sacrament directly, has the further consequence that, in order to assure to believers the real presence and self-communication of Christ, believers must be raised by the Holy Spirit to Christ in heaven. Thus the place of the space-free condescension of Christ is taken by the space-free Holy Spirit, who gives the believing soul a share in His power to rise for the moment above the limits of space, a notion savouring of an ecstatic spirit. On the other hand, the following problems lie before the Lutheran type of doctrine. It lays too little stress, in reference to the Holy Supper, on the *κοινωνία* of the members of Christ one with another. But this can be amended without further trouble.[2] The Reformed theologians have always emphasized this aspect, but have frequently laid too little stress on the com-

[1] *F. C.* 602, 26. Cf. 603, 37.

[2] Luther emphasizes this aspect, and not merely at first. Köstlin, i. 293, ii. 519.

munion with Christ. Hence they do not cordially favour the practice of private communion in the case of the dying. Further, the Lutheran doctrine of the Reformation age looks too exclusively to forgiveness as a gift. The body and blood are supposed to be merely a pledge in reference to *it*, not themselves a blessing (as the symbols of the Calvinistic type at first rightly teach, see p. 317). But this would render the symbolism indistinct and confused. The visible elements are said to be a pledge or symbol of Christ's body and blood, and the body and blood again a pledge of forgiveness. But forgiveness is already secured by baptism, to which man returns by repentance, confession, and absolution before the Supper. In the Holy Supper, therefore, a second, further aspect of the one Christian grace must be treated of. When we consider, further, that a pledge must be visible, which Christ's body and blood are not, and that, on the other hand, the elements have the character of a pledge, as the Reformed theologians remind us, the position assigned to Christ's body and blood in the Lutheran doctrine is almost superfluous.[1] Finally, the doctrine of the partaking of unbelievers is not clearly worked out, and is not without inconsistencies.

§ 145.—*Continuation.*

III.—*Dogmatic Development.*

1. Although the new man is in existence, he has not on this account come to maturity. Nay, death has still to be expelled by the new principle of life, and to this end growing strength is necessary. Life exists when it draws the first

[1] See p. 330. If, in order to avoid this unfortunate result, we said: "The body of Christ, of the presence of which the elements are the sign, carries in itself, so to speak, that grace of forgiveness which He procured by His suffering," while refusing to acknowledge a saving blessing in participation in Christ's body and blood, this would approach in substance to the Zwinglian doctrine, according to which the Holy Supper contains merely a reference to the fruits of the death of Jesus. That, according to the Lutheran doctrine, Christ's body and blood have merely the meaning of a pledge in reference to the blessing of forgiveness, not that of a special saving blessing—on this point unprejudiced inquiry is coming more and more to agreement. Cf. J. Müller, *Dogm. Abh.*, p. 414 ff.; R. Schmidt, *ut supra;* Köstlin, *Luther's Theol.* ii. 516, 517.

breath; but it only remains what it is by growth, by the life becoming active. There is still sin even in the believer; where sin is, death is also. Death indeed grows of itself; it needs no sustenance, because it feeds on the life that exists, unless the latter is put on its guard and gains strength in order thereto; life, however, needs sustenance. But faith and new life are not nourished of themselves. The spiritual man, unless he is to be stunted, needs appropriate sustenance. Preservation comes about through the same means by which the new life was initiated. The regenerate believer has become an independent centre of life through Christ; in communion with Him is life and happiness. If the independence passed into separation from Christ, the result would be unhappiness and spiritual barrenness, not growth. In order to the growth of the inner man, the renewal of this communion is necessary. And with this view the Holy Supper was instituted, that the new man may not merely be preserved amid the temptations, the ebb and flow of the inner life, but may also grow in strength. But such nourishing and strengthening, based on the power of the exalted Lord, and hence on His *kingly* office, is supplied by the Holy Supper, not only because it is a commemorative meal and sign of obligation to confession and fellowship, and therefore a symbol and figure of something past and future, and consequently absent, but also because it gives what it portrays[1] through the power and communication of the exalted Lord. The strengthening lies in the present fellowship with Him—the Head of His kingdom, not with the Logos merely (as the older Greek Church to some extent held), not with the man alone. But He is our Head as the glorified eternal King, able and willing to cause the powers of His entire theanthropic personality to stream into His members[2]—the powers of eternal life, which, although primarily spiritual and therefore only accessible to faith, benefit the entire believing personality, and are meant to transform even this mortal body into the likeness of His image.[3] We need the one undivided Lord,[4] in whom as the God-man all antitheses have their living

[1] § 143. [2] John xv. 1 ff.

[3] Cf. Rom. viii. 11 (according to the *Rec.*); Phil. iii. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 49. *F. C.* 600, 11. 783, 78.

bond of union. But in us the antitheses—highest of all, nature and spirit—are still outside, nay, opposed to each other, and will remain so, unless the uniting potency—that is, the power of the perfected God-man—becomes the possession of those who, born of God, are brethren of Christ and sons of God. It is part, indeed, of the earthly state of the Church to be always possessed of an unsatisfied, persistent longing for her bridegroom; but all the more in her temporal separation from the visible manifestation of the Lord, she needs so much at least as will not leave her behind the first body of disciples, who had a living, actually historic relation to Christ's person. Now in the Holy Supper we find Him, if we so wish, find Christ Himself according to His promise; and to those who take their stand on the intuition of faith (*i.e.* on the truth), the living administration of His eternal office which encompasses us receives the crown of its constantly renewed, ordained revelation and working in the Holy Supper. It is certainly one and the same undivided Christ who desires to give Himself to faith through the Word, as on the other hand through Holy Baptism, and finally through the Holy Supper. Hence the *Apology*[1] rightly defines the gift in the Sacrament to be the same as in the Word. In the present dogma the solidaric unity and entirety of Christian grace must be maintained in opposition to a splitting up or piecing together of that grace, as though it had no unity in the divine purpose of grace and in the unity of Christ's person. But despite this fact, in the order of administration one thing is given to man in Holy Baptism, and another in the Holy Supper; for the stage of the spiritual life before Baptism and before the Holy Supper is so different, that man may receive from one and the same Christ one thing in Baptism and another in the Holy Supper. Still, although it is the undivided Christ who is always offered, not even in the Holy Supper is the same always received, but in this also there are stages. Even the disciples could not receive in the first Supper the same as afterwards, although His gift of Himself was always complete according to the capacity of appropriation present.

2. Relation between Baptism and the Supper.—Holy

[1] *Apol.* 201. 267: Idem effectus est verbi et ritus.

Baptism is the *sacrament of faith*, or of the initiation of faith. The Holy Supper is the *sacrament of love*, of *mutual love* between the Head and the members, and between the members among themselves. Baptism works true faith, which, however, is not productivity, but spontaneous, living receptivity to Christ's substitution. Productivity exists first in love—the specific grace of this meal, in which Christ treats His people as friends, consequently assumes them to be realized personalities,[1] and ministers to the fellowship of active love to Christ and the brethren. The power of sanctification proceeds from the exalted Lord, and for this reason the Holy Supper must be placed under the head of the kingly office, whereas Holy Baptism falls under the substitutionary love of Christ. The point in question in the latter is the origination of a new personality redeemed by Christ, whereas the Holy Supper has in view *communion* in the kingdom, of which He is the Head. Through the Holy Supper the union of the Head and the members becomes mutual, the new personality being treated by Christ as a relatively independent power (*Grösse*), and made such in an increasing degree. There is but one birth into the new life as into the old, and hence but one Baptism. But we must grow through every stage, hence the Holy Supper is to be repeated. The Western Church, therefore, rightly withholds the Holy Supper from the wholly immature with just as great confidence (since the effect of baptism—faith—is presupposed thereto) as baptism is administered to them. Further, on the above grounds it is dogmatically justifiable to lay down, that only such can receive a share in the rights of independent members of the Church as are qualified for reception as mature by the Lord Himself in the Holy Supper. Only communicants must form the active groundwork of the Christian Church, although of course always in different stages, and also according to the degree of physical independence and proficiency. In the same way, it follows from what has been said, that the Holy Supper is the principle of all ecclesiastical organization, and that the leaders of ecclesiastical government must not be sought outside the circle of communicants. Höfling and others show how the

[1] Consequently Christ's substitution remains the continuously active basis. Gal. ii. 20.

principle of the Church-cultus also is to be found in the Holy Supper. The sacred meal, along with what it effects, possesses power to gather the living, mature members together under Christ the Head, and to keep them by His side. The Spirit of love, who proceeds from the Head, is also a Spirit of wisdom, prudence, and strength, and supplies, therefore, the formative principle for the organization of the Church, so that through the Holy Supper the Church becomes a *reflex* of Christ's kingly office. But as Christian love nowhere exists without faith, so the Holy Supper presupposes Baptism, and that as continuously active. Hence, in order to ensure the right and worthy administration of the Holy Supper, the Church makes a return to Baptism (*i.e.* the renewal of the baptismal grace and covenant by self-examination, penitence, confession, and absolution) go first in the Supper.[1]

3. UNIO SACRAMENTALIS.—But now what is the relation of the outward signs and the thing itself in the Holy Supper? On this depends the objectivity of the sacrament, and the decision as to the partaking of believers.

According to the Catholic theory, the visible elements are absorbed and become a mere semblance. In Calvin, with whom Schleiermacher finds fault,[2] they have a too outward, mechanical relation to the thing; for we receive the body and the blood of Christ on occasion of the signs in the elevation of faith above them, without intrinsic connection between the gift and the elements. According to Zwingle, the thing as a gift is absent; the only things present are the elements and the faith, which immediately realizes Christ's meritorious death. The Lutheran *in, sub, cum,* is not merely intended to avoid the Docetic and Ebionitic extreme, but also to express a most intimate connection between the untransformed elements and the thing. It does not go to the point of asserting the identity of the signs with Christ's body and blood; but the difference between the two is not made clear, the union of the two being so represented that the impression might arise, that Christ, with His body and blood, is passively fastened to the elements. In order, at least, to make an attempt at

[1] Gal. ii. 20 is an expression of Christ's substitutionary life in us, or of the baptismal blessing; John xvii. 21, of the Holy Supper.

[2] *Chr. Glaube,* ii. § 140. 4.

obviating the two defects, the *Word of God* in Holy Writ may be referred to. It would be Docetic to overlook its distinction from the eternal Word of God, or the real spiritual contents, and to forget the frailty of the letter. But it would be no less mistaken to see in Holy Scripture a mere sign of an absent thing, as if the Divine Spirit were separated from the Word. Rather, the eternal Word renders Himself present in all times and places through the written Word.[1] Without losing His freedom, the eternal Word has given Himself a manifestation, a sort of world-realization, in the Word of Holy Writ as a means of grace. The written Word is a continuation of the self-revelation of the eternal Word, through which not merely the apostolic preaching, but Christ Himself, is rendered present to us—children of a later age. Little as Scripture is the eternal Word Himself, just as little is it a mere dark, enigmatic sign of that Word, but a means of His revelation and actual presence, as well as a means by which He carries on His activity in time. We apply this dynamic relation between Word and Spirit[2] also to the Holy Supper. The first Supper of the disciples, under one aspect, could not be the same to them as the Supper is to us; Christ was not yet glorified, Pentecost had not yet come. But under another aspect it had something of which Christ's departure from visibility has deprived us, namely, the element of the state of sensible presence lying in the personal, sensible contact of His person with theirs. But this element is of decisive importance in relation to the objectivity of living communion with Christ, because on this depends our being raised above mere subjective thinking and feeling, and placed on historically real ground, in the sphere of Christ's corporeal presence. Now in the Holy Supper present to the senses we have a bridge to the presence of the exalted living Christ. In order that, notwithstanding His departure, His historically real communion with us—individuals—may be brought into the present, and we may rejoice in it, He has instituted the Holy Supper; and through the visible elements, employed in the Supper in accordance with His will, that lost element of

[1] § 135.

[2] This points back to the inner connection and the co-ordination of matter and force, spirit and body. See vol. i. § 38.

visibility and of historically real contact with His institutory will is restored to faith. Nay, the contact is with Christ Himself, to whom the firmly linked chain of the Christian generations leads back the faith, which apprehends and experiences the past as Christ's act, at once present and self-renewing. In these sensibly real elements, or more strictly in the act continuing according to His institutory will through the Church as His organ, and using those elements—an act bearing the unmistakeable traces of His historic work and continued government—we have a ladder to the presence of His real divine-human Person, such as the apostles had in the visibility of His bodily manifestation, so that even in this respect we are not behind them. As the disciples at the Emmaus-board became conscious of His real presence after the first Supper in the act of breaking bread, so under His direction the same legacy has been faithfully transmitted from the primitive Church to the Church of after-ages. Thus the objectivity of the sacrament enables us to become conscious of and rejoice in that realized presence of His, which is the ground of the trustworthiness and blessing of the sacrament. This objectivity or certainty that Christ is present, where His Supper is administered in harmony with His institution, does not rest on faith, rather faith rests on it. It is not faith which makes the sacrament a sacrament, not faith first, but His will connects Christ with the act, and the elements subserving the act. Just as little does the power or intention of the administrator or consecrator do this. The consecration or setting apart of the elements to sacred use, or their consecration by prayer, is necessary indeed to the due administration; but the words exert no magic charm on Christ—He is and remains master of Himself and the Church.[1] According to the doctrine of the Evangelical Church, Christ's presence is only promised to the act as a whole, to the partaking, not *extra usum*. Nor does Christ's presence depend on any change in the elements themselves. For example, it does not depend on the elements—those local things—including or retaining Christ's body and blood, in which case Christ would be so bound to them, that what befalls the elements would also befall His body and blood.[2] No change in the elements

[1] *F. C.* 747, 73 ff. [2] *F. C.* 600, 14.

takes place, and Christ's glorified body can no longer be held fast in a passive way, or by something outside Him. There is no tangible security for His presence. Its certainty is rather based on His fidelity to His kingly promise and purpose, which is continued in the preservation of His institution both of the Church and of the Holy Supper. If this presence of His is so assured to Christendom, that it can only be doubted by one who doubts the purpose of His institution and promise, or the power of the kingly Head to be faithful to His promise, then it is a point of dispute scarcely worth naming, and of no religious importance, as to whether Christ is connected "with the elements in and under them," or with the *act* of the Supper. But since the reality of the Supper can only be decided by the use of the elements, and the act is inconceivable without them, while in any case the elements are the pledge of present grace, it is not easy to see what sort of reason there is on the Reformed side for excluding Christ's presence from the elements and limiting it to the act, supposing that the propositions concerning Christ's permanent theanthropic working are admitted;[1] and on the other hand, the thought of a spatial inclusion of Christ in the elements is kept at a distance. Every theory must in the end go back to the promise of Christ, to the effect that He desires to be the present gift in the Supper. That promise implies, therefore, that the present Christ really offers Himself, through the entire act, to every one taking the outward elements, consequently to unbelievers also. As Christ truly and earnestly offers grace in the Word, and as far as He is concerned not merely to believers, so is it in the Holy Supper. The objective grace exists for all, and this is the essential point;[2] but there is a difference in the taking, and hence in the effect also. As unbelief only receives the sensible word with the bodily ear, while the inner ear or heart is closed to the meaning and truth of the Word, so too may it be in the Holy Supper. The saving blessing (*Christus ut Salvator*) is rejected (*repellunt*) by the unbeliever,[3] therefore not accepted. And since the unbeliever takes the elements like the believer, and Christ offered Himself in the act in which the unbeliever takes part under the guise of a believer,

[1] §§ 126. 127. [2] *Cat. Maj.* 558. [3] *F. C.* 601, 17.

unbelief renders void Christ's promise and purpose, which held good also to him, by this wicked, hypocritical conduct; and whereas he receives nothing but the elements, thus making the sacrament a common eating or empty ceremony, he sins against the Lord and draws down judgment on himself.[1] The opinion is now almost universally given up,[2] and rightly, that unbelievers also may really partake of Christ's body and blood, not merely receive the objective offer. Christ's promise and purpose by no means implies that unbelievers also partake of Him. This would only be conceivable by a separation of the body and blood from Christ's person.[3] Christ's body and blood must then be regarded as something essentially injurious to unbelievers,[4] or as something superfluous. Christ's will is that His entire undivided, theanthropic Person shall become ours in the Holy Supper. Therefore His glorified body cannot be partaken of apart from His rational nature. If all the blessing of the Supper can only be enjoyed through faith,—not by unbelief, as Luther in the Large Catechism and the *Form. Conc.* teach,—the object of partaking must certainly be thought of as primarily spiritual, but not for this reason less real. The God-man received by faith through the Holy Spirit is the real power that reconciles all antitheses—the antithesis of nationalities and individuals, in the last resort even the antithesis between nature and spirit. In Him is given the new and true humanity, in which likeness to God is realized also in the world, appearing in His glorified corporeity. Hence the Holy Supper is also a real bond of communion between all the members. Every individuality is destined to be transfigured through Him, and made a reflex of His glory. And for this very reason, through the instrumentality of the faith that receives Christ, the Holy Supper operates also as the principle of reconciliation between all antitheses in the individual personality, and therefore as the principle of pneumatic corporeity such as will be exhibited in the resurrection-body.

[1] *Cat. Maj.* 558, 35. Jam quicumque hæc sibi dicta statuit creditque ita se habere, ille certo consequutus est. *Cæterum hisce verbis diffidens nihil habet*, utpote qui *nequidquam hæc sibi offerri patitur.*

[2] *E.g.* even by Dieckhoff, *Abendmahl*, p. 631.

[3] In opposition to *F. C.* 600. 787.

[4] As Sartorius, *e.g.*, supposes in his "Meditations."

4. THE CONSECRATION AND DISTRIBUTION.—The elements become the Holy Supper when connected with the words of institution and promise by consecration, and with the act of distribution and partaking. The consecration with Christ's words is the continuation of the act of Christ founding the Supper. If the church herein is simply the organ by which Christ's will is continued and embodied in ever new manifestation, it is most appropriate that the distributing should be accompanied by the words of His lips, in order that He may be realized as the true agent and speaker. Were the church here to give its own,—were it, for example, to interpose here its distinctive doctrinal creed of Christ's Supper,—it would arbitrarily supersede the *continuation* of Christ's word and action by its own action merely *reflective* of His kingly office, and obscure that important distinction between the two, the retention of which in its purity is the strength and mission of the Church of the Reformation. A further consequence of the doctrinal creed of the church (which has its place elsewhere, but by no means here,) being given here instead of the words of Christ, would be that the Lord's table would be made the table of a particular Church-party, the Lord's institution being employed, on the one hand, to express sympathetic union under the name of Luther, Calvin, or the Pope; and on the other, to erect a wall of partition from Christians with other views, to whom, however, the possession of the table of the Lord cannot be denied. But as the Jewish and Gentile Christians, or the parties in Corinth—and further, the holders of very different theories of the Supper—maintained perfect fellowship at the communion in Christian antiquity, because and in so far as they recognized each other's Christian character, so must we act now, and *that in the interest of the objectivity of the sacrament.* For as it is not faith that makes it a sacrament, so also it is not good works, whether of the will or of the intelligence and doctrinal confession. Christ is the royal host. Unbelief and error as little reduce the sacrament itself to nullity as in the case of baptism, but can only mar or interfere with its *blessing.* This also decides how the Church ought to act in the matter of right administration, that no unworthy guests may be consciously admitted. They ought not to be *a priori* desig-

nated unworthy who do not belong to our own visible church-community or separate Church. This would be sectarian, and a renunciation of the œcumenical spirit which ought to dwell in each of the separate churches. For this very reason, also, the doctrinal creed or the interpretation of the mystery of Christ's fellowship with His own, distinguishing a particular Confession, ought not to be required in order to admission to the Holy Supper. This would be, again, incompatible with the fundamental principle of the gospel and the objectivity of the sacrament, making the reception of the sacred meal dependent on subjective acts of the intellect or of the confessing lips. But, according to Luther's Small Catechism, he is right worthy and fitted to partake who hungers and thirsts for the heavenly food, who draws near to the table of the Lord in poverty of spirit, with bowed and broken heart and true longing for personal salvation.[1] Therefore, to wish to exclude from the Holy Supper a soul longing for salvation and feeling its need of strengthening by the Lord, because it belongs to another Confession, whilst its Christian baptism is acknowledged, is a crime against the communion of the Lord; a supersession of Christ and of His hospitable will by arbitrary human will, be it even the will of a vast Church-community; a denial of Christ's love in the midst of the sanctuary of love. Of course, Greek and Roman Christians, by the decisions of their churches, cannot act on such principles; and the latter church especially treats the meal of communion with Christ in a one-sided way, as a meal of confession to it. It aspires to be, not a mere reflex, but a continuation of Christ. But greater would be the guilt of the Evangelical Church, were it, in the supposed interests of ecclesiasticism, to put the hard-won diadem of its knowledge under a bushel, or to surrender the doctrine, that here also the first place is due to Christ and His objective gift, and that on no pretence must His royal hospitality be narrowed by the Church, or that which in virtue of the institution must be the first thing in the sacred act—namely, the communion between Christ and believers—put in the background, and sacrificed to the supposed interests of the

[1] *F. C.* 745, 68.

community.[1] As Holy Baptism belongs to all churches still Christian, so the blessing of the Holy Supper pertains not to a specific Church-community, but to Christendom as a unity. Baptism is reciprocally acknowledged on the Evangelical as on the specifically Catholic side, without the Catholic or Evangelical type of doctrine being introduced into the baptismal act in the way of confession or controversy. So also admission to the sacrament of the Holy Supper must not be made dependent on the dogmatically concrete conception of the Supper, and just as little the acknowledgment of its validity, provided it is administered in harmony with the institution.

Observation.—It especially befits the Lutheran Confession —which lays the chief emphasis, more than Zwingle and Socinus, on the divine objectivity of the sacrament independently of the subject—to give effect to the inner catholicity inherent in the Lutheran Confession, and having its chief point of support precisely in that objectivity, although without detriment to ecclesiastical order. The requirement of a definite doctrinal confession in order to admission would be Zwinglian, not Lutheran, in principle. Add to this, that the requirement of this particular human performance—namely, of an idea correct in form—would not be the least security for real worthiness and a spirit athirst for salvation.

B.—*The Reflecting of the Kingly Office of Christ by the Church, or the Power of the Keys.*

§ 146.

As a *Reflection* of *Christ's kingly activity*, the Church has the right and duty of self-organization in and out of the world. The foundation-stone of this is the work of defining the circle of those who are empowered to act in the Church. No less is the power of establishing ecclesiastical institutions inherent in the Church—in

[1] In Zwingle, along with the commemoration, the *professio* and the interests of the community are the chief matter. Thus the extreme pressing of the Lutheran type passes over into the opposite on this point also.

reference to doctrine in creeds, to worship in liturgy and order of divine service, to life in ecclesiastical custom and constitution,—all this, however, on the understanding that the Church is always subject to Christ's Word and institutions, and therefore does not, by *making* Church-order a dogma, burden the conscience and injure Evangelical freedom.

I.—*Biblical Doctrine.*

1. The Power of the Keys (*potestas clavium*) in reference to the house of God, was committed first to Peter, then to the apostles collectively, and in them to the Church,[1] but only on the basis of confessing Jesus to be the Son of God. Power over the keys is the symbol of authority or government in the house. This authority did not cease with the departure of the apostles, but is necessary to the earthly Church in all ages. No Church can dispense with the function of direction or government. On the other hand, no provision has been made by the Lord for supplementing the apostolate, or for any primacy at all. On the contrary, so far as the primacy actually existed in the beginning, it passed just as actually from Peter during his life to others, to Paul on behalf of the Gentile-Christian world, partly to James the Just on behalf of the Jewish Christians. From these two considerations—the need of direction acknowledged by Christ, and the omission of Christ to provide for a regular transfer of such direction from the apostles to others—it follows that it is left by the Lord to the *Church* to appoint the holders of this function, and that no special order was established by the Lord, to which the right of official appointment was given. The Lord did not intend the apostolate as the holder of Church-government to be a permanent institution. By its very idea as the primitive authentic body of witnesses the apostolate is unrepeatable, because it rests on the uniqueness of the relation of the first generation to Christ, and on their immediate selection and education by Christ. Even the

[1] Matt. xvi. 19, xviii. 18; John xx. 23.

apostles shared with the churches the work of establishing ecclesiastical order and Church discipline.[1]

2. As relates, again, to the *Contents of the Power of the Keys*, the passages bearing on the question imply, first of all, the right of admitting into the house of God, and therefore of deciding on membership in or belonging to the Church. Only in the second line does that power embrace the establishing of regulations and laws as to the life of the community. Belonging to the Church depends on forgiveness of sins, forgiveness being the sign of entrance into the Church. And since an accepted member may again become unworthy of membership through unfaithfulness and apostasy, nay, since they who abide faithful need the renewal of forgiveness, the power of the keys has importance also in reference to those already received, including remission of sin or absolution on the one side, retention of sin as well as Church discipline on the other. The Evangelical Church places the chief stress on the remission or retention of sin.[2] Notwithstanding, it is beyond question that the Lord has also given the power to establish regulations, not indeed to a clergy, but to the church.[3] *Κυβέρνησις* likewise has a distinct charisma of its own. We read of a commission to feed the flock,[4] and the apostolic churches under the direction of the apostles set up institutions like the diaconate,[5] as well as other offices.[6] Especially were leaders appointed by the apostles under the name of elders or bishops, or their appointment was ordered.[7]

II.—*Ecclesiastical Doctrine.*

After several centuries a clergy had grown up as a distinct order. In the Greek Church its function was more that of an authoritative body of teachers, in the Latin more that of

[1] Acts vi. 5; 1 Cor. v. 4.

[2] In Matt. xvi. and xviii. we read of "binding and loosing," which finds its explanation in John xx. 23, where the remitting and retaining of sin are spoken of. Hence the binding and loosing do not refer primarily to obligatory laws and regulations and dispensations from the same.

[3] Matt. xviii. 17; Luke xii. 42, xx. 9 ff. (vineyard); 1 Cor. ix. 17.

[4] 1 Cor. xii. 28; John xxi. 16, 17. [5] Acts vi. 1-6. [6] Eph. iv. 11, 12.

[7] Tit. i. 5; 1 Tim. iii. 1-13, iv. 12 ff., v. 1 ff., 17-19.

government in regulating life. The clergy, in its entirety principally represented in the bishops, ascribed to itself after the Nicene Council, first of all, infallibility in dogma, and soon also divine authority for legislation generally in moral and disciplinary matters. Roman Catholicism more and more made the Church the continuation of Christ's kingly work, nay, represented Him as having deputed His kingly authority to the hierarchy, instead of holding fast the imperishable authority of Christ and His ordinances, and thinking of the Church as designed in its character as a union of clergy and laity to be a reflection of Christ's kingly activity. The Romish Church converted its polity into dogma, imposing on the conscience laws which form no part of the faith as divine and binding obligations. As concerns especially absolution for sins after baptism, and the right of citizenship in the Church, it made arbitrary regulations in reference to penitential discipline, by which it tied the inner life to the priestly order, elevating that order at the expense of God's Word, of free grace as well as of freedom of conscience, into the exclusive dispenser of the divine gifts, and therefore also into a power above the Holy Spirit. The Romish Church especially makes the priestly order exercise kingly authority through absolution and excommunication, which are supposed to have judicial force as an act of judgment on the individual person, by which heaven is opened and closed to him. For these reasons the Reformation rejected the notion that the power of the keys is authority to utter judgment on the worth of the individual person with divine authority, and also that absolution is tied to the priestly order. The gift of trying spirits does not continue as a gift attached to ecclesiastical office. This is not maintained even by the Romish Church. Hence, in order to fill up the gap in the knowledge of the priest, in 1215 it ordained Auricular Confession—certainly a very inadequate substitute for knowledge of the heart, despite the further unscriptural decree that only sin confessed to the priest shall be forgiven. The necessary consequence is uncertainty whether enough has really been confessed and sin is forgiven. Most of all, the latter is made dependent on the fulfilment of human observances and on conditions beyond

power of control. The Evangelical Church so administers *absolution* as to make it the crown of the preaching of the gospel generally, and to *offer* forgiveness to the penitent.[1] In this offer on its part, in reference to which the Church only desires to be Christ's organ, the grace of Christ Himself is offered.[2] In doing this, the Evangelical Church arrogates to itself no judgment on the real penitence of the individual. A judicial act on the character of the man would always be fallible; but the offer, which is more than a mere teaching, namely an *exhibere*, is possible, because the Church ought to offer forgiveness even to non-believers, *that they may believe*. Of course it must do this in such a way as not to omit to awaken the consciousness of sin and guilt, because without such consciousness it would be impossible even to have a consciousness of what forgiveness means, and therefore to receive forgiveness as such.[3] This offer is the chief work of the church. According to Evangelical teaching, again, the *retention* of sin is no judicial act, pronouncing infallibly before God on the merit or demerit of the person. No such judgment and final settlement of the state of the case is even necessary for the Church. In order to avoid desecrating what is holy,[4] it is enough to omit the offer of forgiveness where it has reason to suppose that impenitence exists. The consequence of this is, that the Church is not warranted in granting to such the enjoyment of the full right of citizenship, especially the enjoyment of the Holy Supper, which has absolution for its presupposition. It is quite consistent with this position, that the Church, in the consciousness of reflecting Christ's kingly authority but imperfectly, and mindful of its liability to err, declines absolutely to identify its judgment on individuals with the judgment of Christ, or to put itself as judge in Christ's place,—a position to which it is not called.

[1] *Cat. Maj.* 549, 74.
[2] *Cat.* ut supra; *Apol.* 164. 167.
[3] § 132*b*, 4, 5.
[4] Matt. vii. 6.

§ 146*b*.—*Continuation.*

III. — *Dogmatic Investigation of the Power of the Keys belonging to the Church as a Reflection of Christ's Kingly Authority.*

1. The Church has the right and duty of self-government. *Εὐταξία* and *εὐσχημοσύνη* are enjoined on it.[1] But the chief question for every commonwealth desirous of self-government is: *Who are the persons* to be reckoned members of the commonwealth, especially members influencing the whole? And to decide such a question is certainly to reflect Christ's kingly authority. From what has been said before, it follows that entrance into the house of the Church takes place through overthrow of the dominion of sin, and therefore above all through forgiveness, by which the redeemed are distinguished from the world. The true administration of forgiveness leads to baptism; the right and duty (*i.e.* the office) to offer forgiveness is first of all the office to baptize; to this joins on naturally the office to lead back lapsed members (*e.g.* already baptized in childhood) to the baptismal covenant by penitence and renewed faith (absolution). It is true, all who are baptized, and have confessed before the community the faith which accepts the offered grace, and have not clearly incurred the guilt of apostasy or impenitence, are, to speak generally, legal participators in the ecclesiastical commonwealth. But still a difference of stages obtains among the individual members as to age, gifts, etc. If the first is the stage of those to whom participation in the heavenly kingdom is given by baptism in order that they may believe, the second stage is participation in the full enjoyment of the blessings of the church, especially of the sacrament of the altar. The Church cannot declare those ripe for the sacrament who profess themselves unbelievers, nay, who do not profess themselves believers.[2] The right of participation is obtained by confession of faith, and Confirmation is the Church-ordinance for declaring those who are capable of self-examination qualified for the Supper. Only the *third* stage, of which also physical ripeness of age and understanding is a part, confers the right

[1] 1 Cor. xiv. 40. [2] § 145, 2.

of productive activity in and for the Church, which right, again, must be conveyed by a judgment of the Church. This judgment may be mistaken; it may grant the full right of citizenship too early or too late. But the gift of trying spirits is not so wanting to the Church that it needs a continuance or renewal of the apostolate in order to the distribution of offices.[1] Rather, little as it is given to the Church to determine the individual's relation to God and his total worth, this being a matter of the heart, it is otherwise with the judgment upon gifts and talents, which must needs reveal themselves in outward acts. Hence, provided the Church desires to do everything in the name of Jesus, and therefore to obtain strength and wisdom through prayer in the name of Jesus, —that source of the kingly spirit and power,—thus purifying its will, that it may be one with the will of Christ, gross mistakes will certainly not occur.

2. But the right to establish, preserve, and develop a Christian economy refers not merely to the *persons* who are to have rights of citizenship in it at different stages, but also to the right of legislation and administration, of which also the organizing of offices is a part. In this sense, too, the power of the keys is not committed to an order or still less to an individual person, as is clear from the apostolic practice,[2] while the Church remains bound to Christ's Word and kingly will. It must not make secondary matters a yoke to all. It must not invest with necessity to salvation things either in doctrine or practice, to which such necessity does not belong. And as relates to the form, it must not be tyrannical. Its nature must not be that of a compulsory authority.[3] This distinguishes it from the State. Despite variety of regulations in the Church, of *cerimoniæ* and *constitutiones*, to which also regulations of practice belong, the unity of the Church may exist, and despite the unity a variety. Christ wills no uniformity.[4] Room must be left for Evangelical freedom.

[1] As the Irvingites especially hold.

[2] Acts vi.; *Art. Sm.* 345. 352; *Apol.* 204.

[3] Matt. xx. 25 f.; Luke xxii. 25 f.; 1 Cor. iv. 14; *Apol.* 49. 295. 187; *Art. Sm.* 361.

[4] *Conf. Aug.* vii., and pp. 19, 31. *Apol.* 151. 208; *F. C.* 616. Cf. the parable of the different talents.

SECOND SUBDIVISION.

THE CHURCH APPROPRIATING THE WORLD TO ITSELF, AND ORGANIZED IN AND OUT OF THE WORLD.

§ 147.—*Organization in respect of Christ's continuing Activity.*

The fundamental condition of the organizing of the Church in and out of the world is, that it continually submits to be a faithful organ of the threefold activity which Christ desires to *continue* in and through it. Accordingly its organization has above all to take care that God's Word, Baptism, and the Supper are preserved to it in purity, and that through them Christ's gracious will operates on humanity that has become, and on humanity destined to become, the Church.

Cf. §§ 134. 135. 138–141. 145.

§ 147*b*.—*Organization in respect of reflecting Christ's Activity.*

All the functions of the organized Church that *reflect* Christ's activity have for their norm and rule the immoveable bases of the Church, for their soul the Holy Spirit, for their end the edification (*οἰκοδομή*) of the Church,[1] its intensive and extensive growth. On that basis they are discharged (§§ 134. 136. 142. 146)—*negatively* through the *purifying* activity which includes discipline in the form of self-discipline in individuals, domestic discipline and Church discipline;[2]—*positively* first of all in a *receptive* manner, the life of the Church being invigorated by the regular use of the means of grace; again, in a *productive* and *effective* manner by its *self-presentation*, the central point of which is *worship*, and by activity

[1] Eph. ii. 21, iv. 12.

[2] Civic and state discipline also have their place in the kingdom of God in distinction from the Church. This does not come into consideration here, because the Church is not the subject of such exercise of discipline, but in Christian Ethics.

partly in extending itself among successive new generations and still unconverted nations (Pædagogy, Catechesis, Missions), partly in behalf of its intensive growth;—finally, by *directing* the Church at different stages and in ascending circles. It is necessary to the due order of the Church that these functions be distributed in different offices on the basis of charisms, the variety of which is kept together by the unity of the Spirit in mutual acknowledgment and helpfulness.[1]

LITERATURE.—Nitzsch, *ut supra.* Petersen, *Die Idee der Kirche,* 1839. The writings of Kliefoth, Delitzsch, Löhe, on the Church. W. Preger, *Die Geschichte der Lehre vom geistlichem Amt auf Grund der Geschichte der Rechtfertigungslehre,* 1857. Ad. Schæffer, *Observ. ad ministerii ecclesiast. notionem rectius constituendam,* 1855. Hosemann, *Du Ministère evangelique,* 1855. On Church discipline: Otto, *Versuch einer Verständigung über Kirchenzucht in der evangelischen Denkschrift des Seminars zu Herborn,* Parts 1 and 2, 1854–55 (a rich and extensive literature is referred to by him). Fabri, *Ueber Kirchenzucht im Sinn und Geist des Evangeliums,* 1854. Gottfr. Galli, Dr. Jur., *Die lutherischen und die calvinischen Kirchenstrafen gegen Laien im Reformations-Zeitalter,* Breslau, 1879. Beyschlag, *Deutsch-evangelische Blätter,* v. 2, 1880, Febr., *Soll der evangelische Geistliche auf eigene Hand vom heiligen Abendmahl ausschliessen können?* Zezschwitz, *Praktische Theologie.*

Observation.—We only needed here to note the dogmatic place for the chief subjects of Practical Theology, but add something further.

1. All these functions, by which the church stands forth as a free organism relatively independent in reference to Christ and informed with His Spirit, reflect, although feebly, Christ's official action. This reflection is successful in proportion as the Church more and more loses itself in Christ's mind, and therefore on the ground of prayer in the name of Jesus and study of His Word. In harmony with what has been said,[2] it has first of all to keep away everything disturbing from its life, and secondly to further its positive prosperity. The former, upon which we linger a little, is done by exercising

[1] 1 Cor. xii. 1–30, xiv. 1 ff.; 1 Pet. ii. 5–9; Eph. iv. 8–16. [2] § 146.

the needful caution in receiving new members into the stages described above, and by guarding against offences within itself, as well as against the hurtful influence of unsubdued elements from the world upon its life of communion. Here lies the ground of its *purifying* action in discipline, which has for its end, not the outward glory of the Church as such, but on one side the neutralizing of offences and the maintenance of its inner glory, and on the other the healing of spiritual sickness. Both ends are most certainly attained by the objects of ecclesiastical discipline being led to self-discipline. Only thus understood is Calvin's saying true, that "Church discipline is the *nervus ecclesiæ*," but not in the sense that the administration of justice is an end for its own sake in the Church as in the State, for the Church must not forestall the final judgment.[1] The Donatist ambition to exhibit a Church "pure" and holy in faith directly causes the Church to fail in exhibiting love and patience, without which its "holiness" passes into legality of an indolent and yet magisterial and arrogant spirit, which avoids the more toilsome path of overcoming what is hostile by spiritual means.[2]

Observation.—The negotiations respecting Church discipline since the 15th century, which naturally followed the strivings of that age after ecclesiastical constitution (for which the question of Church discipline is one of the most fundamental and also most difficult points), have been instructive and fruitful in a theoretical, and still more in a practical respect. Among the best works on the subject are those of Fabri, Otto, Nitzsch, and Beyschlag. In keeping with its idea, church discipline must be distinguished on one side from *care of souls*, and on the other from *punishment* in the proper sense, or *expiation*. It has an essential place *alongside* care of souls; for where the latter is finally baffled by obstinacy, something still remains for the church to do, in

[1] Matt. xiii. 25 ff., 29. An excluding of baptized persons from the Holy Supper may be justified, but not from the Church considered as the community of hearers of God's Word. Matt. xviii. 17 is not inconsistent with this view, for even the heathens and publicans are to be objects of culture by the Word, and man's unfaithfulness to the baptismal covenant does not violate God's faithfulness and promise. See §§ 141. 140, 3.

[2] J. Müller expresses himself with much wisdom in eloquent words only too little laid to heart, in the often-mentioned treatises on *The Visible and Invisible Church*, pp. 372-383.

case the sinner gives rise to offence by public uncensured sins, *i.e.* threatens to exert a contagious influence inwardly, and gives offence outwardly, inasmuch as he is a member of the Church, thus bringing reproach on the Church and crippling its influence. But it must also be carefully distinguished from *punishment*. The exercise of the right to punish is an affair of the State, not of the Church. It is no concern of the Church to see that the sinner suffers what is justly due to him, or that it receives satisfaction for the injury done to it or its honour by the sinner. Rather it commits judgment to God, who judges aright and sees the heart. In distinction from these two things, Church discipline is the Church's preserving or guarding itself by withdrawing and severing itself from the incorrigible, offence-giving sinner. With this the love, that seeks and hopes for his amendment, is quite compatible. The love of the Church is shown first in gentleness and patience, which are quite consistent with earnestness, and are evinced in the stages of the Church's procedure. Even ecclesiastical discipline proper, the withdrawal of the Church from the sinner, and the gradual withholding of its communion and blessings, has indeed for its intended effect to isolate the sinner and throw him back upon himself; but since this may and ought to lead to sobriety and self-reflection on his part, it is quite compatible with love, which hopes that this necessary action of the Church may provoke the sinner to amendment, and which gives expression to this hope in intercession. Since the inmost nature of the Church is holy *love*, it cannot assert itself against the stiff-necked, offence-giving sinner without also preserving love. On mere *honour* it ought not to insist; and from this consideration alone Christian Church discipline cannot be derived. Rather, Luther's saying applies also to the Church, "God's honour is His love." Without patience and love it would be sapless, despite all pretension to purity, and would degenerate into legality. It is a misleading, Donatist error to require, under pain of putting in force Church discipline, perfect purity even in but one sphere, *e.g.* that of doctrine, or from but one class of fellow-members—the teaching order.[1] Further, Fabri rightly demands the

[1] Fabri, p. 83, says aptly on one hand: "Let the chief attention be directed to keeping the ministerial order pure," and on the other: "Here above all let the formal creed, provided it is not denied in an absolutely anti-evangelical manner, be less taken into account." He demands that in this matter we keep in mind the Christian equity, which pays regard to the training of the person, and requires us to take into view especially his moral character, and therefore conscientiousness.

spirit of brotherly fellowship as a presupposition for the exercise of Church discipline (p. 75) and possession of the power of the Holy Ghost for those who exercise it. Nor is it by accident that in John xx. 23 Christ prefixes the words: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost." The above principles are based especially on Matt. xviii. 17–20, the fundamental passage on Church discipline; and these principles are acted on in 1 Cor. v. 1 f. (cf. 2 Cor. ii. 6 f.), and again in 1 Tim. i. 20; 2 Tim. ii. 17, 18, iv. 14.

2. The fundamental thought of the Lutheran Dogmatists, in opposition both to the Romish Church and to anarchy even in the form of a levelling spiritualism, is: The Church consists of *tres status hierarchici*—first, the ecclesiastical office (*status ecclesiasticus*); secondly, the Christian magistracy (*magistratus politicus*); thirdly, the popular order (*status œconomicus*). This implies a friendly relation to *national life* (*status œconomicus*) and to the *State* (*status politicus*). But the presupposition of this organization was unity of faith in the nation, which no longer exists. Nor does this arrangement pay regard to the difference of principle in the organization of the State and the Church. The State-organization was rather to some extent directly transferred to the Church. Of ecclesiastical offices and functions the *teaching* office alone has an independent ecclesiastical position in this organization, especially in reference to worship. The history of the Lutheran Church hitherto has been, that the third order with its rights and duties did not attain ecclesiastical development, but became a mere *ecclesia audiens* (hearing and obeying). Its rights were absorbed by the first two orders, whether these were united, as in the age of the Reformation, or whether they were separated, as was done in various forms in the 17th and 18th centuries (when the rights of Church government were claimed both by the teaching order and by the princes); and whether the latter was done by the princes calling themselves temporary bishops (*Nothbischöfe*), perhaps a treaty being also feigned for the transference of the archepiscopacy, or whether they professed to assume the Church government on territorial grounds in virtue of the State-right to make and keep peace, as was done from the 18th into the 19th century. It is only owing to the multiplicity of Confessions in the same State that the continuance of the

supremacy of the State over the Church in the old way became an impossibility. The predominance of the State has also become the practice in the sphere of the Zwinglian Reformation and Anglicanism. The Reformed Confession, however, preserved more of ecclesiastical independence under Calvin's influence, principally by including elders. The passivity of the nation, more prevalent in Lutheran than in Reformed spheres, usually had the effect of paralyzing Church life, and especially Church discipline, which requires the co-operation of the judgment of the Church (Matt. xviii.; cf. 1 Cor. v.).

§ 148.—*Invisibility and Visibility of the Church.*

The distinction of the invisibility and visibility of the earthly Church, rightly defined, is indispensable to the purity of the idea of the Church, which has to organize itself in and out of the world (§ 146 ff.).

LITERATURE.—Joh. Musæus, *Disp. de natura et definitione ecclesiæ* and his *Tractatus de Ecclesia*, 1671, P. I. II. Andersen, *Das prot. Dogma von der sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Kirche, Theol. Mitarbeiten*, 1841, H. 3. J. Müller, *Die unsichtbare Kirche*, in his *Dogmatic Treatises*, pp. 278–403. Ibid., *Die nächsten Aufgaben für die Fortbildung der deutsch-protestantischen Kirchenverfassung*, Janus, 1845, H. 8. J. Köstlin, *Luther's Lehre von der Kirche*, 1853. Münchmeyer, *Das Dogma von der sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Kirche*, 1854. Ritschl, *Ueber die Begriffe der sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Kirche, Stud. u. Krit.* 1859, 2, and *Begründung des Kirchenrechts im evangelischen Begriff der Kirche*, from the *Zeitschr. für Kirchenrecht*, 1869, p. 15 ff. Hackenschmidt, *Des luth. Theologen Joh. Musæus Lehre von der Sichtbarkeit der Kirche, Stud. u. Krit.* 1880, 2. Krauss, *Das prot. Dogma von der unsichtbaren Kirche*, 1876. Harnack, *Die Kirche, ihr Amt und ihr Regiment.*

A.—*The Biblical Doctrine.*

The Church first came into existence with Pentecost, and therefore through the Holy Spirit generating independent faith, for previously the disciples of Christ were still in a state of nonage. Consequently there was as yet no proper Church upon earth immediately after Christ's departure. The whole of Christ's earthly action was directed to the

founding of faith in independent *personalities*, who were to be bound together in love, not to the founding of an impersonal institution or outward ordinances and ceremonies. Certainly the entire body of disciples had already an outward centre in His person, and His design was that the Church should grow out of that body; but such a Church did not as yet exist before the Holy Spirit had prepared and collected a mature discipleship. The Church is called the temple of the Holy Ghost, consisting of living stones bearing Christ's life in them, *i.e.* personalities.[1] Its holiness inheres not in its institutions or in things; it is not of a material, but personal nature. But despite the variety of believing personalities it is One,—Christ has but one body,[2]—and this One is the pillar and ground of the truth, a historical, imperishable power,[3] through its unchangeable characteristics — Word and Sacrament— which are not the Church by themselves, but minister to its preservation. But this one true Church, existing since Pentecost, is not described in the N. T. as absolutely coinciding with the outward community of the baptized. Even in apostolic days much exists in this outward community which belongs not to the pure Church. Not merely particular sins, even false brethren and teachers of error, appear in it; tares grow alongside the wheat. So in the case of Ananias and Sapphira,[4] and still worse things are predicted by Paul and John.[5] Even Christ spoke of adherents who only say, "Lord, Lord," of a guest at the wedding-feast of God's kingdom without a wedding-garment. He compared the kingdom of God to a net, in which good and bad fish are caught, the separation of which shall and ought to take place only at the end of the world. Nay, He called His disciples a little flock in comparison with mankind.[6] It is not given to the Church to know and present itself on earth as perfectly pure and holy,[7] either by attempting to weed out all the

[1] 1 Pet. ii 5 ff.; 2 Tim. ii. 19; Eph. ii. 20; 1 Cor. vi. 19.

[2] Eph. iv. 3–16, v. 23 ff.; 1 Cor. iii. 16, 17.

[3] 1 Tim. iii. 15; Matt. xvi. 18. [4] Acts v.; 2 Cor. xi. 13, 26; Gal. ii. 4.

[5] 2 Thess. ii. 1 ff.; 1 Tim. i. 6 ff., iv. 1 ff. Cf. 2 Tim. ii. 16–18; 1 Cor. xv. 12; 1 John iv. 1 ff., cf. ii. 19 f.; Rev. i.–iii.

[6] Matt. vii. 21, xiii. 47–50, xxii. 1–14; Luke xii. 32.

[7] Eph. iv. 13. The bride of Christ is not pure and without spot in the present æon.

tares, where possibly believers form a majority and have the power, or by requiring all believers to separate themselves and form a separate community, where possibly they form a minority. But it is said: "Let both grow together till the harvest."[1] Christians are rather to be in the world, while not of the world,[2] a light in the darkness, the salt of the world, the leaven in the mass.[3] Christianity desires to be a power in the world appropriating the world, in such a way, indeed, that the world also makes Christianity its own, the Church thus growing out of the world. Since, then, the Church is burdened with many who belong outwardly to it, but inwardly to the world, and since it must still hold fellowship with the world, because many members are still lacking to the completeness of its body, — since, further, its individual members, although believing, are still sinful, while the Church itself as a whole exists not in glory but in weakness, in a lowliness that reflects the destiny of Christ, in cross and passion, it is evident that, according to the N. T., the essence and manifestation, the inner and outer side of the Church, are not yet co-equal.[4] And since, according to what has been said above on its origin, the stress of the principle falls on the first side, which is invisible, the distinction between the invisible and visible Church rests on biblical grounds. On earth its form is to be that of a servant, not triumphant; but this ought not to weaken its zeal in self-purification and growth, but to quicken such zeal because of the yearning hope it has of its certain consummation.[5]

B.—*The Ecclesiastical Doctrine.*

1. The express distinction between the visible and invisible Church is foreign to the first centuries of Christendom, however definite its consciousness of the difference between the inner and outer man and of the relative hiddenness and incognizableness of the former. In the eyes of ancient Christendom the divine idea of the Church and its actuality are chiefly disparate in reference merely to the lowly appear-

[1] Matt. xiii. 29, 36 f. [2] John xvii. 15. [3] Matt. v. 13, 14, xiii. 33.
[4] 1 John iii. 2; Col. iii. 3, 4: ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν κέκρυπται σὺν τῷ Χριστῷ ἐν τῷ θεῷ.
[5] Eph. v. 27, iv. 16.

ance of the Church in its oppressed and still restricted actuality. But both—idea and actuality—were kept together by Christian hope, which, when it went astray in Ebionite and Judaistic paths, only placed so little value on the salvation already existing in the earthly Church as no sort of identity seemed to exist between the earthly Church and that which is to be expected. The reason why distinction was made in the first ages between the visible and invisible Church lay undoubtedly in the fact, that in those ages the Church enjoyed an essential unity and purity, to which not the least contributor was the sifting power of persecutions. The want of outward advantages in the confession of Christianity, nay its dangers, exercised a most effective Church discipline. But when, after the 4th century, the heathen masses suddenly streamed into the Church, the contrast between the Church as it should be and its actuality, especially the character of its leaders, was so obvious that men like Tichonius, Vigilantius, and Jovinian put the true Church, Christ's unspotted bride—the object of their faith, of their love and hope—in glaring contrast with the empirical Church as a different Church. But the Catholic Church withstood such a distinction with the utmost earnestness, permitted only the distinction between the militant and triumphant Church, and found more and more a substitute for that deficiency of holiness in all persons in the Church, which it did not deny, in the holiness of its institutions, which were supposed to give a guarantee for the unity and catholicity, the apostolicity and infallibility of the Church. Then obedience to the hierarchically-constituted Church was made *de fide*, and the limits of the Romish Church became the limits of Christianity, *extra ecclesiam (Romanam) nulla salus.* Attempts at drawing a distinction between the visible and invisible Church are seen in opposition to the outward, increasingly emphasized, unity of the Catholic Church, in the distinction between *prædestinati* or *electi* and the non-elect or *præsciti* advanced in different forms by Augustine, Wycliffe, Huss. But the nature of the distinction is such that its application is postponed to the final judgment, and the conception of the earthly Church is not essentially affected thereby.

2. But the question assumed a different phase in the *age of the Reformation.* The Evangelical idea of faith with its

inwardness contained, instead of mere communion with men and equality in outward rites or ordinances, immediate, personal communion with God, participation in justification through the Atoner and by the Holy Spirit. Therewith was connected the certainty, that this faith must also be the principle and regulator of the community deserving the name of a Christian Church. But in this way the Evangelical teachers came into profound opposition to the Catholic idea of the Church, which found the Church in unity of cultus and ceremonies, but especially in a legal constitution of Christian confessors on the model of the State, and in the subjection of Christians to the hierarchy, to which obedience is due in God's name. On the ground of its idea of the Church, Roman Catholicism denied that the Evangelicals belonged to the Christian Church, unless they submitted to the hierarchical decrees and the Catholic cultus. But the same perception of the nature of faith and its importance to the Church which had led to the severance of the Evangelicals from Roman Catholicism, supplied them with the means both for defending their own standpoint and criticising that of their opponents. And the working out of the apologetic and polemical significance of their positive conception of faith led to the distinction of the *ecclesia* as *visibilis*, in relation to which they maintained their Evangelical freedom, from the *invisibilis*. They refused to concede that they did not belong to the latter. On the contrary, they held themselves the more justified in reckoning themselves a part of it, the more they sought to keep themselves pure from the corruptions of the reigning visible Church, and laid the chief stress on the inwardness of the faith that united them with Christ, and thus with their brethren. This distinction was early advanced in various forms as to substance, although at first without fixed expression; and it was an essential part of the common Evangelical consciousness. But the expression *ecclesia visibilis et invisibilis* gradually became current among all Reformers. Although Zwingle was the first *to use it* (1531), it forced itself on Luther as on Calvin and Melanchthon, although they did not understand two separate churches thereby.[1] Their aim in taking such a line is not to create indifference to the visible Church, or to absolve from duties

[1] See note at end of section.

towards it, but to secure the pure, spiritual character of Christ's Church, its holiness through faith. The pure idea of the Church gained was adapted to form a keen weapon of assault on the secularizing as well as the spiritualizing of the Church, and no less served also as a defence against the reproach brought against the Evangelicals, that in separating from the Pope they separated from the Church of Christ, and as a means of strengthening the confidence, that the Church, although seemingly overwhelmed by hostile powers, still exists and will not perish.[1] This doctrine of the Reformers was next fixed in Symbols.[2]

3. The Evangelical *Confessions* teach: He is not a member of the Church in the proper sense, who stands in the outward communion of Church usages and ceremonies, or in the same *politia* (under the same Church government), but only he who has faith; for the Church is *principaliter* a communion of faith, and the Holy Spirit, the assembly of the saints scattered over the entire circle of the earth.[3] Since then faith, like the Holy Spirit, is not perceptible to sense, under this aspect invisibility pertains to the Church. But on these terms, it may be asked, is even the existence of the Church on earth secured? If it is invisible, can the name of a communion or congregation apply to it? In reference to the *Conf. Aug.*, what the fifth article had said comes into consideration here. It treats of the connection of Word and Sacrament on one hand with faith, on the other with the Holy Spirit. It is accordingly laid down with logical strictness: "Where faith is, there also are Word and Sacrament," and believers gathered around the two are therewith gathered around Christ as their common invisible Head, who is the bond of communion through the Holy Spirit. And since Word and Sacrament are visible, we

[1] *Apol.* 146.

[2] Cf. *Conf. Aug.* v. vi. vii.; *Apol.* iv.; *Art. Sm.* 335. 342 ff. The Reformed Confessions also have in part the formula, *Ecclesia invisibilis et visibilis;* cf. Helv. 1566. c. 17, Scot. c. 16; cf. Westmonast., ed. Niemeyer, c. 25, p. 36. The Lutheran Confessions have not the phrase *Ecclesia invisibilis*, but have the thing almost more than the Reformed Church, which insists more than the former on the phenomenal side and the exhibition of the essence of the Church by organization and Church discipline, nay, to some extent makes a dogma of the first.

[3] "Ecclesia principaliter" or "proprie est societas fidei et Spiritus Sancti, communio, congregatio sanctorum et credentium, sparsorum per totum orbem," *Conf. Aug.* v. viii.; *Apol.* 144, 5. 146.

may go on to say: Although as to its essence the Church is not perceptible to sense (for Word and Sacrament of themselves are not the Church, and still less is the communion of Church-government the Church, which is first given in faith and the Holy Spirit), still it has outward marks, by which its existence is known,[1] not however by sense, but only by faith, as the apostolic symbol already says: "I *believe* in one holy Catholic Church."[2] To faith the existence of the Church is present where Word and Sacrament are, certainly because the two are not without power and effect.[3] Accordingly we must say, where faith is, there too are Word and Sacrament as its birthplace; but also conversely, where Word and Sacrament are, there it must be assumed that the Holy Spirit works faith through them and has His work-place, however little the eye of man is able certainly to single out those who possess living faith, and little as the outward communion in Word and Sacrament can be identified with the Church in the proper sense. The outward communion, in which men are joined together for the common hearing of God's Word and partaking of the Sacraments, is merely the Church in the wider sense[4] (*ecclesia large dicta*). But even this Church has at least a connection with the Church in the proper sense (hence it also bears the name); for even communion in the use of the means of grace would cease were faith altogether to cease on the earth.[5] In its outer circle, therefore, faith must always be assumed. It is believers who perpetuate both means, and thus have real communion with each other. In the same way, moreover, an enduring connection between the Church in the wider and the Church in the stricter sense obtains, because new believers are always born of Word and Sacrament. Hence the *Apology* can say on one hand: We dream of no Platonic state;[6] and on the other: Unbelievers, profligates, and hypocrites are no members of the Church proper (*ecclesia proprie dicta*), which is Christ's body, but are *membra regni diaboli*.[7] Although, accordingly, that which decides the question of belonging to the Church in the proper sense is not communion with men and community of cultus and confession, but communion with the Head of

[1] *C. A.* vii.; *Apol.* 145, 5–7. [2] *Apol.* 145. 7. [3] *Ibid.* 148, 19. 20.
[4] *Ibid.* 146, 11. 28. [5] *Ibid.* 147, 16. 17. [6] *Ibid.* 148, 20.
[7] *Ibid.* 147, 16. 17. 148, 19.

the Church—Christ, still it is quite consistent therewith, that, where true faith exists, establishing of communion with men is not wanting, above all communion in Word and Sacrament as well with actual believers as with those who will believe, who are both contained in the Church in the wider sense, without a separation of the former from the latter being possible to human eyes and permitted to human will.[1] A place indeed is left for Church discipline in opposition to public offences; but the Donatist spirit, and the purism which would fain exhibit a visible church of saints, are repudiated,[2] whether it assume the form of the separation of believers from the rest, or the form of the excision of non-believers from the Church. The latter would involve the denial that the Church upon earth has not merely a visibility (*i.e.* cognizableness), but no less also an invisibility, *i.e.* incognizableness in respect of what persons belong to the church in the proper sense.

This doctrine is next carried forward by the Evangelical theologians. Even the expression *ecclesia visibilis et invisibilis* is retained in Hütter, Gerhard, Baier, etc.[3] But its meaning is not, that these are two churches (*geminæ ecclesiæ*), but the one Church has both predicates. Were the invisible side altogether wanting, either faith also would be altogether wanting, and thus it would no longer be a Church, but illusion, or it would be assumed that the Church has rendered itself completely visible, which is never true of the earthly, developing Church. Conversely, were the visibility (*i.e.* cognizableness) altogether wanting, there would no longer be a Church upon earth, for then not merely would persons be wanting whose faith makes itself known, although not certainly, but also the continuance of the outward signs of the Church with its means of grace. The relative incognizableness of the persons actually belonging to the Church in the proper sense is, in the view of the theologians, by no means incognizableness of the Church itself.

4. In the most recent days the idea of the *ecclesia invisibilis* has encountered evident dislike in many forms, especially with those who lay preponderant stress on the legal side of the church, or think themselves compelled specially to emphasize

[1] *Apol.* 150, 28. [2] *Ibid.* 156, 49.
[3] Gerhard, tom. xi. 82; Hollaz, ii. 798; Calov, viii. 262.

its manifested form.[1] They object against it, that it endangers the unity of the Church, easily leading to a duality of churches, or to a Donatist and spiritualistic conception of the Church. Stahl thinks with Möhler, that the visible Church is the first, the invisible the second. Rothe, Delitzsch, and others, insist that the invisible Church cannot even be thought by itself; for if the Church is to be a community it is not invisible, if it is to be invisible it cannot be a community. Community presupposes an issuing forth of what is within, intercourse. An invisible Church is therefore a *contradictio in adjecto*.[2] Thiersch thinks that the strong emphasizing of the invisible Church has worked injuriously, having given rise to false contentment respecting the contradiction between the idea and actuality of the Church. On logical grounds it is objected to the distinction, that in it both the visible and invisible Church have the name of Church, whereas the visible is no Church in that which distinguishes it from the invisible, namely unbelievers. The Church as a dogmatic idea, it is said, is an object of faith, and there essentially belong to it Word and Sacrament, from which faith arose and continually arises. But unbelievers or the godless are no object of faith; therefore, strictly speaking, they are non-existent to the dogmatic Church-idea. Rather, in relation to the Church-idea they must be left out of sight, and the right to do this is just based on the ground that faith knows Christ as the Substitute, who covers all imperfection in the empirical Church by His holiness. In the dogmatic idea of the Church, therefore, no attention need be paid to *hypocritæ* or *impii*. Accordingly, to distinguish between *ecclesia proprie dicta* and *ecclesia large dicta* would be without justification.[3] We connect the examination of these objections with the dogmatic investigation.

NOTE (see p. 349).

Zwinglii, *Expositio Christianæ Fidei* (composed shortly before his death for Francis I.), ed. Niemeyer, *Collectio Confessionum in*

[1] Cf. J. Müller, p. 282 ff.

[2] Cf. especially Rothe, *Anfänge der chr. Kirche*, p. 99 ff., and *Theol. Ethik*.

[3] So especially Ritschl in the *Studien*, ut supra, and in his treatise on the *Foundation of Church Rights*, p. 15 ff. For the rest, he defends the Evangelical doctrine that the Church is an object of faith, and in so far invisible.

Ecclesia Reformata publicatarum, p. 53, 1840. Zwinglii *Opera*, ed. Schuler et Schulthess, iv. 58: Credimus et unam sanctam esse Catholicam, *h.e.* universalem ecclesiam. Eam autem esse aut *visibilem* aut *invisibilem*. Invisibilis est, quæ—Spiritu s. illustrante Deum cognoscit et amplectitur. To it belong all believers on the face of the earth. It is not called invisible, as though believers were invisible, but because who really believes is known only to God and himself, not to human eyes. Visibilis autem ecclesia non est Pontifex Romanus, etc., sed quotquot per universum orbem Christo nomen dederunt. Among them there are some who are called Christians wrongly, because they believe not; and in the visible Church there are some who are not members of the elect, invisible Church. Accordingly the *ecclesia invisibilis* is a narrower circle than the visible. On the other hand, if the Romish Church is understood by the visible, there are members of the true Church outside this visible one. He does not say in the passage, that the elect form the ecclesia invisibilis, to him the invisible Church is no civitas Platonica; he rather ascribes an organization (pastores, magistratus) to the Church in general. *Calvin* (in the dedication of his *Institutio* to Francis I., *Corp. Ref.* xxx. 22 f. *Inst. Rel. Chr.*, ed. Tholuck, i. 15, of the year 1536): In his cardinibus controversia nostra vertitur: primum, quod ecclesiæ formam semper *apparere et spectabilem* esse contendunt, deinde quod formam ipsam in sede Romanæ ecclesiæ et præsulum suorum ordine constituunt. Nos contra asserimus: et ecclesiam *nulla apparente forma* stare posse, nec formam externo illo splendore—sed longe alia nota contineri, nempe pura Verbi Dei prædicatione et legitima sacramentorum administratione (iv. 12. 1, the *disciplina* is also described as *maxime necessaria* to the Church), iv. 1. 7. Ed. Thol. ii. 193: De ecclesia *visibili* et quæ sub cognitionem nostram cadit, quale judicium facere conveniat,—liquere existimo. Diximus enim bifariam de ecclesia sacros libros loqui. Interdum—eam intelligunt, quæ *revera est coram Deo*, in quam nulli recipiuntur, nisi qui et adoptionis gratia filii Dei sunt et Spiritus sanctificatione vera Christi membra. In this case the Church embraces all the elect from the beginning of the world. Sæpe autem ecclesiæ nomine universam—multitudinem in orbe dispersam designat (S. Scr.), quæ unum se Deum et Christum colere profitetur, Baptismo initiatur in ejus fidem, Cœnæ participatione unitatem in vera doctrina et caritatem testatur, consensionem habet in Verbo Domini ad ejus prædicationem, ministerium conservat a Christo institutum. In hac autem plurimi sunt permixti hypocritæ, sinners also of various classes, who are not reached by church discipline. Quemadmodum ergo nobis *invisibilem*, solius Dei oculis conspicuam ecclesiam *credere* necesse est, ita hanc,

quæ respectu hominum ecclesia dicitur, observare ejusque communionem colere jubemur. As relates to *individuals*, God knows His own, and He alone (§ 8). But He permits us by the *judicium caritatis* to regard as brethren those who show by confession of faith, exemplary walk, and partaking of the Sacraments, that they adhere to the same God and Christ with us. On the other hand, God has provided for the *body* of the Church being known by visible signs. These are Word and Sacraments. For it must certainly be believed, that they are not fruitless (§§ 9, 10). *Luther* in the (second) commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians (Walch. viii. 2745, Erlang. ed. iii. 38): Recti igitur fatemur in symbolo, nos *credere* ecclesiam sanctam. Est enim *invisibilis*, habitans in spiritu, in loco inaccessibili, ideo non potest *videri* ejus sanctitas. Deus enim ita abscondit et obruit eam infirmitatibus, peccatis et erroribus variis formis crucis et scandalis ut secundum sensum nusquam appareat. Qui hoc ignorant—statim offenduntur. Others, on the contrary, invertunt articulum fidei: *credo* ecclesiam sanctam, et pro *credo* ponunt: *video*.

Against Jerome Emser (Walch, xviii. 1654): I therefore conclude that the Christian Church is not tied to any one place, person, or time (nor to the counterfeit Church of the Roman Pope). All Christians in the world pray thus: I *believe* in the Holy Ghost, one holy Christian Church, the communion of saints. If the article is true, it follows that *no one* can *see* or feel the holy Christian Church, nor may it be said: Lo, it is here or there. For what is believed is not seen or felt.—Against Ambrose Catharinus (xviii. 1792): But you may perhaps say: If the Church is altogether in the spirit and a purely spiritual thing, no one can know where any part of it is in the whole world. But (1793 f.): There are not wanting signs by which the Church is known—Baptism, the Bread, and most of all the Gospel. P. 1796: Of a truth the Gospel is the only surest and noblest sign of the Church, far surer than Baptism or the Bread. I speak not of the written Gospel, but of that proclaimed with bodily voice, nor of every sermon delivered from the pulpit in the Church, but of the Word of the right sort, which teaches the true faith of Christ. —Similarly (iv. 1813 on Ps. xxii. 25, xviii. 1221) against Augustine von Alveld: No one says: "I *believe* in the Holy Ghost, one holy Roman Church, a communion of Romanists." We see, we do not believe in the Roman Church. Hence it is not the Church of the Creed. The true Church, which is believed in, is a Church of the sanctified by faith. And no one sees who is believing or holy.—On the other hand, the signs, by which we may know where that Church is in the world, are:

Baptism, the Sacrament, and the Gospel. For where Baptism and the Gospel are, there, no one can doubt, saints are found, and should be like mere children in the cradle. P. 1214 f. he regrets that it has become customary to call the *outward institution* of the Church, and especially the ministerial order, the Church. Spiritual rights and human laws indeed call such a matter the Church or Christendom. But there is not a letter in Scripture to show that such a Church, if it exists apart, was ordained by God. For the sake, therefore, of better understanding and brevity, we would call the two Churches by different names. The first, which is natural, fundamental, essential, and real, we would call the spiritual, internal Christendom. The second, which is artificial and external, we would call a material, external Christendom, not that we desire to separate them from each other, but as the apostle usually speaks of an inward and outward man. The former is not without the latter. Similarly in Walch, v. 450. Why he wishes to know nothing of a *division* into two Churches, he says with special energy (Walch, vii. 303, 304), where he applies the parable of the tares. The Lord's forbidding the servants to tear up the tares is "a comfort against fanatical spirits, Cathari, Anabaptists, who, because they see the Church mixed with the godless, shriek all together: The Church is no Church. This also troubles many people. But if we refused to tolerate tares, there would be no Church. For, seeing that the Church cannot exist without tares, to desire to root up the tares would be to desire to root up the Church. The fanatics, who refuse to harbour any tares among them, only succeed in leaving no wheat among them; *i.e.*, in their desire to be wheat pure and simple, they end in making themselves with their great holiness, forsooth, no Church at all, but a pure and simple sect of the devil. For the arrogant and those puffed up with vain conceit of holiness are at the farthest remove from the Church, which spontaneously confesses that she is a sinner and bears with the intermixed tares, *i.e.* heretics, sinners, godless."

Melanchthon also agrees therewith, as is shown by the *Conf. Aug.* viii. and especially the *Apology*. From 1535 he began in his *Loci* to strongly accentuate the visible side of the Church in opposition to Anabaptism, and in order to give greater security to the Church as a historic power, nevertheless not in such a way as to identify the external manifestation of the Church with the *ecclesia proprie dicta*. To him the Church still remains an object of faith. Cf. Herrlinger, *ut supra*, pp. 252–268.

C.—*Dogmatic Investigation.*

§ 149.

1. The distinction of the Church as *Visibilis* and *Invisibilis* has decisive dogmatic value, but is capable of being wrongly conceived in various ways. Hence, first of all, the *right meaning* must be fixed. As two churches are not to be understood thereby, so also the distinction must not be confounded with the antithesis of reality and idea. The invisible aspect of the Church is real in an eminent sense, no figment of thought nowhere existing, merely something that ought to exist. Christ, the Holy Spirit, faith, are thoroughly real powers. Nor is the distinction the same as that between the true and false Church. This would issue in two churches, one of which would be altogether undeserving of the name of Church. Further, the invisible Church is not identical with the triumphant Church; for although the perfected righteous belong to the *ecclesia invisibilis*, the seat of the latter is not merely heaven. The *ecclesia invisibilis* is found also on earth in the militant, visible Church, else the earthly Church would be no longer a Church. Many emphasize the invisible Church in a sense which shows only too plainly that invisibility signifies to them at most an ideal that ought to be and is essentially identical with the non-existence of an actual Church. Atomistic and separatist thinkers often conceal their feeble sense of communion by appealing to the invisible Church, of which they wish to be regarded members, while utterly indifferent to the visible Church. Many of the educated understand by the invisible Church, in which they reckon themselves, a sort of aristocracy of nobler, loftier natures, for whom the historic reality of the Church is too bad to allow them to share its responsibilities, toils, and sufferings. They seem to themselves to walk on the heights of humanity, whereas they are entangled in an egoism as lacking in humility as in love. This is the pseudo-Protestant error, that exaggerates the just critical element, which impels to a distinction between visibility and invisibility in the Church, to such a degree as to mean that reality and idea are divorced from each other.

But then certainly the opposition to the emphasis laid on the invisibility of the Church must not be pushed so far as with Stahl, Münchmeyer, and others to lay the chief stress on the *visibility of the Church*, from a fear lest the idea of invisibility should beget a spiritualistic undervaluing of the outward Church, or an indifference to the interval between it and the divine idea of the Church. The priority of the visible to the invisible Church is dogmatically untenable. No doubt, faith might originate through the Word alone, and therefore through a co-operating outward element. But the Word, which of course comes first, is still no Church. That faith originates *now* through the ministry of the empirical Church, and therefore now the Church in so far precedes the faith of individuals, is not called in question by the present distinction; but it is quite consistent therewith that a Church only exists when faith exists.[1] Nay, even the outward element, which ministers to the origination of faith—above all, the Word—had first of all an inner existence in the spirit of the speaker. The visible and outward, whether Creed or God's Word, is no certain proof of the existence of faith in the individual speaker. On the other hand, faith only is the end, to which everything external ministers, so that the chief stress must still fall on that which is invisible in the Church. Further, it is correct to say that a distinction must be drawn between the dogmatic and ethical (and still further the legal) idea of the Church. But it cannot be said, that because the dogmatic idea has to do with that which is essential to the idea of the Church, whilst unbelievers belong not to the essential but to the accidental aspect, they must be ignored in reference to the dogmatic idea, and especially that their subsumption under the same idea of the Church, which includes the divine work of gathering together saints, involves a logical self-contradiction. Even the need of redemption, and therefore sin, has a side related to Dogmatics, and is no merely ethical idea. Sin is not to be regarded as a vanishing quantity, a nonentity or defect, which for the sake of Christ's advocacy does not come into consideration when contemplated *sub specie æternitatis*. Rather, time and development have a meaning even for God.[2] And as concerns the divine idea

[1] Cf. § 128, p. 155.

[2] See vol. i. 244 f. 328 f.

of the Church, God has willed no Church but one which advances to its consummation through development, through holding fellowship with non-believers, nay, with such as are unbelievers at least for the moment. But the idea of the Church is of course modified by the mingling which thus arises; not indeed in the sense that *unbelievers* belong just as essentially to the idea of the Church in their own right, so to speak, as believers, for they are only connected with the Church as an element to be vanquished or to be cut off *in due time*, but in the sense that the Church would not answer to its divine idea if it desired to separate from all non-believers and ceased to be a *seminarium credentium*. And thus the idea of the *Ecclesia large dicta* is justified. *How* the Church has to accomplish the vanquishing of unbelievers is an ethical question. But it is part of its dogmatic idea, that it is instituted by God in order more and more to reach its completeness and perfection by development, by historical progress and conflict with unbelief. It is indeed correct to say, that through Christ, who pertains to the Church as its Head, the Church may rightly be called holy, despite its stains, despite the commingling of hypocrites or unbelievers deforming its historic manifestation; and such a theory is in keeping with faith. But this will not justify the Church in being indifferent, in reliance on Christ's vicarious holiness, to the duty of its own actual holiness, and to the unholiness existing in its circle, and therefore in regarding its dogmatic idea as always equally realized. Rather, the object of the expectant faith of the Church are still future acts of God, who will perfect His work in it and present it pure and spotless, a state not as yet existing even to the eye of faith; for it *is* by no means a matter of divinely-wrought faith to regard in a docetic spirit development and history as something indifferent and valueless in reference to the idea.

And now, after disposing of false conceptions, and repelling attacks upon the distinction between the "visible and invisible Church," we can *settle and verify* the *right meaning* of that distinction.

2. The Church is called *invisible* first, because its spiritual essence, as well as the work of the Holy Spirit generally, is not perceptible *to sense;* secondly, because it is neither per-

ceivable by sense nor cognizable with certainty, who are among the true believers and the sanctified by faith; nay, those belong to it who are no longer corporeally upon earth. On the other hand, the meaning is not that the *Church is incognizable;* for, on the contrary, it has been constantly repeated, that it has marks by which we may know that it is and where it is. But these marks must of necessity be outward things—Word and Sacrament—although faith is requisite to judge of their value and recognize them as marks of the Church. Consequently the Church is called *visible,* although by its nature incognizable to sense, *first,* so far as the invisible Church still has outward signs belonging to the sensible world, which give to faith, not to the senses, a guarantee for the existence of the Church; for faith is assured that, where Word and Sacrament are observed, there is the Church, for the means of grace are not ineffectual. *Secondly,* the invisible Church is called visible, because believers or the sanctified by the Holy Spirit, its members upon earth, are visible persons perceivable by sense. *Thirdly,* and finally, visibility is also ascribed to the Church, which is holy by nature, and consists of saints, in the sense that it is part of its idea to hold communion also with those not yet believers in order to lead them to faith. Since it receives such into its outward communion, or tolerates them therein (especially because they are baptized), the manifestation of its community-life includes such as belong to it simply as objects of its culture; for without this it could no longer be called a seed-plot of faith. In this way, without being forced to deny its inner holy essence, it condescends, in keeping with its divine vocation, to become the *Ecclesia large dicta,* which, while perceptible to sense as a community of men, is again as a Church cognizable only to faith. For only faith is aware, that a kernel of men sanctified by faith must be sought in the outward *cœtus vocatorum,* nay, that a Church must be sought only within that *cœtus,* not outside it, where neither Word nor Sacraments are dispensed. On all these grounds it is certain that the Church as *Ecclesia proprie dicta* is an object of *credo, not of sensuous perception,* although it pertains to the idea of the Church to extend its influences into the world of visibility, and also that we must distinguish from sensible perceptibleness the *cognizableness* (*i.e.* to faith),

which of course pertains to the Church both in itself and in its manifestation, or as the *Ecclesia large dicta.*[1]

3. It thus remains to verify the right, nay the dogmatic necessity of the distinction between the visible and invisible Church, but in the sense now settled, that, strictly taken, we can only speak of the invisibility and visibility of one and the same Church, not of a visible and invisible Church, as if there were two, which implies that visibility must not be taken as identical with absolute cognizableness, nor invisibility with absolute incognizableness.

The necessity of acknowledging both sides follows from the following considerations. That no Church at all would exist, if by this were understood merely a community cognizable by sense, needs no further exposition after what has been said. Even the Romish Church holds that no Church would exist without faith and real connection with the Triune God. But, further, nothing outward, however holy and essential, such as God's Word and Sacrament, would be a Church. Everything visible in and by the Church must have for its end and aim the supplementing and nourishing of faith, which is something invisible, like God with whom faith is in communion, and only with this invisible element is the living foundation of an existing Church given. But, conversely, the inner or invisible side of the Church is inseparable from the outward or visible; for this its inner aspect existed already, continually springing into existence through the medium of an outward instrument —the Word of God and the Sacraments, which have to be administered by the existing Church. But again, faith and through faith communion with God in Christ being established, it is impossible for the Church to remain mere invisible communion. Believers would not be a Church, unless they also had communion with each other. Communion is the inner element objectivized, and thus making itself cognizable. Without love, faith would be dead, a lifeless potency. But love shows itself in the intercourse of giving and taking, in which process again the Word of God and the Sacraments form the most important means of intercourse for the communion of believers.

So far the inner connection between the visible and invisible

[1] Although not in reference to persons.

Church is evident. Both predicates are therewith demonstrated to be in mutual and friendly relation, and both essential to the idea of the Church. But the visibility gains a further significance through the entrance of non-believers into the outer circle of the Church, a contradiction being thus seemingly introduced into the idea of the Church, so far as in some way it includes non-believers and yet is said to remain one Church. In other words: The *Ecclesia large dicta* involves difficulty, and yet this is the actual historic Church of all ages, whereas it seems to aim at combining utterly contradictory elements. But the matter assumes another aspect, when it is considered that the *Ecclesia proprie dicta* with its invisible essence has to organize and realize itself in and out of the world of the first creation, in which sin has gained the mastery, and in pursuance of its vocation to enter into fellowship of living intercourse with that world. The empirical manifestation of the Church is thus clouded, the certain cognizableness of true believers is especially lacking, nay, even in believers sin is still a power by which the good principle is fettered and veiled, instead of attaining free and bright revelation. And this gives occasion to the reproach, that the complete Evangelical idea of the Church on one side as a *societas fidei et Spiritus Sancti*, and on the other as *Ecclesia large dicta*, in which the wicked and unbelievers also are found, is self-contradictory, and in any case the empirical Church, which carries such a contradiction in its bosom, must renounce the claim to be really a Church by the Evangelical standard.[1] The Evangelical idea of the Church, say others, is only tenable, provided it is permitted altogether to ignore non-believers or *impii* even in reference to the empirical Church, and to regard them as vanishing before the true point of view or as non-existent, because the real Church is covered by Christ its Head. The insufficiency of the latter expedient has been shown. To the former reproach we reply:

Believers and unbelievers are certainly a contradiction, but a Church community, containing a mixture of both, does not

[1] Or the being sanctified by faith must be excluded from the idea of the Church as an essential *nota*, and the Church must rather be defined as *ecclesia vocatorum*, and therefore exclusively by objective signs, such as Baptism and God's Word.

for that reason form a contradiction destroying its character as a Church, just as little as a State must needs become a *non ens*, if all its members are not animated by the State-idea, and if, on the contrary, a number of them are hostile to the State-principle. Even in such a mixture the empirical Church is still really a Church, so far as the difference between its essence and those in contradiction thereto is not forgotten, but remains in living consciousness; nay, this consciousness influences the will to testify and act against error and sin,—in other words, so long as the Church, which is *principaliter societas fidei et Spiritus Sancti*, in fulfilment of its calling (not merely passively, still less declining from itself), becomes the *Ecclesia large dicta*. Certainly the reason why unbelievers have a place in the *Ecclesia large dicta*, and in communion with believers, is not that they are unbelievers. But because they are able and bound to become believers, they have in them another side, which brings them into fellowship with believers; and it is precisely the strength and essence of the *Ecclesia proprie dicta* which is cherished and fostered by communion with them. They are capable of redemption and committed to the Church as an object of its culture, especially where the regular administration of baptism takes the form of infant-baptism. Believers have no right to declare the season of grace of non-believers expired, discontinue their culture, and anticipate the Judgment. On the contrary, the Church must hold communion with them. While notoriously antichristian elements may be excluded by Church discipline, and offences in walk and doctrine expelled, this gives no sanction to a Donatist course. The tares, so like the wheat as to be undistinguishable from it before harvest, would not thereby be extirpated. Nay, the effect of a premature excision must be to expel those from the Church who ought to be won over by right treatment. Not merely are the true believers, who properly constitute the Church, not certainly recognizable because of hypocrites, but also the knowledge is denied us in what persons the better features suggestive of hope exist, despite appearances to the contrary. For the same reason also Donatism fails in presenting a holy and pure Church in visibility. It cannot avoid including in the Church those who only seem to be pure, and excluding those to whom it owes Christian fellow-

ship and culture, while it forgets also the sin still remaining even in believers. Accordingly in the earthly world-period neither is a separating judgment possible in reference to everything impure in doctrine or in persons, nor a gathering together of the saints of the Church; nor is this even enjoined. The eagerness for premature presentation is common to the Donatist idea of the Church with Catholicism, save that the latter places its confidence in the institutions of its Church,[1] and in its material holiness, so to speak; while Donatism, on the other hand, seeks to bring about a Church composed of thoroughly holy persons. By these means, on one side the Church is narrowed in a separatist spirit, and on the other divorced from its world-historical duty towards what is without, in opposition to the fact that, according to Christ's Word, it is itself the *βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν*, the idea of which requires a tolerating of the tares and a union of believers and unbelievers during its earthly world-period. Thus the idea of the *Ecclesia large dicta* is sanctioned by Christ Himself.

But of course this mixed community, if it is to be rightly called a Church, must have a cohesive bond in the common blessing of God's Word, although in very different degrees of appropriation, and in the use of the Sacraments; for, were these wanting, the essential signs of the Church, even in the wider sense, would be wanting, and thus there would be no Church. The reaction of the Church, where it exists, against error and sin has its firm and invincible support in these its immutable characteristics—Word and Sacrament. It cannot be in that state of contradiction between essence and manifestation willingly, but only reluctantly. But just as little can it solve the contradiction arbitrarily or violently. It can neither palliate the contradiction and accelerate the harmony between the two by pronouncing the world holy, by weakening the antithesis between nature and grace, or by a superficial doctrine of repentance, nor by laying stress upon outward forms, works, and usages, apart from the life-giving Spirit; finally, neither by violent excision of everything in it of a worldly nature, nor, which would be essentially the same, by withdrawing from the

[1] In a similar spirit the degenerate orthodoxy of the seventeenth century thinks the *florentissimus status ecclesiæ* has come, where there is purity and unity in public teaching.

world, in order to present in the like-minded a community of the pure and believing alone. Rather, what is enjoined on it is spiritual conflict with the world within and without it. The salt, the leaven, exists for the mass, and ought not to remain isolated. The fulness of love seeks what is empty in order to fill it. The Church must not avoid communication and participation from fear of pollution. But in doing both, it must reflect Christ in maintaining itself in righteousness. Instead of losing itself in the world, and making itself like it, it has to assimilate, and thus to conquer the world. It thus remains the one true Church, even in the sullied manifestation of its actuality. Invisible in essence, it is constantly in process of becoming visible, by virtue of its immortal inner nature. But it humbly submits to suffer at the hands of the world within and without it, and to exist in servant-form, not in holy, glorious manifestation, until the coming of the Lord, to whom alone the final judgment pertains.

4. Finally, the distinction of the Church as visible and invisible has great value in its right confessional statement, and its acknowledgment is a test of the purity of Evangelical teaching. The value is defensive, critico-polemical, and finally eirenical. In reference to the *defensive* aspect, or as a bulwark of pure Reformation doctrine, the distinction has value, because for its sake it is important, in distinction from Catholicism, to maintain faith—that internal, not sensibly cognizable, and therefore invisible element—and the union with Christ established by faith, as the primitive factor through which the Church is constituted. That union with Christ is the principle and regulator of communion with men (believers and non-believers). It is true, Word and Sacrament precede faith, and at present also the Church which administers them. But as those means of grace are not the Church, because the Church first exists with believers, so also the Church is not the faith-establishing power. Rather, faith is generated by the Holy Spirit through Word and Sacrament, and the Church is not the power over both. No idea of the Church is evangelical, which no longer makes the faith of the members an essential, constituent factor of the Church, but, in order to get rid of the predicate of the invisibility (*i.e.* of the relative incognizableness) of its true members, makes

institutions of any kind the chief thing in the idea of the Church, call it episcopacy or clergy, forms of Confession or[1] the bare fact of being baptized. Especially, as Harnack truly remarks,[2] the Church must not be defined as the entire body of the baptized.[3] That would be, since he who advances not to faith, or he who again falls away, remains baptized, implicitly to treat faith as non-essential to the idea of the Church. It would be an externalizing of the Church, a retrogression to the Catholic mode of view, an offence against the material principle. The divinely-ordained connection between Word and Spirit, between baptism and faith, would be dissolved. Baptized non-believers, because true members of the Church, would also be members of Christ. That a magical notion of baptism as an *opus operatum* would at the same time follow, has been previously shown.

But the distinction has also its indispensable *critical* and *polemical* importance, not merely with an external reference—especially against Donatism and Romanism[4]—but also with internal reference. For it keeps the consciousness awake to the difference or contradiction between the essence of the Church and its empirical manifestation. And this summons to the work of Church purification.

Finally, this distinction includes *eirenical* breadth of sympathy, a Christian œcumenical character. Where this distinction is neglected, and the empirical Church made identical with the essence of the Church, there haughty, stagnant self-contentment appears in the Church in question, which in a repellent and fault-finding spirit loves in its narrowness and short-sightedness to sit in judgment on other Confessions, while overlooking its own imperfection. But in virtue of the fact that we Evangelicals do not make the question of belonging to the true Church dependent on frail, professedly infallible human institutions liable to corruption and on connection with them, but on communion with Christ by faith, it is possible for us to regard, as true partners in faith, all those

[1] As Münchmeyer would have. [2] *Ut supra*, p. 20.

[3] Such a definition would not keep to that which makes the Church the Church.

[4] Donatism refuses to know anything of an *Ecclesia large dicta;* Roman Catholicism emphasizes the visibility in such a degree as to leave but an incidental place to faith and personal holiness.

in other churches, beyond the outward limits of the Evangelical Church, who are in communion with the living Head—Christ, who has His people in all of them. Christ is not so poor, George Calixtus used to say, as to have His Church only in Sardinia.

THIRD SUBDIVISION.

THE MILITANT CHURCH.

§ 150.

The Church, assimilating the world to itself, and organizing itself therein (§§ 147–149), on one side stands in contrast with the non-Christian world as a historic spiritual power, exerting influence on the world in a regular, systematic way, and thus acquiring a potent manifested aspect. But, on the other side, coming in contact with the world, it experiences therefrom counter-influences, which not merely limit or clog its manifestation, but also disturb it internally. The unity and holiness of the Church in its outward and inward reality are injured by violation of the common spirit of love; the truth implanted in it is disturbed by errors. These disturbances, when not mere momentary phenomena, are schism and heresy. But still the Spirit of God departs not from the Church, but arouses in it, where it still exists, purifying and cementing, reforming and conforming activity by way of counteraction; and thus as a *militant Church* (*Ecclesia militans*) it still remains Christ's true Church.

1. Although in the earthly world-period the Church is not an object of sight, but of faith (§ 140), it still really exists upon earth. There is always a seed of believers, although they may at times be only *sparsi per totum orbem, i.e.* without regular communion with each other, but exist for the most part merely as a communion of individual members with each other and with their Head. Did believers no longer exist,

and had all Christendom fallen away, Word and Sacrament would also no longer be preserved; it would be as if Christ had never come: He must appear once more to initiate His historic work, for the purpose of taking up again its broken threads. But as Word and Sacrament are never without effect, so believers, where they exist, are animated with the impulse to realize the communion of faith as widely as possible, to preserve and extend Word and Sacrament. But a still unvanquished world remains in the Church, because sin and error are still a power in every believer, and because the Church—the salt of the world—must not or cannot outwardly separate from the world.[1] To do this, as has been shown, would be contrary to its vocation and to love. It preserves itself, however, as a true Church, because *purifying* forces are at its command in the possession of Word and Sacrament. The Holy Spirit is a spirit of discipline, and from Him proceeds the Church discipline, for the sake of which, as formerly shown, the Church has to organize itself. Now Church discipline certainly nowhere seems able to attain a certain and complete result, because the absolute excommunication from its communion, which might secure such a result, is interdicted to the Church by the educating and loving activity which it owes to all who are baptized. But it can still remain a true Church, according to what was proved above respecting the nature of Church discipline, and the stages of belonging to the Church.[2] The objects of Church discipline who have caused notorious scandal, necessarily lose the right of influencing the Church by election or by official functions, that the scandal may be weakened and deprived of its contagious power. They may also be debarred from the Holy Supper, if they lack the capacity profitably to receive it. By this means they are relegated to the first stages of belonging to the Church, and are now to be treated as under instruction, and as Christian minors. If they refuse to submit to this, they exclude themselves from the Church. But the Church, although compelled[3] for a time on its part to limit or suspend communion, must never exclude from the hearing of God's Word, and must always hold itself ready to receive the penitent again into

[1] John xvii. 15; § 149.
[2] § 147*b*, 1. § 146*b*.
[3] According to Matt. vii. 6 ff.

full communion. By purifying action, the chief force of which consists in employment of God's Word, the Church can thus maintain itself as a true Church, despite the sin and error in its bosom. It is not in the world for a mere show, but to be in spiritual intercourse therewith, in order that through its word the world may come to believe; but it is not of the world.[1] It would destroy itself by conformity to the world. But it would also destroy itself by absolute, and therefore unloving separation from the world. Instead of this, it remains in the world in the character of the salt of the world that loses not its savour, or in its character of a militant Church contending with the weapons of faith, of holy love and hope.

2. In its militant character the Church might have remained a unity even upon earth, and thus been all the more successful in its struggle with the world. But, as we know, in the course of its history it has suffered from various *divisions* or schisms. Like all disturbances, this also must be derived from error and sin.[2] If error were only in an individual, without disturbing the community, it would be transient; and if there were no error, but primarily mere sin, deficiency of love in an individual, a merely momentary weakening of the common spirit might arise. But sin and error stand also in intrinsic connection, they strengthen and fertilize each other, and thus nothing is more natural than their seeking and finding each other. Want of love and selfishness may seek their legitimation in errors, thus acquiring contagious force. Errors may beget strife, alienate the mutually friendly, and cause love to wax cold. Where sin is, there also is the seed of discord; and since sin is everywhere, we may say, discord is everywhere and always on the point of bursting forth; and peace is nowhere save where it is again and again newly won by keeping down the elements of discord. Holy Scripture exhorts: "Pursue peace," because peace is always fleeing away. But sin also begets error, by preventing mutual understanding and agreement. When the powers of error and sin, the powers that mar love and truth, gather and accumulate in masses through the predominance of the world in

[1] 1 Cor. v. 10, 11, vii. 31.

[2] Not from difference of national individualities, which on the contrary ought to be moulded charismatically, and to form a bond of communion.

the Church, a *Church-division* is the consequence, usually—at least in great Church-divisions—attaching itself to different national individualities (effects, so to speak, of unmastered earthly matter), innocent in themselves, but overlooking their need of mutual supplement, or attaching itself to difference of degree in apprehending and appropriating Christianity.

Observation. — If the visible unity of the institutional Church-organism constituted that in which the reality of the Church resides, the man who breaks with that organism and its authorities would always be guilty of schism, and would secede from the true Church. But since obedience to such authorities can only be conditional,[1] because the outward organism of the Church does not represent the continuation, but merely the reflection, of Christ's office, and that possibly in a very distorted form, and since the organism has not the promise of always being sustained by God's word and faith, but may fall away from both, there may be a disobedience to antichristian, Christ-denying ordinances, which is obedience to Christ, as well as an obedience to such ordinances, that would be a participation in the sin of rebellion against Christ. Although in such a case obedience to Christ seems to be the cause of the division, just because the organism only remains what it was before the division, in reality the organism, setting itself in opposition to the call to obedience to Christ, is the cause of the schism, and excludes itself from the true Church inasmuch as it sets itself in opposition to the truth crossing its path.

3. Nothing but sin, and indeed accumulated sin, can split the one Church in its manifestation into a multiplicity of churches, which surrender positive communion with each other, Church divisions being always a grievous judgment on the visible Church. But still the unity can never be utterly abolished. Even the divided churches in their character as Christendom stand in contrast with the world; and the circle where the light of Christianity still shines, be it ever so dimly, is never quite identical with the circle where it is extinguished or does not shine. Where the visible Christian Church still exists through preservation of Word and Sacrament, there also is something of Christian spirit and life, and therefore something to counteract the want of love, or discord and error. All particular churches

[1] § 136, 4.

have a claim to be regarded as Christian so long as they have not lost, but still exercise, the essential characteristics or signs of the Church—Word and Sacrament. For, so long as these endure, even with many perversions, the presupposition of faith must be maintained, namely, that despite heresy and schism the true Church still contains members, and the healing force of the higher nature is not yet extinct. In each of the Church-parties deserving the name, the Holy Spirit is at work as a *Reforming* spirit, and accomplishes His end by setting in motion purifying and cementing forces. Moreover, every particular Church needs such action at all times both for its own sake and in relation to others. The conflict of the militant Church must be directed against the principles that would dissolve the true Church—sin and error,—above all, against impurity within itself.[1] It must never so frame its organization or government as to interdict or exclude effort to purify its life or teaching. But as relates to conduct towards other particular churches, it is wrong to fix the gaze on their faults alone, and, forgetful of our own defects or faults, to wrap ourselves up in self-admiration and security, and by want of sympathy to lessen our influence upon them, instead of righteously acknowledging the excellences or the good bestowed also on them, and regarding that good as a common blessing intended for the whole of the Church, and to be sought by it. Just as blameworthy of course is an attempt at union, whose only aim is to promote an external unity. Such unity is no absolute good alone. The absolute good even for the visible Church is, not indeed a particular form of dogma, but the truth embodied in the dogma and contained in Word and Sacrament. Christ is the true treasure of the Church. Thus truth and unity, faith and love, seem to be limited, but only in appearance, because love is not Christian, unless it takes its law of life from Christ. It is the function of Symbolics to determine the nearness or distance of particular Church-parties from each other, and thus to fix the limit and direction of efforts after unity among them. Towards parties, with whom union is inadmissible as Church communities, like the Roman Catholic Church, ecclesiastical hospitality is at least to be exercised, and, what is of greater import, the

[1] 1 Pet. iv. 17

consciousness of mutual relationship must be shown at least by conflict in love, *i.e.* by rendering help to what is true among them, in criticising what is false, for which a keener eye always dwells in others. And this is the dogmatic principle of Confessional Polemics. Since each individual Church has to do with the others at least in controversy, and each one desires thus to render loving service to the others, nay, acknowledges the good presented by them in distinctive expression, in this way also they are a unity, although divided, or a Christian family; and in this sense all churches, which are still parts of the one true Church, are a militant Church in the spirit of truth and love within and without.

4. Although, therefore, error may be strong, and the bond of communion within or without feeble from different causes, so long as a particular Church is still really militant in outward respects, and still more inwardly or with itself, it is a Christian Church, not forsaken by the healing forces of grace. Both in the toil of conflict outwardly, and in the zeal for constant inward purifying, the believing kernel in different Church-parties forms the true Christendom, strong through faith in the might of Him whom it knows to be with it, and who is able to convert even the storm and tempest of the Church into blessing.[1] The believers in the Church are at all times the preserving, quickening, hallowing salt in relation to those destined and on their way to faith. Without being outwardly separate, they form the inner circle and real centre of the empirical Church. Without being outwardly cognizable, they are also the upholders of particular churches, in whom and for whose sake these churches form a part of the actual Church. This invisible Church in the earthly Church has and is aware of the promise even as to its earthly history, that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. It forms *the Militant Church contending in the certainty of victory.*

[1] Matt. xvi. 18 ff., xviii. 18 ff.

THIRD DIVISION.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE LAST THINGS, OR OF THE CONSUMMATION OF THE CHURCH AND THE WORLD.

§ 151.

There is a consummation of individuals and of the whole, especially of the Church, which, however, is realized not through a purely immanent, uninterrupted process, but through crises and Christ's Second Advent.

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Apol. 217; *Cat.* 371; *Cat. Maj.* 501 ff.; *Form. Conc.* 594, 4. 719, 7. 729, 18.

Observation.—Eschatology embraces:

Firstly, the future up to the decision, both the future of individuals (death and the intermediate state) and the future of God's kingdom on earth, where the doctrines of Chiliasm and of Antichrist come under review.

Secondly, the doctrine of Christ's Second Coming, of the Resurrection of the Dead, and the Judgment.

1. Conscience already carries in it the fundamental features of an Eschatology,[1] for the good is not even believed in as the existing and alone truly real, unless it is believed in as the power to judge the world.[2] God cannot, it is true, desire to compel the wicked to goodness; but were He to allow evil to rule for ever, there would either be no zeal in Him for the honour of the good, or no power to give effect to that zeal. It would therefore not merely be contrary to God's outward glory in face of the world, if He were not World-judge, but also contrary to His inner glory, for He could not be indifferent to the prevalence and dominion of good in the world without indifference to good generally. But the honour of good not merely requires that it exist and show its superiority to evil by a judgment, but also that it reveal its inner wealth, its fulness of energy. In this way a goal of the world is posited negatively and positively. Heathenism, indeed, has but little of Eschatology. To it, questions as to Whence and Whither are secondary to life in the present. It moves only in the circle of physical life, and knows no absolute divine goal of the world, and no such goal for individuals, but has merely attempts at a cosmogony and at a doctrine of immortality and end of the world. The majority in heathenism, to pass by the dualistic religions, so far as their thoughts are at all directed to the future, think of the world as remaining eternally as it is; although a restless mutability is part of its constitution, a mutability however subservient to no goal lying in a straight line, but at most to a cycle which constitutes no progress. There also the individual person is as little considered as the future; but where continuance is bestowed on him, this mostly takes the form suited to the fundamental notion of a cycle, *i.e.* the form of a transmigration of souls, a recurrence measured by shorter or longer periods, but without

[1] Rom. ii. 12 ff.

[2] Hence in Gen. xviii. 25 God is already conceived as Judge of the world.

perceptible progress as the result. It is only where personal, moral duties spring into consciousness under the influence of a more powerfully awakened conscience, that not merely are ideas of a future separation of the good and bad, of punishments and rewards, formed, but the future of the world as a whole is also gradually placed under an ethical point of view. Most of the heathen religions (and the lower dualistic ones also) do not reach the thought of a goal of the world, but remain entangled in an alternation between periods of triumph now on the part of the light, beneficent powers, and now on the part of the dark, harmful powers, whether they stop at the annual cycle or advance to the supposition of longer periods. The former, for example, is the case in the Egyptian and Syrian religions; the latter, in Plato, the Stoa, and Buddhism. But such simple alternation is the opposite of progress, is anti-teleological. Only those dualistic religions, in which the antithesis of moral good and evil emerges with more definite predominance, occupy themselves more with Eschatology, and this in such a form that, after eventful struggles in the earthly world, a blessed world-goal, and an enduring triumph of the good, form part of the prospect in the future. So in the Persian and partially in the German religion.

2. But it is only in the sphere of revelation that such a teleology finds a secure footing. Here first there is scope for a development of eschatological doctrine, for here first the ultimate aim rises to consciousness, for which the world was created, and which must appear in realization at the end. The end or the goal also rules the way to the goal. But here two points are to be observed. First, that according to the O. T. eschatology is little more for a long time than a doctrine of future developments to be looked for *on earth*, while the gaze usually does not extend beyond the earthly world-period. It is a future in this world, not in heaven, which the pious of the O. T. have before their eyes. For this very reason, again, it is less the future of individual persons than of the nation and theocracy. This is in keeping with the historical earthly vocation of the nation, with the mission which Israel had to discharge in reference to the history of religion. That mission is represented by the law built upon Monotheism, and especially by prophecy, which announces more definitely the

destinies of the nation, the judgments upon it, the great judgment-day of God, and also the glorious Messianic age following thereupon, which is to be a blessing to other nations. As relates to individuals, the terrors of Hades (Sheol) are not vanquished even by the faith of the pious in the O. T. Beginnings of faith in immortality are present;[1] even the knowledge that death is not man's normal destiny, but contrary to his idea, is of ancient date. Enoch and Elijah prove that communion with God is a power above death, and resurrection is already employed as a figure for the restoration of the nation. But in the entire O. T. the notion of Sheol remains essentially similar.[2] Just and unjust are gathered in it. Even the former consider Hades a loss in comparison with the earthly life. A doctrine of the separation of the two according to the lot deserved is not yet found. In a word, the O. T. gives no more precise information as to the ultimate fate of individuals—of the pious and godless.[3]

3. Christianity alone is the absolutely teleological religion, pointing to a definite decision in the future in reference to individuals and the whole. In the O. T., Christianity itself is the essential contents of Eschatology. One might think that, after Christianity has become historic fact, prophecy is at an end, everything is fulfilled. And this was the expectation, not only of the prophets, but of the apostles of the Lord, namely, that the end, the consummation of the world, will come with the Messiah—nay, that the Messiah will first of all execute judgment, and that the revealing of His power will be the first thing. But in opposition even to the Baptist,[4] Christ expressly describes judgment not as His first but as His last work; and since He had not to appear first in glory, but in abasement, suffering, and dying, the *συντέλεια αἰῶνος* was thereby deferred, and to the first presence (Parousia) of Christ the expectation of a second was added, on the ground of the most definite statements of Christ. The division of Christ's Parousia into a first and second was not merely necessary on

[1] Ps. xvi. 10, xvii. 15, xlix. 15; Isa. xxvi. 19, liii. 9; Hos. xiii. 14; Dan. xii. 2; Ezek. xxxvii. 3-6.

[2] Cf. Oehler, *O. T. Theology*, I. 245 ff. (Clark). Schultz, *A. T. Theologie*, ed. 1. I. 360 ff., 396 ff., II. 136. 210-220; and Kahle, p. 305 ff.

[3] Oehler, *ut supra*.

[4] Cf. Matt. iii. 10, 12, with John iii. 17.

account of the atonement, because the work of redemption required Christ's sacrifice of Himself in suffering and death, but was also involved in the necessity of an *ethical* process in those to be redeemed. The glory and the sight of Christ's power could not be the first, because the sight would have corrupted the motive of surrender to Christ, and have injured the ethical character of faith. Nevertheless by this postponing of the revelation of the glory of His person and kingdom, which certainly appeared to Christian hope but a small thing, the certain occurrence of a decision to be expected from the Messiah was not rendered in the least doubtful. On the contrary, precisely because the supreme *spiritual* blessing has already come in the gospel, Christian faith which trusts in God knows that the power of consummation exists to bring everything to decision for or against the good, and to cause the worth or demerit of every individual definitely to appear, so that now for the first time through the influence of the gospel everything is ripe for judgment. A pregnant eschatological element lies in Christian faith as such. Faith has experienced so much of Christ's effectual working, that in presence of what is still lacking, however much this may be, it possesses not merely a hope, but the certainty that the divine idea of the world will not remain simply a fair but impotent picture of imagination, and that Christ, by the absolutely sufficient power over sin, the world, the devil, and death dwelling in Him, will not leave the work He has begun a ruin and fragment, but will complete it. Nay, the faith of the Church already descries Christ coming again, as He advances unhalting and undelaying to the end through His unbroken activity in the world. And under this aspect faith recognizes the beginning of the judgment and the end as already come with Christ's manifestation.[1] In reference to the future, believers are not limited to opining or wishing. Christians are a prophetic race,[2] they know of the end and completion of the divine work begun. And thus, under the influence of Christian *hope*, which anticipates the end—the next fruit of faith—Christian wisdom forms its ideas of purpose or ideals, and draws from hope the valiant spirit of love, enabling it with true stedfastness (*ὑπομονή*) to desire the right goal in the right way.

[1] John iii. 19, xii. 47 ff. [2] 1 Pet. i. 3, 4, cf. ii. 9.

4. The distinctive feature of Christian Eschatology is its relation to Christ's person, a thought expressed with special clearness in the doctrine of Christ's *Second Advent*. Christ's person, conceived in the New Testament as ever actively at work, and in due time again becoming visible, gives colour and impress to every point in Christian Eschatology. Not merely will the ultimate destiny of every one be decided by his relation to Christ, and communion with Him form the centre of blessedness to the blessed—not merely will He be Judge of the world, because He is the Son of man; He will also raise the dead, and believers will be made like His glorified body in the Resurrection. The character also of the intermediate state depends on the relation to Him, and its duration on the occurrence of His Second Coming to judgment. Finally, all conflicts and advances of the Kingdom of God, of which He is Head, are connected with His name and continued activity. If theology relegated Him to a secondary position in reference to the consummation, it would make Him a person of transient importance,—a view which by reflex influence must necessarily disorganize the whole of Christology and the doctrine of God's self-revelation.

5. The presupposition of the consummation of the Church and the Kingdom of God is the consummation of individual believers. Again, since believers leave the earth without being saints,[1] the perfecting of individuals is dependent on their personal continuance or immortality, which, however, needs to be distinguished from the resurrection. There is no absolutely cogent proof of immortality. As the doctrine of Man showed, its certainty rests on likeness to God, *i.e.* in the last resort on God.[2] The true idea of God places the worth of man and personality so high, and makes God's gracious purpose of communion with man so certain, that immortality has its guarantee therein. On account of his essential relation to God, man has an infinite destiny and the capacity not to die, which through God issue in the full realization of eternal life in reference to believers. But the relation of the wicked also to God is a relation of infinite importance, such

[1] According to *Cat. Maj.* 501. 502, we are only altogether pure and holy at the Resurrection. Cf. *F. C.* 719, 7: sin cleaves to the soul.

[2] Matt. xxii. 29–32. Cf. vol. i. § 42.

as nature has not. Some (and not merely Socinians) concede immortality to the regenerate only,[1] whereas the unconverted wicked will sooner or later be overtaken by annihilation.

Observation.—In the early Church many voices were lifted up in favour of the view that man has no natural immortality, but that it is only a gift of Christ's grace, *e.g.* Arnobius, and see the article "Tatian" by Möller in Herzog's *Th. Realencyc.* This view has been still more commonly adopted in modern days to avoid the idea of eternal punishment, and to secure a harmonious conclusion of the history of the world. So Weisse, Rothe, and others, and especially Edward White.[2] In behalf of this view it may certainly be asserted, that no immortality in the sense of the soul's incapability of death in virtue of its own strength can be set up. That the proof of the immortality of the soul from the simplicity of its essence is not conclusive,[3] we have seen before. According to Ps. civ. 29, the consequence of God withdrawing His breath is that the creature perishes. As matter of fact, our soul has not life in itself (*i.e.* the power of life) by nature, for otherwise it would possess self-existence (*aseität*), which indeed Rothe ascribes to perfected spirits. But in the proper absolute sense this belongs only to God (of whom, therefore, it is said that He alone has immortality), in a relative sense indeed also to the creature, but only in such a way that God causes His conserving will to co-operate every instant. But while on these grounds it must be conceded that both the formula: *non potest mori* and: *non potest non mori* must be rejected in respect of the soul in itself as in respect of the body, and consequently the formula: *potest mori* is applicable to the soul considered by itself, it does not follow from this, that a really human being falls a prey to annihilation and only the regenerate are really immortal, for the possibility remains of a continuance of life having been conferred on all men by God. In no case can the death of the body be regarded, as is done by Materialism and Pantheism, as the cause of the death of the soul in the case of the non-regenerate. Rather must it remain certain that the human soul is in itself superior to physical potencies and

[1] Which is imparted, according to Dodwell, through the medium of the true Church and its Sacraments, and therefore not to Dissenters.

[2] In his work, *Life in Christ.* The French translation of the work by C. Byse, under the title, *L'immortalité conditionnelle*, 1880, gives in the preface a long list of advocates of this view in Switzerland, England, and North America. In Germany, Nitzsch is mentioned alongside Rothe, Gess, H. Schultz with doubtful authority.

[3] Vol. ii. § 42.

beyond their reach, and therefore is able at all events to outlive the destruction of the body. It would be another question whether the soul cannot be disorganized and led to destruction by hostile powers within itself, *i.e.* by evil, on which point something will be said later on. In the present connection it is enough to see the possibility established of the harmonious consummation of the kingdom of God through the fact that the prospect exists of its deliverance from all hindering hostile elements, *i.e.* unless they consent to incorporation in the kingdom, the deliverance being effected either by the elements falling a prey to destruction, or being excluded from God's consummated kingdom. Only on the supposition that a being really human could pass into a lower class of beings, so that likeness to God became utterly extinct in him, could the capacity for immortality become extinct in him.

6. But Christianity not merely proclaims immortality; according to it, there is also a *consummation* in reference to individuals.[1] A mere progress *in infinitum* in the diminution of evil cannot suffice. Evil is no infinite power like good. It may, indeed, be said that consummation would be uniformity. But rather the nature of evil is to tend to the monotony of death. Vitality and wealth lie in the positive, the spirit and the divinely good, which cannot lack the corresponding nature for the exhibition of itself in the individual and the community. Sin hinders the unfolding of the personality in agreement with the rich variety of the faculties designed for harmonious co-operation; but the power of evil can never preclude the consummation of believers, for, while it is absolutely culpable, it is not absolutely strong, but a finite force (*Grösse*), the power of redemption, on the other hand, being infinite. The latter is the power of indissoluble eternal life, never exhausted, so that evil must be vanquished and excluded simply by the continuous growth of the power of sanctification.

7. But as believers, instead of remaining a fragment, will attain consummation, so the Church and the kingdom of God will do the same.[2] The isolated individual cannot be perfect. This would be no true consummation, for he is also a member and stands in need of the whole in order to his own blessed

[1] Phil. i. 6; Eph. i. 3, 4; 1 Cor. xv. 22.

[2] John x. 16, xvii. 13, 19, 23; Eph. i. 10; 1 Cor. xv. 28.

consummation. The generic consciousness, perfected in love, cannot attain to its absolute satisfaction and realization without communion. Again, without individuals, who have to carry the whole in themselves, and in whom the whole must live, without their conservation and consummation, there would be no consummation of the whole organism, members—whole and part—reciprocally requiring each other in order to perfection. But, more precisely, the following features are necessary to the consummation of the whole.

First. The completion of the members constituting the organism. Therefore the succession of generations, and the supply of living members from those generations, must continue until the organism has obtained all its essential members. It must not be inferred herefrom, either that all men will be incorporated as sanctified members in the organism, or that on the falling away of one class the organism must remain incomplete. For, apart from the consideration that, supposing God had a foreknowledge of what is free, He may have taken into account who will exclude themselves from the organism in sketching its idea, in virtue of His infinite creative power He may cause the succession of generations to go on until the number necessary to completeness is filled up. Therefore, whoever are lost, a compensation through the divine creative power must be supposed.[1]

Secondly. To the actuality of the Church's consummation belongs also a cessation of reproduction, which continually gives the Church a new world to subdue; and this presupposes a transforming of earthly relations. To marry and be given in marriage pertains to the present æon,[2] which did not exist always, as little as this earth of ours, and in the same way will not exist always. Granting, it might be said with some teachers, that the power of regeneration, seizing the entire person, will sanctify also the offspring, a pure life thus passing over to the children (a view, however, favoured neither by Scripture nor experience), even this would be an essential alteration in earthly relations, not to say that regeneration can never become a matter of birth without losing its ethical character.[3] That body and spirit in the

[1] Cf. Matt. xxv. 28. Talents for the work are not wanting.
[2] Luke xx. 35.
[3] John iii. 3.

present æon are asymptotes, is shown by the old age and death of Christians. The bodily and the spiritual organism are still in loose connection and external to each other, so that both have their special centre and their own laws of life, which is necessary on account of the moral calling of man.[1]

Thirdly. None who is impure can have a place in God's perfected kingdom. Moreover, the number actually carrying the kingdom in themselves must also contain what belongs to the perfect σῶμα Χριστοῦ, and those not to be received into the kingdom must also stand outside the idea of God's perfected kingdom.

Observation.—For obvious reasons the old Dogmatists paid little attention to Eschatology. Compared with other dogmas, this doctrine is wanting both in precision and certainty. And even the New Testament, as we shall see, leaves many enigmas and moot points. Hence the eschatological points of doctrine may, with Schleiermacher, be called prophetic. But the statements of the New Testament on these points are also prophetic in the sense that there are not wanting great fixed lines, which permit an eschatological doctrine to be laid down. In the ecclesiastical Eschatology hitherto the following are the principal defects to be noted. *First.* As relates to *individuals*, it supposes for them no such intermediate state between this life and the consummation as to prevent decision being come to upon all, upon their definitive worth and destiny, with the conclusion of the present life. *Secondly.* If death decides everything, this forestalls the final judgment in reference to the lot both of the wicked and believers, for even the importance of the resurrection is threatened, if blessedness follows immediately on death without limitation. *Thirdly.* It is suspicious that the interest for holiness is secondary to the interest for blessedness, which is shown in the fact that the old Dogmatists make complete freedom from imperfection and sin ensue for the justified without further ado with the laying aside of the body. As relates to the *whole*, the old Dogmatists in the first place made no unanimous choice between the twofold possibility, whether the consummation will be a new creation or the crown of a development; further, whether the course of the latter will be purely immanent and gradual, or by means of crises, and in such a way that the heaviest conflicts will fall at the end; finally, whether the victory of the heavenly forces will ensue abruptly, or whether an interpenetration-process of

[1] Cf. vol. ii. § 39.

what is earthly with heavenly forces, effected by moral means, is to be supposed. Further, the uncertainty on the point, what the *Antichristian* power is (whether a heathen, universal empire, or Mohammedanism, or the Papacy, or powers of lying and hate within the Church generally, which enter into a league with the world-power for the persecution of believers), has influence again on the question as to the *Millennium* and its conception, as well as upon the notion of the nature and period of Christ's Second Coming. Moreover, down to our own days different views are held on the point, whether the earthly life of humanity is meant merely to be a probation and preparation for another life, in which alone the real end of life lies, or whether morally precious ends and works of eternal significance also form part of the present life, ends and works in which elements of the realization of the world-goal are to be seen. This point is closely connected with the question, whether, as the Old Testament and the doctrine of a Millennium suppose, the earthly arena and the earthly world-period are capable and worthy of becoming *a representation* of the Kingdom of God, or whether the realization of God's Kingdom is to be conceived as absolutely heavenly and super-earthly. Finally, the doctrine of the old Dogmatists respecting the consummation of the world is too spiritualistic in tone, and is unable to assign to nature enough significance in relation to the spirit. To come to an approximate decision on these questions ought not to be deemed impossible. If in the ancient Church Eschatology assumed a dominant position in reference to the entire faith, so that even Christology was powerfully determined and furthered thereby, the other dogmas in their present rich development have now in turn to render service to Eschatology.

FIRST POINT: THE SECOND ADVENT OF CHRIST, WITH ITS PREPARATION IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD.

§ 152.

Individuals, like the Church and the Kingdom of Christ, await their consummation from the *Second Advent* of Christ, which forms the centre of the entire Eschatology of the New Testament, and ministers not merely to the vanquishing of all hostile powers, but also to the realizing

of the idea of the individual and the whole. This Second Advent is not made superfluous by any previous development of the individual and the whole in this world or the next, since it alone brings the complete conquest of sin and death—to the Individual in the Resurrection, to the Whole by the transfiguration of the world, by the exclusion of evil and the consummation of the Church of God.

Symb. Apostolicum, Nicæn. § 6. *Athanas.* §§ 37, 38. *Conf. Aug.* iii.: Palam est rediturus. *Apol.* 147, 17. 18. *Cat. min.* 371.

LITERATURE. — Corrodi, *Kritische Geschichte des Chiliasmus.* My *Doctrine of the Person of Christ.* Schmidt, *Jahrb. f. d. Theol.* vols. 13. 15. The Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy were against Chiliasm, *e.g.* J. Gerhard and Maresius. On the other hand, more favourable to it: Spener, *Die Hoffnung besserer Zeiten;* Bengel's *Weltalter. Modern advocates* of the Millennium in Germany: the school of Bengel, v. Hofmann, Delitzsch, Beck, Baumgarten, Löhe; Auberlen, *Daniel und die Offenbarung Johannis,* 1857 (For. Theol. Lib.), and *Die Theosophie* of F. C. Oetinger, 1859. Luthardt, *Die letzten Dinge,* 1861, p. 71 f.[1] Rinck, Splittgerber, Koch, Disselhoff, Hebart; more moderate, Karsten, *Die letzten Dinge,* ed. 3, 1861, and Flörcke, *Die Lehre vom tausendjährigen Reich,* 1859. Volk (in Dorpat), *Der Chiliasmus der neuesten Bekämpfung gegenüber,* 1869. Hölemann, *Die Stellung St. Pauli zu der Frage über die Wiederkunft Christi,* 1857. Dieterich (1857, 1858) has come forward in several writings as an opponent of Chiliasm. In substance, also, Hengstenberg must be regarded as an opponent, *Die Offenbarung des h. Johannes für solche, die in der Schrift forschen, erläutert,* ed. 2, 2 vols. 1861, 1862 (For. Theol. Lib.). He supposes that the thousand years' reign lies behind us, and is to be found in the German Empire of Charlemagne up to 1806. Keil is in essential agreement with him in his *Comm. z. Ezechiel* (For. Theol. Lib.), and *Philippi,* vi. 214 ff., although such a doctrine of the Millennium is scarcely different from denying it. The binding of Satan is said to be the existence of Christianity as the State religion, and according to Keil and Philippi is to be dated from the fall of heathenism. In

[1] Like v. Hoffmann, Luthardt teaches that the present course of the world and the resurrection of the just will be followed by a rule of Jesus Christ and His glorified Church of believing confessors over the rest of humanity, who will be subject to the former, not a carnal, but a spiritual rule of peace and state of blessing upon earth, p. 235. According to Luthardt, therefore, the risen just will rule as kings upon earth with Christ over the rest of men still alive.

England and North America, Anderson, Cox, Begg, and especially Cunningham (*On the Second Coming of Christ in Glory*, 1828), are Millenarians. On the other side: Briggs *On Premillenarianism* (in opposition to the theory of Christ's visible coming again before the thousand years' reign, a dogmatico-historical investigation). Respecting the Antichrist must be named in most recent days, Rinck, 1867; Philippi, 1877. Further, Ed. Böhmer, *Zur Lehre vom Antichrist nach Schneckenburger, Jahrb. f. d. Theol.*, vol. vi. pp. 405–467; Renan, *l'Antechrist*, 1873.

I.—*The Biblical Doctrine of Christ's Second Advent.*

The expectation of Christ's personal reappearing, found in the entire primitive Church even in the case of the apostles, is not rooted merely in their personal wishes, or still less in earthly Messianic hopes, but is based upon various discourses of Christ Himself,[1] which treat expressly of His Second Advent at the συντέλεια αἰῶνος. Attempts have been made in various ways to explain away these statements of Christ. Some assume that the disciples wrongly understood the discourses of Jesus. Others would limit the discourses on the Second Advent to the announcement of Christ's resurrection. Others think to succeed by explaining the two other Synoptists *e.g.* by Luke. Others, again, get rid of the problem by assuming that Christ Himself erred in the discourses in question,—a view which they think compatible with His dignity. To the latter it has been rightly replied,[2] that the thought of the Parousia on the lips of Jesus cannot be regarded as a conception accommodated to the times and lying merely at the circumference, but that the centre of the spiritual teaching of Jesus would be affected, if He could have erred in reference to the announcement of His Parousia;[3] for, as

[1] Matt. xxiv., xxv.; Mark xiii.; Luke xxi. (cf. xvii. 20–27, xii. 39, 40, 42–46); Matt. xxv. 1–13, 14–30, 31–46. Cf. Luke xix. 11 ff.; Mark viii. 38, ix. 1, x. 28 ff., xiv. 25, 62 (with the parallel passages); Luke xii. 35–38; Matt. x. 23, xiii. 24–30, xxiii. 20; Acts i. 11; 2 Thess. ii. 8; 1 Thess. iv. 15, v. 23; 1 Cor. xv. 23; Phil. iv. 5; 1 John ii. 18; 1 Pet. iv. 7; Jas. v. 8; Rev. i. 3, iii. 11, xix. 11, xx. 4, 11, xxii. 7, x. 12.

[2] So by Weiffenbach, *Der Wiederkunftsgedanke Jesu*, 1873, pp. 31–67, who would refer the discourses of Jesus on His Second Coming to the resurrection.

[3] Also the many testimonies to Christ's announcement of His Second Coming agree too well for them to rest on a misunderstanding of the disciples.

Schleiermacher rightly saw, Christ's Second Advent forms the real centre of the entire Christian eschatology,[1] and we shall recognize its dogmatic importance in reference to the Person, office, and kingdom of Christ, however important it is to take into account the figurative phraseology in the exposition of this fundamental thought. A warning against ascribing a subordinate importance to the Parousia-discourses should have been found in the circumstance, that the eschatology of the O. T. and the Jewish expectation of the Messiah generally contain no idea answering to the second Parousia, but regard everything as given and decided at once with the appearance of the Messiah, and that all pre-Christian conceptions are essentially modified by the announcement of a second Parousia of Christ. The O. T. prophets had spoken of the Day of the Lord, the great judgment-day of God, as the first act of the Messianic age deciding everything. Christ set forth a second Parousia as the first, and the judgment only as the last.[2] But the expression Parousia certainly has various meanings. Christ promises that He will be present (παρών) in all events and developments of His earthly Church, and will always do what it needs, which presupposes not merely His continued life and participation in His Church, but also His continuous activity and power, which can and will stand, security for the Church. He therefore thinks of this presence of His (παρουσία) as in part invisible, but always as real,—the former, when he says: I am present in the midst of them;[3] or: I am with you always to the end of the world; or when He promises: If any man love me, I will love him and manifest myself unto him, and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him and make our abode with him;[4] or when He says of faith in general, that it receives Him.[5] The entire doctrine of His Word and the Means of Grace is only understood in its real divine-human import, when these means

[1] *Chr. Glaube*, ii. 483, § 150. 3.

[2] Cf. my *Hist. of Doctr. of Person of Christ.*, All that is known to the pre-Christian Jewish Apocalyptics also is, that on His appearance the Messiah will at once found a kingdom of material prosperity. A double Parousia it knows not; later seeming indications of the ideal vanish as a deception.

[3] Matt. xviii. 20, xxviii. 20.

[4] John xiv. 18, 21, 23, 28; also xiv. 3 may be applied here.

[5] John vi. 50–58.

of grace are regarded as the outward media, through which in virtue of His heavenly, regal office, He actively continues His presence with believers. But He also promised His *visible* Second Advent. Here come in His reappearances after His resurrection, which as a fulfilment of His prediction[1] on one hand seal the certainty of His enduring invisible communion with them, and on the other were to be a real foretype of His visible, universally cognizable Second Advent at the judgment and consummation of the world. We have to linger on this latter return. His Parousia in the course of history has the significance of a preparation in reference thereto. All the apostles and ancient Christendom maintain this with all the energy of love and hope as their dearest faith. Their longing anticipated His Second Coming earlier than the event showed.[2] It is in keeping with this fact, that so little is found in the N. T. respecting the state of individuals between death and the resurrection. But more intimations are given respecting the phases of development through which the kingdom of Christ on earth has to run in conformity with Christ's own lot. These phases are so viewed that Christ's Second Coming is not superseded by them, but appears still more necessary. Nor ought the Millennium, according to the meaning of the Revelation of John, to be conceived as forestalling Christ's coming again to judgment.[3] Else there would arise a collision with the general type of N. T. teaching. But the Biblical doctrine of the antichristian powers is of importance for apprehending the entire history of the kingdom of the future.

The N. T. does not countenance a theory which assumes merely a quiet, steadily growing interpenetration or subjugation of the whole world by Christianity in the course of history. This is the optimistic view, which is unprepared for eclipses of the sun in the firmament of the Church. The N. T. foretells catastrophes to the life of the Church, so that in this respect also it is a copy of the life of Christ; and indeed catastrophes arise not merely through persecutions on the part of Heathen and Jews in its beginning, but also out

[1] John xvi. 16 ff.

[2] Heb. x. 37; 2 Pet. iii. 9, 10; Jas. v. 8, 9; 1 Thess. iv. 15 f.; 2 Thess. ii. 7 f.; 1 John ii. 18.

[3] Cf. Briggs, *ut supra*. This is clear from what follows first after chap. xx.

of itself, *i.e.* from its outward circle, on the ground of intimations of Christ;[1] according to John and Paul,[2] when the Christianizing of the nations has advanced, false prophets and pseudo-Messiahs will arise, desiring to enter into confederacy with Satan and to some extent with the world-power against Christians, and to seduce to denial of Christ. These are the powers of Antichrist, conceived indeed as operating and impelling in the apostles' days and discerned by believers,[3] but tending towards more concentrated manifestation, and destined in the end to reach still greater influence. Besides Satan, mention is made here of the πόρνη (whore)[4] and of false prophets.[5] The "beast" of the Revelation is the world-power hostile to God.[6] The antichristian power is a union of the falsification of the truth and divine worship with the hostile world-power, the result of which is a pseudo-Messiahship. Paul seems to regard the Man of Sin as an incarnation of the wicked antichristian power, and as an individual.[7] In Paul he is called the "adversary" (ἀντικείμενος), who raises himself against everything that is called God and divine worship. Self-deification and false worship are connected with his denial of God and blasphemy.[8] He is still hindered in his coming forth by the κατέχων (State and law). He himself is called the Lawless (ἄνομος), not because he issues from the heathen, but because he throws off all bonds in false freedom and caprice.[9] The revelation of this evil power standing in connection with Satan, and also an apostasy of Christendom (ἀποστασία), are expected before the end.[10] But directly on the temporary predominance of the antichristian powers, as to which there is agreement in the N. T., will follow that manifestation of the glory and power of Christianity which is associated with Christ's Second Advent.[11]

[1] Matt. vii. 21, xxiv. 11, 12, 24; Mark xiii. 6, 22.
[2] 1 John ii. 18, where Antichrists are spoken of in the plural; 2 Thess. ii. 3 ff. ἄνομος.
[3] 2 Thess. ii. 7.
[4] Rev. xvii. 1, 5, 15 f., xix. 2.
[5] Rev. xvi. 13, xix. 20, xx. 10. Cf. 2 Pet. ii.
[6] Rev. xiii. 1 ff., xiii. 11 ff., xiv. 9, xv. 2, xvi. 10, xvii. 8 ff., xix. 19, xx. 10.
[7] In John also ἀντίχριστος occurs in the singular, 1 John ii. 22, iv. 3 f.; 2 John 7.
[8] 2 Thess. ii. 4.
[9] *Ibid.* ii. 3–7.
[10] *Ibid.* ii. 3. The Revelation speaks of a mark of the beast.
[11] *Ibid.* ii. 3; Rev. xix. and xx. 2–7.

Here a difference emerges between the Revelation and the other N. T. writings. Whereas the latter join the judgment and the consummation of the world to Christ's Second Advent, the Revelation interposes another phase. It makes a thousand years' reign of the rule of Christ fall into this earthly world-period, and before the final decisive struggle and the victory of Christ. But the meaning of the passage is disputed. According to one interpretation, the martyrs and saints will be previously raised to life in a first resurrection with glorified bodies. According to others, their resurrection only means endowment with power in order to their reigning with Christ.[1] It is further disputed, whether according to the Revelation Christ will be visible upon earth during the Millennium, or will come again at the Millennium only in the sense of the triumphant and glorious manifestation of the power of the gospel, upon which depends the other question, whether the joint-reigning of the saints with Christ will take place invisibly and therefore spiritually in heaven, the earth remaining the old earth, or upon earth.[2] After the Millennium the Revelation makes Satan to be loosed once more for a short time, and Gog and Magog to march against the holy city, in which representation the earthly relations in the Millennium are viewed as essentially the same as the old ones. But this being so, it is improbable that the author is thinking of a *visible* government of Christ with saints raised in glorified bodies on the *old earth*. Neither Christ's visible return, nor a glorifying and transforming of the world, is promised in the Apocalypse for the thousand years' kingdom. The only characteristic of Christ's Second Advent mentioned with certainty is the joint-reigning of the saints with Christ upon thrones and the

[1] In Rev. xx. 6 it is merely said that they are raised to inner life, not that they have already a resurrection-body. If the πρώτη ἀνάστασις signifies that a second still follows for them, by the first resurrection might be understood their rising again in a spiritual sense, as a second coming of Elias is seen in the Baptist. Matt. xvii. 12; Mark ix. 11–13. But if they are raised in body, this may contain a hint that the resurrection of the body does not take place at once for all humanity, but according to the state of ripeness.

[2] Bengel takes the first view. On the other hand, v. Hofmann and Flörcke think that during the Millennium a portion of the earth (Palestine) will be glorified, the rest of the earth not,—a thought in agreement with the eminent importance which they with others think themselves obliged to assign to the Jewish nation in relation to the consummation of the world.

temporary binding of Satan's authority, which latter may just as well take place on the outwardly unchanged earth as the time of the unchaining of his power. Only after the last conflict with the antichristian powers do the final judgment and the manifestation of Christ in glory follow,[1] with the account of the new heaven and new earth, with which cosmical changes the general resurrection is connected.[2]

Paul has not this doctrine of the Millennium. But he seems to have expected a flowering-time of Christianity in the earthly world-period before the end of the world in consequence of the Christianizing of all nations and also of the Jews.[3]

II.—*The Ecclesiastical Doctrine of the History of God's Kingdom up to Christ's Second Advent.*

In the ancient Church up to Constantine, by the Antichrist was understood chiefly the heathen state, and to some extent unbelieving Judaism (which vied with the former in hatred to Christianity); and the perfecting of God's kingdom was expected from its overthrow, whereas the perfecting of individuals was found in their resurrection. From Augustine's days the Church usually saw the *Civitas Dei* in the world realized as to substance in the State, especially where the State was submissive to Church ordinances. In this way, down to the Middle Ages, the basis was cut away from a doctrine of a future Antichrist and a future thousand years' reign. The eschatological hope grew cold, nay, froze into self-contentment on the part of the Church in its external splendour, save that Mohammedanism, as long as it was dangerous, took the place of Antichrist, but without exerting any important influence on the shape of eschatology. The Reformation, impressed by the profound corruption within the Church itself, and struggling with that corruption, saw the Antichrist in its centre—the Roman Papacy. The ardour of eschatological expectations revived in part in the 16th century, and sketched for itself fantastic and revolutionary pictures of the future

[1] Rev. xx. 10 ff. [2] Rev. xx. 11–15, xxi. 1. Cf. 2 Pet. iii.
[3] Rom. xi. 15.

in the Anabaptist commotions, in which carnal notions of a Millennium fermented. The Judaistic, theocratic confounding of the civil and ecclesiastical in Anabaptism was rejected by the Reformers, whose chief concern was about the certainty of reconciliation and eternal life, not about the sensuous well-being and satisfaction of the outward man. Thus it was not a matter of policy to separate from the chiliastic movements of the 16th century, but an inner necessity, and the *Conf. Aug.* rejects such carnal chiliasm on this ground.[1] On the other hand, the Reformation, like ancient Christendom in its way, had no consciousness at once of the world-historical work in humanity, the State, and the entire world of culture imposed on the Protestant principle, but was conscious of inwardly sharing in the supreme good in faith, and the certainty of justification, without seeking, especially in the Lutheran Confession, a more precise, positively influential relation to the State which was left free on principle. If the supreme good is already given, a further advance of history may seem superfluous, and so in fact in the Evangelical Church the approaching end of the world was expected. Not that hope of the consummation of God's kingdom was given up, but that consummation was thought as coming abruptly with Christ's Second Coming apart from intervention of human effort, a purely divine work in a new heaven and new earth after the destruction of the earthly world. And the moral process was abridged for the *individual* just as for the Church, because everything seemed already given with the beginning —faith—in such a way that death was regarded as leading directly to inward consummation. Justification was so closely connected in thought with blessedness, that the latter was pictured as given of itself in a new glorified world by the resurrection, and therefore by a physical process, without reservation of a mediating moral shaping of the personality. The consequence of holding that, according as one departs from the world believing or not believing, his happy or unhappy fate is already decided, was necessarily an emptying and therefore abolition of the intermediate kingdom, to which indeed such great abuses had attached themselves. Essential importance is scarcely left even to the judgment and the

[1] *Conf. Aug.* xvii.

resurrection to blessedness, if all believers enter at once into the blessed life, and non-believers into damnation. But Christ's Second Coming itself, thought to be near, was so represented, that the consummation of the world presupposed its annihilation. Not a renewal of the old, but the creation of a new world was expected, *e.g.* by Gerhard and Quenstedt, which agrees with the dominance of a spiritualistic tone, and of contempt for matter and nature. As there was no thought of a new world-historical mission of the Evangelical Church, so especially there was no thought of the conversion of heathens and Jews, despite the words of Christ and His apostles. It is sufficient, the Dogmatists thought, if merely a sample is saved from every nation. The Jews may be judged because their fathers and to some extent they themselves might have had the gospel, and the heathen because they might come forsooth to Christendom and there obtain Christianity. A different tone of thought has prevailed in the Evangelical Church only since Spener's days. In his case, Evangelical *faith*, inspired with new life, advanced as in early Christian days to *hope;* and since hope sketches for itself ideals of the period of consummation, this hope kindled the mind for the world-historical mission of the Church, and, as in the beginning, the Christian spirit turned from eschatology to the Church's work of love in the earth, to Foreign and soon also to Home Missions. The conversion of the heathen and of Jews enters even in Spener into the circle of Christian hope among Evangelicals, and is recognized as the preliminary condition of Christ's Second Coming and the consummation. Upon this naturally followed again an approximation to the doctrine of the Millennium in the form of "hope of better days." Still delight in work of this kind remained somewhat isolated, until in the present century Protestantism began to comprehend its historical mission to its own people abroad and at home. For this reason, all questions touching Christ's Second Coming, especially its preliminary conditions (the conversion of Jews and heathens, the doctrine of Antichrist, the Millennium), have again in recent days come prominently to the front. However different the theories on many points in this respect, (*e.g.* whether a visible rule of Christ upon earth with risen saints before the end of the world, whether a Millennium in

any sense, is to be taught, whether it lies behind us, whether the Antichrist is to be regarded as a principle revealing itself in many persons in the entire course of history, or as a person in whom evil is concentrated), on this point there is increasing agreement, that the Judgment is impossible before all nations have heard the gospel and had the possibility of believing; and the tendency is more and more to believe, that the process of consummation in the case of individuals and of the whole must be conceived not as merely physical, accomplished either through death or the transformation of the world, or through the external power of Christ, but as at the same time running its course according to ethical laws.

Observation.—Chiliasm has taken very different forms. Its crudest form looked for a happy kingdom of sensuous enjoyments and outward splendour. In one word, it is eudæmonistic. Such was the Chiliasm of antiquity and the Anabaptist Chiliasm of the age of the Reformation. In it the rule of the saints over the heathen and unbelievers plays a great part. The older Chiliasm is specially distinguished from the Anabaptist by this feature, that it passively awaits Christ's Second Coming and the descent of the heavenly Jerusalem, at most requires (in Montanism by direction of its prophets) a moral preparation for the Millennium, whereas the fanatical and revolutionary Chiliasm of the Anabaptists would accelerate the coming of the Millennium by its own action, nay, finally introduce and establish it by means of force. In the older Chiliasm, as in the age of the Reformation, less stress falls on the visible presence of Christ's person and on the inner rule of the Christian spirit, than upon the visible issuing forth of the power and glory of His kingdom as a *dominion* of the saints, not merely their deliverance from hostile oppression or from evils, which the present state of nature brings with it. The more abrupt the *form* in which the opening of the Chiliastic world-period is conceived, the less the interest in an ethical mediation of the consummation. The gross, carnal style of thought which was able, in the two chief forms just mentioned, to unite itself with the circle of ideas in the early Christian Millennium, usually in our days lets drop the connection with Christianity and its hopes. All the more common, on the other hand, in our days are other Chiliasms of a more spiritual tone, whose common character is that they despair of the possibility of mankind being saved and the Church rescued from inner

and outer dissolution with the means hitherto at the service of Christianity,—Chiliasms which look for a new glorious flowering-time of the Church under the government of Christ, visible or invisible, when the means of salvation lacking shall have been bestowed on it by God. Here comes in *first*, according to a widespread opinion, the *conversion of the Jewish nation.* Gentile Christians, it is said, have from the first (through Paul) a spiritualistic Christianity. It is necessary to assert the realism of Scripture, which designed the people of the O. T. to be the centre of the nations, to be the ruling organizing power for humanity, as to which the predictions of the O. T. respecting the Holy Land, Jerusalem, Ezekiel's temple and sacrifice, are not yet fulfilled, and therefore must yet be fulfilled. And although in modern days less weight is placed on the O. T. characteristics, all the more it is frequently insisted, that the right strength and the right success will be lacking to heathen missions until Israel is converted. But according to Paul, conversely, the unbelief of Israel as a nation will continue until the fulness of the heathen has entered, and Israel can grasp with the hands, so to speak, what the Christian nations possess previously. As a *second* means of salvation, a new outpouring of the Holy Spirit is expected in different forms. The degree of His outpouring experienced hitherto, it is said, no longer suffices for the needs of the present, in face of which the gospel no longer proves or can prove itself the quickening and preserving salt, with the exception of individual souls in which it still shows its energy. But the gospel is eternally young, and can never grow old. Moreover, the sin of men, although different in degree, is the same in essence, like the character of the human heart in need of redemption. Distrust of the sufficient strength of the gospel for the mission which the Church has upon earth, must cripple hope and zeal in labour for the kingdom of God, in any case alienate from all organized life of Christian communion, and limit the activity of Christian love to scattered individuals. *Finally*, others find the ground of all the Church's evils conversely in the want, since the death of the apostles, in the Church of an organizing divine authority for all its regulations, especially for the employment of gifts in the right place, and therefore for the distribution of offices. Hence they find the means preparatory to Christ's Parousia in the restoration of the primitive Christian apostolate. But this is to lay such a stress in a Catholicizing spirit on the outward form and institutions of the Church as is out of harmony with the material principle of faith, and

denies the sufficiency of Holy Scripture, in which we possess the true continuance of the apostolate.

A common feature in all these grosser or more refined Chiliasms is that they regard that to which their principal interest is directed as not secured or given in Christianity hitherto, and consequently regard the gospel as inadequately equipped for that which pertains to believers or the Church, and that upon earth. Consequently in one way or another they think too meanly of that which is already come and given with Christ's first Parousia; and this is an Ebionitic or Judaistic trait. The Gnostic or Docetic Eschatology is distinguished from such a view by this, that in an optimistic idealizing spirit it prefers a conception of Christianity which makes everything depend on the inwardness of faith, on the presence in it of eternal life (and therefore for faith the kingdom of God is already come), not on the position that the kingdom of God is still coming. In this case the power of sin—the antichristian element—is undervalued, and this mode of thought is especially shown in the fact that the Gnostic Eschatology can find no place in its theory for the passages of Holy Scripture respecting antichristian powers This Docetic Eschatology, especially when it is based on the ideality of faith as the power which has overcome the world certainly involves the truth, that the earthly world and history is not *merely* a preparation or time of probation, or has the essence of the supreme good only outside itself. This history and world of ours must not be thought empty of the divine. It is not too bad for eternal life to be already implanted in it. But the Docetic Eschatology overlooks the truth contained in Christian hope, namely, that to the complete essence of Christianity belongs also a manifestation-side, dominion over the outward, not merely the vanquishing of everything hostile, but also the positive triumphant unfolding of its import, and the realizing of the harmony between spirit and nature.

III.—*Dogmatic Investigation.*

1. In respect of the earthly history of Christianity (even if we ignore the base secular doctrine [*Diesseitigskeitslehre*] of Materialism) two opposite modes of thought present themselves. The one thinks the chief thing still wanting even after Christ's manifestation, salvation a matter only of the other world, eternal life not a present reality. This under-

valuing of Christ's first manifestation, of the worth of the atonement and the gift of the Holy Spirit, is a false doctrine of the future world (*Jenseitigkeitslehre*), or Ebionitic Eschatology. To it approximates the Romish doctrine in relation to individuals, so far as it does not ordinarily admit an assurance of salvation in the temporal life, but desires with purgatory to interpose a state of punishment even for believers before the consummation. In reference to the Church, Catholicism certainly commits the opposite fault,[1] because it ignores the imperfections still cleaving to the earthly Church, and acts as if the *ecclesia militans* stood *instar triumphantis*, which of course is only possible because it also identifies the Church and the kingdom of God.[2] Conversely, faith and the inner possession of eternal life in this world may be emphasized in a spiritualistic tone, and with indifference to the consummation of the whole as if nothing further were needed, because in a spiritual sense "the resurrection is past already,[3] and the realization of Christianity in the phenomenal world is a matter of indifference." This is false teaching as to the present world of a spiritualistic kind. The Reformation, rejecting both opposite errors, in opposition to the Catholic doctrine of the future in respect of the individual, emphasizes this world and the worth of the earthly life, in virtue of the saving faith and the experience of the power of Christ's *high-priestly* office attainable upon earth, but still does this in such a way as to leave an essential place to the hope of the consummation of the personality. On the other hand, as concerns the Church and the kingdom of God, it does not find their perfect form already given in the actuality of earth. Although it *believes* the consummating principle is incorporated in Christendom, believes in its veiled existence already in the present, it still turns in this respect chiefly to the future, and to the hope of the full unveiling of Christ's *Kingship*, for the consummation of individuals and the whole, at the same time cherishing the consciousness of

[1] Because of the professedly perfect constitution, the hierarchy, in which it sees the virtual Church or its essence.

[2] With one-sided doctrine as to the future world in respect of individuals, it therefore unites a false doctrine of the present world in respect of the Church.

[3] 2 Tim. ii. 18.

the ethical labour to be performed in behalf of the kingdom of God.

Hence the Evangelical Eschatology maintains the pure Christian character, since it keeps the mean between those two extremes, and on the basis of God's kingdom having come preserves the hope of a full coming in visible power in behalf of individuals and the whole. Out of possession in the very midst of non-possession, appropriate to faith, is developed with eternal youth and freshness the Christian confidence that what is still lacking will become a blessed possession.

2. But how according to Scripture is the framework of the earthly history of the Church and kingdom of God to be filled up? In relation to the dogmatic doctrine of the future phases of development, the following points come into notice —the announcement of the *apostasy* to the antichristian side, the question of the Millennium, and the relation of Christ's Second Advent to both. The first question is: Can the greater fierceness of the conflicts, nay, an apostasy before the end, be reconciled with the position that Christianity will penetrate and influence the world both intensively and extensively with growing permanence and comprehensiveness? Of course the former does not follow from sin taken alone. Sin is not a power, the chief strength of which must necessarily reveal itself only at last, and which could not be already broken in principle by Christianity through faith. The opposite is proved by believers, whose sin was originally the same as that of all others. If, then, Christianity has already in its beginnings shown the strength to accomplish the hardest task—the vanquishing of sin in principle, one might think that the rest may and must be accomplished all the more easily. But since the process of Christian grace is and remains ethical in character, *i.e.* since it is conditioned by human freedom, it follows directly from the growing influence of Christianity in the world, that those who nevertheless persevere in resistance will be impelled and hardened by the stronger revelation of Christ to more and more malignant, especially to more spiritual forms of wickedness, in order to hold their ground against it. In this way, then, the apostasy, supported by lying and the semblance of spiritual being, is

the more seductive and contagious, and thereto even outward apostasy in further extension may attach itself in further development and revelation of the inner state. But the transition to this is formed by the inner apostasy through falsification of Christianity, which when it assumes a spiritual garb is capable of the greatest diffusion. Other religions of a higher class look for extension by simple growth, and at least uniform victory in the main. Christianity shows such confidence in its truth and victorious strength, that it predicts a great apostasy in relation to the very time when its influence on humanity has become greatest, while conscious also of being a match for the apostasy. Certain of its indestructibleness, from the first it reckoned on this fact. Momentary overthrow it will convert into the foil of its all the more glorious triumph. When the antichristian powers of hell, with their veiled or open hate to Christianity, have encroached deeply on the history of the Church and suppressed the action of its pure principle, it will display its divine victorious strength as it never did before. But in this case it can only be pronounced fitting, that after the apostasy that counterpart also appear powerfully on earth in the drama of history, of which Paul and the Apocalypse speak, so that the heavenly consummation begins its prelude on earth. Not that a new world-order must begin as concerns sin and death and offspring. But a flowering-time of the Church is perhaps then to be expected, especially through the Christianizing of all nations,[1] because then humanity has again become a unity, acknowledging one Shepherd, because then all charisms bestowed on every nation by nature must tend to the advantage of the whole Church, finally because even the love of old Christendom will be invigorated by the first love of the newly converted nations. This Scriptural doctrine, held fast by the Christian hope of all ages, commends itself also dogmatically on the ground that by the two—the aggravated conflict and the flowering-time following thereupon—the process is visibly marked out in accordance with the laws of freedom. But with the Chiliasm of Judaism or of the Anabaptists of the Reformation-age, their carnal tendency and passionate, impatient eagerness for visible presentation, as well

[1] Matt. xxiv. 14, 34 ff.; Rom. xi. 15, 25 ff.

as with the doubt of the sufficiency for our actual salvation of the gifts brought by Christ's first Parousia, the Church has nothing to do. Nor is Christ's Second Advent forestalled by this preliminary flowering-time.[1]

3. Only *Christ's visible Second Advent* will be the signal for the consummation. To it belongs without doubt a dogmatic significance, although nothing more precise can be settled respecting its time and form.

Its significance for *individuals* results from the following consideration. We have seen already in several dogmatic places how essential to Christian piety is personal living communion with Christ. This is of decisive importance for justification on the basis of Christ's intercession and substitution, for Holy Baptism and the Holy Supper. We need the Head, and communion with Him, in order to growth and consummation. Christ must stand already invisibly before the eye of faith as the living Lord and Saviour, if faith is to be living. And in reference to our future blessedness, we cannot dispense with seeing as He is Him whom we see not and yet love.[2] Just so, for the sake of His person itself it is necessary that the time of His public appearing in glory follow upon the time of His divine-human working, which continues indeed, but is concealed because carried on through the organ of the Church, as seeing Him as He is follows upon the faith of His people; for it is also His loving desire to be thus seen, and by this means share His glory with them.[3] We cannot call it pure or spiritual Christianity where men wish to adhere merely to the Holy Spirit or the divine nature of Christ, whereas the Holy Spirit, as we saw, leads to Christ. It is an essential trait of Christian piety not to imagine blessedness by itself outside communion with Christ. And if Christ is not merely a portion of the supreme good but its centre, while that good must be manifested in order to the consummation of the world, He can on no account remain invisible, but through Him and His revelation in glory must the kingdom of God, which is also His kingdom, be manifested. The happy reunion with friends and kindred in the body is an object of wish and hope to every

[1] John x. 16. [2] 1 Pet. i. 8; 1 Pet. iii. 2.
[3] 1 John iii. 2; John xvii. 24.

one, and yet this is but a secondary matter for the blessedness of believers, compared with the necessity of the beholding of Christ. Nay, the full communion with the Head must contain the security, as also the rule and order, for all other beholding and reunion; for our mutual relations in the future world will be settled not by the laws and ordinances of nature, but by those of the kingdom of grace and its majestic Head.

But the New Testament doctrine of Christ's Second Advent has significance also for the *Church* and the *Kingdom of God*, inasmuch as through it their earthly history receives a conclusion. True, it may then be asked: Why is the fermenting of humanity through the Holy Spirit in growing measure not enough, although according to what has been advanced with severe conflicts, nay, catastrophes? Why is a new *creative* act necessary, instead of a gradual interpenetration and illumination, the result of which would be the visibility of the kingdom of God and Christ in course of nature, as it were? The answer may perhaps lie in a twofold reason. An altogether new attitude of matter and nature to spirit is the condition of consummation, an attitude which the spirit cannot produce out of itself, which can only be given to it, and through which alone the advancement of the spirit to the ruling central position becomes possible.[1] Even as the Church, humanity does not gradually govern nature. But while spirit and nature are external to each other, spirit has not yet its perfect energy and efficiency. Conversely, nature also needs to be liberated from all chaotic and perishable being,[2] in order that it may find its goal, even as spirit only has the means of revealing and realizing itself in the glorifying of nature. Therefore must the mutually external existence of spirit and nature give way to a perfect mutual internal existence. The former is the reason of the mortality of the natural side, and of its being a means of temptation to the spiritual side. For in the mutual external existence the natural side has still too great independence, and exerts a determining power on the personality. Christ now so enhances the energy of the spirit, that nothing foreign can longer rule it. He also unites glorified nature with the spirit,

[1] Cf. also Schleiermacher, ii. 486.

[2] Rom. viii. 21 ff.

without identifying them, by the resurrection in connection with a cosmical process of world-transformation, for which His Second Advent is the signal. But as in this way the false mutual externality of nature and spirit is set aside by Christ's Second Advent, so also through it the false mutual internality of good and evil in the earthly world-period is separated. His Second Advent is a sign of the ripeness of the world for *judgment*. The obverse of the separation of the heterogeneous is the consummation of the communion of everything homogeneous. On all these grounds, Christ's Second Advent is grounded in the necessity of the perfect revelation of His Love, and Power, and Justice.

SECOND POINT: INTERMEDIATE STATE AND RESURRECTION.

§ 153.

There is a Resurrection of the dead, which is not superseded by the Intermediate State, but is realized through the Lord's Second Advent in order to the consummation of the personality.

LITERATURE on the Intermediate State and the Resurrection. —Meissner, *Vom Zustand der abgeschiedenen Seelen* (ed. E. B. Löscher), 1735. Th. Burnet, *De Statu Mortuorum et Resurrectione*, London, 1726. Simonetti, *Ueber die Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit und dem Schlaf der Seelen*, 1758. A sleep of the soul is also accepted by Smalcius, *Refutatio thesium Franzii*, Racov. 1614, and *Anonymi Seria Disquisitio de Statu, Loco, et Vita Animarum*, 1725, and others. (Cf. S. J. Baumgarten, *Theol. Bedenken Samml.* 6. Halle, 1748, p. 227 ff.) Fries also, *Jahrb. f. d. Theol.* 1856, p. 301, assumes a vanishing of personal consciousness with death. Flügge, see above, § 151. Edm. Spiess, *Entwickelungs-gesch. d. Vorstellungen vom Zustand nach dem Tode.* Val. Weigel, *Postille*, ii. 95, Poiret, and others, contended against the earthly *terminus gratiæ.* The majority held it, in part with a continuous purifying of believers until the judgment, for the most part without this, at most with growth from one glory to another (so Bengel, Oetinger, Lange, Delitzsch, *Bibl. Psychologie*, p. 359 [Eng. Tr., Clark, p. 488], Oertel, Karsten, Rinck). But others suppose a process of

redemption even beyond the grave, on condition of repentance and faith before the Judgment of the world. So Rieger, Jung-Stilling, J. Fr. v. Meyer, v. Gerlach, Steudel, Kliefoth, *Liturg. Abh.* i. 195 (in the case of children dying unbaptized and heathen, the decision, it is held, can only occur in the other world). Lessing, *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*, supposes a transmigration of souls in order to their purifying; Ströbel adopts it, in order that by newly appearing on the earth opportunity may be given to all to hear the gospel, so that the earthly life is decisive for all. Krabbe, *Die Lehre von der Sünde und dem Tode in ihrer Beziehung zu einander und zur Auferstehung Christi, exegetisch-dogmatisch entwickelt*, 1836. Maywahlen, *Der Tod, das Todtenreich und der Zustand der abgeschiedenen Seelen, dargestellt a. d. Wort Gottes*, 1854. Boettcher, J. F., *De Inferis Rebusque post Mortem Futuris ex Hebræorum et Græcorum opinionibus*, 1846. Lütkemüller, *Unser Zustand von dem Tode bis zur Auferstehung*, 1852 (a separated Lutheran, then a Catholic; he makes a purgatory necessary). Schultz Herm., *Veteris Test. de hominis Immortalitate Sententia illustrata*, 1861; ibid., *Voraussetzungen der christl. Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit*, 1861. Oehler, G. F., *Veteris Test. Sententia de Rebus post mortem Futuris illustrata*, 1846. Hahn, L., *De Spe Immortalitatis in V. T. gradatim exculta*, 1855. Müller, Jul., *Unsterblichkeitsglaube und Auferstehungshoffnung*, 1855. *Lehre von der Sünde*, ed. 2, i. 469 [Eng. Tr., Clark, ii. 74]. v. Meyer, Fr., *Blätter für höhere Wahrheit*, vi. 233 (a justification of the idea of purgatory). Güder, *Die Lehre von der Erscheinung Jesu Christi unter den Todten in ihrem Zusammenhange mit der Lehre von den letzten Dingen*, 1853; and Althaus (see above, p. 373), desire to fill up the intermediate state with a process of cleansing from sin. Franz, *Das Gebet für die Todten*, Nordh. 1857. Leibbrand, *Gebet für die Todten*, 1864; also Hahn, Gen. Sup., in an official letter, 1850; and Stirm, *Jahrb. f. d. Theol.* 1861, ii. Oertel, *Hades, exegetisch-dogmatische Abhandlung über den Zustand der abgeschiedenen Seelen*, 1863 (according to him, there is still progress in the other world, but also a *terminus peremtorius gratiæ*, not merely through subjective incorrigibleness, but also through neglecting the end fixed by God as a terminus, at which His kingdom will be completed). Schmidt Wold., *De Statu Animarum medio inter mortem et resurrectionem*, 1861. Rinck, *Vom Zustand nach dem Tode*, 1861. Splittgerber, *Schlaf und Tod nebst dem damit zusammenhängenden Erscheinungen des Seelenlebens*, 1865, ed. 2, 1879; ibid., *Tod, Fortleben und Auferstehung oder die letzten Dinge des Menschen*, ed. 3, 1879. Naville, Ernest, *La vie éternelle*, 1861. Philippi, vi. pp. 1–148, 1879. Kahnis, *Luth. Dogmatik*, 1868,

vol. 3. Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, ed. 1, vol. 3, p. 151 ff. § 801 ff. Martensen, *Dogmatics*. Lange, *Positive Dogmatik*, p. 1250; ibid., *Die Reise in das Land der Wahl* (*Todtenreich*), Verm. Schriften, 1841, vol. 2. Hamberger, *Physica Sacra* and *Jahrb. für d. Theol.* 1858, vol. 3. Schöberlein, *Geheimnisse des Glaubens*, and *Princip. und System der Dogmatik*, 1881. The doctrine of immortality is treated under a philosophical aspect (partly on occasion of the work of Richter, see above, p. 373), by Rosenkranz, Göschel: *Zur Lehre von den letzten Dinge*, 1850; *Die siebenfältige Osterfrage*, 1835; *Von den Beweisen für die Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Seele im Lichte der specul. Philosophie*, 1835. Hubert Beckers, *Ueber Göschel's Versuch eines Erweises der persönlichen Unsterblichkeit vom Standpunkt der Hegelschen Lehre aus*, 1836; ibid., *Ueber den Zustand der Seelen nach dem Tod*, in Fichte's *Zeitschrift*, 1835. 2. Fichte, Im., *Die Idee der Persönlichkeit und der individuellen Fortdauer*, ed. 2, 1855, and *Zur Seelenfrage, eine philosophische Confession*, 1859; cf. also his *Anthropologie und Psychologie*. Fischer, K. Ph., and Weisse, *Die Idee der Persönlichkeit*. Schelling, *Clara* (he supposes an essentializing of man in death); v. Rudloff, C. H., *Die Lehre vom Menschen nach Geist, Seele und Leib, während des Erdenlebens und nach seinen Abscheiden*, 1858, ed. 2, 1863, Pt. 1.

I.—*Biblical Doctrine.*

1. A series of passages of the New Testament can be quoted to show that believers pass by death at once into a blessed state, and into closer communion with the Lord. To the robber on the cross Christ says: To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise.[1] Lazarus is carried straight after death into Abraham's bosom.[2] I will come again, says Christ in His farewell discourses, and receive you to myself, that where I am there ye may be also.[3] Paul knows that a crown of righteousness is laid up for him, and that he will be saved into His heavenly kingdom; he longs to be at home with the Lord.[4] The Revelation pronounces the dead blessed, who die in the Lord.[5] Passages like these preclude the notion of a sleep of the soul, and assert that believers pass by death into a better than the earthly state.[6] Nevertheless it would be a mistake to infer from the passages quoted, that perfect,

[1] Luke xxiii. 43. [2] Luke xvi. 22. [3] John xiv. 3.
[4] Phil. i. 23; 2 Tim. iv. 8, 18. [5] Rev. xiv. 13.
[6] πολλῷ γὰρ μᾶλλον κρεῖσσον (σὺν Χριστῷ εἶναι), ἀποθανεῖν μοι κέρδος, Phil. i. 21, 23.

completed blessedness and spiritual consummation begin for believers immediately after death. Paradise indeed is certainly not Hades, but a μονή for the blessed,[1] and for this reason not the heaven which denotes the place or state of the perfected blessed. The good work begun is not completed on the day of death, but on the day of Jesus Christ.[2] On the contrary, a series of passages imply that the chief comfort and dearest hope of Christians refer not to what they attain directly after death, but to what only becomes theirs at Christ's Second Advent and Resurrection, to the deposit laid up and secure for that day.[3] Such great stress is laid on the hope of the resurrection, that, in comparison with it, the advance to preliminary higher stages of life vanishes from sight.[4] An anxious longing for Christ's revelation in glory is ascribed to the departed souls of the martyrs under the altar.[5] An instantaneous vision of God is not promised.[6] A spiritual consummation in relation to volition, feeling, knowledge, leaving nothing to be added but the physical consummation, immediately after death, cannot therefore be found in Scripture.[7] For this reason the advance, which death no doubt brings with it for believers, by no means excludes a middle or intermediate state. This state could only be denied if no reunion with the body and judgment were to be expected after the separation of the soul from the body, but if, according to Scripture, a state, admitting of no change for ever, began contemporaneously with death. But that there is room for changes even in the next world, follows in reference to those who die in faith, from the doctrine of their resurrection. Still more important must be the changes possible in a middle state in the next world in relation to those who in this life have not become ripe for judgment. Holy Scripture

[1] Cf. John xiv. 2 ff. ; 2 Cor. xii. 4. [2] Phil. i. 6.

[3] 1 Pet. v. 4 ; 2 Tim. i. 12, iv. 8 ; 1 John iii. 2 ; Rom. viii. 19, 23 ; 1 Thess. iv. 13, 14 ; Col. iii. 4.

[4] 1 Cor. xv. 29 ff. [5] Rev. vi. 9-11.

[6] Neither in Matt. v. 8 nor in 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

[7] When it is said, the moral imperfection, which certainly still clings to believers on their departure, will be obliterated in a moment by death, which brings them the vision of God (Philippi, vi. 6-8), in opposition to this is the fact that only they who are pure in heart, or holy, shall see God (Matt. v. 8 ; Heb. xii. 14).

says nothing expressly about them, with the exception of the passages in the First Epistle of Peter considered before, and indeed of all those passages, according to which the gospel must be preached to all, and God's purpose of grace applies to all.

2. The New Testament teaches not merely a spiritual resurrection, which takes place at the new birth,[1] but also a bodily one, in opposition to Sadducæism and an idealistic philosophy.[2] Certainly in by far the most numerous passages merely a resurrection of the righteous is spoken of, but in some a general resurrection, without the bodily constitution of the ungodly being indicated.[3] On the other hand, in the case of the pious the resurrection is thought as a union of the spirit with a glorified corporeity, an assimilation of believers with the glorified body of Christ,[4] the resurrection of which is treated as a pattern and pledge of our resurrection.[5] The latter will take place in close association with cosmical processes.[6] The spirit which survives death and corruption, and is in unity with God's Spirit, is conceived as co-operative therein, putting on the mortal, in order to transform it into an immortal mode of being, the dead body being also compared to a seed-corn.[7]

II.—*Ecclesiastical Doctrine.*

Symb. Apost., Conf. Aug. xvii.; *Cat. Maj.* 471. 501.

1. It has been shown previously (p. 131) that many of the earliest Church teachers taught a preaching of the gospel, as well as the possibility of conversion, in Hades. But the Catholic Church, especially after the days of Augustine and

[1] Hymenæus and Philetus, 2 Tim. ii. 18, perhaps also the deniers of the resurrection, 1 Cor. xv. 12.

[2] Matt. xxii. 29–32; 1 Cor. xv.; Luke xiv. 14, xx. 36; Acts xxiii. 6, xxiv. 15, 21; Heb. vi. 2; John v. 29, xi. 24, 25, vi. 44, 54.

[3] John v. 28 f.; Rev. xx. 12–15; Acts xxiv. 15; 2 Cor. v. 10; Dan. xii. 2.

[4] Rom. vi. 5; Phil. iii. 20, 21; 1 Cor. xv. 43, 49, 53; 2 Cor. v. 3–10; John vi. 39; 1 John iii. 2.

[5] Rom. vi. 4, viii. 10, 11; Col. iii. 4.

[6] Rom. viii. 21; 1 Thess. iv. 14–17; 1 Cor. xv. 51 ff.; 2 Pet. iii. 3, 10, 13; Rev. xxi. 1.

[7] 1 Cor. xv. 53, 36–38; Rom. viii. 10, 11.

Gregory the Great, not merely assumed in general a middle period and middle state between death and the resurrection at Christ's Second Advent, but more and more placed all stress on this life to such a degree, that the definitive fate of every one was supposed to be decided with death, and those dying without faith in Christ to be lost, although transferred to different places of punishment. While all who die in faith were supposed to be saved, only those already holy enter at once into blessedness. On the other hand, Christians in general must suffer in purgatory the temporal penalties for their sins, and sin must be obliterated in them by the pain of the *ignis purgatorius*, that they may be able to enter upon blessedness. The *Reformation* utterly rejected the entire doctrine of purgatory, discovering therein a perversion of the gospel, nay, the seat of a crowd of the worst corruptions of the Church. It expected the approaching end of the world, and was therefore all the less inclined to occupy itself much with the state of the soul between death and the resurrection. Its general doctrine at first was as follows: "The end of life brings a decision for all men, without a middle state. In the next world there is only the antithesis of heaven and hell. Hades is identical with Gehenna." But degrees of happiness and misery were supposed among the saved and lost, nay, an enhancement of the state on both sides by the resurrection and judgment. According to some passages in Luther,[1] sin will only be utterly obliterated in us by the resurrection, whereas others, like Gerhard,[2] think that original sin is annihilated in the moment of death.

2. Many teachers of the ancient Church, like Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Jerome, suppose a complete identity of the resurrection-body with the earthly one, inclusive of all the faults of the latter, which Christ will remedy at His Second Advent. A more spiritual theory is maintained, especially by Origen with his school, who even regards the present body as an evil, and a hindrance to perfection. But since Augustine's

[1] *Cat. Maj.* 500, 61: Spiritus S. citra intermissionem nobis sanctificandis opus suum perficit usque in extremum diem; cf. 500, 59.

[2] This is also held by moderns like Rinck, Splittgerber, Philippi, vi. 8. The looking upon God is said to purify the soul at once. Philippi supposes in addition a creative, miraculous act of God, always coinciding with the death of believers.

days, an intermediate view between the materialistic and spiritualistic has prevailed, and was taken over into the Evangelical Church. According to it, the resurrection-body has indeed an identity of substance with the earthly body, but not with the form. The latter will rather be a glorified one.

III.—*Dogmatic Investigation.*

1. DEATH AND RESURRECTION IN GENERAL.—Death, as the separation of the soul from the body, which falls a prey to corruption, is represented in the whole of Scripture as something forming no part of the idea of man, but something that has intervened, a disturbance of the godlike personality through sin, and in so far contrary to nature.[1] Hence redemption, as certainly as it is a restoration, nay, completion of all good, restores, nay, renders more intimate, the original bond of unity between body and soul, and cannot be indifferent to the fact that the bond is broken. To Christians, indeed, death is no longer death in the usual sense, no longer a punitive evil. The Christian is without the sting—the fear of death and Hades. Nay, to Christians death is no longer mere passivity, but an entering into the divine will, and therefore an act, only the "form of death" remaining. But still even to Christians it is no good in itself.[2] The fear of it only vanishes to Christians through the certainty that it is a transition, although painful and violent, to a metamorphosis, to a better life no longer capable of death.[3] This existence is therefore higher than that of man before the Fall. The N. T. has no fondness for a bodiless immortality. It is opposed to a naked Spiritualism, agreeing thoroughly with a profounder philosophy, which discerns in the body not merely the sheath or garment of the soul, but an aspect of the personality belonging to its complete idea, its mirror and organ, of the greatest importance for its activity and history. Even the human body has its peculiar dignity. In the earthly life it is already raised through the Holy Spirit to a higher stage, into

[1] Cf. above, §§ 87. 88.

[2] 2 Cor. v. 4: "I desire to be clothed upon rather than unclothed."

[3] John xi. 25, 26.

a temple of God.[1] But something still higher can be made of matter than is made of it in the earthly body.[2] For even the body is to be renewed after the image of God, which is implied in the statement that it is to be made like Christ's glorified body. Therefore not merely will death inflict no permanent loss, the δόξα of the divine life is to shine forth from it. Here also the N. T. favours Realism, in such a form indeed that stress is not laid on gross matter, but on the element of substantial reality, which will be in harmony with the spirit in its consummation. For this reason it speaks of a new world, a new heaven and new earth, and only finds the crowning of restorative redemption in the pneumatic body of the resurrection, which not merely vanquishes everything deadly, but also glorifies earthly matter. But in the N. T. the resurrection is only placed along with Christ's Second Advent. And thus, before we enter more closely into the dogmatic doctrine of the resurrection, the question cannot be avoided, How is the intermediate period up to the Second Advent to be viewed in relation to the departed?

2. There is an INTERMEDIATE STATE before the decision by the Judgment. The Reformation, occupied chiefly with opposition to the Romish purgatory, leaped over as it were the middle state, *i.e.* left at rest the questions presenting themselves here, gazing with unblenched eye only at the antithesis between saved and damned on the understanding, retained without inquiry (in opposition to more ancient teachers), that every one's eternal lot is definitively decided with his departure from the present life. This is in keeping with the high estimation put on the moral worth of the earthly life. Nevertheless this view is impracticable, and that even on moral grounds. Not merely would nothing of essential importance remain for the Judgment, if every one entered the place of his eternal destiny directly after death, but in that case also no space would be left for a progress of believers, who still are not sinless at the moment of death. If they are conceived as holy directly after death, sanctification would be effected by the separation from the body; the seat therefore of evil must be found in the body, and sanctification would be realized through a mere suffering, namely, of death in a physical pro-

[1] 1 Cor. vi. 15, 19. [2] 1 Cor. xv.

cess, instead of through the will.[1] Add to this, the absoluteness of Christianity demands that no one be judged before Christianity has been made accessible and brought home to him. But this is not the case in this life with millions of human beings. Nay, even within the Church there are periods and circles, where the gospel does not really approach men as that which it is. Moreover, those dying in childhood have not been able to decide personally for Christianity. Nor is the former supposition tenable exegetically. As to the O. T., it does not teach that all men enter directly after death into blessedness or damnation. They rather pass into Sheol, which is described as an abode of the departed who are without power and true life.[2] The pious and godless are not thought of as separated therein. This agrees with the statement that Christ first prepared the place of blessedness, to which His person and work belong.[3] Further, what was said above respecting the Descent into Hades[4] applies here, implying that a salvation through knowledge of the gospel is possible also to the departed. Christian grace is designed for human beings, not for inhabitants of earth.[5] It is not said: He that hears not shall be damned; but: He that believes not.[6] Jesus seeks the lost; lost are to be sought also in the kingdom of the dead. The opposite view leads to an absolute decree of rejection in reference to all who have died and die as heathen, whereas Christian grace is universal. A proof that, according to the N. T., the time of grace does not expire with death by a universal law, is found in Christ's raisings of the dead, *e.g.* the youth at Nain received through resurrection from the

[1] To suppose, with Delitzsch, that after the body is laid aside, the sanctifying power of faith will spontaneously burst forth, and the sight of the reality of what is believed will suddenly wipe out all sin, is to reduce the matter to a mere physical process. Philippi sees that all solutions of this nature proceed on the supposition that sin has not its seat in the spirit, and therefore requires a divine creative act in behalf of every one dying in faith. But he cannot quote Holy Scripture in favour of such a view. It would imply an abridging of the ethical sphere and its laws, a violation of the fundamental law obtaining in the relation between divine and human agency, namely, that God's action is initiatory of action. Hence Kahnis and Martensen rightly hold a continuance of the ethical process in the next world (Martensen, § 276; Kahnis, iii. 554. 576).

[2] See p. 376. Job xxxviii. 17; Gen. xxxvii. 35, xlii. 38, xliv. 29, 31; Num. xvi. 30-33; Ps. xvi. 9, 10, xviii. 5, xlix. 14 ff., lxxxviii. 11, lxxxix. 48.

[3] John xiv. 3.

[4] § 124.

[5] 1 Tim. ii. 4-6; Luke xix. 10; 1 John ii. 2.

[6] Mark xvi. 16.

dead a prolongation of the time of grace, through which Christ's love first became known to him.[1] And if Tyre and Sidon, had they seen what the Jews saw, would have repented in sackcloth and ashes,[2] they would have been saved, which therefore implies that if the time of grace expired for them with death, they would be damned for not seeing and knowing Christ, which was not their fault. When, further, Christ says of a sin,[3] that it is forgiven neither in this nor in the next life, whereas other sins are forgiven in this world without limitation, this contains a testimony that other sins save the sin against the Holy Ghost may be forgiven in the next world. How, moreover, can the *place* alone decide as to moral worth or capacity of redemption? When the Epistle to the Hebrews says: It is appointed to man once to die, and after this the κρίσις,[4] we must not, with the old Dogmatists, take this to mean that the eternal salvation or woe of every one is decided immediately after death. As to the time of the final judgment after death, the passage says nothing. Add to this, that not merely is the last judgment a crisis,[5] but death also brings one in its own way. The importance of the bodily life, and the account to be given of it, are certainly taught in the N. T.[6] The above-quoted passages, which make the pious enter at once a better place, exclude a purgatory as a state of punishment or penance, but by no means exclude a growth in perfection and blessedness. Even the departed righteous are not quite perfected before the resurrection. Their souls must still long for the dominion of Christ and the consummation of God's kingdom.[7] There is therefore a *status intermedius* even for believers, not an instantaneous passage into perfect blessedness. The latter would depreciate the resurrection, which only occurs at Christ's Second Advent.

3. But in what form is this middle state to be thought of? All departed souls before the resurrection are in a bodiless, unclothed state,[8] at least without the resurrection-body as

[1] Luke vii. 11–15.
[2] Matt. xi. 21–24.
[3] Matt. xii. 32.
[4] Heb. ix. 27. It is not called ἡ κρίσις.
[5] The last Judgment usually has the definite article.
[6] *E.g.* 2 Cor. v. 10.
[7] Heb. xii. 22–24; Rev. vi. 9–11.
[8] Cf. 2 Cor. v. 2 ff.

without the earthly. In so far they are all in a state not completely answering to the idea of man, to which corporeity also belongs. But they are not all for this reason in the same state or realm, a view which must follow from a sleep of the soul. As to the pious, the earthly mixture with the ungodly ceases after death; they no longer suffer through them, not even temptation.[1] The connection of believers with Christ is so intimate that death has no power over it.[2] On the contrary, death brings them an advance in freedom from temptations and disturbances, as well as in happiness. For believers there is no longer any punishment, but growth, a further laying aside of defects, an invigoration through the greater nearness of the Lord which they experience, and through the more lively hope of their consummation. But those not as yet believers, so far as they are not incorrigible, remain at first under training which has decision for Christ as its aim.[3] But here a difficulty arises. The necessity of the resurrection is grounded in a relation of corporeity to the person not accidental but essential. Without body, the person cannot be thought self-conscious and active externally. But in this way a corporeity seems necessarily demanded for the middle state, if the souls of the pious are not to be placed in an inferior state, or to fall a prey to unconsciousness. But, on the other hand, to assume a spiritual body for the soul directly after death seems a forestalling of the resurrection. And no less to conceive man after death without corporeity, and yet in higher blessedness, would leave it obscure how far the resurrection is a necessity to him. We must refrain from laying down anything definite on this point. At most, the conjecture may be allowed, that with at all events a relatively bodiless state a still life begins, a sinking of the soul within itself and into the ground of its life—what Steffens calls Involution, and Martensen Self-brooding.[4] There life is predominantly a life in spirituality. The essential, substantial union of the soul with Christ continues, nay, is more uninterrupted and constant. They are able through God to know about the world, and learn now to behold everything in connection with Christ. In this life the sensuous world-reality is the object of sight,

[1] Luke xvi. 26.
[2] Rom. viii. 35-39.
[3] 1 Pet. iv. 6.
[4] Martensen, § 275 f.

the spiritual world is the object of faith. Now that the physical side is wanting to the spirit, these poles are reversed.[1] To departed spirits the spiritual world both in good and evil will appear as the real, as that which rests on immediate evidence.[2] Now, in such living of the soul within itself its ground lies open and unveiled, and thus the withdrawal into self has for the pious a purifying and educative effect. It serves to obliterate all stains, to harmonize the whole inner being, in conformity with the fundamental good tendency either brought from a former state or acquired later, and thus in the middle state there will not be for the pious a mere waiting for the judgment, but a progression in knowledge, blessedness, and holiness, in communion with Christ and the heavenly Church.

But, as relates to those who die unbelievers or not yet believers, to them also the ground of their souls is laid bare, and therefore their impurity, their discord with and alienation from God. This must become conscious discord in themselves. If they were subject to evil inclinations and passions, they will busy themselves with the corresponding objects, and yet find no appeasement of their longing, and will be given over, so to speak, to their thoughts and desires as tormentors. If, instead of repentance and conversion, instead of growth in knowledge of self and knowledge of a holy and yet gracious God in Christ, they prefer to remain in evil, the form of their sin becomes more spiritual, more demonic in accordance with their state, which recedes farther and farther from the present life, and thus ripens for judgment. But by no means will the divine government of the world bear the fault of this result. The gospel will be brought decisively home to all who did not in this world come to definitive decision, and all who do not shut themselves thereto will be saved. If, therefore, in this life the sensuous only was the object of sight, and in so far the physical life preponderated; if next in the middle state life in spirituality, either in good or evil, prepon-

[1] Cf. Kern, *Tüb. Zeitschr., Die christl. Eschatologie*, 1840.

[2] By this it is not meant that all the departed immediately after death behold or can behold everything spiritual, *e.g.* God. If all the departed had perfect knowledge or intuition at once, it would be inconsistent with the fact that even in the next world there is place for a free process not determined *a priori* by perfect knowledge.

derated, and in both cases, therefore, the equilibrium and blessed interpenetration of both sides was wanting, although a progression finds place in the intermediate state in reference to believers, on the other hand the resurrection consummates the personality of believers. Even their manifestation becomes spiritual, pneumatic, and the spiritual becomes manifested, so that it is no longer possible to say which of the two is actual, since rather both sides interpenetrate perfectly and indissolubly.[1]

Observation.—Certainly the possibility is conceivable, that in the middle state the soul has the power, at least in reference to particular acts, to appropriate to itself elements out of nature for purposes of self-revelation, but the forming of a permanent new body and its indissoluble union with the soul are reserved, according to the N. T., for the resurrection.[2]

4. The character of the physical consummation, or of the resurrection-body, its absolute identity in matter and form with the earthly frame, is not included in the idea of the restoration of the entire person to corporeity. Even the seed-corn, which dies, does not all rise again in the wheat. Certain parts are lost in the elements, and enter new combinations, and other new ones are assimilated. Even our body changes its material substance during its life, as Origen early perceived. Without prejudice to its identity, it undergoes daily changes of matter. The identity will rather refer *first* to the plastic form, which in reference to the earthly form had its formative principle in the soul. That principle

[1] Cf. Kern, *ut supra.*

[2] The passage 2 Cor. v. 3, εἴγε—οὐ γυμνοὶ εὑρεθησόμεθα, says: We long to be clothed upon with the heavenly body (vers. 1, 2), although after putting off the earthly body (ἐκδυσάμενοι) we shall not be found naked. If we may so read and understand the passage (which certainly is disputed), then some sort of an intermediate corporeity, having secondary importance in comparison with the divinely-given resurrection-body, may be thought of. For, with Philippi (vi. 35) after Calvin, to refer the covering of the nakedness to the garment of Christ's righteousness is out of place, because the context requires, not a moral, but physical covering. For the rest, Holy Scripture says nothing of a body, the product of the ethical process in this life or the germ of the resurrection-body. This theory may easily lead to the notion that only the regenerate rise again. Were we to say, with Rothe, that even the abnormal moral process produces such a body, at least those who die in childhood, in whose case there can be no question of a moral process, have not acquired such a body.

could effect nothing permanent in the middle state, but with the spiritual consummation of the soul attains the full strength, which is able to appropriate to itself the heavenly body. To the building of an immortal body there needs a different power from that which the soul has immediately after death, and also a different constitution of the elements from the earthly. According to Holy Scripture, the resurrection takes place in association with vast cosmical processes, with a transformation of the world,[1] which will be God's work. As to form, the resurrection-body will correspond to the fact of humanity having been created for Christ, and therefore in its consummation will be made like the image of Him who is our elder brother.[2] As relates *secondly* to *matter*, the elements, in which everything of earthly corporeity is again dissolved, are an essentially uniform mass, like an ocean, of which it is indifferent what parts are assigned to each individual man. The entire world of matter, which makes the constant interchange possible, is made over to humanity as a *common good.* Thus, it may be said, not indeed of the individual, but of humanity, that it will appropriate or put on that which corresponds to its resurrection-life in glorified form out of the same world of elements which served it in the present life, because the perishableness of matter will be abolished by its glorification. Appropriated by the spirit that has attained its permanent state, even matter shares in this permanence.

Observation.—The passage, John v. 29, speaks not merely of a resurrection of life in glorified light-form, but also expressly of a "resurrection of condemnation." Although then an equalizing of the inward and outward of some kind must be supposed in reference to the wicked, still the N. T. gives no more definite information on this point, speaking almost entirely of the resurrection of the just (see p. 405). The other is not so much a matter of dogmatic knowledge as of perverted curiosity.

[1] Rom. viii. 18 ff.; 2 Pet. iii. 10; Rev. xx. 11 f. Then, in Rothe's phraseology, chemistry will through God celebrate its triumph.

[2] Phil. iii. 21; 1 John iii. 2; cf. p. 405.

THIRD POINT: THE LAST JUDGMENT, AND END OF THE WORLD.

§ 154.

There is a final judgment by the returning Lord, the negative side of which is the excision of everything evil from the kingdom of Christ and its blessedness, and the positive the revelation of the full power of redemption by consummation of individuals and of the world.

LITERATURE *respecting the Doctrine of the Judgment.*—Ph. Schaff, *Die Sünde wider den H. Geist und die daraus gezogenen dogmatischen und ethischen Folgerungen*, 1841. Alex. ab Oettingen, *De peccato in Spiritum sanctum*, 1856. Schulze, *Die Sünde wider den heiligen Geist, Evang. K. Z.* 1860, N. 78–83. Erbkam, *Die Lehre vom Verdammniss, Stud. u. Krit.* 1838, ii. (according to Erbkam, the damned will be without eternal misery the scars on the body of Christ).

Respecting Apokatastasis.—Schmid, *Die Frage von der Wiederbringung aller Dinge, Jahrb. f. d. Theol.* xv. 102 ff. After Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, W. Petersen about 1700 has especially defended the restoration of all things. Other friends of this theory are: Oetinger, Th. Burnet, *ut supra*, p. 309 ff. G. Steinheil, *Gott Alles in Allem. Briefwechsel Ueber den Umfang der Erlösung*, 1860 (a Baptist defender of universal restoration). Ern. Naville, see § 153. Stroh, *Christus der Erstling derer, die da schlafen*, 1861. Schumacher, C. Th., *Das Reich Gottes, oder wie führt Gott die Menschen zur Seligkeit? 1 während des Erdenlebens, 2 nach dem Tode bis zum jüngsten Tage*, 1862. Under the same head comes Schleiermacher, *Abhandlung über die Erwählungslehre*, 1819. On the other hand, the Socinian doctrine of an *annihilation* of the wicked, and of an immortality limited to the regenerate, has recently found more common acceptance, see p. 379; cf. Rothe, *Theol. Ethik*, ed. 2, ii. 483, § 458. In England and North America the question of the continuance of hell-punishments has been much ventilated for some years. The most prominent advocate of the theory, that only life in Christ makes immortal, is Edw. White, *Life in Christ*, ed. 3, 1878. Farrar also denies the eternity of hell-punishments, which, on the other hand, is defended by Hodge, Shedd, Pusey, and Goulburn.

The expositions of J. P. Lange in reference to *heaven* and *blessedness* (*Positive Dogmatik*, p. 1281 ff.; *Das Land der Herrlichkeit*, 1838) are excellent, and directed by consecrated imagination. Martensen, *Dogmatics*, §§ 278 and 283. Nitzsch, *System*, § 219. On Schöberlein and Hamberger, see p. 403.

Symb. Apost. Conf. Aug. xvii. *Apol.* 217. 96. 137. *Cat. Maj.* 539. *Form. Conc.* 724. John v. 26 ff.; Matt. xxiv., xxv. 31 f.

1. All judgments in the world's history and by its means are merely partial, ambiguous, and definitively decisive of nothing. Were the final issue an eternal alternation between the triumph and defeat of good, not merely would the subjective, æsthetic, and religious sense be violated; even the ultimate aim would be in peril. The result would be a Dualism representing good and evil as equal in power and worth, and therefore threatening to co-ordinate the two, a view inconsistent with the teleological character of Christianity and the decisive significance of Christ's person. Christianity cannot always remain merely a historic principle *alongside* the absolutely opposite principle, sharing the power with it, as though the two were of equal authority. The kingdom of God must survive all, must show everything hostile to be absolutely bad, or to be hollow, untrue and impotent. We are impelled to demand this not merely by an æsthetic interest, which even of itself requires a harmonious conclusion of the world-drama, but by a religious and moral interest in harmony with the connection subsisting between the moral and the physical, or power. Christianity lays claim to being the reality of realities, which alone has true eternal power. But what it is in itself or internally, it must also manifest. As spiritual, it cannot remain a mere quiescent power. It is the innermost ground-thought of the world, so that without its victory the aim of the world also would remain unaccomplished.

2. Hence the N. T. teaches a last Judgment, and through it a *συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος*, an end of the present world-course, which is not an annihilation of the world,[1] but a

[1] The older theologians from Gerhard to Hollaz would find an *abolitio substantiæ et formæ mundi* in Matt. xxiv. 35; Heb. i. 11; Rev. xx. 11. But other passages oppose this, like 1 Cor. vii. 31 (*τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου—παράγει*); Rom. viii. 19-21. Nor does it agree therewith, that the substance of the world is good and plastic. Cf. Philippi, vi. 143-148.

reaching of its final goal.[1] The pictures of the final judgment include figurative elements.[2] But this is simply the form of the thought, that at the end of the present world-course the point emerges, when a permanent division is effected by divine intervention, when the powers hostile to the kingdom of God are stripped of their imaginary strength, revealed in their falsehood and impotence and consigned to the past, when evil is utterly cut off, given over to its nothingness, or made a harmless subordinate element. God executes the judgment through Christ. The absolute revelation must also be the one that judges. As the truth of humanity, the Son of man is also its absolute norm and standard, according to which the righteous judgment concerning men takes place.[3] Whoever remains in opposition to Him is self-condemned.[4] According to the N. T., there can be no doubt that every one whom the judgment finds unbelieving is condemned to punishment and pain, while believers enter into eternal life. But whether in relation to the total number of men many or few will be transferred to perfect blessedness by this judgment, and whether many or few will fall victims to punishment, we receive no certain disclosure. Accordingly, when Christ is questioned on this point,[5] He treats the inquiry as one which we ought not to entertain. We should ask instead, whether we have done our part that we may enter by the narrow way. It is thus described as a premature question of curiosity. But another question is, whether, if any fall under a condemnatory judgment, they will be damned eternally. In this respect we have a two-fold series of Scripture passages.

On one side it is said,[6] the sin against the Holy Ghost will not be forgiven even in the next world, which seems to imply that when committed by any one, it deprives of blessedness for ever, and will introduce either destruction and annihilation, or eternal damnation. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is definitive unbelief, which absolutely challenges

[1] The *συντέλεια αἰῶνος* is called *θερισμός*. Matt. xiii. 39, 40 ff., 49, xxiv. 3.
[2] *E.g.* Matt. xxv. 31 ff. [3] John v. 27.
[4] John iii. 19. In the same sense also believers are to be co-judges (1 Cor. vi. 2; Luke xxii. 30) in the degree in which they are like the Son of man.
[5] Luke xiii. 23. [6] Matt. xii. 32.

punishment, and for which no further sacrifice exists and no intercession must be made.[1] The unsaved fall a prey to inextinguishable eternal fire, to the worm which dies not.[2] According to the Revelation, the smoke of the torment of those cast into the burning lake ascends from æons to æons.[3] But the strongest passage on this side is the saying respecting the betrayer: "It were better for that man if he had never been born."[4]

On the other hand, there is unquestionably much that is figurative in passages of this kind, and thus the question arises, how far the interpretation should be literal. Again, a destruction of death and Hades is spoken of.[5] Paul calls death the last foe who is overcome, therefore sin has been overcome before. Since, further, with him death denotes also spiritual death, the cause of which is sin, it seems as if the destruction of death implied the ceasing of sin, either through conversion of the wicked or through their destruction. Revelation makes death and Hades, nay, even the devil, to be cast into the burning lake,[6] which denotes the second death. The meaning of the "second death" has in any case something mysterious about it. If the first death is the dissolution of the body, the second might signify a dissolution of the soul, or at least the hardening and dying of the soul to the divine through entire separation from the holy God, and therefore a state of spiritual ruin. Further, the passages concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost say nothing of definite persons who have committed this sin. Of themselves, therefore, they leave the question unanswered, what men, and whether any men, reach this final goal of criminality, which is set before the eyes as a warning. Just so the Revelation of John does not say who, or that a man will be cast into the lake of fire; the hypothetical form is rather chosen: "If one is not inscribed in the book of life," "if one worships the beast,[7] he shall drink the cup of wrath,"

[1] Heb. vi. 4, x. 26, 27; 1 John v. 16; John xvii. 9.

[2] Mark ix. 42–48; Matt. xviii. 8, xxv. 41–46, iii. 10, vii. 19.

[3] Rev. xix. 3, xiv. 11, xx. 10.

[4] Matt. xxvi. 24. The supposition of an annihilation by punishment would be more compatible with this passage than that of universal restoration.

[5] Hos. xiii. 14; Isa. xxv. 8; 1 Cor. xv. 26, cf. vers. 54, 55; Rev. xx. 14.

[6] Rev. xx. 14, cf. ver. 10.

[7] Rev. xx. 15, xiv. 9, εἴ τις.

all which affirms nothing of persons, but of the principle. Add to this, that in the strongest passages the word αἰών, αἰώνιος is often used, which signifies in the nature of the case eternal duration in reference to the blessedness or eternal life of believers, but by no means denotes everywhere an endless period, for an end of the æons is spoken of. Æons and æons of æons also often denote the world-period.[1] Were this meaning to be assumed in reference to the punishments, the result would be indeed a duration of immeasurable length, but not an eternity of duration,—a view which may also be favoured by the passage which makes the punishment endure until the last farthing is paid.[2]

To this add several passages which commend the universality of grace and its all-comprehensive power.[3] Paul looks on to a time when everything shall be subject to the Son, that God may be all in all.[4] According to him, Christ reconciles everything to Himself, whether on earth or in heaven. He makes all things to be gathered together in Christ, both what is in heaven and on earth.[5] And although, according to the chief passage respecting the sin against the Holy Ghost, there is no forgiveness for it,[6] this implies, it is true, the necessity of punishment for those guilty of the sin, but does not preclude deliverance being mediated by the punishment and its just execution.[7]

3. On the ground of the second series of statements, the doctrine of universal restoration (ἀποκατάστασις πάντων) has again and again found its friends, from Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, John Scotus Erigena, down to Petersen (about

[1] Heb. ix. 26. Cf. Burnet, *ut supra*, p. 318 ff. Circumcision is to be an eternal usage, Gen. xvii. 13; Canaan an eternal possession of Israel, Gen. xiii. 15, xlviii. 4. The Mosaic laws in reference to the Passover, and many commands of a transient nature, are called an ordinance for eternity (לְעוֹלָם), *e.g.* Ex. xii. 14, xxvii. 21, xxviii. 43; Lev. x. 15, xvi. 34; Num. xviii. 11. The temple at Jerusalem is to be God's dwelling for ever, 2 Chron. vi. 2. Just so the kingdom of David is to be for ever, 2 Sam. vii. 13. A slave, who spontaneously binds himself by a symbolical act to his lord, is said, according to Ex. xxi. 6, to serve him for ever. That αἰών corresponds to עוֹלָם is shown by the Septuagint and the N.T.

[2] Matt. v. 26. Punitive sufferings may be requisite to deliverance.

[3] Rom. v. 18, xi. 26, 32; Eph. i. 10; Col. i. 16, 20.

[4] 1 Cor. xv. 25–28.

[5] Col. i. 20; Eph. i. 10. Cf. John x. 16.

[6] Matt. xii. 31 ff.

[7] Matt. v. 26.

1700), Michael Hahn, Oetinger, also according to some hints Bengel, but especially Schleiermacher; whereas others,[1] instead of a universal conversion, although by a process of long-continuing punishments, suppose the annihilation of the wicked, either through punishment, or by assuming that only the regenerate are immortal. Certainly in the above passages Paul presupposes that no hostile power, therefore neither death nor sin, will maintain itself against Christ. But all that is certainly affirmed is the impotence of evil, and even the saying that God will be all in all, which must not be understood pantheistically, does not necessarily assert universal salvation and glorification, but may mean that God will be the sole governing power in all according to their character, either as the Just One in opposition to the wicked who shall have lost their freedom, or as the Gracious One. In any case, they can all merely serve the kingdom of God, not assert a power against it. On the other hand, it must be conceded, there is no dogmatic interest demanding that these are of a certainty eternally damned and lost; for this would imply, not merely that the possibility of eternal sin is included in God's ethical idea of the world, but, what is altogether objectionable, that a *real* eternal Dualism pertains to the Christian goal of the world. But the friends of Apokatastasis are not satisfied with this, but maintain the *dogmatic* necessity of their view.

4. Criticism of the Dogmatic Reasons for a Restoration of all Things.—*In the first place, the sameness of man's sin and need of redemption* may be alleged in favour of this doctrine. "If all men by nature are involved in essentially the same sinfulness, from which only redemption can deliver, if it were not overcome in all, the cause would lie in the fact, that Christian grace did not operate with equal effect in all. But since it is meant to apply equally to all, so opposite an effect could not have its reason in God; and consequently, if all are not redeemed, sin could not be by nature an equal power in all, but to God would be conquerable in some, unconquerable in others, which is against the hypothesis." But this reason loses its force, if the final destiny is made, as by us, dependent not on natural sinfulness, but on the use of

[1] See pp. 379, 415.

the freedom for decision for or against Christ restored in all. With the universal outward and inward call is given the universal possibility of faith; but the establishing of the impossibility of unbelief by God's power would directly contradict the ethical character of the world-goal.

"The divine *justice*," it may be further said, "is not satisfied by a number of human beings suffering eternal punishment involuntarily. Its full triumph is only secured, when the guilty consciousness of the sinner himself is compelled to acknowledge the justice of the punishment, which itself paves the way for a turning to the truth and to amendment." Nevertheless justice is not made more just by the fact of its acknowledgment, and non-acknowledgment ought not to delay its manifestation, but makes it all the more necessary. We have no right to say that punishment is only just when it is a means of amendment. Justice, *taken alone*, does not need the salvation or amendment of all.[1]

Universal salvation might rather be derived from the divine *love*. But divine love maintains its sacred, inviolable character through the fact of its being guarded by justice against abuse. Love must not throw itself away. The despisers of the love of Christ, who desecrate His sacrifice, cannot with such conduct be objects of the divine love. This love cannot force itself on any one, and undervalue its own work. Could the despisers of Christ's love be well-pleasing to God, love would declare its own work superfluous. For those who have committed the sin against the Holy Ghost (and only such, as must be conceded, can be objects of eternal damnation), there can be no love in God, because and in so far as they have identified themselves indissolubly with evil.

But are not the *redeeming power* and the victory of Christ incomplete, if enemies exist for ever who are only outwardly, not also inwardly, vanquished, *i.e.* who are merely impotent, but still evil in disposition? "Christ's redemptive purpose indisputably embraces all, therefore His wish would be unfulfilled, unless all became partakers of salvation." Christ's intercession cannot imply that redemption is imparted to those who are unwilling to accept it by personal free decision. The gospel can only vanquish by spiritual means. If

[1] Vol. iii. § 88, p. 125.

the free will decides to reject the gospel, Christ cannot hinder it, or desire to supersede the spiritual process by mere power.[1]

But if, starting from the idea of the *Church*, we say: "None can be wanting to it in the consummation, who belong to its idea; but according to the N. T. everything is created for Christ, therefore all belong to the divine idea of the Church, and thus a universal apokatastasis is required from its standpoint; or, supposing that any one had never belonged to the idea of the Church, he would be thought by God as not belonging to our class of beings, but to another, and this would be Manichæan," the answer thereto is contained in what precedes. It has been shown there that the idea of the Church and kingdom of God will not remain unrealized; God's unexhausted, undiminished creative power and wisdom will know how to provide for this end in the progress of generations, either by means of new individuals, or by the talent of the unfaithful for the work being given to the faithful. Power, therefore, is not conferred on sin to frustrate the thought of the consummation of the kingdom. That unbelievers are not naturally of a different nature from believers, that they did not belong originally to another class of beings having no reference to Christ, is evident from the fact that definitive unbelief is only possible in their case through an abuse of freedom of which they need not have been guilty. The gospel had a positive relation to them also, but by their abuse of freedom they reduced their relation to it to a negative one. Believers also are not saved by a particular predestination, but they did not abuse the freedom which the others also had; not that this is a merit to them, but it furnished to grace the possibility of influence and self-communication.[2]

[1] It is more difficult to refute the objection, how it consists with the love of the God who eternally foresees also free actions to create these, of whom He knows beforehand that they are created for eternal damnation. But whether the divine foreknowledge should be so viewed that it could become a motive for non-creation, is more than questionable. The foreknowledge of definitive unbelief presupposes the creation of those who become unbelieving. Cf. vol. ii. p. 61, and M'Cabe, *The Foreknowledge of God*, 1878. But the question remains: Is conservation for eternal torment conceivable?

[2] § 151, p. 410.

Observation.—But of course it must be conceded that the human race is a genus of beings, the members of which are able through their freedom to separate into antitheses of absolute significance, deeper than any antithesis possible among the different genera of beings in nature. But such depth of separation is only possible on the basis of freedom and original equality. Freedom is the power to sunder spirits into the *absolute* antithesis of children of light and children of darkness, and to convert the latter into a class of beings absolutely opposed indeed to the other. But God did not create men on a dualistic basis.

But do not the *certitude* and *power of Baptism* suffer, unless all are saved? In Baptism, indeed, God assigns to man election and His faithful covenant, which does not apply merely to the moment. If, then, a baptized one is lost, the certainty of the election testified by Baptism is gone.—But, certain as it is that election to the offer of grace by outward and inward calling is universal and absolute, still the election to life embraces only believers and the regenerate, and withal has regard to the use of freedom.

Most of all it may seem established, that the *happiness of believers* must necessarily be *disturbed* by the misery of the one class, especially since the former have the consciousness of not being better or more worthy, but on the contrary of even having contributed to the sin of others by joint responsibility. Thus a sting seems necessarily left in the happiness of the good, unless all are saved. In reply to this, it might indeed be said: If the damnation of some is God's holy and righteous will, a resignation is fitting, in which no other wish is felt than one in harmony with God's will, whose love is not surpassed forsooth by our loving sympathy. But this answer is insufficient, because mere resignation would not comport with the perfecting of personality. On the other hand, in respect to the sting lying in the consciousness of joint-authorship of sin, it must be considered that *the* sin which leads to damnation can never be the sin resulting from innate sinfulness alone, or to speak generally from the influence of the race, the common spirit, example or temptation by error. Rather the sin rendering the individual absolutely bad can only be the personal guilt of rejecting Christ, in which, of course, rejection of good itself is included, and therefore acquiescence in all other possible sin. And when further it is remembered, that only blasphemy against the Holy Ghost can be the final ground of damnation, and therefore the sin that tramples under foot the blood of the new covenant and counts it unholy, sympathy with such

sinners must be essentially different from natural sympathy with members of the race; for they of course belong to an absolutely different class of beings, for whom intercession can no longer be made, because it is ethically as well as logically impossible to desire forgiveness for those who despise it. Certainly provision must be made somehow against a Dualism being perpetuated for ever by powers hostile to God, instead of the consummation of our sphere of creation.

5. Clear as is the deliverance given by the N. T. on the *principle* that unbelief damns, as little clear is the answer it gives in reference to the question as to the *persons* who are judged and treated in accordance with that principle. That there are damned beings, *preponderant* exegetical reasons prove (but we have therewith no dogmatic proposition, because the latter must also be derived from the principle of faith); nor have we been able to find the dogmatic reasons for Apokatastasis decisive. Hence the latter also cannot be dogmatically taught. The objective reason, why no categorical affirmation can be made on dogmatic grounds, lies in human *freedom*. It does not admit the assertion of a universal process leading *necessarily* to salvation, because such process is and remains conditioned by non-rejection and free acceptance.

But such human freedom, so long as it lasts, of course excludes also a categorical dogmatic affirmation, that there certainly are damned beings; for so long as freedom of any kind exists, so long the possibility of conversion is not absolutely excluded, be it even through judgment and damnation to deeper and longer misery. But wherever this possibility issued in reality, there self-evidently the damnation could no longer continue. The necessary, eternal duration of the rejection and damnation of the one class could only be maintained with full precision, provided also the complete loss of freedom for conversion—absolute hardening — was taught, as is usually done by the advocates of eternal damnation, whereupon the new question arises, whether such are still men, and not rather persons that have been men, but have really degenerated into a lower class of beings.

6. But a third theory seems now to meet with growing

assent in opposition both to the Church-doctrine and especially to the doctrine of Apokatastasis, the hypothesis of the annihilation of the wicked, which likewise thinks itself able to make categorical assertions respecting the question of persons. We therefore dwell awhile upon it.

If regard for freedom does not permit the affirmation of the doctrine, that a harmonious conclusion of history and universal restoration are secured by means of conversion being certainly universal without exception, — for if the ethical process turned into a physical one, the result attained would only be of ethical value in appearance,—this harmonious conclusion might seem to be better secured by the supposition, that, because the power of immortal life resides only in Christ and living communion with Him, those who obstinately and definitively withdraw from such communion perish and are annihilated. This theory may even pay regard to human freedom and the divine justice by leaving room for a punishment of the wicked, and making the very annihilation itself to be effected by the consuming divine penalties, which begin from the final judgment.[1] In favour of the supposition of the final annihilation of the wicked, it is alleged[2] that numerous expressions are used in reference to those falling under sentence of condemnation which suggest annihilation.[3] The word "death" indeed has, it is said, various meanings, but it always denotes the dissolution of a living power. "Thus physical death so called," it is said, "is a dissolution of the living unity, which embraces the body and the soul. Further, the sinful state of the soul is called a spiritual death, because through it the bond between the soul and God is dissolved. When, then, a 'second death' is spoken of, this may signify merely the dissolving of the soul itself into

[1] The latter is taught by the Socinians and Rothe, whereas according to Weisse (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1835 : *Ueber die philos. Bedeutung der chr. Eschatologie, Philos. Dogmatik*, § 965) annihilation enters as matter of course for all, who are not rendered immortal by regeneration. White, on the other hand, makes indeed a retributive punishment and pain fall on the godless before their annihilation, while seeming to regard this as the act of God Himself, p. 499 ff.

[2] *E.g.* by White, p. 359 ff.

[3] *E.g.* ἀπώλεια, ὄλεθρος, Matt. vii. 13 ; Rom. ix. 22 ; 1 Thess. v. 3 ; 2 Thess. i. 9 ; 1 Tim. vi. 9 : ἀπολλύναι, ἀπόλλυσθαι, Matt. x. 28 ; Luke xvii. 33 ; John iii. 16, xii. 25 ; 1 Cor. i. 18.

nothing.[1] This view may well be reconciled with the Scripture passages, which teach an eternal duration of hell-punishments, if *αἰώνιος* can denote an immeasurable, indefinitely long duration of punishment."—"Although," it is continued, "the notion may less commend itself, that God Himself directly destroys the souls of the ungodly, we may still remember that an ontological significance belongs also to the ethical, whence it would follow, that just as the appropriation of the Holy Spirit and the divine life has a significance in relation to the enhancement and invigoration of the entire human life, so, conversely, estrangement from God separates from the source of life, and the growing dominion of sin is by no means a matter of indifference to the stability of the spiritual faculties. Sin, moreover, has ontological significance, namely of a negative kind. This also seems to be held by all the Church teachers, who, in order to maintain the eternity of hell-punishments, and to cut off the continuance of a possibility of conversion, assert the complete loss of freedom in the case of the lost to be a natural consequence and punishment of sin, which again would involve, in virtue of the connection between volition and knowledge, a complete darkening of the spirit, an extinction of all remnant of higher light and knowledge of God. But again, however it may be open to dispute whether a being so disorganized, in whom that which makes man man—reason and freedom—is extinguished, ought to be called a man, so much seems clear, that the Church teachers mentioned acquiesce as to the chief matter in the annihilation of the ungodly. The latter are then to be viewed essentially in the light of people who have become insane, perhaps raging in impotent fury for ever, which would be a sort of annihilation of their human character."

It cannot in fact be denied that both views—that of those Church teachers, who make freedom and reason, and especially consciousness of God, to be extinguished for ever in the damned, and that of the advocates of the annihilation of the ungodly—approach very near to each other, save that the latter have in their favour, that they at least do away with the crying dissonance that would be left for the unity of the world, if alongside the world of the perfected and saved,

[1] Cf. Nitzsch, p. 413 ff.

that other world of insanity and blind enmity to God continued eternally. But it does not follow from this, that we can set up the annihilation of the wicked as a dogmatic proposition, but only that, if we hold fast to the immortality of the wicked, the entire extinction of freedom and reason as the effect of sin must not be supposed. The doctrine of the annihilation of the ungodly on its part is likewise mere hypothesis, for to assert at present dogmatically that there are certainly those doomed to annihilation would be incompatible with freedom. But exegetically this hypothesis has against it, that Holy Scripture treats as possible a deliverance from imprisonment, although through heavy punishment.[1] Again, it tells against it, that, whereas Holy Scripture teaches differences of degree in guilt and punishment even after the judgment, and therefore not an infinite guilt in all whom the judgment condemns, this hypothesis, on the contrary, assumes one and the same highest degree of punishment for all sinners, namely annihilation (so far, namely, as the fact is left out of sight, that annihilation is also an end of all punishment).[2] Although, further, this hypothesis seems exceedingly favourable to the unity and harmonious consummation of the world, it still includes the disturbing element, that such glorious capacities of a godlike kind, having an essential relation to infinite excellence, and thus themselves having a share, although small, in the infinite, are supposed to perish, and be annihilated after the fashion of mere finite natural faculties.[3] Accordingly, this hypothesis also cannot lay claim to unreserved acknowledgment and dogmatic authority, and we must be content with saying, that the ultimate fate of individuals remains veiled in mystery, as well as whether all will attain the blessed goal or not. Enough that we have the certainty of eternal life and of the perfecting of God's kingdom, however this may be brought

[1] Matt. v. 26. (Cf. xii. 31 f., since punishment is not forgiveness.)

[2] With annihilation, indeed, all punishment is at an end. But if the ungodly are not annihilated by God, but consumed by the punishments, such a view does not exhibit a just distribution of the degrees of punishment; for the sin of the worst transgressors must do its consuming work most rapidly, and thus the punishment for them would be most quickly ended, whereas it would continue so much the longer, the less the power of evil in the sinner.

[3] Evil is never the substance of the soul; this remains metaphysically good.

about. But although knowledge on many matters in themselves worthy to be known is denied to us as regards Eschatology generally, and especially as regards the present point,—knowledge which is impossible to us because of human freedom,—it yet remains for us to lay down the following dogmatic propositions:—

(1.) There is a judgment, which maintains the divine justice, and also, by excluding everything hostile, subserves the consummation of the kingdom of God.

(2.) There is no predestination to damnation; only continued impenitence can be the cause of that; hence no one who has or can have the will to be converted is damned for ever.

(3.) The process of grace can never fall into the physical sphere. Therefore, rejection of grace remains possible, and every hope of Apokatastasis that passes into the physical sphere is to be rejected, as well as the hope of universal salvation apart from Christ.

(4.) There may be those eternally damned, so far as the abuse of freedom continues eternally; but without the possibility of the restoration of freedom, man has passed into another class of beings, and—regarded from the standpoint of the idea of man—is a mere ruin.

(5.) Blessedness can only exist where holiness exists. As there is no condemned penitence,[1] so there is no unholy blessedness.

§ 155.—*The Consummation of the World and Eternal Blessedness.*

There is an eternal blessedness through the transfiguring consummation of Nature, of Individuals, and of the Kingdom of God.

1. The N. T. foretells, like the Old,[2] a Consummation (*συντέλεια*,[3] *ἀποκατάστασις*[4]), when Christ shall have accom-

[1] Nitzsch: the thought of an eternal damnation and punishment is necessary, inasmuch as there can be no enforced holiness of a personal being, and no saved unholiness in eternity, *System*, ed. 6, § 219, p. 411.

[2] Isa. lxvi. [3] Matt. xiii. 39, 40, 49, xxiv. 3, xxviii. 20.

[4] Acts iii. 21; 1 Cor. xv. 24–28; Rev. xxi. 1.

plished His mediatorial work and led all God's children to the Father, that God may be all in all, *i.e.* that His glory may be revealed, and the authority of His will universal, — not merely the will of His love, but also of His power and justice. As to details, the Consummation of *Nature*, of *Individuals*, and of *the Kingdom of God* is to be considered.

2. The Consummation of the natural world presupposes an end[1] of the present world-period and order, which, however, must not be conceived as an annihilation of the world, although it is described as a conflagration of the world.[2] Matter is not evil. Thus the destruction can only refer to the form of the world.[3] The conflagration may precede as a means for transfiguring the world into heightened beauty, into a new heaven and new earth.[4] The material of the world may be ennobled thereby. This transfiguring of nature includes not merely the erasing of all traces of sin in the form and material of the world, but also so intimate a union of nature with spirit, that no place will any longer exist for decay.[5] Without loss of substantiality, matter will have exchanged its darkness, hardness, heaviness, immobility, and impenetrableness for clearness, radiance, elasticity, and transparency.[6] Although with the consummation of the earthly creation its task will be discharged, from this consummated circle of creation as a basis, an altogether new stadium may again begin, an advance to new creations with the co-operation of perfected humanity, in which God will have His being, and through which He will continue His work.

3. As concerns the Consummation of *Individuals*, the promise is that the righteous shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of the Father.[7] As our earthly body bore the image of the earthly Adam, so our pneumatic spiritual body shall

[1] 1 John ii. 17.
[2] 2 Pet. iii. 7–10.
[3] 1 Cor. vii. 31. See p. 382.
[4] Rev. xxi. 1; Ps. cii. 26; Isa. lxvi.
[5] According to Rothe's *Theol. Ethik*, liability to decay is only possible through the dissolution of the ideal and real through the expiring of the former.
[6] Rothe, *Ethik*, ed. 2, ii. 481 ff. Schöberlein, *Jahrb. f. d. Theol.* 1861, vi. 1; *Ueber das Wesen der geistigen Natur und Leiblichkeit.* Hamberger, *Die himmlische Leiblichkeit, ibid.* 1862, 1. Lange, *ut supra.*
[7] Matt. xiii. 43.

bear Christ's image.[1] We shall stand in a state of unfettered vitality. The somatic-psychical organism will be the absolutely adequate means for the action of the spirit, all mortality and passivity of the body will have vanished. Space and time, although life will still run in these forms, will no longer form restrictive limits. The perfected, through the eternal life in them, have, like God, a fount of life in themselves.[2] "Union with all world-spheres, and especially the persons in them, stands open to the perfected, and therefore fellowship with them. From their inner nature a light will stream forth, forming an atmosphere around them, and binding together the perfected." When we are entirely sanctified in body, soul, and spirit, the earthly distinction of sex also will exist no longer,[3] nor the earthly distinction of ages, each of which has its imperfection; rather the power of eternal life includes both eternal youth and the vigour of maturity. The new spiritual body also is raised into the fulness of spiritual energy. It will share in superiority to space, and be able to emulate the fleetness of thought. Since it will no longer form an independent centre of life outside the spirit and its sphere of energy, but the spirit will have become the sole, all-ruling centre of personality, with the passivity and mortality of the body all liability of the spirit to be tempted by it has disappeared. As relates to the spiritual side, it will be remote from the possibility of sin, not through loss of freedom, but through the indestructible energy of love springing from union with God, from the presence of God and Christ, and from habitual delight in and through them. Consequently the consummated spirit will, in conformity with God and Christ, possess true freedom in the fact that it can no longer become unfree. On the side of knowledge and volition, the soul will enjoy blessed contentment. Then will Christ keep the supper anew with us, and the highest solemnities of the present are but a weak foretaste of the powers of the world to come.[4] Then fragmentariness in *knowledge* will cease, for we shall see face to face.[5] To those who love Him, God will give what no eye has seen or

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 49. Cf. 1 John iii. 2; Phil. iii. 21; 2 Cor. iii. 18.
[2] John iv. 14. [3] 1 Thess. v. 23; Luke xx. 34–36. [4] Heb. vi. 4, 5.
[5] 1 Cor. xiii. 10–12; 1 John iii. 2; John xvii. 24; Rev. xxii. 4.

ear heard or heart conceived.[1] The pure in heart shall see God,[2] *i.e.* not merely possess Him by faith, or possess knowledge through inferences from His works, but they shall know Him as He is. They will have the power to love Him perfectly, for, as Baxter says, we shall only then rightly know His loveliness and beauty when "the heavenly faculty of perception is winged, sharpened, the highest clearness of vision." Since the heavenly body has then become a perfect organ of knowledge, God will be beheld by the beatified in His cosmical being, and the world will be beheld as filled with God, and they will be grasped in their immediate presence. The individual will be known in the light of great intuitions of the whole, and in accordance with the mutual connection between it and the whole. So far as the universe is in eternal progression, and new circles of creation are ever arising, knowledge is never concluded and yet never a fragment; but it can survey the whole existing at the time, and the new treasures of divine wisdom and love ever pouring forth therein. But this whole itself is like a circle extending itself farther and farther, yet always a whole, a harmonious organism. The beatified also stand to each other in the relation of mutual understanding. Not merely will there be a reunion and mutual recognition,[3] but we shall behold (in which even a Socrates rejoiced) all the great spirits in the history of humanity, a Paul, John, the Prophets, and have the noblest enjoyment in infinitely diversified fellowship and love. But the centre of the blessed enjoyment will be God Himself and Christ. The highest activity of the *will* will lie in perfected worship,[4] consisting in adoration, thanks, and praise, and also in joyous obedience which makes itself in godlike love an organ for God's continuous activity. This suggests the relation of blessedness to *rest* and *enjoyment* on one hand, and to *action* on the other. The poetic figures, which depict the enjoyment of the heavenly harmony, are especially borrowed from the sphere of art. Art—the beautiful—receives here at last its special place, for the nature of art is to delight in visible presentation (*Darstellung*), to achieve the classical and perfect with unfettered play

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 9.
[2] Matt. v. 8.
[3] Matt. viii. 11, xvii. 3; Luke xiii. 28.
[4] Rev. vii. 12, xxii. 3.

of its powers.[1] Every one, morally perfect, will thus wed the good to the beautiful. It follows herefrom, that in the rest pictured as the goal, as an eternal Sabbath,[2] there will be no inactivity, and also no unrest in the activity. Labour and effort have fallen away, because the organ serves the spirit with absolute willingness while godlike work continues.[3] There remains nothing to do indeed in reference to personal sin, but for this reason presentative activity still remains, nay, even production and the contemplating of what is produced, both with undisturbed sense of blessedness. The talents of individuals will not be lost, nay, will be raised to higher potency, and spring from out the fount of eternal life without hindrance.[4] The aspect of activity in blessedness is emphasized in the figure of the faithful being set over many things, the commission to rule cities and the sitting and judging, *i.e.* ruling the tribes of Israel.[5] Further, the creations of God will still advance, and since, according to the analogy of the relation of angels to the growth of God's kingdom upon earth, the law prevails that the perfected at the time forms the fixed starting-point for further productions, the blessed will never want an arena of satisfying activity. Since nature has acquired perfect plasticity for the spirit, it will be no longer a mere place or abode of the spirit, but its property, nay, enabled to become the pure mirror of the spirit, and the willing adequate organ for its formations and visible presentations. If inquiry is made as to the contents of this working and presenting, they are the exhaustless contents of eternal life streaming into every individual life, the Triune God Himself. The Deity, infinitely rich and glorious, is apprehended and reflected back by each individuality in peculiar fashion,—a thought expressed in the gleaming jewels of many colours in the building of the city of God.[6] Every individuality, therefore, exhibits the divine in a way no other can do, but is also receptive to each of the rest, and their presentations. Thus, each one in loving contemplation moulds the others and their presentations in the past and present after or into itself, and the saying becomes truth, "All is yours."

[1] Rev. v. 8–14, xxi. [2] Heb. iv. 11; Rev. vii. 16, 17, xxi. 4.
[3] Schleiermacher, *Christ. Glaube*, ii. 500. [4] Luke xix. 13.
[5] Luke xix. 13–17; Matt. xxv. 15 ff., xix. 28. [6] Rev. xxi. 11–23.

A difference of degree finds place in reference to blessedness and glory, but without envy and disorder; for every one has "the measure, which he is able to receive," and every one in his own way shares in that which is another's, through the absolute communion in love binding together the perfected. This enhances the sense of life and the force of individuality. But all—the entire, duly organized circle of countless blessed spirits—grow, without growth implying any defect in blessedness; for their ground of life is the unsullied, faultless blessedness, nay, the eternal life, which is God Himself—Triune as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

4. But the city of God in the glorified universe, the temple therein which is the medium of God's presence to all, is the CHURCH OF GOD. If the universe has become the holy place, it does not lack its Holiest of all. The Church is certainly a narrower idea than that of the kingdom of God; its consummation alone would not be the consummation of the latter. But the Church is not merely humanity united with God, it embraces also the higher spirit-world having the same Head with it—Christ. Again, the Church is the animating, hallowing, glorifying centre of all moral communities, which embrace also nature in its fashion, and which only found imperfect typical manifestations of their reality or idea upon earth. The valuable, true elements of all communities are not merely preserved, but visibly exhibited in harmonious interpenetation without losing their distinctions. Thus is the πολυποίκιλος θεοῦ σοφία,[1] the wealth of God's creative power, revealed through the Church of God and to it, for the Church is the innermost power of consummation to all spheres through the eternal life having its seat in it. The deepest ground thereof lies in the Incarnation or Godmanhood of Christ which took place primarily for it; for in the Incarnation not merely are God and man united, but the beginning of the consummation of nature is typically given in His resurrection. The power of His resurrection continues in the consummated new Creation of His Church, and effects also the transfiguring of the world.[2] As in this Consummation all false interblending of evil and good, of mortal and eternal, must become separated, so also must the mutual

[1] Eph. iii. 10. [2] Phil. iii. 10.

externality of spirit and nature, which is the cause of mortality and liability to temptation, of fickleness and instability, yield to the powers proceeding from the Risen One, in whom spirit and nature are absolutely blended. Thus Paul represents the matter.[1] As a unity the Church is called the Bride of Christ,[2] but it is a unity in variety and multiplicity; it is the city of God, the new Jerusalem.[3] God Himself is its light and sun and everlasting day; but the divine light is also reflected back in varied forms from the well-ordered, firm, and glorious structure of the city. The multitude of the beatified, adoring, perfected righteous, is also united by the Holy Spirit with the Bridegroom,[4] as well as united with each other by love and mutual helpfulness. After the conflicts and tribulations, especially of the last age before Christ's Second Advent, will come the marriage-feast of the Lamb; the Bridegroom will bring home the Bride at the new Supper,[5] at that blessed and indissoluble union of the members with their Head, by which the dearest and holiest relations of earthly communions all attain their reality.

[1] Rom. viii. 11–19; Col. i. 18 ff.; Eph. i. 10.

[2] Rev. xxii. 17. Cf. Matt. ix. 15, xxv. 1; Luke v. 34; Mark ii. 19; Eph. v. 24–32.

[3] Heb. xii. 22; Rev. iii. 12, xxi. 2, 10.

[4] Rev. xxii. 17; Eph. iv. 13, 16.

[5] Rev. xix. 7, 9; Matt. xxii. 2 ff.

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END OF VOLUME IV.

MORRISON AND GIBB, EDINBURGH,
PRINTERS TO HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

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Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 18 July, 2018